Back to the home page of Emachiavelli.com
Contents
Http://www.psychology.ws Psyc
 |
Sexuality and Its Disorders explores sexuality from an evolutionary perspective using powerful, real-life case studies to help readers provide effective guidance around issues relating to sexuality. Drawing on his 30 years of clinical experience and research, author Mike Abrams provides a comprehensive, evidence-based, and clinically-oriented text with cutting-edge coverage throughout. Discussions include the physical and psychological development of sexual identity; the social aspects of sexual behavior; the many expressions of sexuality; cognitive behavior treatment of sexual problems; and more. The many perspectives of sexuality are examined with interviews and commentaries from major figures in the field—including David M. Buss, Helen Fisher, C. Sue Carter of Kinsey, Todd K. Shackelford, Ken Zucker, and Gordon Gallup—who discuss such topics as the origins of sexuality, the nature of love, the role of attachment, and the treatment of sexual problems.
SAGE Publishing Site for Ordering »Visit site sexualitytext.com
|
The Prince
Summary of La Mandragola
Machiavelli
and his political philosophy
Machiavelli Basic
Biography
Machiavelli and Plato
Machiavelli and power
Another Point
of View on Machiavelli's Life
Machiavelli's view on Power:
for good or bad?
Some
Quotations from Machiavelli
Machiavelli's
Writings
Italy in
Machiavell's Time
Machiavelli and Love
Machiavelli On the
Art of War
Discourses on Titus Livy
Book One
Discourses on Titus
Livy: Book Two
Discourse
on Titus Livy Book Three
Description of the Methods Adopted by The Duke Valentino (Cesare Borgia) When
Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli..
The Life of
Castruccio Castrani of Lucca
Machiavellian Rhetoric in The Prince and
the Mandragola
Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)
This section will be updated regularly
adding biographies and historical settings.
Niccolo Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469 of an old citizen family.
Little is known about his life until 1498, when he was appointed secretary and
Second Chancellor to the Florentine Republic. During his time of office, his
journeys included missions to Louis XII and to the Emperor Maximilian; he was
with Cesare Borgia in the Romagna; after watching the Papal election of 1503, he
accompanied Julius II on his first campaign of conquest. In 1507, as a
chancellor of the newly appointed Nove di Milizia, he organized an infantry
force which fought at the capture of Pisa in 1509. Three years later it was
defeated by the Holy League at Prato, the Medici returned to power in Florence,
and Machiavelli was excluded from public life. After suffering imprisonment and
torture, he retired to his farm near San Casiano, where he lived with his wife,
and six children and gave his time to study and writing. His works included The
Prince , (or The Prince) the Discourses on the First Decade of Livy; The Art of
War, and the comedy, Mandragola, a satire on seduction. In 1520, Cardinal Giulio
de'Medici secured him a commission to write a history of Florence, which he
finished in 1525. After a brief return to public life, he died in 1527.
Great Events in Niccolo Machiavelli's life:
1469 May 3, born in Florence the son of a jurist.
1494 The Medici expelled from Florence. Machiavelli Appointed clerk to Adriani
in the second chancery.
1498 Machiavelli succeeds Adriani as second chancellor and secretary.
1500 Sent to France where he meets with Louis XII and the Cardinal of Rouen.
1502 Marries Marietta Corsini. Sent to Romagna as envoy to Cesare Borgia where
he witnessed the events leading up to Borgia's murder. Machiavelli's political
philosophy was highly influenced by his study of Cesare Borgia.
1503 January, returns to Florence.
1504 Second mission to France.
1506 December, submits a plan to reorganize the military to Pierre Soderini,
Florence's gonfalonier, and it is accepted.
1508 Sent to Bolzano to the court of the Emperor Maximilian.
1510 Third and last mission to France
1512 The Medici returns with a Spanish army. Florence deposes Soderini and
welcomes the Medici. Machiavelli dismissed from office and retires to San
Casciano.
1513 Imprisoned after being accused of participation in a conspiracy and
failed coupe. Is tortured and then released upon Giovanni de Medici's election
to the papacy. Returns to San Casciano and writes The Prince.
1515 Writes La Mandragola.
1519 Consulted by the Medici on a new constitution for Florence which he
offers in his Discourses.
1520 Appearance of The Art of War and The Life of Castruccio Castracane.
Commissioned to write the History of Florence.
1526 Clement VII employs Machiavelli to inspect the fortifications at Florence
and then sends him to attend the historian Francesco Guicciardini.
1527 June 20, died, location unknown.
Quotations from the Political Philosophy of Nicolo
Wise men say, and not without reason, that whoever wished to foresee the
future might consult the past.
Of mankind we may say in general they are fickle, hypocritical, and greedy of
gain.
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a
new order of things.
Ambition is so powerful a passion in the human breast, that however high we
reach we are never satisfied.
A prudent man should always follow in the footsteps of great men and imitate
those who have been outstanding. If his own prowess fails to compare with
theirs, at least it has an air of greatness about it.
One change leaves the way open for the introduction of others.
Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.
Historian and statesman, b. at Florence, 3 May, 1469; d. there, 22 June,
1527. His family is said to have been descended from the old marquesses of
Tuscany, and to have given Florence thirteen gonfaloniers of justice. His
father, Bernardo, was a lawyer, and acted as treasurer of the Marches, but was
far from wealthy. Of Nicolò's studies we only know that he was a pupil of
Marcello Virgilio. In 1498 he was elected secretary of the Lower Chancery of the
Signory, and in later years he held the same post under the Ten. Thus it chanced
that for fourteen years he had charge of the home and foreign correspondence of
the republic, the registration of trials, the keeping of the minutes of the
councils, and the drafting of agreements with other states. Moreover he was sent
in various capacities to one or other locality within the State of Tuscany, and
on twenty-three occasions he acted as legate on important embassies to foreign
princes, e. g. to Catherine Sforza (1499), to France (1500, 1510, 1511), to the
emperor (1507, 1509), to Rome (1503, 1506), to Cæsar Borgia (1502), to Gian
Paolo Baglione at Perugia, to the Petrucci at Siena, and to Piombino. On these
embassies he gave evidence of wonderful keenness of observation and insight into
the hidden thoughts of the men he was dealing with, rather than of any great
diplomatic skill. After the defeat of France in Italy (1512) the Medici once
more obtained control of Florence; the secretary was dismissed and exiled for
one year from the city. On the discovery of the Capponi and Boscoli plot against
Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, Machiavelli was accused as an accomplice, and
tortured, but he was set free when the cardinal became Pope Leo X. Thereupon he
retired to some property he had at Strada near San Casciano, where he gave
himself up to the study of the classics, especially Livy, and to the writing of
his political and literary histories. Both Leo X and Clement VII sought his
advice in political matters, and he was often employed on particular missions
affecting matters of state, as, for in stance, when he was sent to Francesco
Guiccardini, the papal leader in the Romagna and general of the army of the
League, concerning the fortification of Florence. He made vain efforts to secure
a public post under the Medici, being ready even to sacrifice his political
opinions for the purpose. He returned home after the sack of Rome (12 May, 1527)
when the power of the Medici had been once more overthrown, but his old
political party turned against him as one who fawned on tyrants. He died soon
afterwards.
Machiavelli's writings consist of the following works:
Historical: "Storie Fiorentine", which goes from the fall of
the Empire to 1492, dedicated to Clement VII, at whose request it had been
written. "Descrizione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare
Vitellozzo Vitelli, etc."; "Vita di Castruccio Cas- tracane";
"Discorsi sopra laprima deca di Tito Livio"; "Descrizione della
peste di Firenze dell' anno 1527"; to this group belong also his letters
from his embassies as well as his minor writings concerning the affairs of Pisa,
Lucca, France, Germany.
Political:
"Il Principe", "Discorso sopra il Riformare
lo Stato di Firenze"; "Dell'arte della guerra", and other
military works.
Literary:
"Dialogo sulle lingue"; fIve comedies: "Mandragola";
"Clizia"; a comedy in prose; "The Andria" of Terence, a
translation; a comedy in verse; "I Decennati" (a metrical history of
the years 1495-1504); "Dell' Asino d'oro", writings on moral subjects;
"La serenata"; "Canti Carnas cialesehi"; a novel, "Belfagor",
etc.
Machiavelli's character as a man and a writer has been widely discussed, and
on both heads his merits and demerits have been exaggerated, but in such a way
that his demerits have preponderated to the detriment of his memory.
Machiavellism has become synonymous with treachery, intrigue, subterfuge, and
tyranny. It has been even said that "Old Nick", the popular name of
the Devil among Anglo-Saxon races, derives its origin from that of Nicolò
Machiavelli. This dubious fame he has won by his book the "Principe",
and the theories therein exploited were further elaborated in his "Discorsi
sopra Livio". To understand the "Principe" right it must be borne
in mind that the work is not a treatise on foreign politics. It aims solely at
examining how a kingdom may be best built up and established; nor is it a mere
abstract discussion, but it is carried on in the light of an ideal long held by
Machiavelli, that a United Italy was possible and in the last chapter of the
work he exhorts the Medici of Florence (Giuliano and Lorenzo) to its
realization. His aim was to point out the best way for bringing it about; he did
not deal with abstract principles and arguments, but collected examples from
classical antiquity and from recent events, especially from the career of Cæsar
Borgia. So that the "Principe" is a political tract with a definite
aim and intended for a particular locality. To gain the end in view results are
to be the only criteria of the methods employed, and even the teachings of the
moral law must give way to secure the end in view. Good faith, clemency, and
moderation are not cast overboard, but he teaches that the interests of the
state are above all individual virtues. These virtues may be useful, and when
they are a prince ought to exercise them, but more often in dealing with an
opponent they are a hindrance, not in themselves, but by reason of the
crookedness of others.
Whosoever would prevail against the treachery, crime, and cruelty of others,
must himself be beforehand in misleading and deceiving his opponent and even in
getting rid of him, as Cæsar Borgia had done. While on the other hand Gian
Paolo Baglione made a mistake, by omitting to imprison or put to death Julius
II, in 1506, on the occasion of his unprotected entry to Perugia (Discorsi sopra
Livio, I, xxvii). Again, a prince must keep clear of crime not only when it is
hurtful to his interests but when it is useless. He should try to win the love
of his subjects, by simulating virtue if he does not possess it; he ought to
encourage trade so that his people, busied in getting rich, may have no time for
politics; he ought to show concern for religion, because it is a potent means
for keeping his people submissive and obedient. Such is the general teaching of
the "Principe", which has been often refuted. As a theory
Machiavellism may per haps be called an innovation; but as a practice it is as
old as political society. It was a most immoral work, in that it cuts politics
adrift from all morality, and it was rightly put on the Index in 1559. It is
worth noting that the "Principe" with its glorification of absolutism
is totally opposed to its author's ideas of democracy, which led to his ruin. To
explain the difficulty it is not necessary to claim that the book is a satire,
nor that it is evidence of how easily the writer could change his political
views provided he could stand well with the Medici. Much as Machiavelli loved
liberty and Florence he dreamed of a "larger Italy" of the Italians.
As a practical man he saw that his dream could be realized only through a prince
of character and energy who would walk in the steps of Cæsar Borgia, and he
conceded that the individual good must give way to the general well-being.
As a historian Machiavelli is an excellent source when he deals with what
happened under his eyes at the various embassies; but it should be remembered
that he gives everything a more or less unconscious twist to bring it into
conformity with his generalizations. This is more marked even in his accounts of
what he had heard or read, and serves to explain the discrepancies in the
letters he wrote during his embassies to Cæsar Borgia, the "Descrizione",
etc., the ideal picture he drew of affairs in Germany, and his life of
Castruccio Castracane, which is rather an historical romance modelled on the
character of Agathocles in Plutarch. He knew nothing of historical criticism,
yet he showed how events in history move in obedience to certain general laws;
and this is his great merit as an historian. His natural bent was politics, but
in his dealings with military matters he showed such skill as would amaze us
even if we did not know he had never been a soldier. He recognized that to be
strong a state must have its standing army, and he upholds this not only in the
"Principe" and the "Discorsi" but in his various military
writings. The broad and stable laws of military tactics he lays down in masterly
fashion; yet it is curious to note that he lays no great stress on firearms.
His style is always clear and crisp and his reasoning close and orderly. What
poetry he has left gives no proof of poetic talent; rather, the comedies are
clever and successful as compositions and only too often bear undisguised traces
of the moral laxity of the author (this is shown also in his letters to his
friends) and of the age in which he lived. His "Mandragola" and "Clizia"
are nothing more or less than pochades and lose no opportunity of scoring
against religion. Machiavelli did not disguise his dislike for Christianity
which by exalting humility, meekness, and patience had, he said, weakened the
social and patriotic instincts of mankind. Hence, he mocked at Savonarola though
he was the saviour of democracy, and he had a special dislike for the Holy See
as a temporal power, as he saw in it the greatest obstacle to Italian unity; to
use his own expression, it was too weak to control the whole peninsula, but too
strong to allow of any other state bringing about unity. This explains why he
has no words of praise for Julius II and his Italian policy. It was merely as an
opportunist that he courted the favour of Leo X and Clement VII. On the other
hand, when death came his way he remembered that he was a Christian and he died
a Christian death, though his life, habits, and ideals had been pagan, and
himself a typical representative of the Italian Renaissance.
Power for good..or bad?
FLORENCE, ITALY
Until Nicolo Machiavelli, writers about politics had been concerned
primarily about how government should work. Machiavelli was concerned about how
it actually does work. For 14 years Machiavelli was a bureaucrat and diplomat
for the city-state of Florence, in Italy. He organized Florence's militia and
was sent ondiplomatic missions throughout Italy and other parts of Europe.
And at every opportunity he watched great men to see how they kept and extended
their power. In 1502 he was sent to Romagna as a representative to Cesare
Borgia, whom he admired for his boldness, clever frauds and expert use of
cruelty.
But in 1512 the army of Pope Julius II took over Florence and restored the
Medici family to its position of authority, and Machiavelli, a republican,was
out of work. He retired to a farm near San Casciano to write letters pleading
for a job and suggesting ways his skills could be used. One of those pleadings
was "The Prince," a small book on political science he completed around 1513 and
dedicated to Lorenzo Medici. He hopedLorenzo would be impressed and offer him a
job. But Lorenzo ignored it -- and him.
But the world did not long ignore The Prince. It soon became an underground
classic in Florence and later was published widely.
The fascinating thing about Machiavelli's works -- particularly The Prince
and to a lesser degree his "Discourses" -- are their clear-eyed examination of
political power, how it is obtained, maintained and expanded. A reader of his
works is bound to think, "Yes, I'll bet that would work!" The troubling aspect
of his many political writings is their cold-heartedness. Machiavelli is just as
willing to help the wicked maintain and expand their power as he is the
virtuous.
For example, if you are not sure whether to rise to power by brute force or
by deceit, Machiavelli will help you decide. It is the chapter in the Discourses
entitled, "Cunning and deceit will serve a man better than force to rise from a
base condition to great fortune." Or, if you are having trouble deciding whether
to kill the people from whom you have taken political power, Machiavelli would
recommend you read the chapter in Discourses titled, "A prince cannot live
securely in astate so long as those live whom he has deprived of it."
But let's be fair to the man -- though he might not be fair to us. First,
much of what he taught is good advice. For example: Rulers should avoid being
hated by the population; they should shun flatterers; they shouldn't make laws
and then disregard them, etc. Second, during the Renaissance there was an effort
to divorce learning from religion and religiously-derived morality, and
Machiavelli -- a man of his time -- was simply applying this logic to the study
of power.
Nevertheless, it is troubling to think that such tyrants as Hitler, Lenin,
and Mussolini have found Machiavelli such valuable reading
Italy Machiavelli's Time
After the fall of the Roman empire Italy evolved into several culturally and
linguistically distinct regions. Around the early 16th century family
based dynasties began to take hold as a major unifying force.
The extended power of a few western European
dynasties changed the political face of Italy, and Europe as a whole. A
prime example was the rivalry between the Habsburgs and the French Valois which
a created pan-European political arena. This tended to make most wars and
disputes trans-European conflicts.
During this political evolution in Europe, Italy
suffered as the nexus of the dynastic disputes. Italy, in effect,
became the battleground for a new style of warfare, and spoil that these new
powers would battle over. These European wars between 1494 and 1540 effectively
ended the renaissance in Italy and were a major theme in Machiavelli's writings.
His new political philosophy and those of subsequent theoreticians were
profoundly inspired by these prolonged struggles.
The disputes in Italy began with an ancient conflict: the competition between the a branch of the French royal family and the rulers of Aragon in Spain for
the kingdom of Naples. In the 1490s, King Charles VIII of France had both
the resources and the desire to seek conquest in that region. Machiavelli
noted that Charles himself was not a great intellect, nor a particularly
charismatic leader. But he fantasized of being like the conquering knights of
legend. His progenitors endowed him with great wealth, and he endeavored
to employ it to achieve European hegemony.
Charles' designs on Italy seemed considerably more
viable when Lodovico Sforza, duke
of Milan, offered to help him take Naples. The idea of a French invasion did not appeal to other Italians, since the French
would have to cross their territories, with unpredictable consequences. This was precisely the sort of situation that Cosimo de' Medici or Lorenzo Magnifico,
in previous years, would have tried to defuse through negotiations. The Medici
family leader in Florence was Piero who lacked the political skills and courage
of some of him prominent forbearers. Instead of shrewdly playing competing
powers against each others he made a destructive alliance with Naples and agreed
to fight the French should they invade.
But when in 1494 King Charles and Duke Lodovico began marching down Italy with an army of unprecedented size,
18,000 men and 40 cannon [Parker, 9], Piero de' Medici panicked. He rode out to
meet Charles and presented him with the keys to all the important fortresses in Florentine territory.
Piero's abject cowardice lost him the domination of the city. When he returned to Florence, the citizens chased him out, and reinstituted a real republic in
place of the sham they had had for the previous 60 years. This was the beginning of a long series of trials and tribulations for Florence, which are of
particular importance in European history because they provided Niccolo Machiavelli with the political experience he later wrote up in his famous books,
The Prince and The Discourses. So we will look at Florentine events in more
detail than we might otherwise. That Italian experience has become the background for a lot of the European tradition of European thought.
The new Florentine government of 1494 had no more chance of resisting Charles VIII than Piero had, so they admitted him. Florence, never a great military
power, was in no position to offer serious resistance. It had to hope that
cooperation with the French would eventually lead to the restoration of its own territory.
Charles's great army had a similar effect elsewhere. But the whole expedition ended in a laughable anti-climax. Charles found
himself trapped in the boot of Italy with all the states save Florence ranged against him. He successfully fought his way home, but had to abandon Naples to
Ferrante, and died as soon as he got to France. It seemed that Italy was left
in much the same state as it had been before. Certainly it was left alone for the next five years.
Those same years were a time of turmoil for Florence. The expulsion of the Medici had left the city without a real constitution, and there was debate about
how the government would work. After years of tyranny in disguise, there was
wide support for a popular government, one that would give decision-making power
to all the respectable citizens. There were important elements who opposed this: not only Medici partisans, but also other members of wealthy, established
families who hoped for an oligarchy. The question was decided in an unexpected way: by the intervention of a revivalist preacher, the Dominican friar Girolamo
Savonarola.
Savonarola had been working in Florence for some years, since the days of
Lorenzo Magnifico, denouncing everything that people like Lorenzo valued: the wealth, sophistication and sensuous beauty of the city. Savonarola thought that
Florence typified what was wrong with his times, and warned that such worldliness would bring punishment down from heaven.
Savonarola's prophecies seemed to have come true with Charles VIII's invasion. Here was the scourge of God, and perhaps the champion who might clean up the
mess in Rome. After the fall of the Medici, Savonarola became the most influential political figure in the city; and when he spoke for an popular
government, he won the day.
For four years, from 1494-98, Savonarola, who was not a Florentine citizen and never held office, was nevertheless its effective ruler. Savonarola, like old
Cosimo de' Medici, appealed to the poorer citizens against the rich and
influential. His message was civic revival through Christian virtue, a turning against worldliness and corruption. He had enough followers that sinners
abandoned the streets: Youths and children formed volunteer brigades that, in
the understated words of an older historian, who knew nothing of modern Iran, "roam[ed] the streets..[and] induced gamblers to hand over the tools of their
trade and women too fashionably dressed to renounce their scandalous display
."
Savonarola's regime had plenty of opposition. For one thing, continued
attachment to the French alliance had not gained the return of Florentine fortresses and towns. There were lots of people, influential ones, who despised
the popular party and Savonarola's crew and called them indifferently the Piagnoni, "the Snivellers."
Further, Pope Alexander VI, the Borgia pope, was irritated by Savonarola's preaching against corruption at Rome and on the Papal throne itself, though
Savonarola named no names. In 1497, Alexander got angry enough to excommunicate
Savonarola. The city continued to support the friar, but he was in a dangerous position if even one of the frequent city elections should go against him. In
March of 1498, this happened: a group of civic officials gained office who were
determined to get rid of Savonarola.
Quickly thereafter, a dispute over whether Savonarola was a true prophet led to
civic unrest. Anti-Sniveller mobs roamed the streets until Savonarola, to avoid civil war, let himself be arrested. The government then tortured him into
admitting he was a fake and condemned him to death as a heretic. The confession, though it was coerced, broke most of the remaining belief in
Savonarola's mission. They expected, unrealistically, an innocent prophet to be
able to withstand any abuse.
Savonarola's fall and execution did not destroy the popular government. It
regrouped under a president for life named Piero Soderini, whose chief secretary
was Niccolo Machiavelli. Under Soderini, Machiavelli became Florence's chief
diplomat, and travelled to all the capitals of Italy and to France, meeting the leaders of the time face to face. Machiavelli also got the chance to try out
his pet military theories. Machiavelli believed that Florence, like other Italian states, was weak because it citizens no longer fought. It depended on
mercenary troops. If a citizen militia could be re-established, Florence's independence would be secure. Machiavelli raised a militia -- out of rural
draftees, not citizens -- but on one occasion it did what it was supposed to. Pisa fell to Florence's army in 1509.
But despite this victory, the situation of small Italian powers like Florence was getting worse. Back in 1499, Charles VIII's successor on the French throne,
Louis XII, had invaded Italy again, aiming not just at Naples, but at Milan as
well. In 1500, Louis made a fateful alliance with Ferdinand, king of Aragon. The French king and the Aragonese one would dispossess Ferrante of Naples and
divide his kingdom. Soon after Naples was occupied, Aragon and France fell out.
In the next thirty years, French troops in Lombardy and Spanish ones in Naples would act as millstones to crush the rest of Italy
The popes might have united Italy against these foreigners.
Instead, they acted venally and mundanely. Most of their efforts were aimed at securing property for their sons and nephews, or in moments of high duty, the narrow
advantage of the papal states. Alexander VI made a deal early on with Louis XII
to gain French aid for his son, the infamous Cesare Borgia. Alexander hoped that Cesare could carve out a central Italian principality. Cesare was a
ruthless man (when he wasn't murdering his sister's husbands) and he terrified other Italian rulers until, mercifully, he died young. Alexander's successor
Julius II was just as terrifying as Cesare, taking the field in person against whoever had crossed him most recently.
It was Julius who ended the Florentine Republic. When Florence stuck with the
French, Julius had his Spanish allies take the city and hand it over to the leading Medici, a cardinal who soon after became Pope Leo X, and thus ruled both
Rome and Florence. This was the end, by the way, of Machiavelli's political career, and the beginning of his career as a writer, to which we will eventually
return. Like previous popes, Leo was most intent on preserving his independence and
building up the family fortune: in his case this meant securing Medici rule in the city his grandfather Lorenzo Magnifico had once led. But he and his cousin,
who succeeded him as Clement VII, had a hard time of it. Each turn of events
merely emphasized how strong France and Aragon were compared to any Italian combination; every attempt to play the superpowers off against each other
sharpened the rivalry between them. The wars became even fiercer after 1519,
when Ferdinand of Aragon was succeeded by his grandson Charles V, who inherited all of Spain, Burgundy, and the Habsburg lands. The French king, now Francis I,
was not willing to let such a powerful monarch have Italy too.
The Medici popes continued to manoeuvre, but in 1527, Pope Clement's plotting with France infuriated Charles, who was now on top in the peninsula, and his
undisciplined unpaid army marched on Rome. When they got there, they put the
city to a horrible sack; Clement himself was obliged to surrender to the emperor, and was kept a virtual prisoner for two years. It was the end of the
devil-may-care Renaissance papacy, and almost the end of the papacy as an
independent political power.
The Sack of Rome gave Florence one last chance at republicanism. The Medici
were tossed out, and the city prepared to fight for its freedom.But Florence found out in 1530 what the pope had found out three years earlier. No matter
how brave they were -- and they were much braver now than in Machiavelli's time --
Spain was too much for them. When Charles cut Florence's supply routes, the city surrendered -- to be handed back to the Medici, who were now in Charles's
good books again. Clement set up a relative as duke, and the family held the title, under Habsburg protection, until the time of
Napoleon. For the Spanish hegemony established by Charles V lasted a very long time.
For some historians, the sack of Rome marks the end of the Renaissance; for
others, the fall of the Florentine Republic. As Italy became a Spanish satellite, and was subjected to a repressive religious reform, the springs of
innovation dried up. Italy was becoming less central in the world, as even trade took different routes.
But the Italian wars themselves produced a noteworthy contribution to the culture of Europe -- a distinctive criticism of history and politics associated
with Niccolo Machiavelli and his friend, the diplomat Francesco Guicciardini. These two men were in their professional lives put through an amazing political
roller-coaster ride in which everything that might happen had, at least once. In particular, Italy had suffered every possible disaster save a Turkish
invasion. Perhaps not surprisingly, they took a pessimistic view of politics; in particular, they were skeptical of the value of reason or morality in
political life.
Machiavelli was actually the less pessimistic of the two. Machiavelli continued
to believe that politics was the only
life for a man. Politics was dangerous and unpredictable, and fortune might strike you down at any point, but the struggle was worth it. The secret was
virtu or virtue; not Christian virtue as preached by Savonarola and all medieval
writers on politics, or classical virtues as praised by earlier humanists.
Virtu meant "the strength and vigor necessary to construct a politically necessary society" [Koenigsberger and Mosse, 109]. The successful prince or
republican society was not good, it was strong and pragmatic; ruthless or
merciful or generous, as circumstances and advantage, not morality, demanded. Machiavelli specifically rejected the claims of Christianity to set the tone of
public life. To quote Koenigsberger: Machiavelli's ideal society was not one of
justice...
but a republic in which all citizens were united by virtu, generating the strength and power of will which could cope with ever-present change and survive. [What was new about Machiavelli was not the idea that effective
politics and morality might conflict]; it was the exaltation of [such pragmatism] into a way of life essential to the construction of the golden age.
Guicciardini, Machiavelli's lesser known friend, was more pessimistic. He saw
no route whatever into the golden age. Guicciardini's contribution to political
thought was not his theoretical prescriptions, but his disillusioned, detailed
historical description of how Italy was enslaved by foreign rulers and betrayed by its own. Guicciardini's history paralleled
Machiavelli because he saw politics as nothing but self-interest, disguised sometimes perhaps by proclamations of duty or right, but self-interest
nonetheless. Guicciardini thus dedicated himself to charting the course of
self-interested power politics, something that he did more diligently than any historian since pagan times.
Together these witnesses to the Italian wars added something interesting to learned European thought: the idea that Christianity might be irrelevant to the
public man and public life, to the political thinker or the historian. It was
not an idea that would be taken up quickly; the Reformation was already underway
well before either died. But it was there, to be picked up and elaborated later.
Machiavelli and
Love
Something of a historical villain, Niccolo Machiavelli is one of history’s most
enduring characters. A staple in high school history books and a standard
question on the European History Advanced Placement exam, Machiavelli is forever
remembered for his political commentary, The Prince, and its amoral philosophy
that “the ends justifies the means”. Modern scholarship has done little – if
anything – to refute Machiavelli’s reputation as a Renaissance bad boy. For
instance, in the index to his book Machiavelli’s Virtue, Harvey Mansfield
indexes the word “Machiavellism” as “See also evil” . Furthermore, in his
text Mansfield tries to explain that Machiavelli never actually wrote the exact
phrase “the ends justifies the means” by instead writing, “…he said worse: that
the end makes the means honorable, and that moral men believe this” .
While it’s useless to refute Machiavelli’s amoral attitude in The Prince, it’s
not fair to judge Machiavelli, the man, as merely sinister and heartless. In
fact, to call him heartless would indeed be a grave error, for just as much as
he was a critic and anticleric, Machiavelli was an experienced and passionate
lover.
Consider this sonnet written to Francesco Vettori in January 1515:
Many times the young Archer
had already tried to wound my breast
with his arrows, because he takes pleasure
in showing contempt for and inflicting injury on others;
and although those arrows were sharp and fierce,
so much so that a diamond couldn’t have withstood the blow,
nonetheless they found such a resistant target
that he had little regard for all their power.
So he, full of indignation and fury,
In order to give proof of his exalted excellence,
Changed quiver, changed arrow and bow;
and he fired one with such violence
that I still grieve over my wounds,
and I confess and acknowledge his power.
Whether or not this is a specific reference to a single love of his own, by
writing this poem Machiavelli is acknowledging the overwhelming power of Cupid’s
arrow. Love’s power over Machiavelli and his dependence on it is evident time
and time again throughout many of his writings – most notably his personal
letters. This paper will attempt to dissect five various love relationships of
Machiavelli’s, namely that between Machiavelli and his wife, Marietta;
Machiavelli and his courtesans; Machiavelli and his male family members,
Machiavelli and his friends, and, finally, Machiavelli and Italy. Ultimately
ideas will emerge to answer the questions who did Machiavelli love, why did he
love them, and how did he benefit from this love.
Marietta
Given the widely held notion that love precedes marriage, it seems a
logical place to being understanding Machiavelli and love is through his
relationship with his wife, Marietta Corsini. However, as Sebastian De Grazia
describes in his book Machiavelli in Hell, love before marriage is a relatively
modern idea. Marriages in the Renaissance were usually arranged by a marriage
broker who matched couples on the basis of family status and dowry. No doubt
Machiavelli and Marietta’s marriage was no exception. Machiavelli married
Marietta in 1501 when he was 32, and, although his parents were dead, De Grazia
writes “we may be sure that the dowry and other arrangements were negotiated by
members and agents of the Machiavegli and Corsini families” .
Very little detail is known about the relationship between Machiavelli and
Marietta. Of the more than 300 letters collected and translated in the volume
Machiavelli and His Friends, there are no letters written from Machiavelli to
Marietta and only one survives from Marietta to Machiavelli. In this particular
letter from 1503 Marietta writes that she misses her husband and expresses
concern over his health. She describes their new son as looking like.
Machiavelli and writes that “Since he looks like you, he seems beautiful to me”
Marietta says she wishes had more letters from Machiavelli and
that she plans to write more herself. She ends her letter, “Remember to come
home”
Marietta’s concern for Machiavelli’s health, her requests for more letters, and
her comments about her baby reminding her of him, all denote an obvious
affection for Machiavelli. Nevertheless, her letters raise a lot of questions
about how Machiavelli felt about his wife. For instance, what kind of wife has
to ask for her husband to “remember to come home”? If love is so powerful that
it “wounds” Machiavelli, why isn’t he voluntarily going home to see his wife
It will be noted later that he went out of his way to see his
mistresses. Another question that arises after reading Marietta’s letter is, “Why didn’t
Machiavelli write her more often?” It’s obvious that Marietta wanted more
letters from her husband, so why didn’t she get them? One possibility is that
Machiavelli did eventually write more letters, it is just that they don’t exist
anymore. Also, in his chapter about Renaissance Epistolary, John Najemy notes
that extensive correspondence between husbands and wives was unusual (20-1).
Thus, the lack of letters does not necessarily mean lack of love. In fact,
there are several other letters from family members that suggest Machiavelli
cared for Marietta. For instance, in a 1527 letter to his son Guido,
Machiavelli writes:
Greet Madonna Marietta for me and tell her I have been expecting-and still do-to
leave here any day; I have never longed so much to return to Florence as I do
now, but there is nothing else I can do. Simply tell her that, whatever she
hears, she should be of good cheer, since I shall be there before any danger
comes.
Although this letter is not directly to his wife, Machiavelli still acknowledges
Marietta and her concerns for his safety.
Having quickly exhausted all obvious sources of information about the
relationship between Machiavelli and Marietta, perhaps more information about
Machiavelli’s views on his marriage and marriage in general can be found through
a close examination of the marriages in his plays Mandragola and Clizia.
Interestingly enough, both plays depict dysfunctional marriages void of romantic
love and lust.
First, in Mandragola, Callimaco, a young Florentine, masterminds a plan to sleep
with the most beautiful women in Italy, Lucrezia, who happens to already be
married to a lawyer. However, sly gentleman that he is, Callimaco successfully
manipulates Lucrezia’s husband, Nicia, to devising a plan to sleep with Lucrezia
for one night. Callimaco not only fulfills his goal, but Lucrezia in turn falls
in love with Callimaco and invites him stay in the same house as she and her
husband .
In Clizia, Nicamaco, who has fallen in love with his adopted daughter, Clizia,
attempts to marry her off to a dunderhead and have them live next door so he can
sleep with his daughter as he pleases. Although the plan is ultimately thwarted
by the arrival of Clizia’s real father, Nicamaco had wanted to tamper with two
marriages: his own and his daughter’s .
Neither one of these plays describes what could be called a wholesome passionate
marriage. The characters have to look outside their marriage to find love. Given
that Machiavelli uses this situation twice, one can more seriously question if
Machiavelli also had no love in his marriage and looked for it elsewhere.
Another interesting aspect of these plays is the language in which husbands
refer –or are thought to supposed to refer- to their wives in. It is at once
overbearing and pretentious. For instance, in Mandragola, Callimaco tells
Nicia, “But I should not pretend to the name of husband if I couldn’t make my
wife so as I wanted” . In Clizia, Nicomaco constantly refers to his
wife, Sofronia, as mad and irrational . Once again, perhaps this is
how Machiavelli felt relationships should be between men and women. Maybe in
his marriage he made the rules and Marietta simply stayed at home waiting for
Machiavelli to tell her what to do next. In De Grazia’s words, in the
Renaissance, “Women are the domesticators of men” (230) Perhaps Machiavelli
loved Marietta only for the home stability she provided him with. When he lost
his job, she was always there as the passive wife hanging on the husband’s every
word. Maybe Machiavelli only loved Marietta for her constant companionship and
domestic upkeep.
One caveat before moving on: While these plays may hold Machiavelli’s true
views about marriage, one must be careful not to infer too much. Consider what
Machiavelli tell’s readers in his preface to Clizia:
Comedies are written to please and delight the spectators…You have, therefore,
to present characters who are ludicrous, slanderous or in love, and the plays
that have plenty of these three sort of dialogue will raise plenty of laughs.
Those that have none won’t find a smile in the house. (Hale 68)
While there is little evidence that Marietta and Machiavelli had a passionate
love affair, there is also not much evidence to prove that they didn’t. Yes,
Machiavelli did not brag to his friends about his beautiful wife as he did other
women, and, yes, he wrote plays about finding love outside of marriage – but is
this enough to assume that Machiavelli did not love Marietta at all?
Sebastian De Gazia suggests that there was love in the marriage, but
it was more of a fraternal love-perhaps like that between brothers. Obviously
Machiavelli had some interest in the marriage because he fathered five children
by Marietta. Also, Machiavelli tried his best to provide for his family before
and after died he died. In his will he left Marietta, “his dear spouse”, a
farm, a farmhouse, and two houses (De Grazia 125). If Machiavelli had truly
loved another woman, he could have given her something in the will because he
would already be dead and Marietta couldn’t kill him for it. It seems that even
if Machiavelli found love outside his marriage-which his plays and the next
section suggests-he still could have loved Marietta, even if it was only for the
constancy and domestication she offered him.
The Mistresses
In a 1523 letter Francesco Vettori writes Machiavelli, “You would
never have married if you had really known yourself.”. What
Vettori is no doubt referring to is Machiavelli’s weakness for women other than
his wife. Unlike with his marriage, Machiavelli’s personal correspondence is
just littered with references to various mistresses and affairs.
The first of Machiavelli’s affairs we know about took place in 1510. Giovanni
Girolami writes Machiavelli that “Jeanne in Lyons is devoted to you” (Atkinson
207). The next letter in the collection Machiavelli and His Friends mentions
Jeanne again and yet another courtesan named La Riccia.
La Riccia’s name appears in at least six letters. It seems that
Machiavelli went to see her on numerous occasions. De Grazia reports that as
Secretary, Machiavelli was accused before the Eight of committing an act of
sodomy with La Riccia (140). Incidentally, the incident did no harm to
Machiavelli’s career and he kept visiting La Riccia-so much so that he writes
that she calls him a “House Pest” .
Again, in August 1514, Machiavelli writes Vettori, “I have met a creature so
gracious, so refined, so noble-both in nature and in circumstance-that never
could either my praise or my love for her be as much as she deserves.” (Atkinson
292-3). At the present time, Machiavelli is living in Florence with his family.
This unnamed mistress “may have been a friend’s sister whose husband had
deserted her to live in Rome.” .
Finally, the last and by far the most significant of Machiavelli’s
extramarital loves was the actress Barbera Raffacani Salutati. It was for
Barbera that Machiavelli penned both Clizia and Mandragola. While there are no
letters to or from Barbera in his personal letters, much information about
Barbera can be gathered from letters between Machiavelli and his friends – most
notably Vettori and Guicciardini.
Machiavelli has an overwhelmingly obvious desire for Barbera. For example, he
writes Guicciardini that “Barbera is there in Rome; if you can do her any
service, I commend her to you, for she gives me far more concern than does the
emperor” (Atkinson ). This is an important statement because politics seemed
really to be Machiavelli’s passion. Shortly after being expelled from Florence,
Machiavelli laments “… I have to talk about politics. I need to either take a
vow of silence or to discuss this” .
Barbera’s feelings for Machiavelli are also evident in letters to Machiavelli
from his friends. Guicciardini writes Machiavelli in 1525 that Barbera “would
season an entire city for you.”. In a particularly fascinating
letter, Jacopo di Filippo Falconetti writes Machiavelli, “she did some
occasional discourtesies to see if you love her.” It seems as if Barbera was
testing Machiavelli’s devotion to her by trying to make him jealous. Given that
Machiavelli wrote plays for her, visited when he could and sent friends to check
on her, it can be assumed that Machiavelli was indeed devoted.
Having briefly described some of Machiavelli’s steamier
relationships, a good question to explore is, was this lust or love? After all,
casual sex was not unusual in Renaissance Florence. Francesco
Vettori, a married man, often preached of the necessity of lust to Machiavelli.
In 1515, explaining his boredom, he writes, “..of necessity one must endeavor to
think of pleasant things, but I know of nothing that give me more delight to
think about and to do than fucking.” (Atkinson 311). Did Machiavelli also view
sex as merely a non-emotional extracurricular sport?
There are several indications that Machiavelli also liked to sleep around for
pleasure. In a most famous letter describing his isolation outside Florence,
Machiavelli writes “...I have neither slept nor fooled around” (Atkinson 265).
This suggests that “fooling around” was a practice he was used to doing. Also,
it is worth noting a 1509 letter that Machiavelli wrote to Guicciardini
describing an incident he had with an old woman. Suffering from “conjugal
famine” Machiavelli is tricked into having sex with a disgusting looking hag.
Machiavelli takes great care in describing the woman’s vulgar appearance and
concludes,“I’ll be damned if I think I shall get horny again” (Atkinson 190-1).
While the truthfulness of this letter has been questioned, it really doesn’t
matter. The point is, Machiavelli probably did have casual sex without love.
Nevertheless, as will next be discussed, Machiavelli most certainly did love
some women. The biggest indicators of this love are Machiavelli’s letters on
love to Vettori.
Machiavelli and Vettori had a unique relationship. What started a political
union spread to friendship, and arguably love itself. In addition to carrying
on a political dialogue, Vettori fairly consistently wrote Machiavelli asking
for advice about a certain woman he had fallen in love with. Machiavelli, being
the good friend that he was, advised this married man to follow his own example
and let go of his heart and follow love. In February 1514 Machiavelli writes:
And since my own precedent causes you dismay, remembering what Love’s arrows
have done to me, I am obliged to tell you how I have handled myself with him.
As a matter of fact, I have let him do as he please and I have followed him
through hill and dale, woods and plains; I have discovered that he has granted
me more charms than if I had tormented him. So the, take off the saddlepacks,
remove the bridle, close your eyes, and say “Go ahead, Love, be my guide, my
leader; if things turn out well, may the praise be yours, if they turn out
badly, may the blame be yours-I am your slave”.
As suggested by this quote, Machiavelli sought after love with the reckless
abandonment of Nicamaco in Clizia and Callimaco in Mandragola.
Machiavelli’s passionate writing about love sharply contrasts his persuasive
letters about politics. In a political context, Machiavelli uses fact, logic,
and history to support his opinion. When writing about love, Machiavelli refers
to authors like Ovid and uses a more abstract tone. Examine this 1514 letter
written to Vettori:
I ought to tell you, as you did me, how this love began, how Love ensnared me
with his nets, where he spread them, and what they were like; you would realize
that, spread among the flowers, these were nets of gold woven by Venus, so soft
and gentle that even though an insensitive heart could have severed them,
nevertheless I declined to do so..
In their respective books, both John Najemy and Sebastian De Grazia attempt to
make some link between Machiavelli’s love of politics and love of women. This
is an important link because, as suggested earlier, politics was supposedly
Machiavelli’s life. De Grazia contends Machiavelli thought “Love of woman seems
to be a force withdrawing men from politics; if interfered with, it becomes a
danger to civil life” (132). De Grazia comes to this conclusion based on the
chapter in the Discourses called How a State is Ruined Because of Women.
Interestingly enough, if this is true, Machiavelli didn’t follow his own advice.
He obviously showed no restraint in his affairs and gave love free reign.
Machiavelli’s country love in particular muted his love for politics. Of this
woman Machiavelli wrote, “No longer to I delight in reading about the deeds of
the ancients or in discussing those of the moderns; everything has been
transformed into tender thoughts, for which I thank Venus and all of Cyprus”
(Atkinson 293). In this quote, love appears to be such a powerful influence that
it has overtaken the importance of politics in Machiavelli’s life.
Najemy writes that Machiavelli equates politics and love by strategizing about
them both in the same way. Of the quote used earlier giving Machiavelli’s
advice to Vettori, Najemy writes it “assumes the necessity of strategy and
negotiation in confronting the power of desire.” (298). Najemy explains that
the desire of a Prince to maintain control of his land parallels the struggle
men have against love. Najemy writes on man and love that “only by
relinquishing all attempts at control could he establish limits on Love’s
ability to harm him.” ; but he continues that “Similarly, if the desire and the
will to control (love) are often self-defeating (either because the object of
desire will not let itself be possessed, or because, if possessed, it reduces
the possessor to submission), conversely submission might actually be the source
of power.” (169). Substituting the word Fortune for love in this sentence
reveals a sentence similar to one found in chapter XXV, On Fortune’s Role in
Human Affairs and How She can be Dealt With, in The Prince (269). He concludes,
“that since Fortune changes and men remain set in their ways, men will succeed
when the two are in harmony and fail when they are not in accord.” (162). Again
though, Machiavelli did not follow his own advice. He was defeated by love.
Accentuating this contradiction is Machiavelli’s closing words in the chapter.
I am certainly convinced of this: that it is better to be impetuous than
cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, in order to keep her
down, to beat her and to struggle with her. (Bondanella 162)
Apparently love was too strong for Machiavelli because he let love overtake him.
If Machiavelli can’t heed his own advice, then is it possible that really love
was more important to him than even politics?
There is no denying that love was a powerful force for Machiavelli. He
continually surrendered himself to his passions for women throughout his life.
But how is his love for his mistresses different than his love for Marietta?
Machiavelli used ripe and luxurious language to explain his affairs to his
friends where as he rarely made mention of his wife. Furthermore, Machiavelli’s
correspondence expressed a certain kind of hopeless and inability to resist
love. In the case of his mistresses, if love was a power relationship, love had
the power-perhaps a greater power than politics. Contrastingly, in
Machiavelli’s views on marriage, the husband had the power. Machiavelli
obviously loved his mistresses in a different way than Marietta. To Marietta,
Machiavelli, the husband, was acting out a social norm. In the case of his
mistresses, Machiavelli was a slave to love and unable to take the advice he
gives to Princes.
Discourses on Livy:
Book 1
DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
ON THE FIRST TEN (BOOKS) OF TITUS LIVIUS
TO ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI
FIRST BOOK
When I consider how much honor is attributed to antiquity, and how many
times,
not to mention many other examples, a fragment of an antique statue has been
bought at a great price in order to have it near to one, honoring his house,
being able to have it imitated by those who delight in those arts, and how
they
then strive with all industry to present them in all their work: and when I
see,
on the other hand, the works of greatest virtu which Historians indicate have
been accomplished by ancient Kingdoms and Republics, by Kings, Captains,
Citizens, Lawgivers, and others who have worked themselves hard for their
country, to be more readily admired than imitated, or rather so much
neglected
by everyone in every respect that no sign of that ancient virtu remains, I
cannot otherwise than wonder and at the same time be sad: and so much more
when
I see in the civil differences that arise between Citizens, or in the
maladies
which men incur, they always have recourses to those judgments or to those
remedies that have been judged or instituted by the ancients. For the civil
laws
are nothing else but the decisions given by the ancient Jurisconsults, which
reduced to a system presently teach our Jurisconsults to judge and also what
is
medicine if not the experience had by the ancient Doctors, (and) on which the
present Doctors base their judgments? None the less in the instituting of
Republics, in maintaining of States, in the governing of Kingdoms, in
organizing
an army and conducting a war, in (giving) judgment for Subjects, in expanding
the Empire, there will not be found either Prince, or Republic, or Captain,
or
Citizen, who has recourse to the examples of the ancients. Which I am
persuaded
arises not so much from the weakness to which the present education has
brought
the world, or from that evil which an ambitious indolence has created in many
Christian Provinces and Cities, than from not having a real understanding of
history, and from not drawing that (real) sense from its reading, or
benefiting
from the spirit which is contained in it. whence it arises that they who read
take infinitely more pleasure in knowing the variety of incidents that are
contained in them, without ever thinking of imitating them, believing the
imitation not only difficult, but impossible: as if heaven, the sun, the
elements, and men should have changed the order of their motions and power,
from
what they were anciently. Wanting, therefore, to draw men from this error, I
have judged it necessary to write upon all those books of Titus Livy which,
because of the malignity of the times, have been prevented (from coming to
us),
in order that I might judge by comparing ancient and modern events what is
necessary for their better understanding, so that those who may read these
Discourses of mine may be able to derive that usefulness for which the
understanding of History ought to be sought. And although this enterprise may
be
difficult, none the less, aided by those who have advised me to begin
carrying
this load, I believe I can carry it so that there will remain for others a
short
way to bring it to its destined place (end).
CHAPTER I
WHAT HAVE GENERALLY BEEN THE BEGINNINGS OF SOME CITIES, AND WHAT WAS THAT OF
ROME
Those who read what the beginning of the City of Rome was, and of her
Law-givers
and how it was organized, do not wonder that so much virtu had been
maintained
for so many centuries in that City, and that afterward there should have been
born that Empire to which that Republic was joined. And wanting first to
discuss
its birth, I say that all Cities are built either by men born in the place
where
they build it or by foreigners. The first case occurs when it appears to the
inhabitants that they do not live securely when dispersed into many and small
parties, each unable by himself both because of the location and the small
number to resist attacks of those who should assault them, and they are not
in
time ((the enemy coming)) in waiting for their defense: or if they should be,
they must abandon many of their refuges, and thus they would quickly become
the
prey of their enemies: so much that in order to avoid these dangers, moved
either by themselves or by some one among them of greater authority, they
restrict themselves to live together in a place selected by them, more
convenient to live in and more easy to defend. Of these, among others, have
been
Athens and Venice: the first under the authority of Theseus was built by the
dispersed inhabitants for like reasons: the other built by many people (who)
had
come to certain small islands situated at the head of the Adriatic Sea, in
order
to escape those wars which every day were arising in Italy because of the
coming
of new barbarians after the decline of that Roman Empire, began among
themselves, without any particular Prince who should organize them, to live
under those laws which appeared to them best suited in maintaining it (their
new
state). In this they succeeded happily because of the long peace which the
site
gave to them (for) that sea not having issue, where those people who were
afflicting Italy, not having ships with which they could invest them; so that
from a small beginning they were enabled to come to that greatness which they
now have.
The second case, when a city is built by foreign forces, is caused by free
men
and by men who depend on others, such as the Colonies sent either by a
Republic
or by a Prince to relieve their towns of (excessive) inhabitants or for the
defense of that country which they have newly acquired (and) want to maintain
securely and without expense; (thy Roman people built many cities, throughout
all their Empire) or they are built by a Prince, not to live there but for
his
own glory, as was the City of Alexandria built by Alexander. And because
these
cities at their origin do not have their freedom, it rarely happens that they
make great progress and are able to be numbered among the chief Kingdoms.
Such
was the building of Florence, for (it was built either by the soldiers of
Sulla,
or perhaps by the inhabitants of the Mountains of Fiesole, who trusting in
that
long peace which prevailed in the world under Octavian were led to live in
the
plain along the Arno) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not in
its
beginning have any other growth that those which were conceded to her through
the courtesy of the Prince.
The builders of Cities are free when any people either under a Prince or by
themselves are constrained either by pestilence or by famine or by war to
abandon their native country, and seek new homes: These either inhabit the
cities that they find in the countries they acquire, as Moses did, or they
build
new ones, as Eneas did. This is a case where the virtu and fortune of the
builder of the edifice is recognized, which is of greater or less wonder
according as that man who was the beginner was of greater or less virtu. The
virtu of whom is recognized in two ways: the first is in the selection of the
site, the other in the establishment of the laws. And because men work either
from necessity or from choice: and because it is seen here that virtu is
greater
where choice has less authority (results from necessity), it is (something)
to
be considered whether it would be better for the building of a city to select
sterile places, so that men constrained to be industrious and less occupied
with
idleness, should live more united, where, because of the poverty of the site,
they should have less cause for discord, as happened at Ragusa and in many
other
cities built in similar places; which selection would without doubt be more
wise
and more useful if men would be content to live of their own (possessions),
and
not want to seek to command that of others.
However, as men are not able to make themselves secure except through power,
it
is necessary to avoid this sterility of country and locate it in very fertile
places, where because of the fertility of the site, it can grow, can defend
itself from whoever should assault it, and suppress whoever should oppose its
aggrandizement. And as to that idleness which the site should encourage, it
ought to be arranged that in that necessity the laws should constrain them
(to
work) where the site does not constrain them (does not do so), and to imitate
those who have been wise and have lived in most amenable and most fertile
countries, which are apt to making men idle and unable to exercise any virtu:
that to obviate those which the amenity of the country may cause through
idleness, they imposed the necessity of exercise on those who were to be
soldiers: of a kind that, because of such orders, they became better soldiers
than (men) in those countries where nature has been harsh and sterile: among
which was the Kingdom of Egypt, which notwithstanding that the country was
most
amenable, that necessity ordained by the laws was so great, that most
excellent
men resulted therefrom: and if their names had not been extinguished by
antiquity, it would be seen that they would have merited more praise than
Alexander the Great, and many others of whom memory is still fresh. And
whoever
had considered the Kingdom of Soldan and the order of the Mamelukes, and of
their military (organization) before it was destroyed by Selim the Grand
Turk,
would have seen there how much the soldiers exercised, and in fact would have
known how much they feared that idleness to which the benignity of the
country
could lead them if they had not obviated it by the strongest laws. I say
therefore that the selection of a fertile location in establishing (a city)
is
more prudent when (the results) of that fertility can be restricted within
given
limits by laws.
Alexander the Great, wishing to build a city for his glory, Dinocrates, the
Architect came to him and showed him how he could do so upon the mountain
Athos,
which place in addition to being strong, could be arranged in a way that the
City would be given human form, which would be a marvelous and rare thing and
worthy of his greatness: and Alexander asking him on what the inhabitants
would
live, he replied that he had not thought of it: at which he laughed, and
leaving
that mountain as it was, he built Alexandria, where the inhabitants would
stay
willingly because of the richness of the country and the convenience to the
sea
and of the Nile.
Whoever should examine, therefore, the building of Rome if he should take
Eneas
for its first ancestor, will know that that City was built by foreigners:
(but)
if Romulus, it would have been built by men native to the place, and in any
case
it would be seen to have been free from the beginning without depending on
anyone: it will also be seen (as it will be said below) to what necessity the
laws made by Romulus, Numa, and the others had constrained them; so much so
that
the fertility of the site, the convenience of the sea, the frequent
victories,
the greatness of the Empire, could not corrupt her for many centuries, and
they
maintained her full of so much virtu than any other republic has ever been
adorned. And because the things achieved by them and that are made notable by
Titus Livius, have taken place either through public Councils or private
(individuals) either inside or outside the City, I shall begin to discourse
upon
those things which occured inside; and as for the public Council, which is
worthy of greater annotation, I shall judge, adding all that is dependent on
them; with which discourses this fast book, or rather this fast part will be
ended.
CHAPTER II
OF THE KINDS OF REPUBLICS THERE ARE, AND OF WHICH WAS THE ROMAN REPUBLIC
I want to place aside the discussion of those cities that had their beginning
subject to others, and I will talk of those which have had their beginning
far
removed from any external servitude, but which (were) initially governed
themselves through their own will, either as Republics or as Principalities;
which have had (as diverse origins) diverse laws and institutions. For to
some,
at the beginning or very soon after, their laws were given to them by one
(man)
and all at one time, as those which were given to the Spartans by Lycurgus:
Some
have received them by chance, and at several times, according to events, as
Rome
did. So that a Republic can be called fortunate which by chance has a man so
prudent, who gives her laws so ordered that without having need of correcting
them, she can live securely under them. And it is seen that Sparta observed
hers
(laws) for more than eight hundred years without changing them and without
any
dangerous disturbance: and on the contrary that City has some degree of
unhappiness which (not having fallen to a prudent lawmaker) is compelled to
reorganize her laws by herself. And she also is more unhappy which has
diverged
more from her institutions; and that (Republic) is even further from them
whose
laws lead her away from perfect and true ends entirely outside of the right
path; for to those who are in that condition it is almost impossible that by
some incident they be set aright. Those others which do not have a perfect
constitution, but had made a good beginning, are capable of becoming better,
and
can become perfect through the occurrence of events. It is very true,
however,
that they have never been reformed without danger, for the greater number of
men
never agree to a new law which contemplates a new order for the City, unless
the
necessity that needs be accomplished is shown to them: and as this necessity
cannot arise without some peril, it is an easy thing for the Republic to be
ruined before it can be brought to a more perfect constitution. The Republic
of
Florence gives a proof of this, which because of the incident of Arezzo in
(the
year) one thousand five hundred and two (1502) was reorganized, (and) it was
disorganized by that of Prato in (the year) one thousand five hundred and
twelve
(1512).
Wanting therefore to discourse on what were the institutions of the City of
Rome
and what events brought her to her perfection, I say, that some who have
written
of Republics say there are (one of) three States (governments) in them called
by
them Principality (Monarchy), of the Best (Aristocracy), and Popular
(Democracy), and that those men who institute (laws) in a City ought to turn
to
one of these, according as it seems fit to them. Some others (and wiser
according to the opinion of many) believe there are six kinds of Governments,
of
which those are very bad, and those are good in themselves, but may be so
easily
corrupted that they also become pernicious. Those that are good are three
mentioned above: those that are bad, are three others which derive from those
(first three), and each is so similar to them that they easily jump from one
to
the other, for the Principality easily becomes a tyranny, autocracy easily
become State of the Few (oligarchies), and the Popular (Democracy) without
difficulty is converted into a licentious one (anarchy). So much so that an
organizer of a Republic institutes one of those three States (governments) in
a
City, he institutes it for only a short time, because there is no remedy
which
can prevent them from degenerating into their opposite kind, because of the
resemblance that virtu and vice have in this instance.
These variations in government among men are born by chance, for at the
beginning of the world the inhabitants were few, (and) lived for a time
dispersed and like beasts: later as the generations multiplied they gathered
together, and in order to be able better to defend themselves they began to
seek
among themselves the one who was most robust and of greater courage, and made
him their head and obeyed him. From this there arose the knowledge of honest
and
good things; differentiating them from the pernicious and evil; for seeing
one
man harm his benefactor there arose hate and compassion between men,
censuring
the ingrates and honoring those who were grateful, and believing also that
these
same injuries could be done to them, to avoid like evils they were led to
make
laws, and institute punishments for those who should contravene them; whence
came the cognition of justice. Which thing later caused them to select a
Prince,
not seeking the most stalwart but he who was more prudent and more just. But
afterwards when they began to make the Prince by succession and not by
election,
the heirs quickly degenerated from their fathers, and leaving off from works
of
virtu they believed that Princes should have nothing else to do than surpass
others in sumptuousness and lasciviousness and in every other kind of
delight.
So that the Prince began to be hated, and because of this hate he began to
fear,
and passing therefore from fear to injury, a tyranny quickly arose. From this
there arose the beginnings of the ruin and conspiracies; and these
conspiracies
against the Prince were not made by weak and timid men, but by those who
because
of their generosity, greatness of spirit, riches, and nobility above the
others,
could not endure the dishonest life of that prince.
The multitude therefore following the authority of these powerful ones armed
itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him, they obeyed them as
their
liberators. And these holding the name of chief in hatred, constituted a
government by themselves, and in the beginning (having in mind the past
tyranny)
governed themselves according to the laws instituted by them, preferring
every
common usefulness to their conveniences, and governed and preserved private
and
public affairs with the greatest diligence. This administration later was
handed
down to their children, who not knowing the changeability of fortune (for)
never
having experienced bad (fortune), and not wanting to remain content with
civil
equality, they turned to avarice, ambition, violation of women, caused that
aristocratic government (of the Best) to become an oligarchic government (of
the
Few) regardless of all civil rights: so that in a short time the same thing
happened to them as it did to the Tyrant, for the multitude disgusted with
their
government, placed itself under the orders of whoever would in any way plan
to
attack those Governors, and thus there arose some one who, with the aid of
the
multitude, destroyed them. And the memory of the Prince and the injuries
received from him being yet fresh (and) having destroyed the oligarchic state
(of the Few), and not wanting to restore that of the Prince, the (people)
turned
to the Popular state (Democracy) and they organized that in such a way, that
neither the powerful Few nor a Prince should have any authority. And because
all
States in the beginning receive some reverence, this Popular State maintained
itself for a short time, but not for long, especially when that generation
that
had organized it was extinguished, for they quickly came to that license
where
neither private men or public men were feared: this was such that every one
living in his own way, a thousand injuries were inflicted every day: so that
constrained by necessity either through the suggestion of some good man, or
to
escape from such license, they once again turn to a Principality; and from
this
step by step they return to that license both in the manner and for the
causes
mentioned (previously).
And this is the circle in which all the Republics are governed and will
eventually be governed; but rarely do they return to the same (original)
governments: for almost no Republic can have so long a life as to be able
often
to pass through these changes and remain on its feet. But it may well happen
that in the troubles besetting a Republic always lacking counsel and
strength,
it will become subject to a neighboring state which may be better organized
than
itself: but assuming this does not happen, a Republic would be apt to revolve
indefinitely among these governments. I say therefore that all the
(previously)
mentioned forms are inferior because of the brevity of the existence of those
three that are good, and of the malignity of those three that are bad. So
that
those who make laws prudently having recognized the defects of each, (and)
avoiding every one of these forms by itself alone, they selected one (form)
that
should partake of all, they judging it to be more firm and stable, because
when
there is in the same City (government) a Principality, an Aristocracy, and a
Popular Government (Democracy), one watches the other.[1]
Among those who have merited more praise for having similar constitutions is
Lycurgus, who so established his laws in Sparta, that in giving parts to the
King, the Aristocracy, and the People, made a state that endured more than
eight
hundred years, with great praise to himself and tranquillity to that City.
The
contrary happened to Solon who established the laws in Athens, (and) who by
establishing only the Popular (Democratic) state, he gave it such a brief
existence that before he died he saw arise the tyranny of Pisistratus: and
although after forty years his (the tyrants) heirs were driven out and
liberty
returned to Athens, for the Popular state was restored according to the
ordinances of Solon, it did not last more than a hundred years, yet in order
that it be maintained many conventions were made by which the insolence of
the
nobles and the general licentiousness were suppressed, which had not been
considered by Solon: none the less because he did not mix it (Popular state)
with the power of the Principate and with that of the Aristocracy, Athens
lived
a very short time as compared to Sparta.
But let us come to Rome, which, notwithstanding that it did not have a
Lycurgus
who so established it in the beginning that she was not able to exist free
for a
long time, none the less so many were the incidents that arose in that City
because of the disunion that existed between the Plebs and the Senate, so
that
what the legislator did not do, chance did. For, if Rome did not attain top
fortune, it attained the second; if the first institutions were defective,
none
the less they did not deviate from the straight path which would lead them to
perfection, for Romulus and all the other Kings made many and good laws, all
conforming to a free existence. But because their objective was to found a
Kingdom and not a Republic, when that City became free she lacked many things
that were necessary to be established in favor of liberty, which had not been
established by those Kings. And although those Kings lost their Empire for
the
reasons and in the manner discussed, none the less those who drove them out
quickly instituted two Consuls who should be in the place of the King, (and)
so
it happened that while the name (of King) was driven from Rome, the royal
power
was not; so that the Consuls and the Senate existed in forms mentioned above,
that is the Principate and the Aristocracy. There remained only to make a
place
for Popular government for the reasons to be mentioned below, the people rose
against them: so that in order not to lose everything, (the Nobility) was
constrained to concede a part of its power to them, and on the other hand the
Senate and the Consuls remained with so much authority that they were able to
keep their rank in that Republic. And thus was born (the creation) of the
Tribunes of the plebs,[2] after which creation the government of that
Republic
came to be more stable, having a part of all those forms of government. And
so
favorable was fortune to them that although they passed from a Monarchial
government and from an Aristocracy to one of the People (Democracy), by those
same degrees and for the same reasons that were discussed above, none the
less
the Royal form was never entirely taken away to give authority to the
Aristocracy, nor was all the authority of the Aristocrats diminished in order
to
give it to the People, but it remained shared (between the three) it made the
Republic perfect: which perfection resulted from the disunion of the Plebs
and
the Senate, as we shall discuss at length in the next following chapters.
CHAPTER III
WHAT EVENTS CAUSED THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS IN ROME, WHICH
MADE
THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT
As all those have shown who have discussed civil institutions, and as every
history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever arranges to found a
Republic and establish laws in it, to presuppose that all men are bad and
that
they will use their malignity of mind every time they have the opportunity;
and
if such malignity is hidden for a time, it proceeds from the unknown reason
that
would not be known because the experience of the contrary had not been seen,
but
time, which is said to be the father of every truth, will cause it to be
discovered. It seemed that in Rome there was a very great harmony between the
Plebs and the Senate (the Tarquins having been driven out), and that the
nobles
had laid aside their haughtiness and had become of a popular spirit, and
supportable to everyone even to the lowest. This deception was hidden, nor
was
the cause seen while the Tarquins lived, whom the nobility feared, and having
fear that the maltreated plebs might not side with them (the nobles) they
behaved themselves humanely toward them: but as soon as the Tarquins were
dead,
and that fear left the Nobles, they begun to vent upon the plebs that poison
which they had kept within their breasts, and in every way they could they
offended them: which thing gives testimony to that which was said above that
men
never act well except through necessity: but where choice abounds and where
license may be used, everything is quickly filled with confusion and
disorder.
It is said therefore that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious, and Laws
make
them good. And where something by itself works well without law, the law is
not
necessary: but when that good custom is lacking, the law immediately becomes
necessary. Thus the Tarquins being dead through fear of whom the Nobles were
kept in restraint, it behooved them (the Nobles) to think of a new order,
which
would cause the same effect which the Tarquins had caused when they were
alive.
And therefore after many confusions, tumults, and dangers of troubles, which
arose between the Plebs and the Nobility, they came for the security of the
Plebs to the creation of the Tribunes, and they were given so much
preeminence
and so much reputation, that they then should always be able to be in the
middle
between the Plebs and the Senate, and obviate the insolence of the Nobles.
CHAPTER IV
THAT DISUNION OF THE PLEBS AND THE ROMAN SENATE MADE THAT REPUBLIC FREE AND
POWERFUL
I do not want to miss discoursing on these tumults that occurred in Rome from
the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the Tribunes; and afterwards I
will
discourse on some things contrary to the opinions of many who say that Rome
was
a tumultuous Republic and full of so much confusion, that if good fortune and
military virtu had not supplied her defects, she would have been inferior to
every other Republic.
I cannot deny that fortune and the military were the causes of the Roman
Empire;
but it indeed seems to me that this would not happen except when military
discipline is good, it happens that where order is good, (and) only rarely
there
may not be good fortune accompanying. But let us come to the other
particulars
of that City. I say that those who condemn the tumults between the nobles and
the plebs, appear to me to blame those things that were the chief causes for
keeping Rome free, and that they paid more attention to the noises and shouts
that arose in those tumults than to the good effects they brought forth, and
that they did not consider that in every Republic there are two different
viewpoints, that of the People and that of the Nobles; and that all the laws
that are made in favor of liberty result from their disunion, as may easily
be
seen to have happened in Rome, for from Tarquin to the Gracchi which was more
than three hundred years, the tumults of Rome rarely brought forth exiles,
and
more rarely blood. Nor is it possible therefore to judge these tumults
harmful,
nor divisive to a Republic, which in so great a time sent into exile no more
than eight or ten of its citizens because of its differences, and put to
death
only a few, and condemned in money (fined) not very many: nor can a Republic
in
any way with reason be called disordered where there are so many examples of
virtu, for good examples result from good education, good education from good
laws, and good laws from those tumults which many inconsiderately condemn;
for
he who examines well the result of these, will not find that they have
brought
forth any exile or violence prejudicial to the common good, but laws and
institutions in benefit of public liberty. And if anyone should say the means
were extraordinary and almost savage, he will see the People together
shouting
against the Senate, The Senate against the People, running tumultuously
throughout the streets, locking their stores, all the Plebs departing from
Rome,
all of which (things) alarm only those who read of them; I say, that every
City
ought to have their own means with which its People can give vent to their
ambitions, and especially those Cities which in important matters, want to
avail
themselves of the People; among which the City of Rome had this method, that
when those people wanted to obtain a law, either they did some of the things
mentioned before or they would not enroll their names to go to war, so that
to
placate them it was necessary (for the Senate) in some part to satisfy them:
and
the desires of a free people rarely are pernicious to liberty, because they
arise either from being oppressed or from the suspicion of going to be
oppressed. And it these opinions should be false, there is the remedy of
haranguing (public assembly), where some upright man springs up who through
oratory shows them that they deceive themselves; and the people (as Tullius
Cicero says) although they are ignorant, are capable of (appreciating) the
truth, and easily give in when the truth is given to them by a trustworthy
man.
One ought therefore to be more sparing in blaming the Roman government, and
to
consider that so many good effects which came from that Republic, were not
caused except for the best of reasons: And if the tumults were the cause of
creation of Tribunes, they merit the highest praise, for in addition to
giving
the people a part in administration, they were established for guarding Roman
liberty, as will be shown in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
WHERE THE GUARDING OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURELY PLACED, EITHER IN THE PEOPLE
OR
IN THE NOBLES; AND WHICH HAVE THE GREATER REASON TO BECOME TUMULTUOUS EITHER
HE
WHO WANTS TO ACQUIRE OR HE WHO WANTS TO MAINTAIN
Among the more necessary things instituted by those who have prudently
established a Republic, was to establish a guard to liberty, and according as
this was well or badly place, that freedom endured a greater or less (period
of
time). And because in every Republic there exists the Nobles and the
Populace,
it may be a matter of doubt in whose hands the guard is better placed. And
the
Lacedemonians, and in our times the Venetians, placed it in the hands of the
Nobles, but that of Rome was placed in the hands of the Plebs. It is
necessary
therefore to examine which of the Republics had made the better selection.
And
if we go past the causes and examine every part, and if their results should
be
examined, the side of the Nobles would be preferred since the liberty of
Sparta
and Venice had a much longer life than that of Rome: And to come to the
reasons,
I say (taking up first the part of the Romans) that thing (liberty) which is
to
be guarded ought to be done by those who have the least desire of usurping
it.
And without doubt, if the object of the Nobles and of the Ignobles (populace)
is
considered, it will be seen that the former have a great desire to dominate,
and
the latter a desire not to be dominated and consequently a greater desire to
live free, being less hopeful of usurping it (liberty) than are the Nobles:
so
that the People placed in charge to guard the liberty of anyone, reasonably
will
take better care of it; for not being able to take it away themselves, they
do
not permit others to take it away.
On the other hand, he who defends the Spartan and Venetian arrangement, says
that those who placed that guardianship in the hands of the Powerful
(Nobles),
made two good points: The one, that they satisfy more the ambitions of those
who
playing a greater part in the Republic, (and) having this club in their
hands,
have more reason to be content; the other, that they take away a kind of
authority from the restless spirit of the People which is the cause of
infinite
discussions and troubles in a Republic, and apt to bring the Nobility to some
(act of) desperation which in times may result in some bad effects. And they
give for an example this selfsame Rome, where the Tribunes of the Plebs
having
this authority in their hands, (and) the having of one Consul from the Plebs
was
not enough for them (the People), but that they wanted to have both (the
Consuls
from the Plebs). From this they afterward wanted the Censure, the Praetorship,
and all the other ranks of the Empire (Government) of the Republic. Nor was
this
enough for them, but urged on by the same fury they began in time to idolize
those men whom they saw adept at beating down the Nobility: whence arose the
power of Marius and the ruin of Rome.
And truly whoever should discuss well both of these things could be in doubt
as
to what kind of men may be more harmful to the Republic, either those who
desire
to acquire that which they do not have, or those who desire to maintain the
honors already acquired. And in the end whoever examines everything
skillfully
will come to this conclusion: The discussion is either of a Republic which
wants
to create an Empire, as Rome, or of one which is satisfied to maintain
itself.
In the first case it is necessary for it to do everything as Rome did; in the
second, it can imitate Venice and Sparta, for those reasons why and how as
will
be described in the succeeding chapter.
But to return to the discussion as to which men are more harmful in a
Republic,
either those who desire to acquire, or those who fear to lose that which they
have acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius had been made Dictator, and
Marcus Fulvius Master of the cavalry, both plebeians, in order to investigate
certain conspiracies that had been formed in Capua against Rome, they were
also
given authority by the people to be able to search out who in Rome from
ambition
and by extraordinary means should endeavor to attain the Consulate and other
houses (offices) of the City. And it appearing to the Nobility that such
authority given to the Dictator was directed against them, they spread the
word
throughout Rome that it was not the Nobles who were seeking the honors for
ambition, or by extraordinary means, but the Ignobles (Plebeians) who,
trusting
neither to their blood (birth) nor in their own virtu, sought to attain those
dignities, and they particularly accused the Dictator: And so powerful was
this
accusation, that Menenius having made a harangue (speech) and complaining of
the
calumnies spread against him by the Nobles, he deposed the Dictatorship, and
submitted himself to that judgement (of himself) which should be made by the
People: And then the cause having been pleaded, he was absolved; at which
time
there was much discussion as to who was the more ambitious, he who wanted to
maintain (his power) or he who wanted to acquire it, since the desires of
either
the one or the other could be the cause of the greatest tumults. But none the
less more frequently they are caused by those who possess (power), for the
fear
of losing it generates in them the same desires that are in those who want to
acquire it, because it does not seem to men to possess securely that which
they
have, unless they acquire more from others. And, moreover, those who possess
much, can make changes with greater power and facility. And what is yet
worse,
is that their breaking out and ambitious conduct arouses in the breasts of
those
who do not possess (power) the desire to possess it, either to avenge
themselves
against them (the former) by despoiling them, or in order to make it possible
also for them to partake of those riches and honors which they see are so
badly
used by the others.
CHAPTER VI
WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN ROME WHICH COULD
ELIMINATE
THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE SENATE
We have discussed above the effects which were caused by the controversies
between the People and the Senate. Now these having continued up to the time
of
the Gracchi, where they were the cause of the loss of liberty, some might
wish
that Rome had done the great things that she did without there being that
enmity
within her. It seems to me therefore a thing worthy of consideration to see
whether in Rome there could have been a government (state) established that
could have eliminated the aforementioned controversies. And to desire to
examine
this it is necessary to have recourse to those Republics which have had their
liberty for a long time without such enmities and tumults, and to see what
(form) of government theirs was, and if it could have been introduced in
Rome.
For example, there is Sparta among the ancients, Venice among the modern,
(both)
having been previously mentioned by me. Sparta created a King with a small
Senate which should govern her. Venice did not divide its government by these
distinctions, but gave all those who could have a part in the administration
(of
its government) the name of Gentlemen: In this manner, chance more than
prudence
gave them (the Venetians) the laws (form of Government), for having taken
refuge
on those rocks where the City now is, for the reasons mentioned above many of
the inhabitants, as they had increased to so great a number, with the desire
to
live together, so that needing to make laws for themselves, they established
a
government, (and) came together often in councils to discuss the affairs of
the
City; when it appeared to them that they had become numerous enough for
existing
as a commonwealth, they closed the path to all the others who should newly
come
to live there to take part in their government: And in time finding in that
place many inhabitants outside the government, in order to give reputation to
those who were governing, they called them Gentlemen, and the others Popolari.
This form (of Government) could establish and maintain itself without tumult,
because when it was born, whoever then lived in Venice participated in that
government, with which no one could complain: Those who came to live there
later, finding the State firm and established did not have cause or
opportunity
to create a tumult. The cause was not there because nothing had been taken
from
them. The opportunity was not there because those who ruled kept them in
check
and did not employ them in affairs where they could pick up authority. In
addition to this, those who came to inhabit Venice later were not very many,
or
of such a great number that these would be a disproportion between those who
governed and those who were governed, for the number of Gentlemen were either
equal to or greater than the others: so that for these reasons Venice could
establish that State and maintain it united.
Sparta, as I have said, being governed by a King and limited Senate could
thus
maintain itself for a long time because there being few inhabitants in
Sparta,
and the path having been closed to those who should want to live there, and
the
laws of Lycurgus having acquired such reputation that their observance
removed
all the causes for tumults. They were able to live united for a long time,
for
Lycurgus had established in Sparta more equality of substance and less
equality
in rank, because equal poverty existed here and the Plebs were lacking
ambitious
men, as the offices of the City were extended to few Citizens, and were kept
distant from the Plebs, nor did the Nobles by not treating them badly ever
create in them the desire to want them. This resulted from the Spartan Kings,
who, being placed in that Principate and living in the midst of that
Nobility,
did not have may better means of maintaining their office, than to keep the
Plebs defended from every injury: which caused the Plebs neither to fear nor
to
desire authority, and not having the dominion, nor fear of it, there was
eliminated the competition which they might have had with the Nobility, and
the
cause of tumults, and thus they could live united for a long time. But two
things principally caused this union: The one, the inhabitants of Sparta were
few, and because of this were able to be governed by a few: The other, that
not
accepting outsiders in their Republic, they did not have the opportunity
either
of becoming corrupt or of increasing so much that they should become
unsupportable to those few who governed her.
Considering all these things, therefore, it is seen that it was necessary
that
the legislators of Rome do one of two things in desiring that Rome be as
quiet
as the above mentioned Republic, either not to employ the Plebs in war like
the
Venetians, or not to open the door to outsiders like the Spartans, But they
did
the one and the other, which gave the Plebs strength and increased power and
infinite opportunities for tumults. And if the Roman State had come to be
more
tranquil, it would have resulted that she would have become even more feeble,
because there would have been cut off from her the means of being able to
attain
that greatness which she achieved. So that Rome wanting to remove the causes
for
tumults, would also take away the causes for expansion. And as in all human
affairs, those who examine them will indeed see that it is never possible to
avoid one inconvenience but that another one will spring up. If therefore,
you
want to make a people numerous and armed in order to create a great Empire,
you
will make it of a kind that you are not able afterward to manage it in your
own
way: if you keep them either small or disarmed in order to be able to manage
them, (and), if you acquire other dominion, you will not be able to hold
them,
or you will become so mean that you will become prey to whoever assaults you.
And therefore, in every one of our decisions, there ought to be considered
where
the inconveniences are less, and then take up the better proceeding, for
there
will never be formed anything entirely clear of suspicion. Rome could
therefore,
like Sparta, have created a Prince for life, and established a limited
Senate;
but desiring to build a great Empire, she could not, like Sparta, limit the
number of her Citizens: which, in creating a King for life and a small number
in
the Senate, would have been of little benefit in connection with her unity.
If
anyone therefore should want to establish a new Republic, he should have to
consider if he should want it to expand in dominion and power as did Rome, or
whether it should remain within narrow limits. In the first case, it is
necessary to establish it as Rome, and to give place to tumults and general
dissensions as best he can; for without a great number of men, and (those)
well
armed, no Republic can ever increase, or if it did increase, to maintain
itself.
In thy second case he may establish her as Sparta and Venice: but because
expansion is the poison of such Republics, he ought in every way he can
prevent
her from making acquisitions, for such acquisitions, based on a weak
Republic,
are entirely their ruin, as happened to Sparta and Venice, the first of which
having subjected almost all of Greece, showed the weakness of its foundation
with the slightest accident; for when there ensued the rebellion of Thebes
caused by Pelopidas, the other cities also rebelling, ruined that Republic
entirely.
Similarly Venice having occupied a great part of Italy, and the greater part
(obtained) not by war but by money and astuteness, when it came to make a
test
of her strength everything was lost in one engagement. I believe then that to
create a Republic which should endure a long time, the better way would be to
organize internally like Sparta, or like Venice locate it in a strong place,
and
of such power that no one should believe he could quickly oppress her: and on
the other hand, it should not be so powerful that she should be formidable to
her neighbors, and thus she could enjoy its state (independence) for a long
time. For there are two reasons why war is made against a Republic: The one,
to
become lord over her: the other, the fear of being occupied by her. These two
means in the above mentioned manner almost entirely removed (the reasons for
war), for it is difficult to destroy her, being well organized for her
defense,
as I presuppose, it will rarely or never happen that one can design to
conquer
her. If she remains within her limits, and from experience it is seen that
there
is no ambition in her, it will never happen that someone for fear of her will
make war against her: and this would be so much more so if there should be in
her constitution or laws (restrictions) that should prohibit her expansion.
And
without doubt I believe that things could be kept balanced in this way, that
there would be the best political existence, and real tranquillity to a City.
But all affairs of men being (continually) in motion and never being able to
remain stable, it happens that (States) either remain stable or decline: and
necessity leads you to do many things which reason will not lead you to do;
so
that having established a Republic adept at maintaining itself without
expanding, and necessity should induce her to expand, her foundations would
be
taken away and her ruin accomplished more readily. Thus, on the other hand,
if
Heaven should be so kind that she would never have to make war, the
languidness
that should arise would make her either effeminate or divided: which two
together, or each one by itself, would be cause of her ruin. Not being able,
therefore, (as I believe) to balance these things, and to maintain this
middle
course, it is necessary in organizing a Republic to think of the more
honorable
side, and organize her in a way that if necessity should induce her to
expand,
she may be able to preserve that which she should have acquired. And to
return
to the first discussion, I believe it is necessary to follow the Roman order
and
not that of any other Republic (because I do not believe it is possible to
find
a middle way between one and the other) and to tolerate that enmity that
should
arise between the People and the Senate, accepting it as an inconvenient
necessity in attaining the Roman greatness. Because in addition to the other
reasons alleged, where the authority of the Tribunes is shown to be necessary
for the guarding of liberty, it is easy to consider the benefit that will
come
to the Republic from this authority of accusing (judiciary), which among
others
was committed to the Tribunes, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VII
HOW MUCH THE FACULTY OF ACCUSING (JUDICIARY) IS NECESSARY FOR A REPUBLIC FOR
THE
MAINTENANCE OF LIBERTY
No more useful and necessary authority can be given to those who are
appointed
in a City to guard its liberty, as is that of being able to accuse the
citizen
to the People or to any Magistrate or Council, if he should in any way
transgress against the free state. This arrangement makes for two most useful
effects for a Republic. The first is, that for fear of being accused, the
citizens do not attempt anything against the state, and if they should (make
an)
attempt they are punished immediately and without regard (to person). The
other
is, that it provides a way for giving vent to those moods which in whatever
way
and against whatever citizens may arise in the City. And when these moods do
not
provide a means by which they may be vented, they ordinarily have recourse to
extra ordinary means that cause the complete ruin of a Republic. And there is
nothing which makes a Republic so stable and firm, as organizing it in such a
way that changes in the moods which may agitate it have a way prescribed by
law
for venting themselves. This can be demonstrated by many examples, and
especially by that of Coriolanus, which Titus Livius refers to, where he says
that the Roman Nobility being irritated against the Plebs, because it seemed
to
them the Plebs had too much authority concerning the creation of the Tribunes
who defended them, and Rome (as happened) experiencing a great scarcity of
provisions, and the Senate having sent to Sicily for grain, Coriolanus, enemy
of
the popular faction, counselled that the time had come (to be able) to
castigate
the Plebs and take away authority which they had acquired and assumed to the
prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping them famished and not distributing the
grain: which proposition coming to the ears of the people, caused so great an
indignation against Coriolanus, that on coming out of the Senate he would
have
been killed in a tumultuary way if the Tribunes had not summoned him to
appear
and defend his cause. From this incident there is to be noted that which was
mentioned above, that it is useful and necessary for a Republic with its laws
to
provide a means of venting that ire which is generally conceived against a
citizen, for if these ordinary means do not exist, they will have recourse to
extraordinary ones, and without doubt these produce much worse effects that
do
the others. For ordinarily when a citizen is oppressed, even if he has
received
an injustice, little or no disorder ensues in the Republic, because its
execution is done by neither private nor foreign forces which are those that
ruin public liberty, but is done by public force and arrangement which have
their own particular limits, and do not transcend to things that ruin the
Republic.
And to corroborate this opinion with examples, among the ancient ones I want
this one of Coriolanus to be enough, on which anyone should consider how much
evil would have resulted to the Roman Republic if he had been killed in the
tumults, for there would have arisen an offense by a private (citizen)
against a
private (citizen); which offense generates fear, fear seeks defense, for this
defense partisans are procured, from the partisans factions arise in the
City,
(and) the factions cause their ruin. But the matter being controlled by those
who had authority, all those evils which could arise if it were governed by
private authority were avoided. We have seen in our time that troubles
happened
to the Republic of Florence because the multitude was able to give vent to
their
spirit in an ordinary way against one of her citizens, as befell in the time
of
Francesco Valori, who was as a Prince in that City (and) who being judged
ambitious by many, and a man who wanted by his audacity and animosity to
transcend the civil authority, and there being no way in the Republic of
being
able to resist him except by a faction contrary to his, there resulted that
he
(Valori) having no fear except from some extraordinary happening, began to
enlist supporters who should defend him: On the other hand, those who opposed
him not having any regular way or repressing him, thought of extraordinary
ways,
so that it came to arms. And where (if it were possible to oppose him, Valori,
by regular means) his authority would have been extinguished with injury to
himself only, but having to extinguish it by extraordinary means, there
ensued
harm not only to himself, but to many other noble citizens. We could also
city
in support of the above mentioned conclusion the incident which ensued in
Florence in connection with Piero Soderini, which resulted entirely because
there was not in that Republic (means of making) accusations against the
ambitions of powerful citizens: for the accusing of a powerful one before
eight
judges in a Republic is not enough; it is necessary that the judges be many
because the few always judge in favor of the few. So that if such a means had
been in existence, they would have accused him (Soderini) of evil while yet
alive, and through such means without having the Spanish army (called) to
come
in, they would have given vent to their feelings; or if he had not done evil
they would not have had the audacity to move against him, for fear that they
would be accused by him: and thus both sides would have ceased having that
desire which was the cause of the trouble.
So that this can be concluded, that whenever it is seen that external forces
are
called in by a party of men who live in a City, it can be judged to result
from
its bad organization because there did not exist within that circle of
arrangements, a way to be able without extraordinary means to give vent to
the
malignant moods that arise in men, which can be completely provided by
instituting accusations before many judges and giving them reputation
(authority). These things were so well organized in Rome that in so many
discussions between the Plebs and the Senate, neither the Senate nor the
Plebs
nor any particular citizen, ever attempted to avail (himself) of external
force,
for having the remedy at home it was not necessary to go outside for it. And
although the above examples are amply sufficient to prove this, none the less
I
want to refer to another recital by Titus Livius in his history, which refers
to
there having been in Chiusi (Clusium), at that time a most noble City of
Tuscany, one Lucumones who had violated a sister of Aruntes, and Aruntes not
being able to avenge himself because of the power of the violator, went to
seek
out the French (Gauls) who then ruled in that place which today is called
Lombardy, and urged them to come to Chiusi with arms in hand, pointing out to
them how they could avenge the injury he had received with advantage to
themselves: but if Aruntes could have seen how he could have avenged himself
by
the provisions of the City, he would not have sought the barbarian forces.
But
just as these accusations are useful in a Republic, so also are calumnies
useless and harmful, as we shall discuss in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
AS MUCH AS ACCUSATIONS ARE USEFUL TO A REPUBLIC, SO MUCH SO ARE CALUMNIES
PERNICIOUS
Notwithstanding that the virtu of Furius Camillus when he was liberating
(Rome)
from the oppression of the French (Gauls) had caused the Roman citizens to
yield
him (top honors) without appearing to them to have lost reputation or rank,
none
the less Manlius Capitolinus was not able to endure that so much honor and
glory
should be bestowed on him; for it seemed to him he had done as much for the
welfare of Rome by having saved the Campidoglio (Capitol), he had merited as
much as Camillus, and as for other warlike praises he was not inferior to
him.
So that filled with envy, he was not able to sow discord among the Fathers
(Senators) he turned to the Plebs, sowing various sinister opinions among
them.
And among other things he said was, that the treasure which had been
collected
(together) to be given to the French (Gauls), and then was not given to them,
had been usurped by private citizens: and if its should be recovered it could
be
converted to public usefulness, alleviating the plebs from tribute or from
some
private debt. These words greatly impressed the Plebs, so that Manlius begun
to
have concourse with them and at his instigation (created) many tumults in the
City: This thing displeased the Senate and they deeming it of moment and
perilous, created a Dictator who should take cognizance of the case and
restrain
the rashness of (Manlius); whereupon the Dictator had him summoned, and they
met
face to face in public, the Dictator in the midst of the Nobles and Manlius
in
the midst of the Plebs. Manlius was asked what he had to say concerning who
obtained the treasure that he spoke about, for the Senate was as desirous of
knowing about it as the Plebs: to which Manlius made no particular reply, but
going on in an evasive manner he said, that it was not necessary to tell them
that which they already knew, so that the Dictator had him put in prison. And
it
is to be noted by this text how detestable calumnies are in free Cities and
in
every other form of government, and that in order to repress them no
arrangement
made for such a proposition ought to be neglected. Nor can there be a better
arrangement to putting an end to these (calumnies) than to open the way for
accusations, for accusations are as beneficial to Republics as calumnies are
harmful: and on the other hand there is this difference, that calumnies do
not
need witnesses nor any other particular confrontation to prove them so that
anyone can be calumniated by anyone else, but cannot now be accused, as the
accuser has need of positive proof and circumstances that would show the
truth
of the accusation. Men must make the accusations before the Magistrates, the
People, or the Councils: calumnies (are spread) throughout the plaza and
lodgings (private dwellings). These calumnies are practiced more where
accusations are used less and where Cities are less constituted to receive
them.
An establisher of a Republic therefore ought so to organize it that it is
possible to accuse every citizen without any fear and without any suspicion:
and
this being done, and well carried out, he should severely punish the
calumniators, who cannot complain if they are punished, they having places
open
to them to hear the accusations of those who had caluminated them in private.
And where this part is not well organized great disorders always follow, for
calumnies irritate but do not castigate citizens, and those who have been
irritated think of strengthening themselves, easily hating more than fearing
the
things that are said against them.
¶ This part (as has been said) was well organized in Rome, and has always
been
poorly organized in our City of Florence. And as in Rome this institution did
much good, at Florence this poor order did much evil. And whoever reads the
history of this City, will see how many calumnies have been perpetrated in
every
time against those citizens who occupied themselves in its important affairs.
Of
one, they said he had robbed money from the Community; of another, that he
had
not succeeded in an enterprise because of having been corrupted; and of yet
another, because of his ambitions had caused such and such inconvenience. Of
the
things that resulted there sprung up hate on every side, whence it came to
divisions, from divisions to Factions (Sects), (and), from Factions to ruin.
If
in Florence there had been some arrangement for the accusation of citizens
and
punishment of calumniators, there would not have occurred the infinite
troubles
that have ensued, for those Citizens who had been either condemned or
absolved,
could not have harmed the City, and there would have been a much less number
accused than there had been calumniated, as it could not have been (as I have
said) as easy to accuse as to calumniate any one. And among the other things
that some citizens might employ to achieve greatness have been these
calumnies,
which employed against powerful citizens who opposed his ambition, did much
for
them; for by taking up the past of the people, and confirming them the
opinion
which they had of them (the nobles), he made them his friends.
And although we could refer to many examples, I want to be content with only
one. The Florentine army which was besieging Lucca was commanded by Messer
Giovanni Guicciardini, their Commissioner. It was due either to his bad
management or his bad fortune, that the fall of that City did not ensue. But
whatever the case may have been, Messer Giovanni was blamed, alleging he had
been corrupted by the Lucchesi: which calumny, being favored by his enemies,
brought Messer Giovanni almost to the last desperation. And although, to
justify
himself because there was no way in that Republic of being able to do so.
From
which there arose great indignation among the friends of Messer Giovanni, who
constituted the greater part of the nobility, and (also) among those who
desired
to make changes in Florence. This affair, both for this and other similar
reasons, grew so, that there resulted the ruin of the Republic.
Manlius Capitolinus was therefore a calumniator and not an accuser; and the
Romans showed in this case in point how the calumniators ought to be
punished.
For they ought to be made to become accusers, and if the accusation proves
true
either to reward them or not punish them; but if it does not prove true, to
punish them as Manlius was punished.
CHAPTER IX
HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE MAN ALONE IN DESIRING TO ORGANIZE A NEW REPUBLIC
TO
REFORM ITS INSTITUTIONS ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE ANCIENT ONES
And it may appear perhaps to some that I have gone too far into Roman
history,
not having yet made any mention of the organizers of this Republic, or of
(having regard for) her institutions, her religion, and her military
establishment. And therefore, not wanting to keep in suspense the minds of
those
who want to understand these matters, I say, that many perhaps should judge
it a
bad example that the founder of a civil society, as Romulus was, should first
have killed his brother, then have consented to the death of Titus Tatius, a
Sabine, who had been chosen by him to share the Kingdom; because of which it
might be judged that the citizens could, from ambition and the desire to
rule,
with the authority of their Prince, attack those who should be opposed to
their
authority. Which opinion would be correct, if the object he had in mind in
causing that homicide should be considered. But this must be assumed, as a
general rule, that it never or rarely occurs that some Republic or Kingdom is
well organized from the beginning, or its institutions entirely reformed a
new,
unless it is arranged by one (individual only): rather it is necessary that
the
only one who carries it out should be he who on whose mind such an
organization
depends. A prudent Organizer of a Republic, therefore, who has in mind to
want
to promote, not himself, but the common good, and not his own succession but
his
(common) country, ought to endeavor to have the authority alone: and a wise
planner will never reprimand anyone for any extraordinary activity that he
should employ either in the establishment of a Kingdom or in constituting a
Republic. It is well then, when the deed accuses him, the result should
excuse
him; and when it is good, as that of Romulus, he will always be excused; for
he
ought to be reprehended who is violent in order to destroy, and not he who
does
so for beneficial reasons. He ought, however, to be so prudent and wise that
the
authority which he has assumed, he will not leave to his heirs (or) any
other:
for men being more prone to evil than to good, his successor could employ for
reasons of ambition that which should be employed for virtuous reasons by
him.
In addition to this, even if one is adept at organizing, the thing organized
will not endure long if its (administration) remains only on the shoulders of
one individual, but it is good when it remains in the care of many, and thus
there will be many to sustain it. As the organization of anything cannot be
made
by many because of the diverse opinions that exist among them, yet having
once
understood this, they will not agree to forego it. And that Romulus merited
to
be excused for the death of his brother and that of his companion, and that
what
he had done he did for the common good and not for his own ambition, is shown
by
his immediate institution of a Senate with which he should consult, and
according to the opinions of which he would make his decision. And whoever
considers well the authority which Romulus reserved for himself, will see
that
he did not reserve anything else other than the command of the army when war
was
decided upon, and of convening the Senate. This was seen at that time when
Rome
became free after the driving out of the Tarquins, where there was no other
innovation made on the ancient institutions except that in place of an
hereditary King there should be two Consuls (elected) each year. Which gives
testimony that all the institutions at the origin of that City were more in
conformity with a free and civil society than with an absolute and tyrannical
one.
Infinite examples could be given in corroboration of the things mentioned
above,
such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of Kingdoms and Republics,
who were able to formulate laws for the common good (only) by assigning the
(necessary) authority to themselves: but I want to omit these as they are
already well known. I will refer only to one not so well known, but which
should
be given consideration by those who desire to be institutors of good laws,
(and), this is that of Agis, King of Sparta, who desiring to bring the
Spartans
back to those limits which the laws of Lycurgus had delimited for them,
(and),
it seeming to him that by deviating in part from them his City had lost much
of
that ancient virtu, and consequently her power and dominion, was at once
killed
by Spartan Ephors as a man who wanted to become a Tyrant. But Cleomenes
succeeding him in the Kingdom, there arose in him the same desire from
(reading)
the records and writings of Agis that he found, in which his thoughts and
intentions were seen, (and) he recognized that he could not render this good
to
his country, unless he should become alone in authority, as it seemed to him
he
would not be able because of the ambitions of men to provide the good for the
many against the desires of the few: and seizing a convenient opportunity had
all the Ephors killed and those who could oppose him: after which he
completely
restored the laws of Lycurgus. This decision helped to revive Sparta and give
to
Cleomene that reputation which was (equal) to that of Lycurgus, if it had not
been for the power of Macedonia and the weakness of the other Greek
Republics.
For after this establishment (of the laws) he was soon assaulted by the
Macedonians, and finding that by herself (Sparta) was inferior in strength,
and
not having anyone to whom he could have recourse, he was defeated, and his
plans
(no matter how just and laudable) remained incompleted. Considering all these
things, therefore, I conclude that to establish a Republic it is necessary
that
one must be alone, and Romulus merits to be excused and not censured for the
death of Remus and of Tatius.
CHAPTER X
AS MUCH AS THE FOUNDERS OF REPUBLICS AND KINGDOMS ARE LAUDABLE, SO MUCH ARE
THOSE OF A TYRANNY SHAMEFUL
Among all men who have been praised, the most lauded are those who are heads
and
establishers of Religion. Next after them are those who have founded
Republics
or Kingdoms. After these are celebrated those who have commanded armies,
(and)
who have enlarged the (territory) of their Kingdom of those of their country.
To
these should be added men of letters, and because these are of many fields,
they
are celebrated according to their degree (of excellence). To other men, the
number of whom is infinite, some degree of praise is given to them as pertain
to
their art and profession. On the other hand, those men are infamous and
destroyers of Religion, dissipators of Kingdoms and Republics, enemies of
virtu,
of letters, and of every other art which brings usefulness and honor to human
generations (mankind), such as are the impious and violent, the ignorant, the
idle, the vile and degraded. And no one will ever be so mad or so wise, so
wicked or so good, that selecting between these two kinds of men, does not
laud
what is laudable, and censure what is censurable. None the less, however,
nearly
all men deceived by a false good or a false glory allow themselves to drift
either voluntarily or ignorantly into the ranks of those who merit more
censure
that praise. And being able to establish either a Kingdom or a Republic with
eternal honor to themselves, they turn to Tyranny, nor do they see because of
this action how much fame, how much glory, how much honor, security, and
tranquil satisfaction of the mind, they lose; and how much infamy, disgrace,
censure, danger, and disquiet, they incur. And it is impossible that those
who
live as private individuals in a Republic, or who by fortune or virtu become
Princes, if they read the history and the records of ancient events, would do
well living as private citizens in their country to live rather as a Scipio
than
a Caesar; and those who are Princes, rather as Agesilaus, Timoleon, and Dion,
than as Nabis, Phalaris, and Dionysius, because they will see these (latter)
to
be thoroughly disgraced and those (former) most highly praised. They will
also
see that Timoleon and the others had no less authority in their country than
had
Dionysius and Phalaris, but they will see that they had had greater security
for
a longer time. Nor is there anyone who deceives himself by the glory of
Caesar,
he being especially celebrated by writers, for those who praised him were
corrupted by his fortune and frightened by the long duration of the Empire
which, ruling under his name did not permit that writers should talk of him
freely. But whoever wants to know what the writers would have said of him
freely, let him observe what they say of Cataline. And so much more is Caesar
to
be detested, as how much more is he to be censured for that which he did,
than
he who (just) intends to do evil. He will also see how Brutus was extolled
with
so many praises; so that not being able to censure him (Caesar) because of
his
power they extolled his enemy. Let he who has become a Prince in a Republic
also
consider how much more praise those Emperors merited who, after Rome became
an
Empire, lived under the laws (and) as good Princes, than those who lived an
in a
contrary manner; and he will also see that it was not necessary for the
praetorian soldiers or the multitudes of the legions to defend Titus, Nerva,
Trajan, Hadrai Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and Marcus (Aurelius), because
their
customs, the good will of the people, and the love of the Senate would defend
them. He will also see that the Eastern and Western armies were not
sufficient
to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and so many other wicked emperors, from
those
enemies which their bad customs and evil lives had raised up against them.
And if the history of those men should be well considered, it would be very
instructive to any Prince in pointing out to him the way to glory or censure,
to
security or fear. For of the twenty-six who were Emperors from Caesar to
Maximinius, sixteen were murdered. Ten died in a natural way; and if among
those
who were murdered there may have been some good men, such as Galba and
Pertinax,
they were killed by that corruption that his predecessors had left among the
soldiers. And if among those who died in a natural way there were some
wicked,
such as Severns, it resulted from their very great good fortune and virtu,
which
two things are found together in few men. He will also learn from this lesson
of
history how a good Kingdom can be organized, for all, except Titus, were bad:
(and) those who succeeded by adoption were all good, such as were those five
from Nero to Marcus (Aurelius). And when the Empire became hereditary, it
came
to ruin. Let a Prince therefore place himself in the times of Nero and
Marcus,
and let him compare them with those which preceded and followed (that period)
and afterward let him select in which (of the two) he would want to be born
and
in which he would want to reign. For in those times governed by good
(Emperors),
he will see a Prince secure in thy midst of secure citizens, he will see the
world full of peace and justice, he will see the Senate with its authority,
the
Magistrates with their honor, rich citizens enjoying their wealth, nobility
and
virtu exalted, he will see every quiet and good; and on the other hand (he
will
see) every rancor, every license, corruption, and ambition extinct; he will
see
that golden era where everyone can hold and defend whatever opinion he
wishes:
In the end, he will see the triumph of the world, the Prince full of
reverence
and glory, the people full of love and security. Then if he will consider the
sorrowful times of the other Emperors, he will see the atrocities from war,
discords from seditions, cruelty in peace and war, so many Princes slain by
the
sword, so many civil wars, so many foreign wars, Italy afflicted and full of
new
misfortunes, her Cities ruined and sacked: He will see Rome burned, the
Capitol
of its citizens destroyed, the ancient temples desolate, ceremonies
corrupted,
the City full of adulterers: he will see the sea full of exiles, the shores
full
of blood. He will see innumerable cruelties take place in Rome, and nobility,
riches, honors, and above all virtu, accounted capital crimes. He will see
informers rewarded, servants corrupted against the masters, freemen against
their patrons, and those who should lack enemies, oppressed by friends. And
he
will also recognize very well what obligations Rome, Italy, and the world
owed
to Caesar. And without doubt (if he was born of man), he would be dismayed at
every imitation of those evil times, and burning with an immense desire to
follow the good. And truly, a Prince seeking the glory of the world ought to
desire to possess a corrupt City, not to spoil it entirely like Caesar, but
to
reorganize it like Romulus. And truly the heavens cannot give man a greater
opportunity for glory, nor could man desire a better one. And if to want to
organize a City well, it should be necessary to abolish the Principate, he
who
had failed to (give her good laws) should merit some excuse. But he does not
merit any excuse who can hold the Principate and organize it. And in sum, let
he
to whom the heavens gives the opportunity consider that there are two ways:
The
one which will make him live securely and render him glorious after his
death,
the other which will make him live in continual anxiety and after death leave
of
himself an eternal infamy.
CHAPTER XI
OF THE RELIGIONS OF THE ROMANS
Although Rome had Romulus as its original organizer and, like a daughter,
owed
her birth and education to him, none the less the heavens, judging that the
institutions of Romulus were not sufficient for so great an Empire, put it
into
the breasts of the Roman Senate to elect Numa Pompilius as successor to
Romulus,
so that those things that he had omitted, would be instituted by Numa. Who,
finding a very ferocious people and wanting to reduce them to civil obedience
by
the acts of peace, turned to religion as something completely necessary in
wanting to maintain a civilization, and he established it in such a manner
that
for many centuries there never was more fear of God than in that Republic,
which
facilitated any enterprise which the Senate or those of great Roman men
should
plan to do. And whoever should discuss the infinite actions of the people of
Rome (taken) all together, and of many Romans (individually) by themselves,
will
see that those citizens feared much more the breaking of an oath than the
laws,
like those men who esteem more the power of God than that of man, as is
manifestly seen in the examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus, for after
the defeat that Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans at Cannae, many citizens
had gathered together (and) frightened and fearful (and) had agreed to
abandon
Italy and take themselves to Sicily: when Scipio heard of this, he went to
meet
them, and with bared sword in hand he constrained them to swear not to
abandon
their country. Lucius Manlius, father of Titus Manlius, who was later called
Torquatus, had been accused by Marcus Pomponius, a Tribune of the Plebs: and
before the day of judgment arrived, Titus went to meet Marcus, and
threatening
to kill him if he did not swear to withdraw the accusation against his
father,
constrained him to swear, and he (Marcus) from fear of having sworn withdrew
the
accusation from him (Lucius). And thus those citizens whom (neither) the love
of
their country and of its laws could keep in Italy, were kept there by an oath
that they were forced to take, and the Tribune put aside the hatred that he
had
for his father, the injury that his son had done him, and his honor, in order
to
obey the oath taken; which did not result from anything else than from that
religion which Numa had introduced in that City. And whoever considers well
Roman history will see how much Religion served in commanding the armies, in
reuniting the plebs, both in keeping men good, and in making the wicked
ashamed.
So that if it were discussed as to which Prince Rome should be more
obligated,
Romulus or Numa, I believe that Numa would (rather) attain the higher rank;
for
where Religion exists it is easily possible to introduce arms, but where
there
are arms and not religion, it (religion) can only be introduced there with
difficulty. And it is seen that for Romulus to institute the Senate and to
make
the other civil and military arrangements, the authority of God was not
necessary, but it was very necessary for Numa, who pretended he had met with
a
Nymph who advised him of that which he should counsel the people; and all
this
resulted because he wanted to introduce new ordinances and institutions in
that
City, and was apprehensive that his authority was not enough. And truly there
never was any extraordinary institutor of laws among a people who did not
have
recourse to God, because otherwise he would not have been accepted; for they
(these laws) are very well known by prudent men, but which by themselves do
not
contain evident reasons capable of persuading others. Wise men who want to
remove this difficulty, therefore, have recourse to God. Thus did Lycurgus,
thus
Solon, thus many others who had the same aims as they.
¶ The Roman people, therefore, admiring his (Numa's) goodness and prudence,
yielded to his every decision. It is indeed true that those times were full
of
Religion, and those men with whom he (Numa) had to work were coarse (which)
gave
him great facility to pursue his designs, being able easily to impress upon
them
any new form. And without doubt whoever should want to establish a Republic
in
the present era, would find it more easy to do so among men of the mountains
where there is no civilization, than among those who are used to living in
the
City, where civilization is corrupt, as a sculptor more easily extracts a
beautiful statue from crude marble than of one badly sketched out by others.
Considering all this I conclude therefore, that the Religion introduced by
Numa
was among the chief reasons for the felicity of that City, for it caused good
ordinances, good ordinances make good fortune, and from good fortune there
arises the happy successes of the enterprises. And as the observance of
divine
institutions is the cause of the greatness of Republics, so the contempt of
it
is the cause of their ruin, for where the fear of God is lacking it will
happen
that that kingdom will be ruined or that it will be sustained through fear of
a
Prince, which may supply the want of Religion. And because Princes are short
lived, it will happen that that Kingdom will easily fall as he (Prince) fails
in
virtu. Whence it results that Kingdoms which depend solely on the virtu of
one
man, are not durable for long, because that virtu fails with the life of that
man, and it rarely happens that it is renewed in (his) successor, as Dante
prudently says:
Rarely there descends from the branches (father to son) Human probity, and
this is the will (of the one) who gives it, because it is asked alone from
him.
The welfare of a Republic or a Kingdom, therefore, is not in having a Prince
who
governs prudently while he lives, but one who organizes it in a way that, if
he
should die, it will still maintain itself. And although crude men are more
easily persuaded by new ordinances and opinions, yet it is not impossible
because of this to persuade civilized men, (and) who presume themselves not
to
be crude. The people of Florence did not seem either crude or ignorant, none
the
less Brother Girolamo Savonarola was persuaded that he talked with God. I do
not
want to judge whether that was true or not, because one ought not to talk of
so
great a man except with reverence. But I may well say that an infinite
(number)
believed him without they having seen anything extraordinary which would make
them believe, because his life, the doctrine, the subjects he took up were
sufficient to make them have faith. Let no one be dismayed, therefore, if he
is
not able to attain that which had been attained by others, for men (as was
said
in our preface) are born, live, and die, always in the same way.
CHAPTER XII
OF HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN RELIGION; AND HOW ITALY, BECAUSE THE
MEDIUM OF THE ROMAN CHURCH WAS LACKING, WAS RUINED
Those Princes or those Republics that want to maintain themselves
uncorrupted,
have above everything else to maintain uncorrupted the servances of Religion,
and hold them always in veneration. For no one can have a better indication
of
the ruin of a province than to see the divine institutions held in contempt.
This is easy to understand, when it is known upon what the Religion of the
fatherland is founded; for every Religion has the foundation of its existence
on
some one of its principal institutions. The life of the Gentile Religion was
founded upon the responses of the Oracles and upon the tenets of the Augurs
and
Aruspices; all their other ceremonies, sacrifices, rites, depended on these.
For
they readily believed that that God who could predict your future good or
evil,
should also be able to concede it to you. From this arose their temples,
their
sacrifices, their supplication, and all the other ceremonies venerating him;
for
the Oracle of Delphi, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated
Oracles
kept the world in admiration and devotion. As soon as these began to speak in
the manner of the Potentates, and this falsity was discovered by the people,
men
became incredulous and disposed to disturb every good institution. The
Princes
of a Republic or a Kingdom ought therefore to maintain their Republic's
religions, and in consequence well and united. And therefore they ought in
all
things which arise to foster it (even if they should judge them false) to
favor
and encourage it: and the more prudent they are, and the more they understand
natural things, so much more ought they to do this. And because this practice
has been observed by wise men, there has arisen the beliefs in the miracles
that
are celebrated in Religion, however false; for the prudent ones have
increased
(their importance) from whatever origin they may have derived and their
authority gives them credence with the people. There were many of these
miracles
in Rome, and among others was that (which occurred) when the Roman soldiers
were
sacking the City of Veienti, some of whom entered the Temple of Juno, and,
standing in front of her statue, and saying "WILL YOU COME TO
ROME?", it
appeared to some that she had made a sign (of assent), and to others that she
had said yes. For these men, being full of Religion, (which T. Livius
demonstrated) when they entered the Temple went in without tumult and
completely
devoted and full of reverence, seemed to hear that response to their question
which perhaps they had presupposed: which opinion and belief was favored and
magnified by Camillus and by the other Princes of the City.
If the Princes of the Republic had maintained this Christian religion
according
as it had been established by the founder, the Christian States and Republics
would have been more united and much more happy than they are. Nor can any
greater conjecture be made of its decline, than to see that those people who
are
nearer to the Church of Rome, the head of our Religion, have less Religion.
And
whoever should give consideration to its foundations, and observe how much
different present usage is from them, should judge that without doubt her
ruin
or flagellation (chastisement) is near. And because some are of the opinion
that
the well-being of Italian affairs depend on the Church of Rome, I want to
discuss those reasons against them that occur to me, and I will present two
most
powerful ones, which according to me are not controvertible. The first is,
that
by the evil example of that court, this province has lost all devotion and
all
Religion: so that it brings (with it) infinite troubles and infinite
disorders;
for where there is Religion every good is presupposed, so too where it is
lacking the contrary is presupposed. We Italians therefore have this
obligation
with the Church and with the Priests of having become bad and without
Religion;
but we also have a greater one, which is the cause of our ruin. This is that
the
Church has kept and still keeps this province (country) of ours divided: and
Truly any country never was united or happy, except when it gave its
obedience
entirely to one Republic or one Prince, as has happened to France and Spain.
And
the reason that Italy is not in the same condition, and is not also governed
by
one Republic or one Prince, is solely the Church, for having acquired and
held
temporal Empire, she has not been so powerful or of such virtu that she was
able
to occupy the rest of Italy and make herself its Prince. And on the other
hand,
she has not been so weak that the fear of losing her dominion of temporal
things
has made her unable to call in a power that could defend her against those
who
had become too powerful in Italy, as was seen anciently by many experiences,
when through the medium of Charles the Great she drove out the Lombards who
already were the kings of almost all Italy, and when in our times she took
away
the power of Venetians with the aid of France; afterwards she drove out the
French with the aid of the Swiss. The church therefore not being powerful
(enough) to occupy Italy, and not having permitted that another should occupy
her, has been the cause why she (Italy) has not been able to be united under
one
head, but has been under so many Princes and Lords, from which there has
resulted so much disunion and so much weakness, that she became prey not only
to
the powerful Barbarians, but to anyone who should assault her. This we other
Italians owe to the Church of Rome, and to none others. And anyone who should
want to observe the truth of this more readily through experience, should
need
to be of such great power that he should be sent to live at the Roman Court,
with all the power it has in Italy, over the towns of the Swiss, who today
are
the only People who live accordingly to ancient customs both as far as
Religion
and military institutions (are concerned) and he would see that in a little
time
the evil customs of that Court would cause more disorders in that province
(country) than could spring up from any other incident in any other time.
CHAPTER XIII
HOW THE ROMANS SERVED THEMSELVES OF RELIGION TO ESTABLISH THE CITY AND TO
CARRY
OUT THEIR ENTERPRISES AND STOP TUMULTS
And it does not appear to me outside my purpose to refer to some examples
where
the Romans served themselves of Religion in order to reorganize the City and
to
further their enterprises. And although there are many in (the writings of)
Titus Livius, none the less I want to content myself with these. The Roman
people having created the Tribunes with Consular Power, and all but one
(selected from the) Plebs, and pestilence and famine having occurred there
that
year, and certain prodigies coming to pass, the Nobles used this occasion of
the
creation of the new Tribunes, saying that the Gods were angered because Rome
had
ill-used the majesty of its Empire, and that there was no other remedy to
placate the Gods than by returning the election of the Tribunes to its own
(original) place; from which there resulted that the Plebs frightened by this
Religion created all the Tribunes from the (class of the) Nobles.
¶ It was also seen at the capture of the City of the Veienti, that the
Captains
of the armies availed themselves of Religion to keep them disposed to an
enterprise, when lake Albano had risen astonishingly that year, and the
soldiers
being weary from the long siege (and) wanted to return to Rome, the Romans
insinuated that Apollo and certain other (oracles) had given replies that
that
year the City of the Veienti should be captured when Lake Albano should
overflow: which event made the soldiers endure the weariness of the war and
the
siege, being taken by this hope of capturing the town, and they remained
content
to pursue the enterprise so much that Camillus who had been made Dictator
captured that City after it had been besieged for ten years. And thus
Religion
well used was helpful both in the capture of that City and for the
restoration
of the Tribuneships to the Nobility, that without the said means either would
have been accomplished only with difficulty.
¶ I do not want to miss referring to another example to this purpose. Many
tumults had arisen in Rome caused by Terentillus the Tribune, (because of)
his
wanting to promulgate a certain law for the reasons which will be given in
their
place below: and among the first remedies that were used by the Nobility was
Religion, of which they served themselves in two ways. In the first, they
caused
the sibylline books to be exhibited, and to give a reply to the City, that
through the medium of civil sedition, there was impending that year the
danger
of (the City) losing its liberty; which thing (although it was discovered by
the
Tribunes) none the less put so much terror into the breasts of the Plebs that
it
cooled (their desire) to follow them. The other mode was when one Appius
Erdonius with a multitude of bandits and servants numbering four thousand men
occupied the Campidoglio (Capitol) by night, so that it was feared that the
Equians and Volscians, perpetual enemies of the Roman name, should have come
to
Rome and attacked her; and the Tribunes because of this did not cease
insisting
in their pertinacity of promulgating the Terentillan law, saying that that
fear
was fictitious and not true; (and) one Publius Rubetius, a grave citizen of
authority, went out from the Senate, (and) with words partly lovingly and
partly
menacing, showed them (the people) the danger to the City and the
unreasonableness of their demands, so that he constrained the Plebs to swear
not
to depart from the wishes of the Consul. Whence the Plebs, forced to obey,
reoccupied the Campidoglio: but the Consul Publius Valerius being killed in
that
attack, Titus Quintius was quickly made Consul, who in order not to allow the
Plebs to rest, or to give them time to think again of the Terentillan law,
commanded them to go out from Rome and go against the Volscians, saying that
because of that oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul they were
obligated to follow him: to which the Tribunes opposed themselves saying that
that oath was given to the dead Consul and not to him. None the less Titus
Livius shows that the Plebs for fear of Religion wanted more readily to obey
the
Consul than believe the Tribunes, saying in favor of the ancient Religion
these
words: "He feared that the age had not yet come, when the Gods were to
be
neglected, nor to make interpretations of their oaths and laws to suit
themselves." Because of which thing, the Tribunes, apprehensive of their
losing
all their liberty, made an accord with the Consul to remain in obedience to
him
and that for one year there should be no discussion of the Terentillan law
and
the Consuls, on the other hand, should not draw on the Plebs for war outside
(of
Rome). And thus Religion enabled the Senate to overcome that difficulty which
without it, they could never overcome.
CHAPTER XIV
THE ROMANS INTERPRETED THE AUSPICES ACCORDING TO NECESSITY, AND WITH THEIR
PRUDENCE MADE A SHOW OF OBSERVING RELIGION, EVEN WHEN THEY WERE FORCED NOT TO
OBSERVE IT, AND IF ANYONE RECKLESSLY DISPARAGED IT THEY PUNISHED HIM
The Auguries not only ((as was discussed above)) were the foundation in good
part of the ancient Religion of the Gentiles, but they were also the causes
of
the well-being of the Roman Republic. Whence the Romans cared more for this
than
any other institution, and used it in their Consular Comitii, in starting
their
enterprises, in sending out their armies, in fighting engagements, and in
every
important activity of theirs, whether civil or military: and they never would
go
on an expedition unless they had persuaded the soldiers that the Gods
promised
them the victory. And among the Aruspices there were in the armies certain
orders of Aruspices which they called Pollari (guardians of the Sacred
Fowls).
And anytime they were ordered to fight an engagement with the enemy they
desired
these Pollari make their Aruspices; and if the fowls pecked away, they fought
with a good augury: if they did not peck away, they abstained from battle.
None
the less, when reason showed them that a thing ought to be done, not
withstanding the Aruspices should be adverse, they did it anyway: but then
they
turned these (aruspices) with conditions and in such a manner so adeptly,
that
it should not appear they were doing so with disparagement to their Religion:
which method was used by Consul Papirus in a most important battle which he
waged against the Samnites, which afterward left them entirely weak and
afflicted. For Papirus being in the field encountered the Samnites, and as
victory in battle appeared certain to him, and because of this wanting to
come
to an engagement, he commanded the Pollari that they make their Aruspices:
but
the fowls did not peck away, and the Prince of the Pollari seeing the great
disposition of the army to fight and the thoughts to win which were in the
Captain and all the soldiers, and in order not to take away this opportunity
from the army of doing well, reported to the Consul that the Aruspices were
proceeding well, so that Papirus ordered out his squadrons; but some of the
Pollari having told certain soldiers that the fowls had not pecked away, they
in
turn told it to Spurius Papirus nephew of the Consul; and when he reported
this
to the Consul, he (the Consul) quickly replied that he should attend to doing
his duty well, and that as to himself and the army the Aruspices were
correct,
and if the Pollarius had told a lie, it would come back on him to his
prejudice.
And so that the result should correspond to the prognostication, he commanded
his legates that they should place the Pollari in the front ranks of the
battle.
Whence it resulted that in going against the enemy, a Roman soldier drawing a
dart by chance killed the Prince of the Pollari: which thing becoming known,
the
Consul said that every thing was proceeding well and with the favor of the
Gods,
for the army through the death of that liar was purged of every blame and of
whatever anger (the Gods) should have had against him. And thus by knowing
well
how to accommodate his designs to the Aruspices, he (Papirus) took steps to
give
battle without his army perceiving that he had in any part neglected the
institutions of their Religion.
Appius Pulcher acted in a contrary fashion in Sicily in the first Punic war;
for
wanting to give battle to the Carthaginian army, he caused the Pollari to
make
Aruspices, and when they reported to him that those fowl did not peck away,
he
said "Let us see if they would drink," and had them thrown into the
sea: whence
that giving battle he lost the engagement; for which he was condemned at
Rome,
and Papirus honored, not so much for the one having lost and the other having
won, but because the one had gone against the Aruspices in a prudent manner,
and
the other fearfully. Nor did this method of making Aurispices have any other
object than to have the soldiers go into battle with confidence, from which
confidence almost always victory resulted. Which institution was not only
used
by the Romans, but by those outsiders; of which it seems to me proper to
adduce
an example in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XV
HOW THE SAMNITES HAD RECOURSE TO RELIGION AS AN EXTREME REMEDY FOR THE THINGS
AFFLICTING THEM
The Samnites having been routed many times by the Romans, and having lastly
been
defeated in Tuscany, and their armies destroyed and Captains killed, and
their
allies such as the Tuscans, French (Gauls), and Umbrians having also been
defeated, so that "They were not able to continue any longer with their
own men
or with those from outside, yet would not abstain from the war, and instead
of
giving up the unsuccessful defense of liberty, they would undertake one more
attempt at victory before being overcome". Whence they decided to make
one last
try: and since they knew that to want to win it was necessary to induce
obstinacy into the courage of the soldiers, and that to induce it there was
no
better means than Religion, they decided to repeat their ancient sacrifices
through the medium of Ovius Paccius their Priest, who arranged it in this
form:
that a solemn sacrifice being made, (and), in the midst of the slain victims
and
burning altars make all the heads of the army swear never to abandon the
fight;
then they summoned the soldiers one by one and in the midst of those altars
and
surrounded by many centurions with bared swords in their hands, they made
them
first swear that they would not reveal the things they saw or heard, then
with
execrable phrases and words full of terror they made them swear and promise
the
Gods that they would go readily wherever the Emperor should command them, and
never to flee in battle, and to kill whomever they should see fleeing; which
oath if not observed would be visited on the head of his family and on his
descendants. And some of them being frightened, (and) not wanting to swear,
were
quickly put to death by the centurions: so that the others who followed,
terrified by the ferocity of the spectacle, all swore. And in order to make
this
gathering of theirs more imposing, there being forty thousand men there, they
dressed half of them in white clothes with crests and plumes on the helmets,
and
thus arrayed they took position at Aquilonia: Papirius came against them, who
in
encouraging his soldiers said, "Those crests cannot inflict wounds, and
paint
and gilding keep Roman javelins from transfixing shields". And to weaken
the
opinion that his soldiers had of the enemy because of the oath they had
taken,
he said that it (the oath) was to inspire fear, and not courage, in those
(who
had taken it), for it made them at the same time fear their own Citizens,
their
Gods, and their enemies. And coming to the fight, the Samnites were defeated;
for the virtu of the Romans, and the fear conceived from the past routs
overcame
whatever obstinacy they were able to assume by virtu of their Religion and by
the oath they had taken. None the less it is seen that they (the Samnites)
did
not appear to have any other refuge, nor try other remedies to be able to
revive
hope and reestablish their lost virtu. Which fully testifies how much
confidence
can be obtained by means of Religion well used. And although this part might
perhaps be rather placed among affairs of outside (peoples), none the less as
this refers to one of the most important institutions of the Republic of
Rome,
it has appeared to me proper to commit this in this place so as not to divide
this material and have to return to it many times.
CHAPTER XVI
A PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, IF BY SOME ACCIDENT BECOMES
FREE,
MAINTAINS ITS LIBERTY WITH DIFFICULTY
Many examples derived from the records of ancient history will show how
difficult it is for a people used to living under a Prince to preserve their
liberty after they had by some accident acquired it, as Rome acquired it
after
driving out the Tarquins. And such difficulty is reasonable; because that
people
is nothing else other than a brute animal, which ((although by nature
ferocious
and wild)) has always been brought up in prison and servitude, (and) which
later
being left by chance free in a field, (and) not being accustomed to (obtain)
food or not knowing where to find shelter for refuge, becomes prey to the
first
one who seeks to enchain it again. This same thing happens to a people, who
being accustomed to living under governments of others, not knowing to reason
either on public defense or offense, not knowing the Princes or being known
by
them, return readily under a yoke, which often times is more heavy than that
which a short time before had been taken from their necks: and they find
themselves in this difficulty, even though the people is not wholly corrupt;
for
a people where corruption has not entirely taken over, cannot but live at all
free even for a very brief time, as will be discussed below: and therefore
our
discussions concern those people where corruption has not expanded greatly,
and
where there is more of the good than of the bad (spoiled). To the above
should
be added another difficulty, which is that the state which becomes free makes
enemy partisans, and not friendly partisans. All those men become its enemy
partisans who avail themselves of the tyrannical state, feeding on the riches
of
the Prince, (and) who when they are deprived of the faculty of thus availing
themselves, cannot live content, and some are forced to attempt to
reestablish
the tyrancy so as to recover their authority. It does not ((as I have said))
acquire friendly partisans, for a free society bestows honors and rewards
through the medium of honest and predetermined rules, and outside of which
does
not honor or reward anyone; and when one receives those honors and rewards as
appears to them he merits, he does not consider he has any obligation to
repay
them: in addition to this that common usefulness which free society brings
with
it, is not known by anyone ((while he yet possesses it)), which is to be able
to
enjoy his own possessions freely without any suspicion, not being
apprehensive
of the honor of his womenfolk, or that of his children, and not to fear offer
himself; for no one will ever confess himself to have an obligation to one
who
only does not offend him.
Thus ((as was said above)) a free state that has newly sprung up comes to
have
enemy partisans and not friendly partisans. And wanting to remedy this
inconvenience and these disorders which the above mentioned difficulties
bring
with them, there is no remedy more powerful, nor more valid, healthy, and
necessary than (was) the killing of the sons of Brutus, who, as history
shows,
together with other Roman youths were induced to conspire against their
country
for no other reason than because they could not obtain extraordinary
advantages
for themselves under the Consuls as under the Kings; so that the liberty of
that
people appeared to have become their servitude. And whoever undertakes to
govern
a multitude either by the way of liberty (Republic) or by the way of a
Principate, and does not make sure of those who are enemies of that new
institution, establishes a short lived state. It is true that I judge those
Princes unfelicitous who, to assure their state when the multitude is
hostile,
have to take extraordinary means; for he who has only a few enemies can
easily
and without great scandals make sure of them, but he who has the general
public
hostile to him can never make sure of them, and the more cruelty he uses, so
much more weak becomes his Principate; so that the best remedy he has is to
seek
to make the People friendly. And although this discussion departs from that
written above, in speaking of a Prince here and of a Republic there, none the
less in order not to have to return again to this matter I want to speak a
little more.
A Prince, therefore, wanting to gain over to himself a people who are hostile
to
him ((speaking of those Princes who have become Tyrants in their country)), I
say that they ought first to look into that which the people desire, and he
will
find they always desire two things: the one, to avenge themselves against
those
who are the cause of their slavery: the other, to regain their liberty. The
first desire the Prince is able to satisfy entirely, the second in part. As
to
the first, there is an example in point. When Clearchus, Tyrant of Heraclea,
was
in exile, a controversy arose between the people and the Nobles of Heraclea,
(and) the Nobles seeing themselves inferior, turned to favor Clearchus, and
conspiring with him they placed him in opposition to the disposition of the
people of Heraclea, and (thus) took away the liberty from the people. So that
Clearchus finding himself between the insolence of the Nobles, whom he could
not
in any way either content or correct, and the rage of the People who could
not
endure having lost their liberty, he decided suddenly to free himself from
the
nuisance of the Nobles, and to win the people over to himself. And on this,
taking a convenient opportunity, he cut to pieces all the Nobles, to the
extreme
satisfaction of the People. And thus, in this way, he satisfied one of the
desires people had, that is, to avenge themselves. But as to the desire of
the
people to regain their liberty, the Prince, not being able to satisfy it,
ought
to examine what are the reasons that make them desire to be free, and he will
find that a small part of them desire to be free in order to command, but all
the others, who are an infinite number, desire liberty also as to live in
security. For in all Republics in whatever manner organized, there are never
more than forty or fifty Citizens of a rank to command, and because this
number
is small, it is an easy matter to assure oneself of them, either by taking
them
out of the way, or by giving them a part of so many honors as, according to
their condition, ought in good part to content them. The others, to whom it
is
enough to live in security, are easily satisfied by creating institutions and
laws which, together with his power, gives realization to the general
security
of the people. And when a Prince does this, and the people see that no one
breaks such laws by accident, they will begin in a very short time to live in
security and contentment. In example for this, there is the Kingdom of
France,
which lives in security from nothing else other than those Kings being bound
by
an infinite number of laws in which the security of his people is realized.
And
whoever organized that state wanted that those Kings should do ((in their own
way)) with the arms and the money as they wanted, but should not be able to
dispose of any other thing otherwise than by the laws that were ordained.
That
Prince, therefore, or that Republic, that does not secure itself at the
beginning of its state, should assure itself at the first opportunity, as the
Romans did. And he who should allow this to pass will repent too late of not
doing that which he ought to have done. The Roman people, therefore, being
not
yet corrupted when they recovered their liberty, were able to maintain it,
after
the sons of Brutus were put to death and the Tarquins destroyed, with all
those
remedies and institutions which have been discussed at another time. But if
that
people had been corrupted, there never would have been found valid remedies,
in
Rome or elsewhere, to maintain it (their liberty), as we shall show in the
next
chapter.
CHAPTER XVII
A CORRUPT PEOPLE COMING INTO THEIR LIBERTY CAN MAINTAIN ITSELF FREE ONLY WITH
THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY
I judge that it was necessary that Kings should be eliminated in Rome, or
(else)
that Rome would in a very short time become weak and of no valor; for
considering to what (degree of) corruption those Kings had come, if it should
have continued so for two or three successions, (and) that that corruption
which
was in them had begun to spread through its members; (and) as the members had
been corrupted it was impossible ever again to reform her (the state). But
losing the head while the torso was sound, they were able easily to return to
a
free and ordered society. And it ought to be presupposed as a very true
matter
that a corrupted City which exists under a Prince, even though that Prince
with
all his lives (family) may be extinguished, can never become free; and that
rather it should happen that one Prince destroy the other, for (these people)
will never be settled without the creation of a new Lord, who by his goodness
together with his virtu will then keep them free: but that liberty will last
only during his life time, as happened at different times in Syracuse to Dion
and Timoleon, whose virtu while they lived, kept that City free: but when
they
died, it returned to the ancient Tyranny. But there is no more striking
example
to be seen than that of Rome, which after the Tarquins had been driven out,
was
able quickly to resume and maintain that liberty; but after the death of
Caesar,
Caligula, and Nero, and after the extinction of all the line of Caesar, she
could not only never maintain her liberty, but was unable to reestablish it.
And
so great a difference in events in the same City did not result from anything
else other than (the fact that) the Roman People in the time of Tarquin was
not
yet corrupt, and in the latter time (Caesar's) it became very corrupt. For to
keep her sound and disposed to keep away from Kings at that time, it was
enough
to make them swear that they should never consent that any of them should
ever
reign in Rome; but in the time of the other (Caesar) the authority of Brutus
with all the Eastern legions was not enough to keep her disposed to want to
maintain that liberty which he, in imitation of the first Brutus, had
restored
to her. Which resulted from that corruption which the party of Marius had
spread
among the people, at the head of which was Caesar, who was able so to blind
the
multitude that they did not recognize the yoke which they themselves were
placing on their necks.
And although this example of Rome is to be preferred to any other example,
none
the less on this proposition I want to refer to people known before our
times. I
say, therefore, that no incident ((although grave and violent)) can ever
restore
Milan or Naples to freedom, because those people are entirely corrupt. Which
was
seen after the death of Filippo Visconti, who, wanting to restore liberty to
Milan, did not know how and could not maintain it. It was therefore a great
good
fortune for Rome that no sooner had these Kings become corrupt than they were
driven out, and that before their corruption should pass into the vitals of
that
City; which corruption was the cause of the infinite tumults which took place
in
Rome ((men having good intentions)) (and which) did no harm, but rather
benefited the Republic. And this conclusion can be drawn, that where the
people
is not corrupted, tumults and other troubles do no harm; but where corruption
exists, well ordered laws are of no benefit, unless they are administered by
one
who, with extreme strength, will make them be observed until the people
become
good (cured); I do not know if this ever happened, or whether it be possible
that it could happen; for it is seen ((as I have said a little above)) that a
City coming to decadence because of the corruption of its people, if it ever
happens that she is raised up again, it happens through the virtu of one man
who
is then living, and not by the virtu of the general public, that the good
institutions are sustained: and as soon as such a one is dead, they will
return
to their pristine habits, as happened at Thebes, which by the virtu of
Epaminondas, while he was alive, was able to maintain the form of a Republic
and
Empire, but after his death returned to its first disorders: the reason is
this,
that one man cannot live so long that the time will be enough to bring a City
back to good habits which for a long time has had evil habits. And if one of
very long life or two continuous successors of virtu do not restore it (the
state), so one which lacks them ((as was said above)) is quickly ruined,
unless
it should be made to be restored through many dangers and much bloodshed. For
such corruption and little inclination for a free society result from an
inequality that exists in that City; and wanting to bring them to equality,
it
is necessary to use the most extraordinary means, which few know or want to
use,
as will be described in more detail in another place.
CHAPTER XVIII
IN WHAT WAY IN A CORRUPT CITY A FREE STATE CAN BE MAINTAINED, IF THERE IS ONE
THERE, OR IF NOT, HOW TO ESTABLISH IT
I believe it is not outside the purpose of this discussion, nor too distant
from
that written above, to consider whether a free State can be maintained in a
City
that is corrupted, or, if there had not been one, to be able to establish
one.
On this matter I say that it is very difficult to do either one or the other:
and although it is almost impossible to give rules ((because it will be
necessary to proceed according to the degrees of corruption)), none the less,
as
it is well to discuss every thing, I do not want to omit this. And I will
presuppose a City very corrupt, where such difficulties come to rise very
fast,
as there are found there neither laws or institutions that should be enough
to
check a general corruption. For as good customs have need of laws for
maintaining themselves, so the laws, to be observed, have need of good
customs.
In addition to this, the institutions and laws made in a Republic at its
origin
when men were good, are not afterward more suitable, when they (men) have
become
evil. And if laws vary according to circumstances and events in a City, its
institutions rarely or never vary: which results in the fact that new laws
are
not enough, for the institutions that remain firm will corrupt it. And in
order
to make this part better understood, I will tell how the Government was
established in Rome, or rather the State, and the laws with which afterwards
the
Magistrates restrained the Citizens. The institution of the State included
the
authority of the People, the Senate, thy Tribunes, the Consuls, method of
seeking and creating Magistrates, and the method of making laws. These
institutions were rarely or never varied by events. The laws that restrained
the
Citizens varied, such as was the law of the Adulterers, the Sumptuary, that
of
Ambition, and many others, according as the Citizens from day to day became
corrupt. But the institutions of the State becoming firm, although no longer
good for the corrupt (people), those laws that were changed were not enough
to
keep men good, but would have been of benefit if with the changes of the law
the
institutions should have been modified.
And that it is true that such institutions in a City that had become corrupt
were not good, is expressly seen in these two principal points. As to the
creation of the Magistracies and the laws, the Roman People did not give the
Consulship and other high offices of the City, except to those who asked for
them. In the beginning these institutions were good because no one asked for
these (offices) except those Citizens who judged themselves worthy, and
having a
refusal was ignominious: so that in order to judge himself worthy every one
worked well. However, this system became pernicious in a corrupt City, for it
was not those who had more virtu, but those who had more power, who asked for
the Magistracies, and the less powerful ((no matter of how much virtu))
abstained from asking from fear. This evil did not come on suddenly, but by
degrees, as happens with all other evils: for the Romans having subjugated
Africa and Asia, and reduced almost all of Greece to their obedience, had
become
assured of their liberty, nor did they seem to have more enemies who should
give
them fear. This security, and this weakness of her enemies, caused the Roman
people no longer to regard virtu in bestowing the Consulship, but
graciousness,
drawing to that dignity those who knew better how to handle men, not to those
who knew better how to conquer their enemies: afterwards they descended from
those who had more graciousness to give it to those who had more power. So
that
because of the defects of such institutions, the good were entirely excluded
from everything. A Tribune or some other Citizen could propose a law to the
people on which every Citizen could speak in favor or against it before it
should be adopted. This institution was good when the Citizens were good, for
it
was always well that anyone who intended some good for the public was able to
propose it, and it was well that everyone could speak his thoughts on it, so
that the people, having listened to all sides, could then select the best.
But
when the Citizens had become bad such institutions became the worst, for only
the powerful proposed laws, (and) not for the common liberty, but for their
own
power, and everyone for fear of them was not able to speak against them: so
that
the people came to be deceived or forced into deciding their own ruin.
It was necessary, therefore, if Rome wanted to maintain herself free in her
corruption, that she should have made new institutions, just as she had made
new
laws in the process of her existence, for other institutions and modes of
living
ought to be established in a bad people as well as in a good one, nor can the
form be the same in a people entirely different. But because these
institutions
when they are suddenly discovered no longer to be good have to be changed
either
completely, or little by little as each (defect) is known, I say that both of
these two courses are almost impossible. For in the case of wanting to change
little by little a prudent man is required who sees this evil from a distance
and at its beginning. It is easily probable that no one such as these springs
up
in a City: and even if one should spring up he is never able to persuade
others
of that which he intends; for men living in one manner, do not want to
change,
and the more so as they do not see the evil face to face, but being shown to
them as (mere) conjecture.
As to changing these institutions all at once when everyone recognizes they
are
not good, I say that the defect which is easily recognized is difficult to
correct, for to do this it is not enough to use ordinary means, as ordinary
means are bad, but it is necessary to come to the extraordinary, such as
violence and arms, and before anything else to become Prince of that City,
and
to be able to dispose of it as he pleases. And as the re-organization of the
political life of a City presupposes a good man, and the becoming of a Prince
of
a Republic by violence presupposes a bad man; for because of this it will be
found that it rarely happens that a (good) men wants to become Prince through
bad means, even though his objectives be good; or that a bad one, having
become
Prince, wants to work for good and that it should enter his mind to use for
good
that authority which he had acquired by evil means. From all the things
written
above, arises the difficulty or impossibility of maintaining a Republic in a
City that has become corrupted, or to establish it there anew. And even if it
should have to be created or maintained, it would be necessary to reduce it
more
to a Royal State (Monarchy) than to a Popular State (Republic), so that those
men who because of their insolence cannot be controlled by laws, should be
restrained by a Power almost Regal. And to want to make them become good by
other means would be either a most cruel enterprise or entirely impossible;
as I
said above this is what Cleomenes did, who for wanting to be alone (in the
Government) killed the Ephors, and if Romulus for the same reasons killed his
brother and Titus Tatius, the Sabine, and afterwards they used their
authority
well, none the less, it ought to be noted that one and the other of these men
did not have their subjects stained with that corruption of which we have
discussed in this chapter, and therefore they could desire (good), and
desiring
it, conform their designs accordingly.
CHAPTER XIX
A WEAK PRINCE WHO SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT PRINCE CAN BE MAINTAINED, BUT ANY
KINGDOM CANNOT BE MAINTAINED IF A WEAK ONE IS SUCCEEDED BY ANOTHER WEAK ONE
In considering the virtu and the mode of proceeding of Romulus, of Numa, and
of
Tullus, the first three Kings of Rome, it will be seen that Rome was favored
by
the greatest good fortune, having the first King most ferocious and warlike,
the
next quiet and religious, the third similar in ferocity to Romulus, and a
greater lover of war than of peace. For it was necessary in Rome that in the
beginning there should spring up an Organizer of civil institutions, but it
then
indeed was necessary that the other Kings should reassume the virtu of
Romulus,
otherwise that City would have become effeminate and prey to her neighbors.
Whence it can be noted that a successor not having as much virtu as the
first,
is able to maintain a State which was erected by that man before him and can
enjoy his labors; but if it happens either that his life is a long one, or
that
after him there should not spring up another who should reassume the virtu of
the first one, that Kingdom of necessity will be ruined. And so, on the
contrary, if two, one after the other, are of great virtu, it will often be
seen
that they achieve most great things and that they will rise with their fame
to
the heavens. David without doubt was a man most excellent in arms, in
doctrine,
and in judgment, and so great was his virtu, that having conquered and beaten
down all his neighbors, he left a peaceful Kingdom to this son Solomon, which
he
was able to preserve with the arts of peace and of war, and he was able
happily
to enjoy the virtu of his father. But he could not thus leave it to his son
Rehoboam, who not being like his grandfather in virtu, or like his father in
fortune, remained heir to the sixth part of the Kingdom only with great
effort.
Bajazet, Sultan of the Turks, although he was more a lover of peace than of
war,
was able to enjoy the efforts of his father Mahomet, who having like David
beaten his neighbors, left him a firm Kingdom and capable of being preserved
easily with the arts of peace. But if his own son Soliman, the present lord,
had
been like his father and not his grandfather, that Kingdom would have been
ruined: but it was seen that this man was to surpass the glory of his
grandfather.
I say, therefore, through these examples, that it is possible for a weak
Prince
succeeding an excellent one to preserve any Kingdom, even if it should not be
as
that of France, which is maintained by its ancient institutions: and those
Princes are weak who are not able to endure war. I conclude, therefore, with
this discussion that the virtu of Romulus was so great, that it was able to
give
time to Numa Pompilius to be able to rule Rome with the arts of peace; but he
was succeeded by Tullus, who by his ferocity reassumed the reputation of
Romulus; after whom there followed Ancus, so gifted by nature that he was
able
to use peace and endure war. And first he addressed himself to want to hold
the
ways of peace, but he soon knew that his neighbors judging him effeminate
esteemed him little, so that he decided that if he wanted to maintain Rome he
needed to turn to war and imitate Romulus, and not Numa. Let all the Princes
who
have a State take example from this, that he who imitates Numa may keep it
(the
State) or not keep it, according as the times and fortune may turn his way;
but
he who imitates Romulus, and is like him armed with prudence and weapons,
will
keep it in any case, unless it is taken from him by an obstinate (and)
excessive
force. And certainly it can be though that, if Rome had not by chance had as
her
third King a man who had not known how to recover with arms her reputation,
she
would never then have been able, except with the greatest difficulty, to gain
a
foothold, nor to achieve the results that she did. And thus as long as she
lived
under Kings, she was subject to these dangers of being ruined under a weak or
bad King.
CHAPTER XX
TWO CONTINUOUS SUCCESSIONS OF PRINCES OF VIRTU ACHIEVE GREAT RESULTS; AND
THAT
WELL ORGANIZED REPUBLICS OF NECESSITY HAVE SUCCESSIONS OF VIRTU; THEREFORE
THEIR
ACQUISITIONS AND EXPANSIONS ARE GREAT
After Rome had driven out her Kings, she was no longer exposed to those
perils
which were mentioned above, resulting from a succession of weak or bad Kings;
for the highest (authority) was vested in the Consuls, who came to that
Empire
not by heredity or deceit or violent ambition, but by free suffrage, and were
always most excellent men, from whose virtu and fortune Rome had benefited
from
time to time, (and) was able to arrive at her ultimate greatness in as many
years as she had existed under her Kings. For it is seen that two continuous
successions of Princes of virtu are sufficient to acquire the world, as was
(the
case of) Philip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great. A Republic ought to be
able to do so much more, having the means of electing not only two
successions,
but an infinite number of Princes of great virtu who are successors one after
the other: which succession of virtu is always well established in every
Republic.
CHAPTER XXI
HOW MUCH BLAME THAT PRINCE AND REPUBLIC MERIT WHO LACK THEIR OWN ARMS
Present Princes and modern Republics, who lack their own soldiers in regard
to
defense and offense, ought to be ashamed of themselves and to think from the
example of Tullus that such a defect exists not because of the lack of men
suitable for the military, but that by their own fault they have not known
how
to make soldiers of their men.[3] For Tullus, after Rome had been at peace
forty
years, did not find a man ((when he succeeded to the Kingdom)) who had ever
been
in war. None the less, planning to make war, he did not think of availing
himself of the Samnites, or of the Tuscans, or of others who were accustomed
to
bear arms, but as a most prudent man decided to avail himself of his own
people:
And such was his virtu that he was able quickly to make excellent soldiers
under
his own government. And there is nothing more true than that (truth), if
there
are no soldiers where there are men, this results from the defect of the
Prince,
and not from any local or natural defect: of which there is a very recent
example: For everyone knows that in recent times the King of England
assaulted
the kingdom of France, and did not take as soldiers any other than his own
people: and because that Kingdom had been for more than thirty years without
making war, he did not have either soldiers or a Captain who had ever fought:
none the less, he did not hesitate with them to assault a Kingdom full of
Captains and good armies, which had been continually under arms in the wars
in
Italy. All of which resulted from that King being a prudent man and that
Kingdom
well organized, that in time of peace did not neglect the arrangements of
war.
The Thebans, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, after having liberated Thebes, and
rescued her from the servitude of the Spartan Empire, finding themselves in a
City accustomed to servitude, and in the midst of an effeminate people, did
not
hesitate ((so great was their virtu)) to put them under arms and with them go
to
meet the Spartan armies in the field and conquered them: and whoever writes
says, that these two in a short time showed that men of war were born not
only
in Lacedemonia, but in every other place where men are born, as long as there
was to be found one man who should know how to train them in military
service,
as is seen (in the case) of Tullus who knew how to train the Romans. And
Virgil
could not express this thought better, and with other words shows how he
adhered
to that, when he said: "And Tullus made of These men soldiers".
CHAPTER XXII
WHAT IS TO BE NOTED IN THE CASE OF THE THREE ROMAN HORATII AND OF THE THREE
ALBAN CURATII
Tullus, King of Rome, and Metius, King of Alba, agreed that that people
should
be lord of those whose above mentioned three men should overcome (those of)
the
others. All the Alban Curatii were killed, (and) there remained only one of
the
Roman Horatii alive, and because of this Metius, King of the Albans, with his
subjects, remained subject to the Romans. And when that Horatius returned as
conqueror to Rome, meeting his sister who was married to one of the three
dead
Curatii, and who was weeping over the death of her husband, he killed her.
Whence that Horatius, because of this crime, was placed on trial and after
much
deliberation was freed, more because of thy prayers of his father than
because
of his own merits. Here three things are to be noted. One, that one should
never
risk all his fortune with only part of his forces. Next, that in a well
organized City, the demerits (crimes) are never rewarded with merits. The
third,
that proceedings are never wise where one ought to be doubtful of their
observance. For being in servitude means much to a City, that it ought never
to
be believed that any of those Kings or of those People should be content that
three of their Citizens should make them subject, as is seen Metius wanted to
do, who although immediately after the victory of the Romans confessed
himself
conquered and promised obedience to Tullus, none the less, in the first
expedition in which they were to come against the Veienti, it is seen that he
sought to deceive them, as one who sees too late the imprudence of the
proceeding undertaken by him. And because this third point has been talked
about
much, we will talk only of the other two in the following two chapters.
CHAPTER XXIII
THAT ONE OUGHT NOT TO PUT IN PERIL ALL HIS FORTUNE AND ALL HIS FORCES; AND
BECAUSE OF THIS THE GUARDING OF PASSES IS OFTEN HARMFUL
It was never judged (to be) a wise proceeding to put into peril all of one's
fortune or all of one's forces. This may be done in many ways. One is to do
as
Tullus and Metius did when they committed all the fortune of their country
and
the virtu of so many men, as both of these had in their armies, to the virtu
and
fortune of three of their Citizens, which came to be only a minimum part of
the
forces of each of them. Nor did they see that because of this proceeding all
the
labors that their ancestors had endured in the establishment of the Republic
in
order to have it exist free a long time, and to make her Citizens defenders
of
their liberty, were as it were made in vain, it being in the power of so few
to
lose it. Which action (on the part) of those Kings could not be considered
worse. This error is also almost always committed by those who ((seeing the
enemy)) plan to hold different places and guard the passes. For almost always
this decision will be damaging unless you can thus conveniently keep all your
forces (there) in that difficult place. In this case such a procedure is to
be
taken: but being in a rugged place and not being able to keep all your forces
there, the procedure is damaging. I am made to think thusly by the example of
those who, when they are assaulted by a powerful enemy, and their country
being
surrounded by mountains and rugged places, never tried to combat the enemy in
the passes and in the mountains, but have gone out to meet them in front of
these, or when they did not wish to do that, have awaited him behind these
mountains in easy and not-rugged places. And the reason was, as it were, as
alleged before; for many men cannot be brought to the guarding of rugged
places,
not only because it is not possible to live there a long time, but also
because
being in narrow places capable of (admitting) only a few, it is not possible
to
sustain an enemy who comes in a large body to hurl himself at you: And it is
easy for the enemy to come in large numbers, because his intention is to pass
and not stop, while to him who awaits him (the enemy) it is impossible to
wait
with large numbers, having to quarter himself for a longer time ((not knowing
when the enemy may attempt to pass)) in narrow and sterile places, as I have
said. Having therefore lost that pass that you had presupposed to hold, and
in
which your people and the army had trusted, there will very often enter in
the
people and the rest of the forces so much terror that, without being able to
test the virtu of those remaining, they are lost; and thus you have lost all
your fortune with only part of your forces.
Everyone knows with how much difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps which
divide
Lombardy from France, and with how much difficulty he crossed those which
divide
Lombardy from Tuscany; none the less, the Romans awaited him first on the
Ticino
and afterwards on the plains of Arezzo; and they wanted rather that their
army
should be consumed by the enemy in places where they themselves could
conquer,
than to lead it over the Alps to be destroyed by the malignity of the site.
And
whoever reads all the histories attentively will find very few Captians of
virtu
to have held similar passes and for the reasons mentioned, and because they
cannot close them all, the mountains being like the fields and having roads
not
only well known and frequented, but many other which, if not known to
outsiders,
are well known to the people of the country, with whose aid you will always
be
brought to any place against the wishes of whoever opposes you. Of this a
most
recent example in the year one thousand five hundred fifteen (1515) can be
cited. When Francis King of France planned to cross into Italy in order to
recover the State of Lombardy, the greater foundation of those who opposed
his
enterprise was that the Swiss would stop him in the mountain passes. And as
was
seen from this experience, that foundation of theirs was vain, for that King,
leaving aside two or three places guarded by them (Swiss), came by another
unknown road, and was already in Italy before they were aware of it. So that,
frightened, they retreated to Milan, and all the people of Lombardy adhered
to
the French forces, having been proved wrong in their opinion that the French
would be held in the mountains.
CHAPTER XXIV
WELL ORGANIZED REPUBLICS ESTABLISH REWARDS AND PENALTIES FOR THEIR CITIZENS,
BUT
NEVER COMPENSATE ONE (AT THE EXPENSE) OF THE OTHER
The merits of Horatius had been very great, having by his virtu conquered the
Curatii. None the less such a homicide displeased the Romans so much, that he
was brought to trial for his life, notwithstanding that his merits were so
great
and so recent. Which thing, to whoever should consider it only superficially,
would seem to be an example of the ingratitude of the people. None the less,
whoever should examine it closer, and with better consideration will look for
what the orders of the Republic ought to be, will blame that people rather
for
having absolved him than for having wanted to condemn him: and the reason is
this, that no well-ordered Republic ever cancels the misbehavior of its
citizens
by their merits; and having rewarded one for having acted well, if that same
one
afterwards acts badly, it castigates him without having regard to any of his
good actions. And if these orders are well observed, a City will exist free
for
a long time; if otherwise, it will quickly be ruined. For if to a citizen who
has done some eminent work for the City, there is added to his reputation of
that which he acquired, and audacity and confidence of being able to do some
wrong without fear of punishment, he will in a short time become so insolent
as
to put an end to all civil law. But wanting that the punishment for evil
actions
be feared, it is very necessary to observe rewarding good, as is seen was
done
by Rome. And although a Republic may be poor and can give only a little, it
ought not to abstain from giving that little, because every little gift given
to
someone in recompense for a good deed, no matter how big (the deed), will
always
be esteemed very greatly by whoever receives it as an honorable thing. And
the
history of Horatius Codes and that of Mutius Scaevola are well known; how one
held back the enemy on a bridge until it was cut, (and) the other burned his
hand having erred in wanting to murder Porsenna, King of the Tuscans. For
these
two eminent deeds two measures of land were given to each of those men by the
public. The history of Manlius Capitolinus is also well known. For having
saved
the Campidoglio from the Gauls who were besieging it, this man was given a
small
measure of flour by those who had been besieged inside with him, which reward
((according to the value that was then current in Rome)) was great and of
quality; (but) when Manlius afterward, either from envy or from his evil
nature,
moved to raise up sedition in Rome, and seeking to gain over the People to
himself, he was, without regard to any of his merits, thrown precipituously
from
that Campidoglio which he had previously with so much glory saved.
CHAPTER XXV
WHOEVER WANTS TO REFORM AN ANCIENT STATE INTO A FREE CITY, SHOULD RETAIN AT
LEAST A SHADOW OF THE ANCIENT FORMS
He who desires or wants to reform the State (Government) of a City, and
wishes
that it may be accepted and capable of maintaining itself to everyone's
satisfaction, it is necessary for him at least to retain the shadow of
ancient
forms, so that it does not appear to the people that the institutions have
been
changed, even though in fact the new institutions should be entirely
different
from the past ones: for the general mass of men are satisfied with
appearances,
as if it exists, and many times are moved by the things which appear to be
rather than by the things that are. The Romans knew this necessity in the
beginning of their free existence, (and) for this reason, had in place of one
King created two Consuls, (and) did not want them to have more than twelve
Lictors so as not to exceed the number that ministered to the Kings. In
addition
to this, an annual sacrifice was made in Rome, which could not be done except
by
the King in person, and as the Romans wishing that the People should not
desire
any of the ancient things because of the absence of the King, created a chief
for the said sacrifice, whom they called the King of sacrifice, and placed
him
under the high priest. So that the people through this means came to be
satisfied with that sacrifice and never to have reason, for lack of them, to
desire the return of the King. And this ought to be observed by all those who
want to abolish an ancient (system of) living in a City and bring it to a new
and more liberal (system of) living. For as new things disturb the minds of
men,
you ought to endeavor that these changes retain as much as possible of the
ancient (forms); and if the magistrates change both in number and in
authority
and in duration (of term) from the ancients, the names at least ought to be
retained. And this ((as I have said)) ought to be preserved by whoever wants
to
organize an absolute power into a Republic or a Kingdom; but he who wants to
establish an absolute power, which by authors is called a Tyranny, ought to
change everything, as will be mentioned in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XXVI
A NEW PRINCE IN A CITY OR PROVINCE TAKEN BY HIM OUGHT TO ORGANIZE EVERYTHING
ANEW
Whoever becomes Prince either of a City or a State, and more so if his
foundations are weak, and does not want to establish a civil system either in
the form of a Kingdom or a Republic, (will find) the best remedy he has to
hold
that Principality is ((he being a new Prince)) to do everything anew in that
State; such as in the City to make new Governors with new titles, with new
authority, with new men, (and) make the poor rich, as David did when he
became
King, who piled good upon the needy, and dismissed the wealthy empty-handed.
In
addition to this he should build new Cities, destroy old ones, transfer the
inhabitants from one place to another, and in sum, not to leave anything
unchanged in that Province, (and) so that there should be no rank, nor order,
nor status, nor riches, that he who obtains it does not recognize it as
coming
from him; he should take as his model Philip of Macedonia, father of
Alexander,
who, by these methods, from a petty King became Prince of Greece. And those
who
write of him tell how be transferred men from Province to Province, as the
Mandrians (Shepherds) move their sheep. These methods are most cruel and
hostile
to every system of living, not only Christian, but human, and should be
avoided
by every man; and he should want rather to live as a private individual than
as
a King at the (expense of the) ruin of men. None the less, he who does not
want
to take up the first path of good, must, if he wants to maintain himself,
follow
the latter path of evil. But men take up certain middle paths which are most
harmful, for they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as the
following chapter will show by example.
CHAPTER XXVII
VERY RARELY DO MEN KNOW HOW TO BE ENTIRELY GOOD OR ENTIRELY BAD
When Pope Julius II in the year one thousand five hundred and five (1505)
went
to Bologna to drive the house of Bentivogli out of that State, of which they
had
held the Principate (of that State) for a hundred years, he wanted also to
remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni from Perugia, of which he was Tyrant, (and) to
be
the one who planned to eliminate all the Tyrants who were occupying the lands
of
the Church. And having arrived at Perugia with this purpose and decision
known
to everyone, he did not wait to enter in that City with his army that was
protecting him, but entered unarmed, notwithstanding that Giovanpagolo was
inside with large forces that he had gathered for defense. And thus, brought
by
that fury which governed all his actions, with only his simple guard he
placed
himself in the hands of the enemy, whom he then carried off with him, leaving
a
governor in that City who should administer it for the Church. The temerity
of
the Pope and the cowardice of Giovanpagolo were noted by the prudent men who
were with the Pope, nor could they understand whence it happened that he
(Baglioni) did not with his perpetual fame attack his enemy at once and
enrich
himself with booty, there being with the Pope all the Cardinals with their
valuables. Nor could it be believed that he abstained either from goodness or
that his conscience restrained him; for no regard of piety could enter in the
heart of a riotous man, who had kept his sister, and had put to death his
cousins and nephews in order that he could reign there: but it is concluded
that
men do not know how to be entirely bad or perfectly good, and that when an
evil
has some greatness in it or is generous in any part, they do not know how to
attempt it. Thus Giovanpagolo, who did not mind being publicly (called)
incestuous and a parricide, did not know how, or to say more correctly, did
not
dare ((even having a justifiable opportunity)) to make an enterprise where
everyone would have admired his courage and which would have left an eternal
memory of himself, being the first who would have shown the Prelates how
little
esteemed are they who live and reign as they do, and would have done an act,
the
greatness of which would have overcome every infamy and every danger that
could
have resulted from it.
CHAPTER XXVIII
FOR WHAT REASONS THE ROMANS WERE LESS UNGRATEFUL TO THEIR CITIZENS THAN THE
ATHENIANS
Whoever reads of the things done by Republics will find in all of them some
species of ingratitude against their citizens, but he will find less in Rome
than in Athens, and perhaps in any other Republic. And in seeking the reasons
for this, speaking of Rome and Athens, I believe it was because the Romans
had
less reason to suspect their citizens than did the Athenians. For in Rome
((discussing the time from the expulsion of the Kings up to Sulla and
Marius))
liberty was never taken away from any of its citizens, so that in that (City)
there was no great reason to be suspicious of them, and consequently (no
cause)
to offend them inconsiderately. The very contrary happened in Athens, for her
liberty having been taken away by Pisistratus in her most florid time and
under
the deception of goodness, so soon then as she became free, remembering the
injuries received and her past servitude, she became a harsh avenger not only
of
the errors of her citizens, but even the shadow of them. From which resulted
the
exile and death of so many excellent men: From this came the practice of
ostracism and every other violence which that City at various times took up
against her Nobility. And it is very true what these writers say of that
Civil
Society, that when they have recovered their liberty, they sting their people
more severely than when they have preserved it. Whoever would consider,
therefore, what has been said, will not blame Athens for this, nor praise
Rome,
but he will blame only the necessity resulting from the difference of events
which occurred in those Cities. For whoever will consider things carefully,
will
see that if Rome had had her liberty taken away as it was in Athens, Rome
would
not have been any more merciful toward her citizens than was the latter. From
which a very real conjecture can be made of that which occurred after the
expulsion of the Kings against Collatinus and Publius Valerius, of whom the
first ((although he was found in liberating Rome)) was sent into exile for no
other reason than for having the name of the Tarquins, and the other having
only
given suspicion by building a house on Mount Celius, was also made to be an
exile. So that it can be judged ((seeing how severe Rome was in these two
suspicions)) that she would have been ungrateful as Athens was, if she had
been
offended by her citizens as she was in her early times and before her
expansion.
And so as not to have to return again to this matter of ingratitude, I shall
say
that which will occur in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XXIX
WHICH IS MORE UNGRATEFUL, A PEOPLE OR A PRINCE
It appears to me apropos of the above written matter to discuss with example
who
practiced this ingratitude more, a People or a Prince. And to discuss this
part
further, I say that this vice of ingratitude arises either from avarice or
from
suspicion: For when a People or a Prince has sent out one of its Captains on
an
important expedition, where that Captain ((having won)) has acquired great
glory, that People or that Prince is bound in turn to reward him: and if in
place of a reward they, moved by avarice, either dishonor or offend him, not
wanting ((held back by this cupidity)) to take the trouble, they make an
error
that has no excuse, but will leave behind for them an eternal infamy. Yet
many
Princes are found who err in this way. And Cornelius Tacitus tells the reason
in
this sentence; An injury is more apt to be repaid than a benefit, where
gratitude is onerous and exultation is had in revenge. But when they do not
reward one; or ((to say it better)) they offend one, moved not by avarice,
but
by suspicion, then both the People and Prince merit some excuse. And much is
read of this ingratitude shown for such reasons, for that Captain who by his
virtu has conquered an Empire for his Lord, overcoming the enemy and filling
himself with glory and his soldiers with riches, of necessity acquires so
much
reputation with his soldiers, with his enemies, and with the Prince's very
own
subjects, that that victory can be distasteful to that Lord who had sent him.
And because the nature of men is ambitious and suspicious, and puts no limits
on
the fortune of anyone, it is not impossible that the suspicion which is
suddenly
aroused in the Prince after the victory of his captain, may not by itself
have
been increased by some of his actions or expressions made insolently. So that
the Prince cannot think otherwise than to secure himself: and to do this
thinks
of either having him die or taking away from him that reputation which he
gained
among his army and the people, and with all industry show that the victory
was
not due to the virtu of that (Captain), but by chance and cowardice of the
enemy, or by the wisdom of other Captains who had been with him in that
action.
After Vespasian, while in Judea, was declared Emperor by his army, Antonius
Primus, who was to be found with another army in Illyria, took his side, and
came into Italy against Vitellius who reigned in Rome, and with the greatest
virtu routed two armies of Vitellius and occupied Rome, so that through the
virtu of Antonius, Mutianus, who had been sent by Vespasian, found everything
achieved and all difficulties overcome. The reward which Antonius received
was
that Mutianus took away from him the command of the army, and little by
little
reduced his authority in Rome to nothing: so that Antonius went to find
Vespasian who was yet in Asia, by whom he was received in such a fashion,
that
in a brief time, having been reduced to no rank, died almost in despair. And
histories are full of such examples.
In our own times anyone now living knows with what industry and virtu
Gonsalvo
Ferrante, fighting in the Kingdom of Naples for Ferrando King of Aragon
against
the French, had conquered and won that Kingdom, and was rewarded for his
victory
by Ferrando, who departed from Aragon and came to Naples, where he first took
away from him the command of the armed forces, then took away from him the
fortresses, and then took him with him to Spain, where in a short time he
died
unhonored.
And this suspicion, therefore, is so natural in Princes that they cannot
defend
themselves against them, and it is impossible for them to show gratitude
toward
those who, by victory under their ensigns, have made great conquest. And if a
Prince cannot defend himself from them, is it not a miracle or something
worthy
of greater consideration, that a people does not also defend itself; for a
City
which exists free has two objectives, one conquering, the other maintaining
itself free, and it happens that because of excessive love for both of these
it
makes errors. As to the errors made in conquering, they will be spoken of in
their proper place. As to the errors made in maintaining itself free, among
others they are those of offending those Citizens whom it ought to reward,
and
of having suspicion of those in whom it ought to have confidence. And
although
these things in a Republic already corrupted cause great evils, and which
many
times rather leads to tyranny, as happened in Rome under Caesar who took by
force that which ingratitude denied him, none the less in a Republic not yet
corrupted they are the cause of great good, and make for a longer free
existence, maintaining itself because the fear of punishment makes men better
and less ambitious.
It is true that among all the people who ever had an Empire for reasons
discussed above, Rome was the least ungrateful, for it can be said there is
no
other example of her ingratitude than that of Scipio; for Coriolanus and
Camillus were both made exiles because of the injuries that the one and the
other had inflicted on the Plebs: But he one was never pardoned for having
always preserved a hostile spirit against the People: the other was not only
recalled (from exile), but for the rest of his life was adored as a Prince.
But
the ingratitude shown to Scipio arose from a suspicion that the Citizens
begun
to have of him that was never had of others, which (suspicion) arose from the
greatness of the enemy that Scipio conquered, from the reputation which that
victory in such a long and perilous war had given him, from the rapidity of
it,
from the favor which his youth, his prudence, and his other memorable virtues
had acquired for him. These were so many, that for no other reason, the
Magistrates of Rome feared his authority, which displeased intelligent men as
something unheard of in Rome. And his manner of living appeared so
extraordinary
that Cato the elder, reputed a saint, was the first to go against him, and to
say that a City could not be called free where there was a Citizen who was
feared by the Magistrates. So that if the people of Rome in this case
followed
the opinion of Cato, they merit the excuse that I said above was merited by
those People and those Princes who, because of suspicion, are ungrateful.
Concluding this discourse, therefore, I say that using this vice of
ingratitude
for either avarice or suspicion, it will be seen that the People never use it
from avarice, and from suspicion much less than do Princes, having less
reason
for suspicion, as will be told below.
CHAPTER XXX
WHAT MEANS A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC OUGHT TO USE TO AVOID THIS VICE OF
INGRATITUDE, AND WHAT THAT CAPTAIN OR THAT CITIZEN OUGHT TO DO SO AS NOT TO
BE
TOUCHED BY IT
A Prince, to avoid the necessity of having to live with suspicion or to be
ungrateful, ought to go on his expeditions in person, as those Roman Emperors
did in the beginning, as does the Turk in our times, and as those of virtu
have
done and still do. For winning, the glory and the conquests are all theirs:
and
when they do not ((the glory belonging to others)) it does not appear to them
to
be able to use that conquest unless they extinguish that glory in others
which
they have not known how to gain for themselves, and to become ungrateful and
unjust is without doubt more to their loss than to their gain. But when
either
through negligence or little prudence they remain idle at home and send a
Captain, I have no precept to give them, then, other than that which they
know
by themselves. But I will say to that Captain, judging that he will not be
able
to escape the stings of ingratitude, that he must do one of two things:
either
immediately after the victory he must leave the army and place himself in the
hands of the Prince, guarding himself from any insolent and ambitious act, so
that he (the Prince) despoiled of every suspicion has reason either to reward
him or not to offend him, or if he does not please to do this, to take boldly
the contrary side, and take all those means through which he believed that
that
conquest is his very own and not of his Prince, obtaining for himself the
good
will of his soldiers and of the subjects, and must make new friendships with
his
neighbors, occupy the fortresses with his men, corrupt the Princes (Leaders)
of
his army, and assure himself of those he cannot corrupt, and by these means
seek
to punish his Lord for that ingratitude that he showed toward him. There are
no
other ways: but ((as was said above)) men do not know how to be all bad, or
all
good. And it always happens that immediately after a victory, he (a Captain)
does not want to leave his army, is not able to conduct himself modestly,
does
not know how to use forceful ends (and) which have in themselves something
honorable. So that being undecided, between the delays and indecision, he is
destroyed.
As to a Republic wishing to avoid this vice of ingratitude, the same remedy
cannot be given as that of a Prince; that is, that it cannot go and not send
others on its expeditions, being necessitated to send one of its Citizens. It
happens, therefore, that as a remedy, I would tell them to keep to the same
means that the Roman Republic used in being less ungrateful than others:
which
resulted from the methods of its government, for as all the City, both the
Nobles and Ignobles (Plebeians) devoted themselves to war, there always
sprung
up in Rome in every age so many men of virtu and adorned with various
victories,
that the People did not have cause for being apprehensive of any of them,
there
being so many and one guarding another. And thus they maintained themselves
wholesome and careful not to show any shadow of ambition, nor give reason to
the
People to harm them as ambitious men; and if they came to the Dictatorship,
that
greater glory derived rather from their laying it down. And thus, not being
able
by such methods to generate suspicion, they did not generate ingratitude. So
that a Republic that does not want to have cause to be ungrateful ought to
govern as Rome did, and a Citizen who wants to avoid its sting ought to
observe
the limits observed the limits observed by the Roman Citizens.
CHAPTER XXXI
THAT ROMAN CAPTAINS WERE NEVER EXTRAORDINARILY PUNISHED FOR ERRORS COMMITTED;
NOR WERE THEY YET PUNISHED WHEN, BY THEIR IGNORANCE OR BAD PROCEEDINGS
UNDERTAKEN BY THEM, HARM ENSUED TO THE REPUBLIC
The Romans were ((as we discussed above)) not only less ungrateful than other
Republics, but were even more merciful and considerate in punishing their
Captains of the armies than any other. For if their error had been from
malice,
they castigated them humanely: if it was through ignorance, they did not
punish
them but rewarded and honored them. This manner of proceeding was well
considered by them, for they judged that it was of great importance to those
who
commanded their armies to have their minds free and prompt and without any
outside regard as to how they took up their duties, that they did not want to
add anything, which in itself was difficult and dangerous, believing that if
these were added no one would be able to operate with virtu. For instance,
they
sent an army into Greece against Philip of Macedonia, and into Italy against
those people who first overcame them. This Captain who was placed in charge
of
such an expedition would be deeply concerned of all the cares that go on
behind
those activities, which are grave and very important. Now, if to such cares
should be added the many examples of the Romans who had been crucified or
otherwise put to death for having lost the engagement, it would be impossible
for that Captain, among such suspicions, to be able to proceed vigorously.
Judging, therefore, that the ignominy of having lost would be a great
punishment
for such a one, they did not want to frighten him with other greater
penalties.
As to errors committed through ignorance, here is an example. Sergius and
Virginius were besieging Veii, each in charge of part of the army, of which
Sergius was on the side whence the Tuscans could come, and Virginius on the
other side. It happened that Sergius being assaulted by the Faliscans among
other people, preferred being routed and put to flight before sending to
Virginius for help: And on the other hand, Virginius waiting for him (Sergius)
to be humiliated, would rather see the dishonor of his country and the ruin
of
the army, than to succor him. A truly bad case, and worthy to be noted, and
of
creating a poor conjecture of the Roman Republic, if both of them had not
been
castigated. It is true that where another Republic would have punished them
with
a capital penalty, it (Rome) punished them with a monetary fine. Which was
done,
not because their errors merited greater punishment, but because the Romans
wanted in this case, for the reasons already mentioned, to maintain their
ancient customs.
As to errors (committed) through ignorance, there is no more striking example
than that of Varro, through whose temerity the Romans were routed at Cannae
by
Hannibal, where that Republic was brought in danger of its liberty, none the
less because it was ignorance and not malice, they not only did not castigate
him, but honored him, and on his return to Rome, the whole Senatorial order
went
to meet him, (and) not being able to thank him for the battle, they thanked
him
for returning to Rome and for not having despaired of Roman affairs.
When Papirus Cursor wanted to have Fabius put to death for having, against
his
command, combatted with the Samnites, among the other reasons which were
assigned by the father of Fabius against the obstinacy of the Dictator was
this,
that in any defeat of its Captains, the Roman People never did that which
Papirus in victory wanted to do.
CHAPTER XXXII
A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT NOT TO DEFER BENEFITING MEN IN THEIR NECESSITY
Although the Romans succeeded happily in being liberal to people, yet when
danger came upon them from Porsenna coming to assault Rome in order to
restore
thy Tarquins, the Senate apprehensive of the plebs who might want to accept
the
Kings than to sustain a war, in order to assure themselves (of the plebs),
relieved them of the salt gabelle and all other taxes, saying that the poor
did
much for the public benefit if they reared their children, and that because
of
this benefice that people should submit itself to endure siege, famine, and
war:
let no one who trusts in this example defer in gaming the people over to
himself
until the time of danger, for it will not succeed for him as it succeeded for
the Romans; for the people in general will judge not to have gotten that
benefit
from you, but from your adversaries, and becoming afraid that once the
necessity
is past, you would take back from them that which by force you gave them,
they
will have no obligation to you. And the reason why this proceeding turned out
well for the Romans was because the State was new, and not yet firm, and that
the people had seen that other laws had been made before for their benefit,
such
as that of the appeal to the Plebs: so that they could persuade themselves
that
that good which was done, was not caused so much by the coming of the enemy
as
much as the disposition of the Senate to benefit them: In addition to this
the
memory of the Kings, by whom they had been ill-used and injured in many ways,
was fresh. And as similar occasions rarely occur, so it rarely occurs that
similar remedies do good. Therefore Republics as well as Princes ought to
think
ahead what adversities may befall them, and of which men in adverse times
they
may have need of, and then act toward them as they might judge necessary
((supposing some case)) to live. And he who governs himself otherwise,
whether
Prince or Republic, and especially a Prince, and then on this fact believes
that
if danger comes upon him, he may regain the people for himself by benefits,
deceives himself, because he not only does not assure himself, but
accelerates
his ruin.
CHAPTER XXXIII
WHEN AN EVIL HAS SPRUNG UP EITHER WITHIN A STATE OR AGAINST A STATE, IT IS A
MORE SALUTARY PROCEEDING TO TEMPORIZE WITH IT THAN TO ATTACK IT RASHLY
The Roman Republic growing in reputation, strength, and empire, its neighbors
which at first had not thought how much harm that new Republic would be able
to
bring to them, commenced ((but too late)) to recognize their error, and
wanting
to remedy that which at first they had not remedied, they (arranged) for
forty
peoples (tribes) to conspire against Rome: whence the Romans among the usual
remedies made by them in urgent perils, wanted to create a Dictator, that is,
to
give power to one man who, without any consultation, should be able to
decide,
and without any appeal should be able to execute his decisions: This remedy
which formerly was useful and a means of overcoming imminent perils, was also
always most useful in all those incidents which sprung up at any time against
the Republic in the expansion of the Empire. On which subject it will first
be
discussed, that when an evil springs up either within a Republic or against a
Republic, whether from intrinsic or extrinsic causes, and has become so great
that it begins to make (everyone) afraid, it is a much more safe procedure to
temporize with it than to try to extinguish it. For almost always those who
try
to crush it, make its force greater, and make that evil which is suspected
from
it to be accelerated. And incidents similar to these arise more frequently in
a
Republic from intrinsic and extrinsic causes, as it often occurs that it
allows
a Citizen more power than is reasonable, or the corrupting of a law is begun
which is the nerve and life of a free society: and this error is allowed to
run
so far, that it is a more harmful procedure to want to remedy it than to let
it
go on. And it is so much more difficult to recognize these evils when they
first
arise, as it seems more natural to men always to favor the beginning of
things:
And such favors are accorded more to those accomplishments which have in them
some virtu or are done by young men, than to any other thing: for if some
young
noble is seen to spring up in a Republic who has in him some extraordinary
virtu, the eyes of all the Citizens begin to turn toward him, and they agree
without regard (to consequences) to honor him: so that if there is any stitch
of
ambition in him, the assemblage of favors which nature and these incidents
give
him, he will soon come to a place that when the Citizens see their error,
they
will have few remedies to stop him, and they wanting so much to employ that
which they have, do nothing other than to accelerate his power.
Of this many examples can be cited, but I want to give only one of our City
(of
Florence). Cosimo De'Medici, from whom the house of Medici in our City owed
the
beginning of its greatness, came into such reputation by the favor which his
prudence and the ignorance of the other Citizens gave him, that he begun to
bring fear to the State, so that the other Citizens judged it dangerous to
offend him and still more dangerous to allow him to go on. But Niccolo Da
Uzzano
living in those times, who was held to be a man most expert in civil affairs,
and having made the first error in not recognizing the dangers that could
arise
from the reputation of Cosimo, never permitted while he lived that a second
(error) be made, that is, that it should be attempted (to want) to destroy
him,
judging that such an attempt would be the ruin of their State, as in fact was
seen after his death; for those Citizens (who remained) not observing these
counsels of his, made themselves strong against Cosimo and drove him out of
Florence. Whence there resulted that, his party resentful of this injury, a
little later called him back and made him Prince of the Republic, to which
rank
he could never have ascended without that manifest opposition. This same
thing
happened in Rome to Caesar who was favored by Pompey and the others for his
virtu; which favor a little while later was converted to fear: to which
Cicero
gives testimony, saying that Pompey had too late begun to fear Caesar. Which
fear caused them to think of remedies, and the remedies they took accelerated
the ruin of the Republic.
I say, therefore, that since it is difficult to recognize these evils when
they
spring up, this difficulty caused by the deception which things give in the
beginning, it is the wiser proceeding to temporize with them when they are
recognized than to oppose them. For by temporizing with them, they will
either
extinguish themselves, or the evil will at least be deferred for a longer
time.
And Princes ought to open their eyes to all these things which they plan to
do
away with, and be careful by their strength and drive not to increase them
instead of decreasing them, and not believe that by blowing at a thing, it
can
be done away with, or rather to suffocate the plant by blowing on it. But the
force of the evil ought to be well considered, and when they see themselves
sufficient to oppose it, to attack it without regard (to consequences),
otherwise they should let it be, and in no way attempt it. For it will happen
as
was discussed above, and as it did happen to the neighbors of Rome, to whom
after Rome had grown so much in power, it was more salutary to seek to
placate
her and hold her back with methods of peace, than with methods of war to make
her think of new institutions and new defenses. For their conspiracy did
nothing
other than to make them united, more stalwart, and to think of new ways by
which
in a short time they expanded their power: Among which was the creation of a
Dictator, by which new institution they not only overcame the imminent
dangers,
but was the cause of obviating infinite evils in which, without that remedy,
that Republic would have been involved.
CHAPTER XXXIV
THE DICTATORIAL AUTHORITY DID GOOD AND NOT HARM TO THE ROMAN REPUBLIC; AND
THAT
THE AUTHORITY WHICH CITIZENS TAKE AWAY, NOT THOSE ARE GIVEN THEM BY FREE
SUFFRAGE, ARE PERNICIOUS TO CIVIL SOCIETY
Those Romans who introduced into that City the method of creating a Dictator
have been condemned by some writers, as something that was in time the cause
of
tyranny in Rome; alleging that the first tyrant who existed in that City
commanded her under this title of Dictator, saying if it had not been for
this,
Caesar could not under any public (title) have imposed his tyranny. Which
thing
was not well examined by those who held this opinion and was believed beyond
all
reason. For it was not the name or the rank of Dictator that placed Rome in
servitude, but it was the authority taken by the Citizens to perpetuate
themselves in the Empire (government): and if the title of Dictator did not
exist in Rome, they would have taken another; for it is power that easily
acquires a name, not a name power. And it is seen that the Dictatorship while
it
was given according to public orders and not by individual authority, always
did
good to the City. For it is the Magistrates who are made and the authority
that
is given by irregular means that do injury to Republics, not those that come
in
the regular way. As is seen ensued in Rome where in so much passage of time
no
Dictator did anything that was not good for the Republic. For which there are
very evident reasons: First, because if a Citizen would want to (offend and )
take up authority in an irregular manner, it must happen that he have many
qualities which he can never have in an uncorrupted Republic, for he needs to
be
very rich and to have many adherents and partisans, which he cannot have
where
the laws are observed: and even if he should have them, such men are so
formidable that free suffrage would not support them. In addition to this, a
Dictator was made for a (limited) time and not in perpetuity, and only to
remove
the cause for which he was created; and his authority extended only in being
able to decide by himself the ways of meeting that urgent peril, (and) to do
things without consultation, and to punish anyone without appeal; but he
could
do nothing to diminish (the power) of the State, such as would have been the
taking away of authority from the Senate or the people, to destroy the
ancient
institutions of the City and the making of new ones. So that taking together
the
short time of the Dictatorship and the limited authority that he had, and the
Roman People uncorrupted, it was impossible that he should exceed his limits
and
harm the City: but from experience it is seen that it (City) always benefited
by
him.
And truly, among the other Roman institutions, this is one that merits to be
considered and counted among those which were the cause of the greatness of
so
great an Empire: For without a similar institution, the Cities would have
avoided such extraordinary hazards only with difficulty; for the customary
orders of the Republic move to slowly ((no council or Magistrate being able
by
himself to do anything, but in many cases having to act together)) that the
assembling together of opinions takes so much time; and remedies are most
dangerous when they have to apply to some situation which cannot await time.
And
therefore Republics ought to have a similar method among their institutions.
And
the Venetian Republic ((which among modern Republics is excellent)) has
reserved
authority to a small group (few) of citizens so that in urgent necessities
they
can decide on all matters without wider consultation. For when a similar
method
is lacking in a Republic, either observing the institutions (strictly) will
ruin
her, or in order not to ruin her, it will be necessary to break them. And in
a
Republic, it should never happen that it be governed by extraordinary
methods.
For although the extraordinary method would do well at that time, none the
less
the example does evil, for if a usage is established of breaking institutions
for good objectives, then under that pretext they will be broken for evil
ones.
So that no Republic will be perfect, unless it has provided for everything
with
laws, and provided a remedy for every incident, and fixed the method of
governing it. And therefore concluding I say, that those Republics which in
urgent perils do not have resort either to a Dictatorship or a similar
authority, will always be ruined in grave incidents. And it is to be noted in
this new institution how the method of electing him was wisely provided by
the
Romans. For the creation of a Dictator being of some discredit to the
Consuls,
as the Chiefs of the City had to come to the same obedience as others, (and)
wanting that the authority for such election should remain in the consuls,
believing that if an incident should arise that Rome would have need of this
Regal power, by doing this voluntarily by themselves (Consuls), it would
reflect
on them less. For the wounds and every other evil that men inflict on
themselves
spontaneously and by choice, pain less in the long run than do those that are
inflicted by others. In later times, however, the Romans, in place of a
Dictator, used to give such authority to the Consul, in these words: Let the
Consuls see that the Republic suffers no detriment. But to return to our
subject, I conclude, that the neighbors of Rome seeking to oppress her,
caused
her to institute methods not only enabling her to defend herself, but
enabling
her with more strength, better counsels, and greater authority to attack
them.
CHAPTER XXXV
THE REASON WHY THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRS IN ROME WAS HARMFUL TO THE
LIBERTY
OF THAT REPUBLIC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS CREATED BY PUBLIC AND FREE
SUFFRAGE
The election of the Ten citizens (Decemvirs) created by the Roman people to
make
the laws in Rome, who in time became Tyrants, and without any regard took
away
her liberty, appears to be contrary to what was discussed above, that that
authority which is taken by violence, not that which is given by suffrage,
harms
the Republics. Here, however, the methods of giving authority and the time
for
which it is given, ought to be considered. For when free authority is given
for
a long time ((calling a long time a year or more)) it is always dangerous and
will produce effects either good or bad, according as those upon whom it is
conferred are good or bad. And if the authority given to the Ten and that
which
the Dictators have are considered, it will be seen beyond comparison that
that
of the Ten is greater. For when a Dictator was created there remained the
Tribunes, Consuls, (and) the Senate, with all their authority, and the
Dictator
could not take it away from them; and even if he should have been able to
remove
anyone from the Consulship, or from the Senate, he could not suppress the
Senatorial order and make new laws. So that the Senate, the Consuls, and the
Tribunes, remaining with their authority, came to be as his guard to prevent
him
form going off from the right road. But in the creation of the Ten all the
contrary occurred, for they annulled the Consuls and the Tribunes, and they
were
given authority to make laws and do every other thing as the Roman People
had.
So that, finding themselves alone, without Consuls, without Tribunes, without
the appeal to the People, and because of this not having anyone to observe
them,
moved by the ambitions of Appius, they were able in the second year to become
insolent. And because of this, it ought to be noted that when (we said) an
authority given by free suffrage never harmed any Republic, it presupposed
that
a People is never led to give it except with limited powers and for limited
times: but when either from having been deceived or for some other reason it
happens that they are induced to give it imprudently and in the way in which
the
Roman people gave it to the Ten, it will always happen as it did to them
(Romans). This is easily proven, considering the reasons that kept the
Dictators
good and that made the Ten bad: and considering also how those Republics
which
have been kept well ordered have done in giving authority for a long (period
of)
time, as the Spartans gave to their King, and how the Venetians give to their
Doges; for it will be seen in both these methods, guardians were appointed
who
watched that the Kings (and the Doges) could not ill use that authority. Nor
is
it of any benefit in this case that the people are not corrupted, for an
absolute authority in a very brief time corrupts the people, and makes
friends
and partisans for itself. Nor is it harmful either to be poor or not to have
relatives, for riches and every other favor quickly will run after power, as
we
will discuss in detail in the creation of the said Ten.
CHAPTER XXXVI
CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE HIGHER HONORS OUGHT NOT TO DISDAIN THE
LESSER
The Romans had made Marcus Fabius and C. Manlius Consuls, and had won a
glorious
engagement against the Veienti and the Etruscans, in which, however, Quintus
Fabius brother of the Consul, who the previous year had himself been Consul,
was
killed. Here, then, ought to be considered how much the institutions of that
City were adept at making her great, and how much the other Republics
deceived
themselves in deviating (themselves) from her methods. For although the
Romans
were great lovers of glory, none the less they did not esteem it a
dishonorable
thing to obey presently those whom at another time they had commanded, and to
serve in that army of which they had been Princes. Which custom is contrary
to
the opinion, orders, and practices of the Citizen of our times: and in Venice
this error still holds that a Citizen having had a high rank would be ashamed
to
accept a lesser, and the City consents to them what she cannot change. Which
thing, however honorable it should be for a private (citizen) is entirely
useless for the public. For a Republic ought to have more hope, and more
confidence in a Citizen who descends from a high rank to govern a lesser,
than
in one who rises from a lower rank to govern a higher one. For the latter
cannot
reasonably be relied upon unless he is surrounded by men, who are of such
respectability or of such virtu, that his inexperience can be moderated by
their
counsel and authority. And if in Rome there had been the same customs as are
in
Venice, and other modern Republics and Kingdoms, where he who had at one time
been Consul should never want to enter the army except as Consul, there would
have arisen infinite things prejudicial to a free society, both because of
the
errors that new men would make, and because of their ambition which they
could
have indulged in more freely, not having men around them in whose presence
they
should be afraid to err, and thus they would have come to be more
unrestrained,
which would have resulted entirely to the detriment of the public.
CHAPTER XXXVII
WHAT TROUBLES THE AGRARIAN LAW BROUGHT FORTH IN ROME; AND HOW TROUBLESOME IT
IS
TO MAKE A LAW IN A REPUBLIC WHICH GREATLY REGARDS THE PAST BUT CONTRARY TO
THE
ANCIENT CUSTOMS OF THE CITY
It was the verdict of ancient writers that men afflict themselves in evil and
weary themselves in the good, and that the same effects result from both of
these passions. For whenever men are not obliged to fight from necessity,
they
fight from ambition; which is so powerful in human breasts, that it never
leaves
them no matter to what rank they rise. The reason is that nature has so
created
men that they are able to desire everything but are not able to attain
everything: so that the desire being always greater than the acquisition,
there
results discontent with the possession and little satisfaction to themselves
from it. From this arises the changes in their fortunes; for as men desire,
some
to have more, some in fear of losing their acquisition, there ensues enmity
and
war, from which results the ruin of that province and the elevation of
another.
I have made this discussion because it was not enough for the Roman Plebs to
secure themselves from the Nobles through the creation of the Tribunes, to
which
(desire) they were constrained by necessity, that they soon ((having obtained
that)) begun to fight from ambition and to want to divide with the Nobles
their
honors and possessions, as things more esteemed by men. From this there arose
the plague that brought forth the contentions about the Agrarian law, and in
the
end was the cause of the destruction of the Roman Republic. And because
well-ordered Republics have to keep the public (State) rich and its Citizens
poor, it was apparent that there was some defect in that law in the City of
Rome, which either was now drawn in the beginning in such a way that it
required
to be redrawn every day, or that it was so long deferred in the making that
it
became troublesome in regard to the past, or if it had been well ordered in
the
beginning, it had become corrupted in its application. So that whatever way
it
may have been, this law could never be spoken of in Rome without that City
going
upside down (from turmoil). This law had two principal articles. Through the
first it provided that each Citizen could not possess more than so many
jugeri
of land, through the other that the fields which were taken from the enemy
should be divided among the Roman people. This, therefore, came to make two
strong offenses against the Nobles, for those who possessed more land than
the
law permitted ((of whom the Nobles were the greater part)) had to be deprived
of
it, and by dividing the possessions of the enemy among the Plebs, it deprived
them (Nobles) that means of enriching themselves. Since this offense came to
be
against the powerful men, and who thought that by going against it they were
defending the public, whenever ((as I have said)) this was brought up, that
City
would go upside-down, and the Nobles with patience and industry temporized,
either by calling out the army, or by having that Tribune who proposed it
opposed by another Tribune, or sometimes by yielding in part, or even by
sending
a Colony to that place that was to be distributed, as happened in the
countryside of Antium, about which a dispute spring up from this law; a
Colony
drawn from Rome was sent to that place, to whom the said countryside was
assigned. Concerning which Titus Livius used a notable remark, saying that it
was difficult to find in Rome one who would give his name to go to the said
Colony; so much more ready were the Plebs to defend the things in Rome than
to
possess them in Antium.
This mood concerning this law thus troubled them for a time, so that the
Romans
begun to conduct their armies to the extreme parts of Italy, or outside of
Italy, after which time it appeared that things settled down. This resulted
because the fields that the enemies of Rome possessed being far removed from
the
eyes of the Plebs, and in a place where it was not easy to cultivate them,
became less desirable; and also the Romans were less disposed to punish their
enemies in such a way, and even when they deprived them of some land from
their
countryside, they distributed Colonies there. So that for these reasons this
law
remained, as it were, dormant up to the time of the Gracchi, by whom it being
revived, wholly ruined the liberty of Rome; for it found the power of its
adversaries redoubled, and because of this (revival) so much hate developed
between the Plebs and the Senate, that it came to arms and bloodshed beyond
every civil limit and custom. So that the public Magistrates not being able
to
remedy them, nor either faction having further confidence in them, recourse
was
had to private remedies, and each of thy factions decided to appoint a chief
(for themselves) who would defend them. In these troubles and disorders the
Plebs came and turned to Marius with his reputations, so that they made him
Consul four times; and with few intervening intervals that his Consulship
continued so that he was able by himself to make himself Consul another three
times. Against which plague thy Nobility, not having any remedy, turned their
favor to Sulla, and having made him Head of their party, arrived at civil
war,
and after much bloodshed and changes of fortune, the Nobility remained
superior.
Later, in the time of Caesar and Pompey, these moods were revived, for Caesar
making himself Head of the party of Marius, and Pompey of that of Sulla;
(and)
coming to arms Caesar remained superior, who became the first Tyrant in Rome,
so
that City was never again free.
Such, therefore, was the beginning and the end of the Agrarian law. And
although
elsewhere we showed that the enmity in Rome between the Senate and the Plebs
should maintain Rome free, because it gave rise to those laws which favored
liberty, and therefore the result of this Agrarian law may seem different
from
such a conclusion, I say that I do not on that account change my opinion, for
so
great is the ambition of the Nobles, that if it is not beaten down in various
ways and means in a City, it will soon bring that City to ruin. So that if
the
contentions about the Agrarian law took three hundred years in bringing Rome
to
servitude, she would perhaps have been brought to servitude much sooner if
the
Plebs with this law and their other desires had not always restrained the
ambitions of the Nobles. It is also to be seen from this how much more men
esteem property than honors, for the Roman Nobility, always yielded without
extraordinary trouble to the Plebs in the matter of honors, but when it came
to
property, so great was its obstinacy in defending it, that the Plebs in order
to
give vent to their appetites had recourse to those extraordinary proceedings
which were discussed above. The movers of these disorders were the Gracchi,
whose intentions should be praised more than their prudence. For to want to
remove an abuse that has grown up in a Republic, and enact a retrospective
law
for this, is a badly considered proceeding, and ((as was discussed above at
length)) does nothing else than to accelerate that evil which leads to that
abuse; but by temporizing with it, either the evil comes much later, or by
itself in time ((before its end comes)) it will extinguish itself.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
WEAK REPUBLICS ARE IRRESOLUTE AND DO NOT KNOW HOW TO DECIDE; AND IF THEY TAKE
UP
ANY PROCEEDING, IT RESULTS MORE FROM NECESSITY THAN FROM ELECTION
Because of a very great pestilence occurring in Rome, it appeared to the
Volscians and the Equeans that the time had come for them to be able to
attack
Rome, these two people raised a large army and assaulted the Latins and the
Ernicians, and their country being laid waste, the Latins and Ernicians were
constrained to make it (to be) known to Rome, and pray that they might be
defended by the Romans, but the Romans being afflicted by the pestilence,
answered them that they should take up the proceeding of defending themselves
with arms, for they were not able to defend them. In which is recognized the
generosity and prudence of that Senate, that in every circumstance they
always
wanted to be the one that should be Prince of (make) the decisions which her
subjects had to take; nor were they ever ashamed to decide something contrary
to
their mode of living or to other decisions previously made by them, whenever
necessity should compel them. I say this, because at other times the same
them,
whenever necessity should compel them. I say this, because at other times the
same Senate had forbidden the said people to arm and defend themselves, so
that
to a less prudent Senate it would then have seemed to them a falling from
their
dignity to concede to them this defense. But that (Senate) always judged
things
as they ought to be judged, and always took the less objectionable proceeding
as
the better; for they knew the evil of not being able to defend their
subjects,
and they knew also the evil of letting them arm themselves without them (the
Romans), for the reasons given and many others that are understood: none the
less knowing that they (thy Latins and Ernicians) had in any case armed
themselves from necessity, having the enemy upon them, they took the
honorable
course and decided to let them do what had to be done with their permission,
so
that having once disobeyed from necessity, they might not accustom themselves
to
disobeying from choice.
And although this would appear to be a proceeding that every Republic ought
to
have taken, none the less weak and ill-advised Republics do not know how to
assume it, nor how to gain honor in a similar necessity. The Duke of
Valentino
had taken Faenza and made Bologna submit to his terms. Afterwards wanting to
return to Rome by way of Tuscany, he sent one of his men to Florence to ask
passage for himself and his army. In Florence they consulted how this thing
should be managed, but everyone counselled that it not be conceded to them.
The
Roman way was not followed in this, for the Duke being very well armed, and
the
Florentines disarmed so that they could not prohibit the passage, it was much
more to their honor that it should appear that he (the Duke) passed with
their
permission than by force; for as it was they had nothing but shame, which
would
have in part been less if they had managed otherwise. But the worst part that
weak Republics have, is to be irresolute; so that all the proceedings they
take
are taken by force, and if anything good should be done by them, they do it
by
force and not by their prudence. I want to give two other examples of this
which
occurred in our times in the State (Government) of our City in the year one
thousand five hundred (1500).
King Louis XII of France having retaken Milan, wanting to restore Pisa in
order
to obtain the fifty thousand ducats that had been promised him by the
Florentines after such restitution, he sent his armies toward Pisa captained
by
Monsignor De Beaumont, who, although French, was none the less a man in whom
the
Florentines had great confidence. This Captain placed himself and his army
between Cascina and Pisa in order (to go) to assail the walls, where delaying
several days to organize themselves for the capture, Pisan Orators
(Ambassadors)
came to Beaumont and offered to give up the City to the French army, with
terms
that under the pledge of the King he promise not to put them into the hands
of
the Florentines until four months after (the surrender). This proceeding was
completely refused by the Florentines, so that after beginning the siege, it
followed that (he had to raise it and) he had to retire in shame. Nor was the
proceeding refused for any other reason than the mistrust of the faith of the
King, into whose hands they had been forced to place themselves because of
their
weak counsel; and on the other hand, while they did not trust him, neither
were
they able to see that it would have been easier for the King to restore Pisa
to
them after he had gone inside the City, and if he did not restore it to
expose
his mind (perfidy); but not having (the City) he could promise it to them and
they would be forced to buy that promise: So that it would have been much
more
useful to them to have consented that Beaumont should have taken it (Pisa)
under
any promise, as was seen in the subsequent experience in the year MDII (1502)
when Arezzo having rebelled, Monsignor Imbault was sent by the King of France
to
the succor of the Florentines with French forces, who, arriving near Arezzo,
soon began to negotiate an accord with the Arentines who were (willing) to
give
up the town under certain pledges similar to those (asked) by the Pisans.
This
proposal was rejected in Florence: when Monsignor Imbault learned of this,
and
it appeared to him that the Florentines little understood him, he began to
hold
negotiations for the treaty (of surrender) on his own without the
participation
of the Commissioners so that he could conclude it in his own way; and under
it,
he entered with his forces into Arezzo, making the Florentines understand
that
they were fools and did not understand the things of the world: that if they
wanted Arezzo, they should let the King know, who was much better able to
give
it to them with his forces inside that City rather than (with them) outside.
In
Florence they did not cease abusing and censuring the said Imbault, nor did
they
stop until they realized that if Beaumont had been like Imbault, they would
have
had Pisa as (they had) Arezzo.
And so to return to the subject, irresolute Republics never take up good
proceedings except by force; for their weakness never allows them to decide
where there is any doubt, and if that doubt is not dispelled by some violence
which pushes the, they always remain in suspense.
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE SAME INCIDENTS OFTEN HAPPEN TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE
And it is easily recognized by those who consider present and ancient affairs
that the same desires and passions exist in all Cities and people, and that
they
always existed. So that to whoever with diligence examines past events, it is
an
easy thing to foresee the future in any Republic, and to apply those remedies
which had been used by the ancients, or, not finding any of those used, to
think
of new ones from the similarity of events. But as these considerations are
neglected or not understood by those who govern, it follows that the same
troubles will exist in every time.
The City of Florence, having after the year XCIV (1494) lost part of her
Empire,
such as Pisa and other lands, was obliged to make war against those who
occupied
them: and because he who occupied them was powerful, there followed that they
spent much in the war without any fruit: from the great spending there
resulted
great taxes, from the taxes infinite complaints from the people: and as this
war
was managed by a Magistracy of Ten Citizens who were called the "Ten of
the
War", the general public begun to hold them in aversion as those who
were the
cause of the war, and its expenses, and began to persuade themselves that if
the
said Magistracy were remoted, the path for war would be removed: so that if
they
had to do it (reappoint the Ten) again, they would allow their (terms) to
expire
without making changes and commit their functions to the Signoria. Which
decision was so pernicious that it not only did not end the war as the
general
public had persuaded itself it would, but removed those who were managing it
with prudence, and there followed so great disorders that in addition to
Pisa,
Arezzo, and many other places were lost: so that the people perceiving their
error, (and) that the cause of the malady was the fever and not the doctor,
re-established the Magistracy of the Ten.
This same mood had arisen in Rome against the (name of the) Consuls; for that
people, seeing one war arise from another, and not ever being able to have
any
repose, where they should have believed it had arisen from the ambition of
neighbors who wanted to oppress them, they thought it had arisen form the
ambition of the Nobles, who, being unable to castigate the Plebs within Rome
where they were defended by the power of Tribunate, wanted to lead them
outside
Rome (where they were) under the Consuls in order to oppress them, (and)
where
they would not have any aid: And because of this, they thought that it was
necessary either to remove the Consuls or somehow to regulate their power, so
that they should not have authority over the People either at home or abroad.
The first who tried (to introduce) this law was one Terentillus, a Tribune,
who
proposed that there ought to be created (a Council of) five men who should
examine the power of the Consuls and to limit it. This greatly excited the
Nobility, as it appeared to them the majesty of the Empire would decline
completely, so that no rank in that Republic would remain to the Nobility.
None
the less, so great was the obstinacy of the Tribunes that the dignity of the
Consuls was extinguished: and after some other regulations they were finally
content rather to create Tribunes with Consular power than to continue the
Consuls, holding so much more in hatred their dignity than their authority.
And
thus they continued for a long time, until they recognized their error and
returned to the Ten as the Florentines (did), (and) also re-established the
Consuls.
CHAPTER XL
THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRATE IN ROME, AND WHAT IS TO BE NOTED IN IT; AND
WHERE IT WILL BE CONSIDERED AMONG MANY OTHER THINGS HOW A REPUBLIC CAN BE
SAVED
OR RUINED BECAUSE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS
As I want to discuss in detail the incidents that arose in Rome because of
the
creation of the Decemvirate, it does not appear to me superfluous to narrate
first all that ensued because of such creations, and then to discuss those
parts
which are notable (actions) in it, which are many and (worthy) of much
consideration, both by those who want to maintain a Republic free as well as
by
those who should plan to subjugate her. For in such a discussion will be seen
the many errors made by the Senate and the Plebs prejudicial to liberty, and
the
many errors made by Appius, Chief of the Decemvirate, prejudicial to that
Tyranny which he had intended to have established in Rome. After much
discussion
between the People and the Nobility concerning the adoption of new laws in
Rome
through which the liberty of that State should be firmly established, by
agreement they sent Spurius Posthumus with two other Citizens to Athens for
copies of those laws that Solon gave to that City, so as to be able to base
the
(new) Roman laws upon them. These men having gone and returned, they arrived
at
the appointing of the men who should examine and establish the said laws, and
they created the Decemvir (Ten Citizens) for a year, among whom Appius
Claudius,
a sagacious but turbulent man, was appointed. And in order that they might
create such laws without any regard (to authority), they removed all the
other
Magistracies from Rome, and particularly the Tribunes and the Consuls, and
also
took away the appeal to the people: so that this new Magistracy (of the Ten)
became absolute Princes (Masters) of Rome. Next Appius took over to himself
all
the authority of his other colleagues because of the favor he exercised
toward
the Plebs; for he had made himself so popular with his demonstrations, that
it
seemed a wonder that he should have so readily taken on a new nature and new
genius, having before that time been held to be a cruel persecutor of the
Plebs.
These Ten conducted themselves civilly, not having more than ten Lictors who
walked before the one who had been placed in charge over them. And although
they
had absolute authority, none the less, having to punish a Roman Citizen for
homicide, they cited him before (the sight of) the People and made them judge
him.
They (The Ten) wrote the laws on ten tablet, and before confirming them
exposed
them to the public, so that all could read and discuss them, and so that they
might know if there was any defect in order to be able to amend them before
confirming them. Upon this Appius caused a rumor (to be spread) throughout
Rome,
that, if to these ten tablets there were to be added two others, perfection
would be given to them, so that this opinion gave the People the opportunity
to
reappoint the Ten for another year: to which the People willingly agreed, as
much so as not to reappoint the Consuls, as also because they hoped to remain
without Tribunes, who were the judges of their causes, as was said above.
Proceedings being taken, therefore, to re-establish it (The Ten), all the
Nobility moved to seek these honors, and among the first was Appius: and he
showed so much humanity toward the Plebs in asking for it, that he begun to
be
suspected by his companions: For they could not believe so much graciousness
could exist with so much haughtiness. And being apprehensive of opposing him
openly, they decided to do it by artifice: and although he was the youngest
of
them all, they gave him the authority to propose the future Ten to the
People,
believing that he would observe the limitations of the others of not
proposing
himself, it being an unaccustomed and ignominious thing in Rome. He in truth
changed the impediment into an opportunity, and nominated himself among the
first, to the astonishment and displeasure of all the Nobles. He then
nominated
nine others to his liking. Which new appointments made for another year,
begun
to show their error to the People and to the Nobility. For Appius quickly put
an
end to his alien character, and begun to show his innate haughtiness, and in
a
few days he filled his colleagues with his own spirits. And in order to
frighten
the people and the Senate, in place of the twelve Lictors, they created one
hundred and twenty. For some days the fear was equal (on both sides), but
then
they begun to disregard the Senate and beat the Plebs, and if any beaten by
one
(Decemvir) appealed to another, he was treated worse in the appeal than he
had
in the first instance. So that the Plebs recognizing their error began, full
of
affliction, to look to the Nobles, And to capture the aura of liberty, where
they had feared servitude, to which condition they had brought the Republic.
And
this affliction was welcome to the Nobility, That likewise weary of the
present,
they desired the Consuls. The days that ended the year had come: the two
tables
of the laws were made, but not published. From this, the Ten took the
opportunity to continue their Magistracy, and begun to retain the State
through
violence and make satellites of the Noble youth, to whom they gave the
possessions of those they had condemned: By which gifts these youths were
corrupted, and preferred their license to their complete liberty.
It happened at this time that the Sabines and Volscians moved war against the
Romans, from the fear of which the Ten Began to discuss the weakness of their
State, for without the Senate they could not wage war, and to assemble the
Senate seemed to them they would lose their State. But being compelled to
they
took up this last proceeding, and assembling the Senate, many of the Senators
spoke against the haughtiness of the Ten, and in particular Valerius and
Horatius: and their authority would have been entirely extinguished except
that
the Senate, because of envy of the Plebs, was unwilling to show its
authority,
thinking that if the Ten resigned the magistracy voluntarily, it would be
possible that the Tribune of the Plebs might be re-established. Deciding on
war,
therefore, they sent out two armies, led in part by the said Ten. Appius
remained to govern the City: whereupon it happened that he became enamorated
of
Virginia, and wanting to take her off by force, her father Virginius killed
her
in order to save her from him: whence tumults ensued in Rome and in the
armies,
which, having come together with the remnants of the Roman Plebs, went to
Mount
Sacer, where they stayed until the Ten resigned the Magistracy and the
Tribunes
and Consuls were re-established, and Rome restored to the form of its ancient
liberty.
It is to be noted from this text, therefore, that the evil of creating this
Tyranny first arose in Rome for the same reasons that give rise to the
greater
part of Tyrannies in Cities: and this (results) from the too great desire of
the
people to be free, and from the too great desire of the Nobles to dominate.
And
if they do not agree to make a law in favor of liberty, but one of the
parties
throws its (influence) in favor of one man, then a Tyranny quickly springs
up.
The People and the Nobles of Rome agreed to create the Ten, and create them
with
such authority, from the desire which each of the parties had, one to
extinguish
to Consular office, the other (to extinguish that of) the Tribunate. The Ten
having been created, it seemed to the Plebs that Appius had come to (the side
of) the People and should beat down the Nobles, (and) the People turned to
favor
him. And when a People is led to commit this error of giving reputation to
one
man because he beats down those whom he hates, and if this man is wise, it
will
always happen that he will become Tyrant of that City. For (together) with
the
favor of the People he will attend to extinguishing the Nobility, and after
they
are extinguished he will turn to the oppression of the People until they are
also extinguished; and by the time the People recognize they have become
enslaved, they will not have any place to seek refuge. This is the path all
those have taken who established Tyrannies in Republics: and if Appius had
taken
this path, his tyranny would have taken on more vitality and would not have
been
overthrown so readily. But he did everything to the contrary, nor could he
have
governed more imprudently, that in order to hold the tyranny he made enemies
of
those who had given it to him and who could maintain it for him, and made
friends of those who were not in accord to give it to him and could not
maintain
it for him; and he lost those who were his friends, and sought to have as
friends those who could not be his friends; for although the Nobles desired
to
tyrannize, yet that part of the Nobility which finds itself outside of the
Tyrancy is always hostile to the Tyrant; nor can he ever win them all over to
him because of the great ambition and avarice that exists in them, the Tyrant
not having riches and honors enough to be able to satisfy them all. And thus
Appius in leaving the People and attaching himself to the Nobles, made a most
obvious error, both for the reasons mentioned above, and because, in wanting
to
hold a thing (government) by force, the one who does the forcing needs to be
more powerful than he who is forced. Whence it arises that those Tyrants who
have the general public as friends and the Nobles as enemies, are more
secure,
because their violence is sustained by a greater force than that of those men
who have the People as an enemy and the Nobility as a friend. For with that
favor (of the people) the internal forces are enough to sustain him, as they
were enough for Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta, when Greece and the Roman People
assaulted him; who, making sure of a few Nobles, and having the People as a
friend, he defended himself with them; which he could not do if he had them
as
an enemy. But the internal forces of the other rank not being enough because
there are few friends within it, he must seek (aid) outside. And this may be
of
three kinds; the one, foreigners as satellites who would guard your person;
another, to arm the countryside (and) have them perform the duty that the
Plebs
should do; the third, to ally oneself with powerful neighbors who would
defend
you. Whoever has these means and observes them well, although he has the
People
as his enemy, is able in some way to save himself. But Appius could not
accomplish this winning of the countryside over to himself, the countryside
and
Rome being one and the same thing, and he did not know how to do what he
might
have done; so that he was ruined at the outset. The Senate and the People
made
very great errors in this creation of the Decemvirs; for although in that
discussion made above of the Dictator, that those Magistrates that are
self-constituted, not those whom the People create, are harmful to liberty;
none
the less the People ought, when they create the Magistrates, do it in such a
way
that they should have some regard to becoming bad (abusing their power). But
where they should have proposed safeguards for maintaining them good, the
Romans
removed them, (and) only created the Magistracy (of Ten) in Rome and annulled
all the others because of the excessive desire ((as we said above)) that the
Senate had to extinguish the Tribunes, and the Plebs to extinguish the
Consuls;
this blinded them so that they both contributed to such disorders. For men,
as
King Ferrando said, often act like certain smaller birds of prey, in whom
there
is so much desire to pursue their prey to which nature incites them, that
they
do not observe another larger bird which is above them about to kill them.
It is to be recognized through this discussion, therefore, as we proposed in
the
beginning, the error which the Roman people made in wanting to save their
liberty, and the errors of Appius in wanting to seize the Tyrancy.
CHAPTER XLI
TO JUMP FROM HUMILITY TO PRIDE AND FROM MERCY TO CRUELTY WITHOUT PROFITABLE
MEANS, IS AN IMPRUDENT AND USELESS THING
In addition to other means ill-used by Appius in order to maintain his
tyranny,
that of jumping from one quality to another was of no little moment. For his
astuteness in deceiving the Plebs by simulating to be a man of the People was
well used: those means were also well used in which he caused the Ten to be
reappointed: that audacity in nominating himself against the expectation of
the
Nobility was also well used: the naming of colleagues suitable to him was
also
well used: but in doing this ((according as was said above)) what he did was
not
well used in changing his nature so quickly, and from being a friend showing
himself to be the enemy of the Plebs, from being humane to being haughty,
from
easy (of access) to difficult; and to do this so very readily, that without
any
excuse everyone should know the falseness of his spirit. For whoever at one
time
has appeared to be good and wants for purposes of his own to become bad,
ought
to do it by proper means (gradually), and in a way that they should be
conducive
to the opportunities, so that before his changed nature takes away old favors
from him, it may give him some new ones that his authority may not be
diminished; otherwise, finding himself discovered and without friends, he
will
be ruined.
CHAPTER XLII
HOW EASILY MAN MAY BE CORRUPTED
It should be noted also in the matter of the Decemvirate how easily men are
corrupted and make themselves become of a contrary nature, even though (they
are) good and well educated; (and), considering how those youths whom Appius
had
chosen to surround him begun, for the little advantages that followed from
it,
to be friendly to that tyranny, and that Quintus Fabius, one of the number of
the second Ten, being a very good man, (but) blinded by a little ambition and
persuaded by the malignity of Appius, changed his good habits into the worst,
and became like, him. Which, if well examined, the Legislators of Republics
or
Kingdoms will more promptly restrain human appetites and take away from them
the
hope of being able to err with impunity.
CHAPTER XLIII
THOSE WHO COMBAT FOR THEIR OWN GLORY ARE GOOD AND FAITHFUL SOLDIERS
From the above written treatise it also is to be considered what a difference
there is between a contented army which combats for its own glory, and that
which is ill disposed and which combats for the ambitions of others. For
where
the Roman armies were usually victorious under the Consuls, they always lost
under the Decemvirs. From this example there can be recognized part of the
reasons of the uselessness of mercenary soldiers, who have no other reason
which
keeps them firm but a small stipend which you give to them. Which reason is
not,
and can never be, enough to make them faithful, nor so much your friends that
they be willing to die for you. For in those armies where there is not that
affection toward the man for whom they combat which makes them become his
partisans, there can never be so much virtu which would be enough to resist
even
an enemy of little virtu. And because this love cannot arise in any contest
except from his own subjects, it is necessary in wanting to keep a State, or
to
want to maintain a Republic or a Kingdom, that he arm himself with his own
subjects, as is seen to have been done by all those others who, with their
armies, have made great advances. The Roman armies under the Ten had the same
virtu as before: but because there was not in them the same disposition, they
did not achieve their usual results. But as soon as the Magistracy of the Ten
was extinguished and they begun to fight as free men, that same spirit
returned
in them, and consequently their enterprises had their happy endings according
to
their ancient custom.
CHAPTER XLIV
A MULTITUDE WITHOUT A HEAD IS USELESS, AND ONE OUGHT NOT TO THREATEN FIRST,
AND
THEN SEEK AUTHORITY
Because of the incident of Virginia the Roman Pleb was led armed to the
sacred
mountain (Mons Sacer). The Senate sent its Ambassadors to ask by what
authority
they had abandoned their Captains and retired to the Mountains. And so much
was
the authority of the Senate esteemed that, the Plebs not having their chiefs
among them, no one dared to reply. And T. Livius says that they did not lack
material to reply, but they did lack someone who should make the reply. Which
thing demonstrates in point the uselessness of a multitude without a head.
This
disorder was recognized by Virginius, and by his order twenty military
Tribunes
were created who would be their chiefs to reply to and convene with the
Senate.
And having requested that (the Senators) Valerius and Horatius should be sent
to
them, to whom they would tell their wants, they (the Senators) would not turn
to
go unless the Ten first had resigned their Magistracy: and having arrived on
the
mountain where the Pleb was, these things were demanded of them, that they
wanted the re-establishment of the Tribunes of the Plebs, (and) that an
appeal
to the people from every Magistracy should be allowed, and that all of the
Ten
should be given up to them as they wanted to burn them alive. Valerius and
Horatius lauded the first of their demands: they censured the last as
impious,
saying; You condone cruelty, yet fall yourselves into cruelty, and counselled
them to leave off making mention of the Ten, and to attend to taking from
them
their authority and power, and that afterwards there would not be lacking the
means of satisfying them (their vengeance). From which it is recognized
openly
how foolish and little prudent it is to ask for a thing, and to say at first,
I
want to do evil with it: for one ought not to show his mind, but to want in
every way to seek to obtain that which he desires. For it is enough to ask
from
one his arms, without saying I want to kill you with them; for when you have
the
arms in your hands then you will be able to satisfy your appetite.
CHAPTER XLV
IT IS A BAD EXAMPLE NOT TO OBSERVE A LAW THAT HAS BEEN MADE, AND ESPECIALLY
BY
THE AUTHOR OF IT; AND IT IS MOST HARMFUL TO RENEW EVERY DAY NEW INJURIES IN A
CITY AND TO THE ONE WHO GOVERNS IT
The accord having taken place and Rome restored to its ancient form,
Virginius
cited Appius before the People to defend his cause. He complied accompanied
by
many Nobles. Virginius commanded that he be put in prison. Appius begun to
shout
and appeal to the People. Virginius said that he was not worthy of having
that
(right of) appeal which he had destroyed, nor to have as defender that People
whom he had offended. Appius replied that they (the People) had no (right) to
violate that appeal which they had established with so much desire. He was
incarcerated, however, and before the day of judgment (came) he killed
himself.
And although the wicked life of Appius should merit every punishment, none
the
less it was little consistent to violate the laws, and more so one recently
made. For I do not believe there is a worse example in a Republic than to
make a
law and not to observe it, and much more when it is not observed by those who
made it.
Florence, after ninety four (1494), having had its State (Government)
reorganized with the aid of Brother Girolamo Savonarola ((whose writings show
the doctrine, prudence, and the virtu of his spirit)) and among other
provisions
for the security of the Citizens having had a law enacted which enabled an
appeal to the People from the verdicts which the (Council of) Eight and the
Signoria should give in cases affecting the State ((which passage took more
time
and was attained with the greatest difficulty)); it happened that a little
after
the confirmation of this (law), five Citizens were condemned to death by the
Signoria on account of (acts against) the State, and when they wanted to
appeal,
they were not permitted to do so and the law was not observed. Which took
away
from the Brother more reputation than any other incident; for if that (right
of)
appeal was useful, he should have had it observed: if it was not useful, he
ought not to have had it passed. And so much more was this incident noted,
inasmuch as the Brother, in so many preachings that he made after that law
was
broken, never condemned those who broke it, or excused them, as one who did
not
want to condemn a thing that suited his purpose, yet was not able to excuse
it.
This, having uncovered his ambitions and partisan spirit, took away his
reputation and caused him many troubles.
A State also offends greatly when every day it renews in the minds of its
Citizens new moods because of new injuries which it inflicts on this one and
that one, as happened in Rome after the Decemvirate. For all of the Ten and
other Citizens were accused and condemned at different times, so that a great
fright existed in the Nobility, judging that there would never be an end to
such
condemnations until all the Nobility was destroyed. And great evils would
have
been generated in that City, if it had not been foreseen by the Tribune
Marcus
Duellius, who issued an edict that for one year it would not be licit to cite
anyone or to accuse any Roman Citizen; this reassured all the Nobility. Here
it
is seen how harmful it is to a Republic or to a Prince to keep the minds of
their subjects in a state of fear by continuing penalties and suspended
offenses. And without doubt no more pernicious order can be held; for men who
begin to be apprehensive of having done a capital evil, will secure
themselves
from perils in every way, and become more audacious and have less regard in
attempting new things. It is necessary, therefore, either never to offend any
one or to make the offense at a stroke, and afterwards to reassure men and
give
them cause to quiet and firm the spirit.
CHAPTER XLVI
MEN JUMP FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER, AND FIRST THEY SEEK NOT TO BE
OFFENDED,
THEN TO OFFEND OTHERS
The Roman People having recovered their liberty, (and) having returned to
their
original rank, and having obtained even greater reputation from the many new
laws made in corroboration of their power, it appeared reasonable that Rome
would for some time become quiet. None the less from experience the contrary
was
seen, for every day new tumults and new disorders sprung up. And as Titus
Livius
most prudently renders the cause whence this arose, it does not appear to me
outside my purpose to refer in point to his words, where he says that the
People
or the Nobility always increased their haughtiness when the other was
humiliated; and the Plebs remaining quiet within bounds, the young Nobles
began
to offend them; and the Tribunes were able to make few remedies, because they
too were violated. The Nobility, on the other hand, although it seemed to
them
that their young men were too ferocious, none the less took care to see that
if
(the law) should be transgressed, it should be transgressed by their own and
not
by the Plebs. And thus the desire of defending liberty caused each to prevail
(raise itself) in proportion as they oppressed the other. And the course of
such
incidents is, that while men sought not to fear, they begun to make others
fear,
and that injury which they ward off from themselves, they inflict on another,
as
if it should be necessary either to offend or to be offended. From this may
be
seen one way among others in which Republics ruin themselves, and in what way
men jump from one ambition to another, and how very true is that sentence
which
Sallust placed in the mouth of Caesar, That all evil examples have their
origin
in good beginnings. Those ambitious Citizens ((as was said before)) who live
in
a Republic seek in the first instance not to be able to be harmed, not only
by
private (citizens), but even by the Magistrates: in order to do this, they
seek
friendships, and to acquire them either by apparently honest means, or by
supplying them money or defending them from the powerful: and as this seems
virtuous, everyone is easily deceived and no one takes any remedy against
this,
until he, persevering without hindrance, becomes of a kind whom the Citizen
fear, and the Magistrates treat with consideration. And when he has risen to
that rank, and his greatness not having been obviated at the beginning, it
finally comes to be most dangerous in attempting to pit oneself against him,
for
the reasons which I mentioned above concerning the dangers involved in
abating
an evil which has already grown much in a City; so that the matter in the end
is
reduced to this, that you need either to seek to extinguish it with the
hazard
of sudden ruin, or by allowing it to go on, enter into manifest servitude,
unless death or some accident frees you from him. For when the Citizens and
the
Magistrates come to the above mentioned limits and become afraid to offend
him
and his friends, it will not take much effort afterwards to make them judge
and
offend according to his will. Whence a Republic, among its institutions,
ought
to have these, to see that its Citizens under an aura of good are not able to
do
evil, and that they should acquire that reputation which does good and not
harm
to liberty, as will be discussed by us in its proper place.
CHAPTER XLVII
MEN, ALTHOUGH THEY DECEIVE THEMSELVES IN GENERAL MATTERS DO NOT DECEIVE
THEMSELVES IN THE PARTICULARS
The Roman People ((as was said above)) having become annoyed with the
Consular
name, and wanting to be able either to choose as Consuls men of the Plebs, or
to
limit their authority, the Nobility in order not to discredit the Consular
authority by either change, took the middle course, and were content that
four
Tribunes with Consular power be created, who could come from the Plebs as
well
as from the Nobles. The Plebs were content with this, as it seemed to them to
destroy the Consulship and give them a part in the highest ranks. From this a
notable case arose, that when it came to the creation of these Tribunes, and
they could have selected all Plebs, the Roman people chose all Nobles. Whence
Titus Livius says these words: The results of this election show how
different
minds are when in contention for liberty and for honors, differing according
to
certain standards when they (have to) make impartial judgments. And in
examining
whence this can happen, I believe it proceeds from men deceiving themselves
in
general matters, (and) not so much in particular matters. As a general thing,
it
appeared to the Roman Pleb that it merited the Consulship because they were
the
majority in the City, because they bore more of the danger in war, (and)
because
they were the ones who with their arms maintained Rome free and made it
powerful: and this desire seeming to them to be reasonable ((as has been
said)),
they turned to obtain this authority by whatever means. But when they had to
make a judgment of their particular men, recognized their weaknesses, and
judged
that none of them should merit that which all together it seemed to them they
merited. So that ashamed of them (their own), they had recourse to those who
merited it. Of which decision Titus Livius, deservingly admiring it, said
these
words: Where is there now this modesty and equity, and this loftiness of
spirit,
which once pervaded all the people?
In corroboration of this there can be cited another notable example which
ensued
in Capua after Hannibal had defeated the Romans at Cannae: while all Italy
was
aroused by this defeat, Capua was still in a state of tumult because of the
hatred that existed between the People and the Senate: and Pacovius Calanus
finding himself at that time in the supreme Magistracy, and recognizing the
peril to which that City was exposed because of the tumults, endeavored
through
his rank to reconcile the Plebs with the Nobility: and having come to this
decision, he had the Senate assemble, and narrated to them the hatred which
the
People had against them, and the dangers to which they were exposed of being
killed by them, if the City was given up to Hannibal, as the power of the
Romans
was afflicted: afterwards he added that if they wanted to leave the managing
of
this matter to him, he would do so in a way that they would be united
together;
but, as he wanted to do so, he would lock them inside the palace, and by
seemingly giving the people the power to castigate them he would save them.
The
Senate yielded to this thought, and he called the people to talk to them; and
having shut up the Senate in the palace, (and) said to them that the time had
come to be able to subdue the haughtiness of the Nobility and avenge
themselves
for the injuries received from them (the Senate), having them all shut up
under
his custody: but because he believed they would not want their City to remain
without a government, it would be necessary ((if they wanted to kill the old
Senators)) to create new ones. And, therefore, he had put all the names of
the
Senators into a bourse and would begin to draw them in their presence, and
that
one after another of those drawn would die after they should find his
successor.
And beginning to draw one, at his name, there was raised a very great noise,
calling him haughty, cruel and arrogant: but when Pacovius requested that
they
make the exchange, the haranguing completely stopped: and after some time one
of
the Plebs was nominated, at whose name some begun to whistle, some to laugh,
some to speak ill in one way and some in another: and thus there followed one
after the other, that all those who were named were judged by them unworthy
of
the Senatorial rank: so that Pacovius taking this occasion said: Since you
judge
that this City would be badly off without a Senate, and you cannot agree to
make
the exchange of Senators, I think it would be well if you reconciled
together,
because the fear in which the Senators have been has so humbled them that you
will now find in them that humanity which you seek for elsewhere. And they
agreeing to this, there ensued the union of these orders, and they
discovered,
when they were constrained to come to the particulars, the deception.
After one thousand four hundred fourteen (1414) when the Princes of the City
had
been driven from Florence, and no other government having been instituted,
but
rather a certain ambitious license, and public affairs going from bad to
worse,
many of the populari seeing the ruin of the City and not understanding the
cause, they blamed the ambitions of some powerful one who would feed the
disorders in order to be able to make a State to his own liking and take away
their liberty: and there were those who went through the loggias and the
plazas
speaking ill of many Citizens, and threatening them that if they should ever
find themselves (members) of the Signoria, they would uncover this deceit of
theirs and would castigate them. It often happened that ones like these did
ascend to the supreme Magistracy, and when they had risen to that position
and
saw things more closely, they recognized whence disorders arose, and the
dangers
that hung over them, and the difficulty of remedying them. And seeing that
the
times and not the men were causing the disorders, they quickly were of
another
mind and acted otherwise, because the knowledge of things in particular had
taken away that deception which, in the general consideration, they had
presupposed. So that those who at first ((when he was a private citizen))
heard
him speak, and afterwards saw them remain quiet in the supreme Magistracy,
believed that this resulted not by the more real knowledge of things, but
from
their having been perverted and corrupted by the Nobles. And as this happened
to
many men and many times, there arose among them a proverb, which said: These
men
have one mind in the plaza and another in the palace. Considering, therefore,
all that has been discussed, it is seen that the quickest possible way to
open
the eyes of the People, is by finding a way ((seeing that a generality
deceives
them)) in which they should have to descend to particulars, as did Pacovius
in
Capua and the Senate in Rome. I believe also that it can be concluded that no
prudent man ought ever to disregard popular judgment in particular matters,
(such as) the distribution of dignities and honors, for in this only the
People
do not deceive themselves, and if they do some times, it will be rare when
they
deceive themselves more often than do the few men who have to make such
distributions. Nor does it seem to me to be superfluous to show in the
following
chapter the order which the Senate held in order to deceive the People in its
distributions.
CHAPTER XLVIII
WHOEVER WANTS A MAGISTRACY NOT TO BE GIVEN TO A VILE OR WICKED ONE, WILL HAVE
IT
ASKED BY A MAN MORE VILE AND MORE WICKED, OR BY ONE MORE NOBLE AND MORE GOOD
When the (Roman) Senate became apprehensive that the Tribunes with Consular
power should be created from plebeian men, they took one of two courses:
either
they caused the more reputable men of Rome to be designated, or by suitable
means they (surely) corrupted some sordid and most ignoble Plebeians, who
mixed
with the plebeians of better quality who usually asked for these offices, so
that even they should ask for them. This latter course caused the Plebs to be
ashamed of themselves to give it to the latter, and the first (course) made
them
ashamed to take it away from the former. All of which confirms the
proposition
of the preceding discussion, where it is shown that the people deceive
themselves in general matters, but they do not deceive themselves in
particular
matters.
CHAPTER XLIX
IF THOSE CITIES WHICH HAD THEIR BEGINNING FREE AS ROME, HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY
IN
FINDING LAWS THAT WOULD MAINTAIN THEM, THOSE THAT HAD THEIR BEGINNING IN
SERVITUDE HAVE ALMOST AN IMPOSSIBILITY
How difficult it is in establishing a Republic to provide all those laws that
should maintain her free, is very well shown by the progress of the Roman
Republic, which notwithstanding that it was established with many laws, first
by
Romulus, and afterwards by Numa, by Tullus Hostilius, and by Servius, and
lastly
by the Ten Citizens created for such a purpose, none the less in managing
that
City new needs were always discovered and it was necessary to create new
ordinances; as happened when they created the Censors, who were one of those
provisions that aided in keeping Rome free during the time she existed in
liberty. For having become arbiters of the customs of Rome, they were the
most
potent cause why the Romans had retarded the further corruption of
themselves.
In the creation of this Magistracy they indeed made one error at the start,
creating them for five years: but a short time later it was corrected by the
prudence of the Dictator Mamercus, who, through new laws, reduced the said
Magistracy to eighteen months: which the Censors who were then (aging) in
office
took so badly, that they deprived Mamercus from (treating with) the Senate:
which thing was greatly censured both by the Plebs and the Fathers: and as
history does not show whether Mamercus was able to defend himself against
this,
it must be assumed either that history is defective, or that the institutions
of
Rome in this part were good; for it is not well that a Republic should be so
constituted that a Citizen in order to promulgate a law conforming to a free
society could be oppressed without any remedy.
But returning to the beginning of this discussion I say, that for creating
such
a new Magistracy it ought to be considered that, if those Cities which had
their
beginnings in liberty but become corrupt by themselves, like Rome, have great
difficulty in finding good laws for maintaining themselves free, it is not to
be
wondered at if those which had their beginnings in servitude find it, not
difficult, but impossible ever to organize themselves so that they are able
to
live securely and quietly; this, as is seen, happened to the City of Florence
which, for having had its beginnings subject to the Roman Empire, and having
always existed under the government of others, remained subject for a long
time
and without any thought to (freeing) itself: afterward when the opportunity
arrived for her to breathe free, she began to make her institutions, which
being
mixed with ancient ones that were bad, could not be good: and thus she had
gone
on managing herself for two hundred years of which there exists a true
record,
without ever having a State (Government) by which she could truly be called a
Republic. And these difficulties which existed in her, have always existed in
those Cities that have had beginnings similar to hers. And although many
times
ample authority was given by public and free suffrage to a few Citizens to be
able to reform her, yet they have never organized her for the common good,
but
always in favor of their own party: which made not for order, but for major
disorders in that City. And to come to some particular example I say, that
among
other things that have to be considered by an establisher of a Republic is to
examine into whose hands he places the authority of blood (death) over its
own
Citizens. This was well constituted in Rome, for there one could ordinarily
appeal to the People; and even if an important event should occur where the
deferring of an execution through the medium of an appeal should be
dangerous,
they had recourse to the Dictator, who executed it immediately: to which
refuge
they never had recourse except in necessity. But Florence and other Cities
born
as she was ((in servitude)) had this authority placed in a foreigner, who,
sent
by a Prince performed such an office. When they afterwards came into liberty,
they kept this authority in a foreigner, whom they called Captain. Which
((because he was able easily to be corrupted by powerful Citizens)) was a
pernicious thing. But afterwards changing itself through the changes of
governments which they organized, they created the Eight Citizens who should
perform the office of that Captain. Which arrangement from bad became worse,
for
the reasons mentioned at other times, that the few were always ministers of
the
few and more powerful (citizens).
The City of Venice is guarded from that (abuse), which has (a Council) of Ten
Citizens who are able to punish any Citizen without appeal. And as this was
not
enough to punish the powerful even though they had the authority, they
established (the Council) of Forty: And in addition the Council of the
Pregadi
((which is the highest council)) had the power to castigate them. So that
lacking an accuser, there was not lacking a judge to keep powerful men in
check.
It is no wonder, therefore, seeing that in Rome (laws) were made by herself
with
many prudent men, new causes sprung up every day for which she had to make
new
laws to maintain her free existence, which, if, in other Cities which had
disordered beginnings, such difficulties sprung up, they could never
reorganize
themselves.
CHAPTER L
A COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE OUGHT NOT TO BE ABLE TO STOP THE ACTIVITIES OF A CITY
When T. Quintus Cincinnatus and Gnaius Julius Mentus were Consuls in Rome,
being
disunited, they stopped all the activities of that Republic. When the Senate
saw
this, they advised the creation of a Dictator, in order that he do that
which,
because of their (Consuls) discords, they could not do. But the Consuls
disagreeing on every other thing, were in accord only on this: not to want to
create a Dictator. So that the Senate not having any other remedy had
recourse
to the aid of the Tribunes, who, with the authority of the Senate, forced the
Consuls to obey. Here first is to be noted the usefulness of the Tribunes,
who
were not only useful in restraining the ambitions which the powerful had
against
the Plebs, but also that which they employed among themselves. The other,
that
there ought never to be established in a City the ability of a few to
interrupt
any of its decisions which are ordinarily necessary in maintaining the
Republic.
For instance, if you give authority to a Council to make a distribution of
honors and offices, or to a Magistracy the administration of a business, it
is
proper either to impose on them the necessity that they must do it in any
case,
or to arrange that if they did not want to do it themselves, that another can
and ought to do it: otherwise this constitution would be defective and
dangerous, as was seen it was in Rome, if the authority of the Tribunes could
not have been opposed to the obstinacy of those Consuls.
In the Venetian Republic, the grand Council distributes the honors and
offices.
It sometimes happened that the general public, either from contempt or from
some
false suggestions, did not create the successors to the Magistrates of the
City
and to those who administered their outside Empire. This resulted in a very
great disorder, because suddenly both the subject lands and the City itself
lacked their legitimate judges, nor could they obtain anything if the
majority
of that council were not satisfied or deceived. And this inconvenience would
have brought that City to a bad end if it had not been foreseen by the
prudent
Citizens, who taking a convenient opportunity made a law that all the
Magistrates who are or should be inside or outside the City should never
vacate
their offices until exchanges with their successors were made. And thus was
removed from that council the evil of being able with peril to the Republic
to
stop public activities.
CHAPTER LI
A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT TO FEIGN TO DO THROUGH LIBERALITY, THAT WHICH
NECESSITY CONSTRAINS THEM
Prudent men always make the best of things in their actions, although
necessity
should constrain them to do them in any case. This prudence was well employed
by
the Roman Senate when they decided that a public stipend be given to the
fighting men, it having been the military custom of they maintaining their
own
selves. But the Senate seeing that war could not be made for any length of
time
in this manner, and, because of this, they could neither besiege towns nor
lead
armies to a distance, and judging it to be necessary to be able to do the one
and the other, decided that the said stipends be given: but they did it in
such
a way that they made the best of that which necessity constrained them to do;
and this present was so accepted by the Plebs, that Rome went upside down
with
joy; for it seemed to them to be a great benefit which they never hoped to
have,
and which they would never have sought by themselves. And although the
Tribunes
endeavored to cancel this decree, showing that it was something that
aggravated
and not lightened the burden ((it being necessary to impose tributes to pay
this
stipend)), none the less they could not do much to keep the Plebs from
accepting
it: which was further increased by the Senate by the method by which they
assigned the tributes, for those that were imposed on the Nobles were more
serious and larger, and the first (required) to be paid.
CHAPTER LII
TO REPRIMAND THE INSOLENCE OF A POWERFUL ONE WHO SPRINGS UP IN A REPUBLIC,
THERE
IS NO MORE SECURE AND LESS TROUBLESOME WAY THAN TO FORESTALL HIM THOSE WAYS
BY
WHICH HE COMES TO POWER
It will be seen from the above written discourse, how much credit the
Nobility
had acquired with the Plebs because of the demonstrations made to their
benefit,
both by the stipends ordered, as well also as the method of imposing the
tributes. If the Nobility had maintained themselves in this order they would
have removed every cause for tumult in that City, and this would have taken
away
from the Tribunes that credit which they had with the Plebs, and consequently
their authority. And, truly, there cannot exist in a Republic, and especially
in
those that are corrupt, a better method, less troublesome and more easily
opposed to the ambitions of any Citizen, than to forestall him those ways by
which he observes to be the paths to attain the rank he designates. Which
method, if it had been employed against Cosimo De'Medici, would have been a
much
better procedure for his adversaries than to have driven him out of Florence:
for if those Citizens who were competing against him had taken his style of
favoring the People, they would have succeeded without tumult and without
violence in drawing from his hands the arms which he availed himself of most.
Piero Soderini had made a reputation for himself in the City of Florence
alone
by favoring the General Public; this among the People gave him the reputation
as
a lover of liberty in the City. And certainly it would have been an easier
and
more honest thing for those Citizens who envied him for his greatness, (and)
less dangerous and less harmful to the Republic, for them to have forestalled
him in the ways by which he made himself great, than to want to oppose him in
such a way that with his ruin, all the rest of the Republic should be ruined;
for if they had taken away from his hands those arms which made him strong
((which they could have done easily)) they could have opposed him in all the
councils and all the public deliberations boldly and without suspicion. And
if
anyone should reply that if those Citizens who hated Piero made an error in
not
forestalling him the ways with which he gained reputation for himself among
the
People, Piero also made an error in not forestalling him those ways by which
his
adversaries made him be feared: for which Piero merits to be excused, as much
because it was difficult for him to have done so, as also because it was not
honest for him: For the means with which he was attacked were to favor the
Medici, with which favors they beat him and, in the end, ruined him. Piero,
therefore, could not honestly take up this part in order that he could
destroy
that liberty by his good name, to which he had been put in charge to guard:
Moreover, these favors not being able to be done suddenly and secretly, would
have been most dangerous for Piero; for whenever he should be discovered to
be a
friend of the Medici, he would have become suspect and hated by the People:
whence there arose more opportunities to his enemies to attack him than they
had
before.
In every proceeding, therefore, men ought to consider the defects and perils
which it (presents), and not to undertake it if it should be more dangerous
than
useful, notwithstanding the result should conform to their decision: for to
do
otherwise in this case it would happen to them as it happened to Tullius
(Cicero), who, wanting to take away the favors from Marcantonio, increased
them
for him: for Marcantonio having been judged an enemy of the Senate, and
having
gathered together that great army in good part from the soldiers who had been
followers of Caesar's party, Tullius, in order to deprive him of those
soldiers
advised the Senate to give authority to Octavian and send him with the army
and
the Consuls against him (Antony) and join the latter (Octavian), and thus
Marcantonio remaining bereft of favor, would easily be destroyed. Which
(thing)
turned out to the contrary, for Marcantonio won over Octavian to himself,
who,
leaving Tullius and the Senate, joined him. Which (thing) brought about the
complete destruction of the party of the Aristocracy (Patricians). Which was
easy to foresee, and that which Tullius advised should not have been
believed,
but should have kept account always that name which, with so much glory, had
destroyed his enemies and acquired for him the Principality of Rome, and they
ought never to have believed they could expect anything from his supporters
favorable to liberty.
CHAPTER LIII
THE PEOPLE MANY TIMES DESIRE THEIR RUIN, DECEIVED BY A FALSE SPECIES OF GOOD:
AND HOW GREAT HOPES AND STRONG PROMISES EASILY MOVE THEM
After conquering the City of the Veienti, there entered into the Roman People
the idea that it would be a useful thing for the City of Rome if one half of
the
Romans should go and live at Veii, arguing that because that City was rich in
countryside, full of buildings, and near to Rome, it could enrich the half of
the Roman Citizens and not disturb any civil activities because of the
nearness
of the location. Which thing appeared to the Senate and the wiser Romans so
useless and so harmful, that they said freely they would rather suffer death
than consent to such a decision. So that this subject coming up for debate,
the
Plebs were so excited against the Senate that it would have come to arms and
bloodshed if the Senate had not made itself a shield of some old and esteemed
Citizens, reverence for whom restrained the Plebs so that they did not
proceed
any further with their insolence. Here, two things are to be noted. The
first,
that many times, deceived by a false illusion of good, the People desire
their
own ruin, and unless they are made aware of what is bad and what is good by
someone in whom they have faith, the Republic is subjected to infinite
dangers
and damage. And if chance causes People not to have faith in anyone ((as
occurs
sometimes, having been deceived before either by events or by men)), their
ruin
comes of necessity. And Dante says of his proposition in the discussion he
makes
in De Monarchia (On Monarchy), that the People many times shout, Life to
their
death and death to their life. From this unbelief it sometimes happens in
Republics that good proceedings are not undertaken, as was said above of the
Venetians who, when assaulted by so many enemies could not undertake a
procedure
of gaining some of them over to themselves by giving to them things taken
from
others; because of this war was moved against them and a conspiracy of
(other)
Princes made against them, before their ruin had come.
Considering therefore what is easy and what is difficult to persuade a People
to, this distinction can be made: either that which you have to persuade them
to
represents at first sight a gain or a loss, or truly it appears a courageous
or
cowardly proceeding: and if, in the things that are placed in front of the
people, there is seen a gain even though it is concealed under a loss, and if
it
appears courageous even though it is hidden beneath the ruin of the Republic,
it
will always be easy to persuade the multitude to it: and thus it will always
be
difficult to persuade them of those proceedings where either some usefulness
or
loss is apparent, even though the welfare and benefit (of the Republic) were
hidden under it. This that I have said is confirmed by infinite examples,
Roman
and foreign, modern and ancient.
For, from this, there arose the evil opinion that sprung up in Rome of Fabius
Maximus, who could not persuade the Roman people that it was useless to that
Republic to proceed slowly in that war, and to sustain the attack of Hannibal
without engaging in battle, because that people judged this proceeding
cowardly,
and did not see what usefulness there should be in that, and Fabius did not
have
sufficient cause to demonstrate it to them: and the People are so blinded on
these ideas of bravery, that although the Roman People had made that error of
giving authority to the Master of the horse of Fabius to enable him to engage
in
battle, even though Fabius did not want to, and that because of this
authority
the Roman camp would have been broken up except for the prudence of Fabius
which
remedied it; this experience was not enough for them, for they afterwards
made
Varro Consul, not for any of his merits but for having promised throughout
all
the plazas and public places of Rome to rout Hannibal anytime he should be
given
the authority. From this came the battle and defeat of Cannae, and almost
caused
the ruin of Rome. I want to cite on this proposition another Roman example.
Hannibal had been in Italy eight or ten years, had filled this province with
killings of Romans, when M. Centenius Penula came to the Senate, a very base
man
((none the less he had some rank in the military)), and offered them that if
they gave him authority to be able to raise an army of volunteers in any
place
in Italy he wished, he would in a very short time give them Hannibal, either
taken or dead. The demands of this man appeared foolish to the Senate: none
the
less thinking that if they should deny him this, his request would be later
known by the People, that there might arise some tumult, envy, and ill will
against the Senatorial order, they conceded it to him; desiring rather to put
in
danger all those who followed him than to cause new indignation to spring up
among the People, knowing how much a like proceeding would be accepted and
how
difficult it would be to dissuade them. This man, therefore, with an
unorganized
and undisciplined multitude went to meet Hannibal, and he no sooner had come
to
the encounter than he, with all his followers, were routed and killed.
In Greece in the City of Athens, Nicias, a most serious and prudent man,
never
could persuade that people that it would not be good to go and assault
Sicily,
so that this decision taken against the will of the wise caused the complete
ruin of Athens. When Scipio was made Consul and desired the province of
Africa,
he promised to everyone the ruin of Carthage; when the Senate did not agree
to
this because of the verdict of Fabius Maximus, he threatened to bring it
before
the People, as he very well knew that such decisions were liked by the
People.
On this proposition an example can be given of our own City, as it was when
Messer Ercole Bentivogli, commander of the Florentine forces, together with
Antonio Giacomini, after having defeated Bartolomeo D'Alvino at San Vincenti,
went to besiege Pisa: which enterprise was decided upon by the People on the
brave promises of Messer Ercole, although many of the wise Citizens censured
it:
none the less there was no remedy, being pushed by that desire of the general
public which was based on the brave promises of the commander.
I say, therefore, that there is no easier way to ruin a Republic where the
People have authority, than to involve them in a brave enterprise: because
where
the People are of any importance, they will always accept them, nor will
there
be anyone of contrary opinion who will know any remedy. But if the ruin of
the
City results from this, there also and more often results the ruin of the
particular Citizens who are in charge of such enterprises: for the People
having
expected victory, if defeat comes, they do not blame fortune or the impotence
of
those who commanded, but their wickedness and ignorance, but most of the
times
they either kill or imprison them, or exile them, as happened to infinite
Carthaginian Captains and to many Athenians. Nor do any victories that they
might have had in the past benefit them, because they are all cancelled by
the
present defeat, as happened to our Antonio Giacomini, who, not having
conquered
Pisa as he promised and the People expected, fell into such popular disgrace
that, notwithstanding his past infinite good works, he (was allowed to) live
more because of the humanity of those who had authority who defended him from
the People than for any other reason.
CHAPTER LIV
HOW MUCH AUTHORITY A GREAT MAN HAS IN RESTRAINING AN EXCITED MULTITUDE (MOB)
The second notable item mentioned in the text of the above chapter is, that
nothing is so apt to restrain an excited multitude (mob) as the reverence
(inspired) by some man of gravity and authority who encounters them; and not
without reason Virgil says:
When they saw a man of grave aspect and strong with merit
They became silent, and stood with eager ears.
Therefore, he who is in charge of an army, or he who finds himself in a City
where a tumult has arisen, ought to present himself there with as much grace
and
as honorably as he can, attiring himself with the insignia of his rank which
he
holds in order to make himself more revered. A few years ago Florence was
divided into two factions, who called themselves, thusly, the Frateschi
(Brotherly) and Arrabiati (Angered); and coming to arms, the Frateschi were
defeated, among whom was Pagolantonio Soderini, a Citizen greatly reputed in
those times; and during those tumults the People went armed to his house to
sack
it, Messer Francesco, his brother, then Bishop of Volterra and today
Cardinal,
by chance found himself in the house; who, as soon as he heard the noise and
saw
the disturbance, dressed himself in his most dignified clothes and over them
put
on his Episcopal surplice, and went to meet those armed ones, and with his
person and his words stopped them: which (thing) was talked about and
celebrated
throughout the City for many days.
I conclude, therefore, that there is no sounder or more necessary remedy to
restrain an excited multitude than the presence of a man who by his presence
appears and is revered. It is seen, therefore, ((to return to the preceding
text)) with how much obstinacy the Roman Plebs accepted that proceeding of
going
to Veii because they judged it useful, but did not recognize the danger that
existed underneath this; and that the many tumults which arose there would
cause
troubles, if the Senate with serious men (and) full of reverence had not
restrained their fury.
CHAPTER LV
HOW EASILY THINGS ARE MANAGED IN THAT CITY WHERE THE MULTITUDE IS NOT
CORRUPT,
AND THAT WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY A PRINCIPALITY CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED, AND
WHERE
THERE IS NONE A REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED
Although above there has been much discussed that which is to be feared or to
be
hoped for in corrupt Cities, none the less it does not seem to me outside
this
subject to consider a decision of the Senate concerning the vow that Camillus
had made to give the tenth part of the plunder of the Veienti to Apollo:
which
plunder having come into the hands of the Roman Pleb, and being unable
otherwise
to review the account of it, the Senate made and edict that everyone should
present to the Republic the tenth part of that which they had plundered. And
although such a decision was not put into effect, the Senate afterwards
having
taken other ways and means for satisfying Apollo in fulfillment for the Pleb,
none the less from such decisions it is seen how much the Senate confided in
them (the People), and how they judged that no one would not present exactly
all
that which was commanded of them by the edict. And on the other hand, it is
seen
how the Pleb did not think of evading the edict in any part by giving less
than
they ought, but to relieve themselves of this by showing open indignation.
This
example, together with many others that have been recited above, show how
much
goodness and religion there was in that People, and how much good there was
to
be hoped for from them. And, truly, when this goodness does not exist, no
good
is to be hoped for, as can be hoped for in those provinces which, in these
times, are seen to be corrupt, as is Italy above all others, even though
France
and Spain have their part of such corruption. And, if in those provinces,
there
are not seen as many disorders as arise in Italy every day, it derives not so
much from the goodness of the people ((which in good part is lacking)) as
from
having a King who keeps them united, not only by his virtu, but by the
institutions of those Kingdoms which are yet unspoiled.
In the province of Germany this goodness and this religion is seen to exist
in
great (measure) in those People, which makes for the existence of many
Republics
in freedom, and they so observe the laws that no one from inside or outside
dares to attack them. And that this is true that in their kingdom there yet
exists a good part of that ancient goodness, I would like to give an example
similar to that given above of the Senate and the Roman Pleb. When it
occurred
in those Republics that they had to spend any quantity of money for public
account, those Magistrates or Councils who had the authority imposed on all
the
inhabitants of the City (a tax) of one or two percent of what each one had of
value. And such decision being made in accordance with the laws of the land
everyone presented himself before the collectors of this impost, and first
taking an oath to pay the right sum, he threw into a box provided for that
purpose that which it appeared to him according to his conscience he ought to
pay: to which payment there was no witness other than he who paid. From which
it
can be conjectured how much goodness and how much religion still exists in
those
people. And it ought to be noted that every one paid the true amount, for if
it
had not been paid, the impost would not have yielded that amount which they
had
planned in accordance with previous ones that had been taken, and if they had
not yielded (this amount), the fraud would be recognized, and if it had been
recognized other means than this would have been taken. Which goodness is
much
more to be admired in these times as it is very rare; rather, it is seen to
be
remaining only in that province: which result from two things; the one, that
they do not have great commerce with their neighbors, for others have not
come
to their homes nor have they gone to the homes of others, but have been
content
with those goods, live on those foods, clothe themselves with the wool which
the
country provides, which has taken away any reason for intercourse and
(consequently) the beginning of any corruption: hence they have not been able
to
take up the customs of the French, of the Spanish, or of the Italians, which
nations all together are the corrupters of the world. The other cause, is
that
that Republic, whose political existence is maintained uncorrupted, does not
permit that any of its Citizens to be or live in the manner of a Gentleman,
instead maintain among themselves a perfect equality, and are the greatest
enemies of those Lords and Gentlemen who are in that province: and if, by
chance, any should come into their hands, they kill them as being Princes of
corruption and the cause of every trouble.
And to clarify what is (meant by) this name of Gentleman, I say that those
are
called Gentlemen who live idly on the provisions of their abundant
possessions,
without having any care either to cultivate or to do any other work in order
to
live. Such as these are pernicious to every Republic and to every Province:
but
more pernicious are those who, in addition to the above mentioned fortune,
also
command castles, and have subjects who obey them. Of these two sorts of men,
the
Kingdom of Naples, the Lands of Rome, the Romagna, and Lombardy, are full.
From
which it happens that there never has been a Republic in those provinces, nor
any political existence (system), because such kinds of men are all enemies
of
every civil society. And in provinces so constituted, to want to introduce a
Republic would be impossible. But only an arbiter (monarch) would recognize
it,
and he would have no other means but to establish a Kingdom: the reason is
this,
that when the body of people is so corrupted that the laws are not sufficient
to
restrain it, there needs to be established there that superior force, which
is
the Royal hand that, with absolute and full power, places a restraint to the
excessive ambitions and corruption of the Powerful. This (cause) is verified
by
the example of Tuscany, where one sees in a small extent of land there have
existed for a long time three Republics, Florence, Siena, and Lucca; and
although the other Cities of that Province are in a way subject to these,
yet,
by their spirit and their institutions, it is seen that they maintain, or
attempt to maintain, their liberty: all of which arises from there not being
any
lords of castles in that province, and few or no Gentlemen: but there exists
so
much equality, that it would be easy for a prudent man who had knowledge of
ancient civilizations, to introduce a civil government there. But its
misfortunes have been so great, that up to these times not any one has come
forth who has been able to or known how to do it.
From this discussion, therefore, this conclusion is drawn, that he who would
want to establish a Republic where there are many Gentlemen, cannot do so
unless
first he extinguishes them all; and that he who would want to establish a
Kingdom or a Principality where there is great equality, will never be able
to
do so unless he withdraws from that equality many of the ambitious and
unquiet
spirits, and makes them Gentlemen in fact and not in name, giving them
castles
and possessions, as well as giving them aid of men and money, so that
surrounded
by these he can through them maintain his power, and they through his support
can maintain their ambitions, and the others constrained to endure that yoke
which force and nothing else could make them endure. And, because of this,
there
being a proportion of those who force and those who are forced, each man will
remain firm in his rank. And as the establishing of a Republic in a province
better adapted to being a Kingdom, or to establishing a Kingdom in one better
adapted to being a Republic, is a matter for one who in brains and authority
is
rare, there have been many who have wanted to do so, but few only who have
known
how to bring it about. For the greatness of the undertaking in part frightens
them and in part stops them, so that they fail in the very beginning. I
believe
that this opinion of mine, that a Republic cannot be established where there
are
Gentlemen, appears contrary to the experience of the Venetian Republic, in
which
none could have any rank except those who were Gentlemen. To which it is
answered that this example does not oppose it, for the Gentlemen in that
Republic are more so in name than in fact, as they do not have great incomes
from possessions, their riches being founded on commerce and movable
property:
and, in addition, none of them have castles or any jurisdiction over men; but
in
them that name of Gentleman is a name of dignity and reputation, without
being
based on those things on which men are called Gentlemen in other Cities. And
as
other Republics have all their divisions (of classes) under various names, so
Venice is divided into Gentlemen and Popolari, and wants that the former can
have all the honors, from which all others are entirely excluded. This does
not
cause disorders in those towns for the reasons mentioned at other times.
Republics, therefore, can be established where a great equality exists or can
be
established, and, on the contrary, a Principality can be established where a
great inequality exists; otherwise they will lack proportion and have little
durability.
CHAPTER LVI
BEFORE GREAT EVENTS OCCUR IN A CITY OR A PROVINCE, SIGNS COME WHICH FORETELL
THEM, OR MEN WHO PREDICT THEM
Whence it arises I do not know, but from ancient and modern examples it is
seen
that no great event ever takes place in a City or a Province that has not
been
predicted either by fortune tellers, by revelations, by prodigies, or by
other
celestial signs. And in order for me not to go distant from home in proving
this, everyone knows how the coming of King Charles VIII of France into Italy
was predicted by Brother Girolamo Savonarola, and how in addition to this it
was
said throughout Italy that at Arezzo there had been seen in the air
men-at-arms
battling together. In addition to this, everyone knows how, before the death
of
Lorenzo De'Medici the elder, the Duomo was hit in its highest part by a bolt
from the skies which very greatly damaged that edifice. Also everyone knows
how,
a little while before Piero Soderini, who had been made Gonfalonier for life
by
the Florentine people, had been driven out and deprived of his rank, the
palace
was struck in the same manner by a (lightning) stroke. I could cite other
examples in addition to these, which I will omit to avoid tedium. I shall
narrate only that which T. Livius tells of before the coming of the French
(Gauls) to Rome, that is, how one Marcus Creditus, a Pleb, reported to the
Senate that, passing at midnight through the Via Nova (New Road), he had
heard a
voice louder than human which admonished him that he should report to the
Magistrates that the Gauls were coming to Rome. The cause of this I believe
should be discussed and interpreted by a man who has knowledge of natural and
supernatural things, which I have not. But it could be, as some Philosophers
hold, that this air being so full of spirits, having an intelligence which by
natural virtu foresee future events, and having compassion for men, so that
they
can warn them by such signs to prepare for defense. But, however it may be,
such
is the truth, (and) that always after such incidents there follows things
extraordinary and new in the provinces.
CHAPTER LVII
TOGETHER THE PLEBS ARE STRONG, DISPERSED THEY ARE WEAK
There were many Romans ((after the ruin of their country had ensued because
of
the passage of the Gauls)) who had gone to live at Veii contrary to the
constitution and orders of the Senate, which, in order to remedy this
disorder,
commanded through its public edicts that everyone within a certain time and
under certain penalties should return to inhabit Rome. Which edict at first
was
made light of by those against whom it was made, but afterwards when the time
came for obeying it, they all obeyed. And Titus Livius said these words, From
being ferocious when together, fear made them individually obedient. And
truly
this part of the nature of the multitude cannot be better shown than by this
sentence. For the multitude many times is audacious in speaking against the
decision of their Prince: but afterwards, when they see the penalty in sight,
not trusting one another, they run to obey. So that it is certainly to be
seen
that whatever may be said of a People about their good or bad disposition,
ought
not to be held of great account, if you are well prepared to be able to
maintain
your authority if they are well disposed, and if they are ill-disposed, to be
able to provide that they do not attack you. This refers to those evil
dispositions which the People have from causes other than their having lost
either their liberty or their Prince much loved by them, but who is still
living: for the evil dispositions that arise from these causes are formidable
above every thing, and have need of great remedies to restrain them: their
indispositions from other (causes) are easily managed if they do not have
Chiefs
to whom they have recourse, for, on the one hand, there is nothing more
formidable than a multitude loose and without a Head, and on the other hand,
there is nothing weaker, because whenever they have arms in their hands it is
easy to subdue them, if you have a shelter which enables you to avoid their
first attack: for when their spirits are cooled down a little, and each one
sees
that he has to return to his house, they begin to be distrustful of
themselves,
and to think of their individual safety either by fleeing or surrendering
themselves. A multitude so excited, therefore, in wanting to escape these
perils, has promptly to make a Head among themselves, who would control it,
keep
it united, and think of its defense, as the Roman plebs did when, after the
death of Virginius, they departed from Rome, and to save themselves created
twenty Tribunes from among themselves: and if they do not do this, it will
always happen as T. Livius said in the above written words, that all together
they are strong, but when each one then begins to think of his own peril,
they
become vile and weak.
CHAPTER LVIII
THE MULTITUDE IS WISER AND MORE CONSTANT THAN A PRINCE
Nothing is more vain and more inconstant than the multitude, so our T. Livius
and all other Historians affirm. For it often occurs in narrating the actions
of
men to observe the multitude to have condemned some one to death, and that
same
(multitude) afterwards weeping and very much wishing him back; as is seen the
Roman people did in the case of Manlius Capitolinus, who, having condemned
him
to death, afterwards most earnestly desired him back. And the words of the
author are these: As soon as they knew there was no peril from, they desired
to
have him back. And elsewhere, where he tells of the incidents which arose in
Syracuse after the death of Hieronymus, nephew of Hiero, says: It is the
nature
of multitude, either to serve humbly, or to dominate haughtily. I do not
know,
in wanting to defend a thing which ((as I have said)) is accused by all
writers,
if I were to undertake a cause so hard and full of difficulty, that I would
have
either to abandon it in shame, or to go on with it burdensomely. But however
it
may be, I do not judge, or will ever judge, it to be a defect to defend any
opinion with arguments, without wanting to employ either authority or force.
I say, therefore, the individual men, and especially Princes, can be accused
of
that defect which the writers accuse the multitudes; for anyone who is not
controlled by the laws, will make the same errors as a loose multitude. And
this
can be easily observed, for there are and there have been many Princes, but
of
the good and wise ones there have been only a few, I say, of those Princes
who
have been able to break that restraint which could control them; among whom
are
not those Kings who arose in Egypt in that ancient period when that province
was
governed by laws, nor those who arose in Sparta, nor those who have risen in
France in our times, which Kingdom is more regulated by laws than any other
Kingdom of our times of which there is knowledge. And these Kingdoms which
arise
under such constitutions are not to be placed in that number whence the
nature
of each man individually has to be considered, and to see if he is like the
multitude; for alongside them there ought to be placed a multitude controlled
by
laws in the same way as they (the Kings) were, and the same goodness will be
found in them as we see in (the Kings), and we will see that they serve
neither
haughtily nor humbly; as was the Roman People, who while the Republic
remained
incorrupt, never served humbly or ruled insolently, but rather with its
institutions and Magistracies held its rank honorably. And when it was
necessary
to spring up against a powerful one who was harming them, they did so, as was
seen with Manlius and the Ten, and others who sought to oppress them; and so
also when it was necessary for the public safety to obey the Dictators and
Consuls. And if the Roman People desired Manlius Capitolinus after his death,
it
is not to be wondered at, for they desired his virtu, which had been such
that
the memory of them brought compassion to everyone, and would have had the
power
to cause that same result in any Prince, for it is the verdict of all writers
that virtu is lauded and admired even in ones enemies: and if so much desire
could have restored him, the Roman people would have given him the same
judgment
as they did when they took him from prison, a little before they condemned
him
to death: and as was also seen of Princes held to be wise, who have had some
persons put to death and then greatly regretted it, as Alexander with Clitus
and
his other friends, and Herod with Mariamne: But that which our Historian says
of
the nature of the multitude, he does not say of those who were regulated by
laws, such as were the Romans, but of an unbridled multitude, as was that of
Syracuse, which made those errors which infuriated and unbridled men make,
and
as Alexander and Herod did in the abovementioned cases.
The nature of the multitude, therefore, is not to be blamed any more than
that
of Princes, for they all err equally when they all are able to err without
control. Of which, in addition to what I have said, there are many examples,
both from among the Roman Emperors and from among other Tyrants and Princes,
where so much inconstancy and recklessness of life is observed, as is ever
found
in any multitude. I conclude therefore, contrary to the common opinion which
says that the People, when they are Princes, are changeable and ungrateful,
affirming that there are no more of these defects in them than there are in
particular Princes: And to accuse the People and the Princes together can be
the
truth; but to except the Princes would be a deception: For a People that
commands and is well organized will be stable, prudent, grateful, and not
otherwise than a Prince, or even better than a Prince, although he be
esteemed
wise. And on the other hand, a Prince loosened from the (control) of the
laws,
will be ungrateful, inconstant, and more imprudent than a people. And that
difference in their proceedings arises, not from the different nature, ((for
it
is the same in everyone, and if there is an advantage for good, it is in the
People)) but from the more or less respect they have for the laws under which
one and the other live. And whoever considers the Roman people will see that
for
four hundred years they have been enemies of the name of Royalty and lovers
of
glory and of the common good of their country: He will see so many examples
employed by them which testify to the one thing and the other. And if anyone
should allege to me the ingratitude that they (the Roman people) showed
against
Scipio, I will reply that which was discussed above at length on this
subject,
where it has been shown that people are less ungrateful than Princes. But as
to
prudence and stability, I say, that a people is more prudent, more stable,
and
of better judgment than a Prince: And not without reason is the voice of the
people like that of God, for a universal opinion is seen causes marvelous
effects in its prognostication, so that it would seem that by some hidden
virtu,
evil or good is foreseen. As to the judging of things, it is rarely seen that
when they hear two speakers who hold opposite views, if they are of equal
virtu,
they do not take up the the better opinion, and they are capable of seeing
the
truth in what they hear. And if ((as has been said above)) they err in things
concerning bravery, or which appear useful, a Prince also errs many times in
his
own passions, which are much greater than those of the people. It will also
be
seen that in the election of their magistrates, they make by far a better
selection than a Prince, but a people will never be persuaded that it is
better
to bring to that dignity a man of infamous and corrupt habits: to which a
Prince
may be persuaded easily and in a thousand ways. It will be seen that when a
people begin to hold a thing in horror, they remain in that opinion for many
centuries, which is not seen in a Prince. And on both of these two things,
the
testimony of the Roman people will suffice for me, who, in so many hundreds
of
years, in so many elections of Consuls and Tribunes, they did not make four
elections of which they had to repent. And ((as I have said)) they held the
name
of Royalty in so much hatred, that no obligation to any of its Citizens who
should seize that title would enable him to escape the merited penalty. In
addition to this, it will be seen that the Cities where the people are
Princes,
make the greatest progress in the shortest time and much greater than those
who
have always been under a Prince, as Rome did after the driving out of the
Kings,
and Athens did after they were free of Pisistratus. Which cannot arise except
that those governments of the people are better than those of the Princes.
Nor do I want that there should be opposed to my opinion all that which our
Historian has said in the aforementioned text and in any other; for if there
should be discussed all the disorders of the People, all the disorders of the
Princes, all the glories of the People, all those of the Princes, it will be
seen that the People are far superior in goodness and in glory. And if
Princes
are superior to the people in instituting laws, forming civil governments,
make
new statutes and ordinances, the People are so much superior in maintaining
the
institutions which will add to the glory of those who established them.
And in sum to epilogue this material, I say that the States of the Princes
have
lasted a long time, the States of the Republics have lasted a long time, and
both have had need to be regulated by laws; for a Prince who can do what he
wants is a madman, and a People which can do as it wants to is not wise. If,
therefore, discussion is to be had of a Prince obligated by laws, and of a
People unobligated by them, more virtu will be observed in the People than in
Princes: if the discussion is to be had of both loosened (from such control),
fewer errors will be observed in the People than in the Princes, and those
that
are fewer have the greater remedies: For a licentious and tumultuous People
can
be talked to by a good man, and can easily be returned to the good path:
(but)
there is no one who can talk to a Prince, nor is there any other remedy but
steel (sword). From which the conjecture can be made of the maladies of the
one
and the other: that if words are enough to cure the malady of the People, and
that of the Prince needs the sword, there will never be anyone who will not
judge that where the greater cure is required, they are where the greater
errors
exist. When a People is indeed unbridled, the foolishness that they do is not
to
be feared, nor is fear to be had of the present malady, but of that which can
arise, a Tyrant being able to rise up amidst so much confusion. But the
contrary
happens in the case of bad Princes, where the present evil is feared, and
there
is hope for the future, men persuading themselves that the (termination) of
their lives can make liberty spring up. Thus the difference between the one
and
the other is seen, that one concerns things that are, the other of things
that
will be. The cruelties of the multitude are (directed) against those whom
they
fear will oppose the common good, those of a Prince are (directed) against
those
whom he fears will oppose his own good. But the opinion against the People
arises because everyone speaks evil of the people freely and without fear
even
while they reign; of the Princes they talk with a thousand fears and a
thousand
apprehensions. And it does not appear to me to be outside this subject ((for
this matter draws me there)) to discuss in the following chapter whether
alliances made with a Republic, or those made with a Prince, can be trusted.
CHAPTER LIX
WHICH ALLIANCES OR LEAGUES CAN BE TRUSTED, WHETHER THOSE MADE WITH A REPUBLIC
OR
THOSE MADE WITH A PRINCE
As there occurs every day that Princes or Republics make leagues and
friendships
between themselves, and also similarly alliances and accords are drawn
between a
Republic and a Prince, it appears to me proper to examine whose faith is more
stable, and which ought to be held more in account, that of a Republic or
that
of a Prince. In examining everything, I believe that in many cases they are
the
same, and in some there is a difference. I believe, therefore, that accords
made
by force will not be observed either by a Prince or by a Republic: I believe
that when fear of (losing) the State comes to pass, both will break the faith
in
order not to lose it, and will serve you ingratitude. Demetrius, who was
called
Conqueror of Cities, had given infinite benefits to the Athenians: it
happened
that later, having been routed by his enemies and taking refuge in Athens as
a
City friendly and obligated to him, was not received by her: which saddened
him
much more than had the loss of his forces and his army; Pompey, having been
routed by Caesar in Thessaly, took refuge in Egypt with Ptolemy, who, in the
past he had reinstated in his Kingdom, but was put to death by him. Which
instances, it is seen, have the same reasons; none the less it was more
humanely
employed by a Republic and with less injury, than by the Prince. Where there
is
fear, therefore, there will be found in each the same (loss of) faith. And if
in
either a Republic or a Prince it is found that they observe the faith even if
ruin may be expected, this also may arise from similar reasons. For it can
very
well occur that a Prince, who is a friend of a powerful Prince (and) who may
not
then have the opportunity to defend him, can hope that with time he (the
latter)
will restore his Principality to him; or believe he will find either faith or
accords with his enemies. Of this kind have been the Princes of the Kingdom
of
Naples who have followed the French side. And as for Republics, Saguntum in
Spain was of this kind, which hazarded her own ruin in order to follow the
Roman
side, and with Florence in MDXII (1512) in order to follow the French side.
And
I believe, taking everything into account, that in such cases where danger is
imminent, there will be found greater stability in the Republics than in
Princes: For even if the Republics had the same spirit and the same wants as
Princes, their movements being slower will always make them take longer to
form
resolutions than Princes, and because of this they will be less prompt in
breaking their faith.
Alliances are broken for usefulness. In this, Republics are more careful in
the
observance of accords than Princes. And it is possible to cite examples where
a
minimum of usefulness has caused a Prince to break his faith, and where a
great
usefulness has not caused faith to be broken by a Republic; as was that
proceeding which Themosticles proposed to the Athenians, to whom in his
speech
he said he had a counsel that would be of great usefulness to their country,
but
could not tell it so as not to disclose it for discovering it would take away
the opportunity of doing it. Whence the people of Athens elected Aristedes to
whom he should confide the matter, and according to which they would later
decide as it might appear to them: whereupon Themosticles showed that the
fleet
of all Greece, although they were under their faith, was in such a position
that
they could easily win it for themselves or destroy it, which would make the
Athenians the arbiters of that Province. Whence Aristedes reported back to
the
people that the proposal of Themosticles was most useful, but most dishonest:
for which reason the people rejected it entirely, which would not have been
done
by Philip the Macedonian and the other Princes who had looked for more
usefulness, and who had gained more by breaking the faith than by any other
means.
Of the breaking of pacts because of some cause for non-observance, I will not
speak, as it is an ordinary thing: but I will talk of those that are broken
for
extraordinary reasons, where I believe, from the things said, that the people
make fewer errors than Princes, and because of this, they can be trusted more
than Princes.
CHAPTER LX
HOW THE CONSULSHIP AND EVERY OTHER MAGISTRACY IN ROME OUGHT TO BE (BESTOWED)
WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO AGE
And it is to be seen from the course of History that the Roman Republic,
after
the Consulship came to the Pleb, admitted all its Citizens (to this dignity)
without regard to age or blood (birth), even though the regard to age never
existed in Rome as they always went to find virtu, whether it was in young
men
or old. This is seen from the testimony of Valerius Corvinus who was made
Consul
at twenty three years (of age); and Valerius said, talking to his soldiers,
that
the Consulship was the reward of virtu, not of blood. Which thing can be much
discussed, whether or not it is well considered. As to blood (birth), this
was
conceded because of necessity, and this same necessity which existed in Rome
would also be found in every City that wanted to have the same success as
Rome
had, as has been said at another time; for hardships cannot be given to men
without reward, nor can the hope of obtaining the reward be taken away
without
peril. And it was proper, therefore, that the plebs should have the hope of
obtaining the Consulship, and that they should nourish this hope for a time,
without attaining it: When afterward the hope was not enough, they had to
arrive
at that result (the Consulship). The City that does not admit its Plebs to
any
of its glory, can treat them in their own way, as has been discussed
elsewhere;
but that City which wants to accomplish that which Rome did, cannot make this
distinction.
And given that it is so (as regards birth), the question of age needs no
reply,
rather it is necessarily disposed of; for in electing a young man to a rank
which has need of the prudence of an old man, it happens ((the multitude
having
to elect him)) that he should come to that rank through some noble action
that
he should make. And when a young man is of such great virtu as to have made
himself known by some notable thing, it would be a very harmful thing if that
City should not then be able to avail itself of him, and that it should have
to
wait until he should have aged (and) that age deprive him of that vigor of
spirit and activity of which (at that age) his country should avail itself,
as
Rome availed itself of Valerius Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many
other who triumphed when very young.
1. That is, an Executive, a House of Lords or Senate (originally sitting as a
Judiciary), and a Commons or House of Representatives or Legislature each
acting
to check and balance the other.
2. A judiciary.
3. Establish a National Army or Militia, rather than rely on Mercenaries.
Discourses on Livy:
Book 2
DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
ON THE FIRST TEN (BOOKS) OF TITUS LIVIUS
TO ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI
SECOND BOOK
Men always praise ((but not always reasonably)) the ancient times and find
fault
with the present; and they are such partisans of things past, that they
celebrate not only that age which has been recalled to their memory by known
writers, but those also ((being now old)) which they remember having seen in
their youth. And when this opinion of theirs is false ((as it is most of the
times)) I am persuaded the reasons by which they are led to such deception
are
various. And the first I believe is that the whole truth which would bring
out
the infamy of those times, and they amplify and magnify those others that
could
bring forth their glory. Moreover, the greater number of writers so obey the
fortune of the winners that, in order to make their victories glorious, they
not
only exaggerate that which is gotten by their own virtu, but they also
exaggerate the actions of the enemies; so that whoever afterwards is born in
either of the two provinces, both the victorious and the defeated ones, has
cause to marvel at those men and times, and is forced summarily to praise and
love them. In addition to this, men hating things either from fear or envy,
these two reasons for hating past events come to be extinguished, as they are
not able to offend or give cause for envy of them. But the contrary happens
with
those things that are (presently) in operation and are seen, which because
you
have a complete knowledge of them as they are not in any way hidden from you;
and knowing the good together with the many other things which are
displeasing
to you, you are constrained to judge the present more inferior than the past,
although in truth the present might merit much more of that glory and fame; I
do
not discuss matters pertaining to the arts, which shine so much by
themselves,
which time cannot take away or add a little more glory which they merit by
themselves; but I speak of those matters pertinent to the lives and customs
of
men, of which such clear evidences are not seen.
I repeat, therefore, that the custom of praising and blaming as mentioned
above
is true, but it is not true that you err in doing it. For sometimes of
necessity
our judgment is the truth, as human affairs are always in motion, either
ascending or descending. And we see a City or a Province well-organized in
its
government by some excellent man, and for a time always progressing toward
the
better through the virtu of that organizer. He who is born in that state, and
praises the past more than the present, deceives himself; and his deception
is
caused by those things mentioned above. But if they are born in that City or
province after the time when it has begun to descend to its bad times, then
he
does not deceive himself. And in thinking of how these things go on, I judge
that the world has always been in the same condition, and that there is as
much
good as there is bad in it; but this bad and good vary from province to
province, as is seen by the historian of those ancient Kingdoms which varied
from one another because of the variations in customs, while the world
remained
the same: the only difference was, that where virtu first found a place in
Assyria, it then (moved) to Media, afterwards to Persia, and from there came
to
Italy and Rome: and if after the Roman Empire no other Empire followed which
endured, and where the world kept together all its virtu, none the less it is
seen to be scattered in many nations where people lived with virtu, as it was
in
the Kingdom of the Franks, the Kingdom of the Turks, that of the Soldan (of
Egypt), and today the people of Germany, and before then that Saracen Sect
which
accomplished such great things and occupied so much of the world after having
destroyed the Eastern Roman Empire. In all these provinces, therefore, after
the
Romans fell, the Sects possessed, and yet possess in part, that virtu which
is
desired and lauded with true praise. And whoever is born in them and praises
the
times past more than the present, may deceive himself: but whoever is born in
Italy and Greece, and has not become either an Ultramontane in Italy or a
Turk
in Greece, has reason to find fault with his times and to praise the others,
for
in the past there are many things that make him marvel, but now there is not
anything that will compensate for the extreme misery, infamy, and disgrace in
these times where there is no observance of religion, of laws, or of military
discipline, but are stained by every brutish reasoning. And these vices are
even
more detestable as they exist more in those who sit in the tribunals,
commanding
everyone, and desiring to be adored.
But returning to our argument, I say that, if the judgment of men is corrupt
in
deciding whether the present or the ancient age is better, in those things
where
because of their antiquity they cannot have a perfect knowledge as they have
of
their own times, the old men ought not to corrupt themselves in judging the
times of their youth and their old age, they having known and seen the latter
and the former equally. Which thing would be true if men throughout all the
periods of their lives had the same judgment and the same appetites. But as
these vary ((although the times do not vary)), things cannot appear the same
to
those men who have other appetites, other delights, and other considerations
in
their old age than in their youth. For as men wane ((when they age)) in
strength
but grow in judgment and prudence, so it is that those things which in their
youth appeared supportable and good, will turn out ((as they grow old))
unsupportable and bad, and where they ought to blame their judgment, they
blame
the times. In addition to this, human appetites being insatiable ((because by
nature they have to be able to and want to desire everything, and to be able
to
effect little for themselves because of fortune)), there arises a continuous
discontent in the human mind, and a weariness of the things they possess;
which
makes them find fault with the present times, praise the past, and desire the
future, although in doing this they are not moved by any reasonable cause. I
do
not know, therefore, whether I merit to be numbered among those who deceive
themselves, if in these Discourses of mine I shall laud too much the times of
the ancient Romans and censure ours. And truly, if the virtu that then
reigned
and the vice that now reigns should not be as clear as the Sun, I would be
more
restrained in talking, being apprehensive of falling into that deception of
which I accuse others. But the matter being so manifest that everyone sees
it, I
shall be bold in saying openly that which I learned of those times and these,
so
that the minds of the young men who may read my writings can avoid the latter
(evils) and imitate the (virtu) of the former, whenever fortune should give
them
the opportunity. For it is the office of a good man to show others that good
which because of the malignity of the times and of fortune, he has not been
able
to accomplish, so that ((many being capable)) some of those more loved by
Heaven
can accomplish them.
And having in the discourses of the preceding book talked of the decisions
made
by the Romans pertinent to the internal affairs of the City, in this (book)
we
shall talk of that which the Roman people did pertinent to the aggrandizement
of
their Empire.
CHAPTER I
WHETHER VIRTU OR FORTUNE WAS THE GREATER CAUSE FOR THE EMPIRE WHICH THE
ROMANS
ACQUIRED
Many (authors), among whom is that most serious writer Plutarch, have had the
opinion that the Roman people in acquiring the Empire were favored more by
Fortune than by Virtu. And among other reasons which he cities, he says that,
by
the admission of that people, it can be shown that they ascribed all their
victories to Fortune, as they had built more temples to Fortune than to any
other God. And it seems that Livius joined in this opinion, for he rarely
makes
any Roman speak where he recounts (of) Virtu, without adding Fortune. Which
thing I do not in any way agree with, nor do I believe also that it can be
sustained. For if no other Republic will ever be found which has made the
progress that Rome had, then I note that no Republic will ever be found which
has been organized to be able to make such conquests as Rome. For it was the
virtu of the armies that enabled her to acquire that Empire; and the order of
proceeding and her own institutions founded by her first Legislator that
enabled
her to maintain the acquisitions, as will be narrated below in further
discussion.
These (authors) also say that the fact of not ever engaging in two most
important wars at the same time was due to the fortune and not the virtu of
the
Roman people; for they did riot engage in war with the Latins until they had
so
beaten the Samnites that the Romans had to engage in a war in defense of
them:
They did not combat with the Tuscans until they first subjugated the Latins,
and
had by frequent defeats almost completely enervated the Samnites: So that if
these two powers had joined together ((while they were fresh)), without doubt
it
can easily be conjectured that the ruin of the Roman Republic would have
ensued.
But however this thing may have been, it never did happen that they engaged
in
two most powerful wars at the same time; rather it appeared always that at
the
beginning of one the other would be extinguished, or in extinguishing one
another would arise. Which is easily seen from the succession of wars engaged
in
by them; for, leaving aside the one they were engaged in before Rome was
taken
by the French (Gauls), it is seen that while they fought against the Equii
and
the Volscians, no other people ((while these people were powerful)) rose up
against them. When these were subdued there arose the war against the
Samnites,
and although before that war was ended the Latin people rebelled against the
Romans with their armies in subduing the insolence of the Latins. When these
were subdued, the war against the Samnites sprung up again. When the Samnites
were beaten through the many defeats inflicted on their forces, there arose
the
war against the Tuscans; which being composed, the Samnites again rose up
when
Pyrrhus crossed over into Italy, and as soon as he was beaten and driven back
to
Greece, the first war with the Carthaginians was kindled: and that war was
hardly finished when all the Gauls from all sides of the Alps conspired
against
the Romans, but they were defeated with the greatest massacre between
Popolonia
and Pisa where the tower of San Vincenti stands today. After this war was
finished, they did not have any war of much importance for a space of twenty
years, for they did not fight with any others except the Ligurians and the
remnants of the Gauls who were in Lombardy. And thus they remained until
there
arose the second Carthaginian war, which kept Italy occupied for sixteen
years.
When this war ended with the greatest glory, there arose the Macedonian war;
(and) after this was finished there came that of Antiochus and Asia. After
this
victory, there did not remain in all the world either a Prince or a Republic
that could, by itself or all together, oppose the Roman forces.
But whoever examines the succession of these wars, prior to that last
victory,
and the manner in which they were conducted, will see mixed with Fortune a
very
great Virtu and Prudence. So that if one should examine the cause of that
(good)
fortune, he will easily find it, for it is a most certain thing that as a
Prince
or a People arrives at so great a reputation, that any neighboring Princes or
Peoples by themselves are afraid to assault him, and he has no fear of them,
it
will always happen that none of them will ever assault him except from
necessity; so that it will almost be at the election of that powerful one to
make war upon any of those neighbors as appears (advantageous) to him, and to
quiet the others by his industry. These are quieted easily in part because
they
have respect for his power, and in part because they are deceived by those
means
which he used to put them to sleep: and other powerful ones who are distant
and
have no commerce with him, will look upon this as a remote thing which does
not
pertain to them. In which error they remain until the conflagration arrives
next
to them, for which, when it comes, they have no remedy to extinguish it
except
with their own forces, which then will not be enough as he has become most
powerful.
I will leave to one side how the Samnites remained to see the Volscians and
the
Equii conquered by the Romans, and so as not to be too prolix I will make use
of
the Carthaginians who were of great power and of great reputation when the
Romans were fighting with the Samnites and Tuscans; for they already held all
Africa, Sardinia and Sicily, and had dominion in part of Spain. Which power
of
theirs, together with their being distant from the confines of the Roman
people,
caused them never to think of assaulting them, nor of succoring the Samnites
and
Tuscans; rather it made them do as is done in any power that grows, allying
themselves with them (the Romans) in their favor and seeking their
friendship.
Nor did they see before this error was made, that the Romans having subdued
all
the peoples (placed) between them and the Carthaginians, begun to combat them
for the Empire of Sicily and Spain. The same thing happened to the Gauls as
to
the Carthaginians, and also to Philip King of Macedonia and to Antiochus; and
everyone of them believed ((while the Roman people were occupied with
others))
that the others would overcome them, and then it would be time either by
peace
or war to defend themselves from (the Romans). So that I believe that the
(good)
Fortune which the Romans had in these parts would be had by all those Princes
who would proceed as the Romans and who would have that same Virtu as they
had.
It would be well here in connection with this subject to show the course held
by
Roman people in entering the Provinces of others, of which we have talked
about
at length in our treatment of Principalities (Treatise on the Prince), for
there
we have debated this matter widely. I will only say this briefly, that they
have
always endeavored to have some friend in these new provinces who should be as
a
ladder or door to let them climb in, both to let them enter and as a means of
keeping it; as was seen, that by means of the Capuans they entered Samnium,
by
means of the Camertines into Tuscany, by the Mamertines into Sicily, by the
Saguntines into Spain, by Massinissa into Africa, by the Aetolians into
Greece,
by Eumences and other Princes into Asia, and by the Massilians and the
Aeduans
into Gaul. And thus they never lacked similar supports, both in order to be
able
to facilitate their enterprises of their acquiring provinces and in holding
them. Which those people who observed them saw that they had less need of
Fortune, than those people who do not make good observers. And so as to
enable
everyone to know better how much more Virtu enabled them to acquire that
Empire
than did Fortune, in the following chapter we will discuss the kind of people
they had to combat and how obstinate they were in defending their liberty.
CHAPTER II
WITH WHAT PEOPLE THE ROMANS HAD TO COMBAT, AND HOW OBSTINATELY THEY DEFENDED
THEIR LIBERTY
Nothing caused so much hard work for the Romans as the overcoming of the
surrounding people and part of the distant Provinces, as the love many people
in
those times had for liberty; which they so obstinately defended but they
would
never have been subjugated except for the excessive virtu (of the Romans).
For,
from many examples, it is known into what dangers they placed themselves in
order to maintain or recover (their liberty), and what vengeance they
practiced
against those who had deprived them of it. It is also to be learned from the
lessons of history what injury the people and the City received from such
servitude. And, while in these times there is only one Province of which it
can
be said has in it free Cities, in ancient times in all the Provinces there
existed many free people. It will be seen that in those times of which we
speak
at present, there were in Italy, from the Alps ((which now divide Tuscany
from
Lombardy)) up to the furthest (part) in Italy, many free peoples, such as
were
the Tuscans, the Romans, the Samnites, and many other people, who inhabited
the
remaining part of Italy. Nor is there ever any discussion whether there was
any
King outside those who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna, King of Tuscany, whose
line was extinguished in a manner of which history does not speak. But it is
indeed seen that in those times when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Tuscany
was free, and so much did it enjoy its liberty and so hated the title of
Prince,
that when the Veientians created a King for the defense of Veii, and
requested
aid of the Tuscans against the Romans, they decided, after much consultation,
not to give aid to the Veientians as long as they lived under the King,
judging
it not to be good to defend the country of those who already had subjected
themselves to others. And it is easy to understand whence this affection
arises
in a people to live free, for it is seen from experience that Cities never
increased either in dominion or wealth except while they had been free. And
truly it is a marvelous thing to consider to what greatness Athens had
arrived
in the space of a hundred years after she had freed herself from the tyranny
of
Pisistratus. But above all, it is a more marvelous thing to consider to what
greatness Rome arrived after it liberated itself from its Kings. The cause is
easy to understand, for not the individual good, but the common good is what
makes Cities great. And, without doubt, this common good is not observed
except
in Republics, because everything is done which makes for their benefit, and
if
it should turn to harm this or that individual, those for whom the said good
is
done are so many, that they can carry on against the interests of those few
who
should be harmed. The contrary happens when there is a Prince, where much of
the
time what he does for himself harms the City, and what is done for the City
harms him. So that soon there arises a Tyranny over a free society, the least
evil which results to that City is for it not to progress further, nor to
grow
further in power or wealth, but most of the times it rather happens that it
turns backward. And if chance should cause that a Tyrant of virtu should
spring
up, who by his courage and virtu at arms expands his dominion, no usefulness
would result to the Republic but only to be himself; for he cannot honor any
of
those citizens who are valiant and good over whom he tyrannizes, as he does
not
want to have to suspect them. Nor also can he subject those Cities which he
acquires or make them tributary to the City of which he is the Tyrant,
because
he does not help himself in making them powerful, but it will help him
greatly
in keeping the State disunited, so that each town and each province should
recognize him. So that he alone, and not his country, profits from his
acquisitions. And whoever should want to confirm this opinion with infinite
other arguments, let him read Xenophon's treatise which he wrote on Tyranny.
It is no wonder, therefore, that the ancient people should have persecuted
the
Tyrants with so much hatred and should have loved living in freedom, and the
name of Liberty so much esteemed by them; as happened when Hieronymus, nephew
of
Hiero the Syracusan, was killed in Syracuse; that when the news of his death
came to his army, which was not very far from Syracuse, they at first begun
to
raise a tumult and take up arms against his killers; but when they heard that
there was shouting of liberty in Syracuse, attracted by the name everyone
became
quiet, their ire against the Tyrannicides was quelled, and they thought of
how a
free government could be established in that City. It is also no wonder that
the
people took extraordinary vengeance against those who deprived them of
liberty.
Of which there have been many examples, but I intend to refer only to one
which
happened in Corcyra, a City of Greece, in the times of the Peloponnesian war,
where, the Province being divided into two factions, of which the Athenians
followed one, the Spartans the other, there arose then among the many other
Cities a division among themselves, some following (the friendship of)
Sparta,
the the others (of) Athens: and it happened in the said City (Corcyra) that
the
nobles had prevailed and had taken away the liberty from the people; the
populari (popular party) with the aid of the Athenians recovered its power,
and,
having laid hands on the nobility, put them into a prison capable of holding
all
of them; from which they took out eight or ten at one time under a pretext of
sending them into exile in different places, but put them to death with
(examples of) extreme cruelties. When the remainder became aware of this,
they
resolved if possible to escape that ignominious death, and arming themselves
as
(best) as they could, they fought with those who attempted to enter and
defended
the entrance to the prison; but when the people came together at this noise,
they pulled down the upper part of that place, and suffocated them in the
ruins.
Many other similar notable and horrible cases occurred in the said Province,
so
that it is seen to be true that liberty is avenged with great energy when it
is
taken away than when it is only threatened (to be taken).
In thinking, therefore, of whence it should happen that in those ancient
times
the people were greater lovers of Liberty than in these times, I believe it
results from the same reason which makes men presently less strong, which I
believe is the difference between our education and that of the ancients,
founded on the difference between our Religion and the ancients. For, as our
Religion shows the truth and the true way (of life), it causes us to esteem
less
the honors of the world: while the Gentiles (Pagans) esteeming them greatly,
and
having placed the highest good in them, were more ferocious in their actions.
Which can be observed from many of their institutions, beginning with the
magnificence of their sacrifices (as compared) to the humility of ours, in
which
there is some pomp more delicate than magnificent, but no ferocious or
energetic
actions. Theirs did not lack pomp and magnificence of ceremony, but there was
added the action of sacrifice full of blood and ferocity, the killing of many
animals, which sight being terrible it rendered the men like unto it. In
addition to this, the ancient Religion did not beatify men except those full
of
worldly glory, such as were the Captains of armies and Princes of Republics.
Our
Religion has glorified more humble and contemplative men rather than men of
action. It also places the highest good in humility, lowliness, and contempt
of
human things: the other places it in the greatness of soul, the strength of
body, and all the other things which make men very brave. And, if our
Religion
requires that there be strength (of soul) in you, it desires that you be more
adept at suffering than in achieving great deeds.
This mode of living appears to me, therefore, to have rendered the world weak
and a prey to wicked men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the great
body
of men, in order to go to Paradise, think more of enduring their beatings
than
in avenging them. And although it appears that the World has become
effeminate
and Heaven disarmed, yet this arises without doubt more from the baseness of
men
who have interpreted our Religion in accordance with Indolence and not in
accordance with Virtu. For if they were to consider that it (our Religion)
permits the exaltation and defense of the country, they would see that it
desires that we love and honor her (our country), and that we prepare
ourselves
so that we can be able to defend her. This education and false
interpretations,
therefore, are the cause that in the world as many Republics are not seen in
them that the people have as much love for liberty now as at that time. I
believe, however, the reason for this rather to be, that the Roman Empire
with
its arms and greatness destroyed all the Republics and all civil
institutions.
And although that Empire was later dissolved, yet these Cities could not
reunite
themselves, nor reorganize their civil institutions, except in a very few
places
in that Empire.
But however it was, the Romans found a conspiracy in every smallest part of
the
world of Republics very well armed and most obstinate in the defense of their
liberty. Which shows that the Roman people could never have overcome them
without that rare and extreme virtu. And to give an example of one instance,
the
example of the Samnites suffices for me, which seems to be a marvelous one.
And
T. Livius admits that these (people) were so powerful and their arms so
valiant,
that, up to the time of the Consul Papirus Cursor, son of the first Papirus,
for
a period of forty six years, they were able to resist the Romans, despite the
many defeats, destruction of Towns, and massacres suffered by their country.
Especially as it is now seen that that country where there were so many
Cities
and so many men, is now almost uninhabited: and yet it was so well
established
and so powerful, that it was unconquerable except by Roman virtu. And it is
an
easy thing whence that order and disorder proceeded, for it all comes from
their
then living in freedom and now living in servitude. For all the towns and
provinces which are free in every way ((as was said above)) make the greatest
advances. For here greater populations are seen because marriages are more
free
and more desired by men, because everyone willingly procreates those children
that he believes he is able to raise without being apprehensive that their
patrimony will be taken away, and to know that they are not only born free
and
not slaves, but are also able through their own virtu to become Princes. They
will see wealth multiplied more rapidly, both that which comes from the
culture
(of the soil) and that which comes from the arts, for everyone willingly
multiplies those things and seek to acquire those goods whose acquisition he
believes he can enjoy. Whence it results that men competing for both private
and
public betterment, both come to increase in a wondrous manner. The contrary
of
all these things happens in those countries which live in servitude, and the
more the good customs are lacking, the more rigorous is the servitude. And
the
hardest of all servitudes is that of being subject to a Republic: the one,
because it is more enduring and the possibility of escaping from it is
missing:
the other, because the final aim of a Republic is to enervate and weaken ((in
order to increase its own power)) all the other states. Which a Prince who
subjugates you does not do unless that Prince is some barbarous Prince, a
destroyer of countries and dissipater of all human civilization, such as are
oriental Princes: But if he has ordinary human feelings in him, most of the
times he will love equally the Cities subject to him, and will leave them
(enjoy) all their arts, and almost all their ancient institutions. So that if
they cannot grow as if they were free, they will not be ruined even in
servitude; servitude being understood as that in which Cities serve a
foreigner,
for of that to one of their own Citizens, we have spoken above.
Whoever considers, therefore, all that which has been said, will not marvel
at
the power which the Samnites had while they were free, and at the weakness to
which they came afterwards under servitude: and T. Livius gives testimony of
this in many places, and mainly in the war with Hannibal, where he shows that
when the Samnites were pressed by a legion of (Romans) who were at Nola, they
sent Orators (Ambassadors) to Hannibal to beg him to succor them. Who in
their
speech said to him. that for a hundred years they had combatted the Romans
with
their own soldiers and their own Captains, and many times had sustained
(battle
against) two consular armies and two Consuls; but now they had arrived at
such
baseness that they were hardly able to defend themselves against the small
Roman
legion which was at Nola.
CHAPTER III
ROME BECAME A GREAT CITY BY RUINING THE SURROUNDING CITIES AND ADMITTING
FOREIGNERS EASILY TO HER HONORS
Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis. (Rome grew on the ruins of Alba) Those who
plan for a City to achieve great Empire ought with all industry to endeavor
to
make it full of inhabitants, for without this abundance of men, one can never
succeed in making a City great. This is done in two ways, by love and by
force.
Through love, by keeping the ways open and secure for foreigners who should
plan
to come to live there. Through force, by destroying the neighboring Cities
and
sending their inhabitants to live in your City. Which was so greatly observed
by
Rome, that in the time of the sixth King of Rome, that there lived there
eighty
thousand men capable of bearing arms. For the Romans wanted to act according
to
the custom of the good cultivator, who, in order to make a plant grow and
able
to produce and mature its fruits, cuts off the first branches that it puts
out,
so that by retaining that virtu in the roots of that plant, they can in time
grow more green and more fruitful. And that this method of aggrandizing and
creating an Empire was necessary and good, is shown by the example of Sparta
and
Athens; which two Republics although well armed and regulated by excellent
laws,
none the less did not attain to the greatness of the Roman Empire, and Rome
appeared more tumultuous and not as well regulated as those others. No other
reason can be adduced for this than that mentioned above; for Rome, from
having
enlarged the population of the City in both those two ways, was enabled to
put
two hundred thousand men under arms, while Sparta and Athens were never able
(to
raise) twenty thousand each. Which resulted not from the site of Rome being
more
favorable than those of the other, but solely from the different mode of
procedure. For Lycurgus, founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking that
nothing
could more easily dissolve its laws than the admixture of new inhabitants,
did
everything (he could) so that foreigners would not come to them; and in
addition
to not receiving them into their citizenship by marriage, and other commerce
that makes men come together, ordered that in that Republic of his only
leather
money should be spent, in order to take away from everyone the desire to come
there in order to bring in merchandise or some arts: of a kind so that the
City
could never increase its inhabitants. And because all our actions imitate
nature, it is neither possible nor natural that a slender trunk should
sustain a
big branch. A small Republic, therefore, cannot conquer Cities or Republics
which are larger and more valiant than it; and if it does conquer them, it
happens then to them as to that tree that has its branches bigger than its
trunk, which sustains it only with great effort with every little breeze that
blows; such as is seen happened in Sparta, which had conquered all the Cities
of
Greece, but as soon as Thebes rebelled, all the others rebelled, and the
trunk
remained alone without branches. Which could not have happened to Rome, as it
had its trunk so big that it could sustain any branch. This mode of
proceeding
therefore, together with others which will be mentioned below, made Rome
great
and most powerful. Which T. Livius points out in two (few) words, when he
said:
Rome grew while Alba was ruined.
CHAPTER IV
REPUBLICS HAVE HAD THREE WAYS OF EXPANDING
Whoever has studied the ancient histories finds that Republics had three ways
of
expanding. One has been that which the ancient Tuscans observed, of being one
league of many united Republics, where there is not any one before the other
either in authority or in rank. And in acquiring other Cities they made them
associates of themselves, as in a similar way the Swiss do in these times,
and
as the Achaens and Aetolians did in ancient times in Greece. And as the
Romans
had many wars with the Tuscans ((in order to illustrate better the first
method)) I will extend myself in giving a particular account of them. Before
the
Roman Empire, the Tuscans were the most powerful people in Italy, both on
land
and on the sea, and although there is no particular history of their affairs,
yet there is some small record and some signs of their greatness; and it is
known that they sent a colony to the sea, above (north of) them, which they
called Adria, which was so noble that it gave a name to that sea which the
Latins also called the Adriatic. It is also known that their arms (authority)
was obeyed from the Tiber up to the foot of the Alps which now encircle the
greater part of Italy; notwithstanding that two hundred years before the
Romans
became so powerful that the said Tuscans lost the Dominion of that country
which
today is called Lombardy: which province had been seized by the Gauls, who,
moved either by necessity or the sweetness of the fruits, and especially of
the
wine, came into Italy under their leader Bellovesus, and having defeated and
driven out the inhabitants of the province, they settled there where they
built
many Cities, and they called that Province Gallia from the name they
themselves
had, which they kept until they were subjugated by the Romans. The Tuscans,
then, lived in that equality and proceeded in their expansion through the
first
method which was mentioned above: and there were twelve Cities, among which
were
Clusium, Veii, Fiesole, Arezzo, Volterra, and others like them, which through
a
league governed their Empire; nor could they go outside of Italy with their
acquisitions, a great part of which still remained intact (independent), for
the
reasons which will be mentioned below.
The other method is to make them associates; not so closely, however, that
the
position of commanding the seat of the Empire and the right of sovereignty
should not remain with you; which method was observed by the Romans. The
third
method is to make subjects of them immediately and not associates, as did the
Spartans and Athenians. Of which three methods this last is entirely useless
as
is seen was the case in the above mentioned two Republics, which were ruined
for
no other reason than from having acquired that dominion which they were
unable
to maintain. For to undertake the governing of Cities by violence, especially
those which were accustomed to living in freedom, is a difficult and
wearisome
thing. And unless you are armed, and powerfully armed, you cannot either
command
or rule them. And to want to be thus established, it is necessary to make
associates of them who would help in increasing the population of your City.
And
as these two Cities (Sparta and Athens) did not do either the one or the
other,
their method of procedure was useless. And because Rome, which is an example
of
the second method, did both things, she therefore rose to such exceeding
power.
And as she had been the only one to act thusly, so too she had been the only
one
to become so powerful; for she had created many associates throughout all
Italy,
who lived with them in many respects equally under the law, but on the other
hand ((as I said above)) she always reserved for herself the seat of Empire
and
the right of command, so that these associates of hers came ((without their
being aware of it)) through their own efforts and blood to subjugate
themselves.
For as soon as they begun to go beyond Italy with their armies to reduce
other
Kingdoms to Provinces, and to make for themselves subjects of those who,
having
been accustomed to live under Kings, did not care to be subjects, and from
having Roman governors, and having been conquered by armies under Roman
command,
they recognized no one to be superior other than the Romans. So that those
associates of Rome (who were) in Italy found themselves suddenly surrounded
by
Roman subjects and pressed by a very large City like Rome: and when they
understood the deceit under which they had lived they were not in time to
remedy
it, for Rome had achieved so much authority with the (acquisition) of the
external provinces, and so much power was to be found within themselves, the
City having become greatly populated and well armed. And although these
associates of hers conspired against her in order to avenge the injuries
inflicted on them, they were defeated (in war) in a short time, worsening
their
condition; for from being associates they too became their subjects. This
method
of proceeding ((as has been said)) had been observed only by the Romans; and
a
Republic which wants to aggrandize itself cannot have any other method, for
experience has not shown anything else more certain and more true.
The fore-mentioned method of creating Leagues, such as were the Tuscans,
Achaians, and the Aetolians, and as are the Swiss today, is, after that of
the
Romans, the better method; for with it, it is not possible to expand greatly,
but two benefits ensue: the one, that they are not easily drawn into war: the
other, that that which you take you can easily hold. The reason they are not
able to expand is that Republics are not united and have their seats in
several
places, which makes it difficult for them to consult and decide. It also
makes
them undesirous of dominating, for, as many Communities participating in that
dominion, they do not value much such acquisitions as does a single Republic
which hopes to enjoy it entirely by itself. In addition to this they are
governed by a council, and it follows that they are tardier in every decision
than those which come from those who live in the same circle. It is also seen
from experience that such methods of procedure have a fixed limit, of which
there is no example which indicates it has ever been transgressed; and this
(limit) is the addition of twelve or fourteen communities, beyond which they
cannot go, and as their defending themselves appears to them to be difficult
they do not seek greater dominion, as much because necessity does not
constrain
them to have more power, as well as for not recognizing any usefulness in
further acquisitions for the reason mentioned above: for they have to do one
of
two things: either to continue making additional associates for themselves,
as
this multitude would cause confusion, or they would have to make them
subjects
to themselves. And as they see the difficulty of this, and little usefulness
in
maintaining it, they see no value in it. When, therefore, they are come to
such
a great number that it appears to them they can live securely, they turn to
two
things: the one, to take up the protection of others who seek it, and by this
means obtain money from each one, and which they can readily distribute among
themselves: the other, is to become soldiers for others and accept a stipend
from this Prince or that, who hires them for undertaking his enterprises, as
is
seen the Swiss do these days, and as one reads was done by the above
mentioned
ones. Of which Titus Livius gives testimony, where he tells of Philip, King
of
Macedon, coming to negotiate with Titus Quintus Flaminius, and discussing the
accord in the presence of a Praetor of the Aetolians, the said Praetor in
coming
to talk with him, was by him reprimanded for avarice and infidelity, saying
that
the Aetolians were not ashamed to enlist in the military service for one, and
then also send their men into the service of the enemy, so that many times
the
Aetolian ensigns were seen among the two opposing armies. We see, therefore,
that this method of proceeding through leagues has always been the same, and
has
had the same results. It is also seen that the method of making (them)
subjects
has always been ineffective and to have produced little profit: and when they
had carried this method too far, they were soon ruined. And if this method of
making subjects is useless in armed Republics, it is even more useless in
those
which are unarmed, as the Republics of Italy have been in our times.
It is to be recognized, therefore, that the Romans had the certain method,
which
is so much more admirable as there was no example before Rome, and there has
been no one who has imitated them since Rome. And as to leagues, only the
Swiss
and the league of Swabia are found to be the only ones which imitated them.
And
finally of this matter it will be said, so many institutions observed by
Rome,
pertinent to the events both internal as well as external, have not only not
been imitated in our times, but have not been taken into account, being
judged
by some not to be true, by some impossible, by some not applicable and
useless.
So that by remaining in this ignorance we (Italy) are prey to anyone who has
wanted to rule this province. But if the imitation of the Romans appeared
difficult, that the ancient Tuscans ought not to appear so, especially by the
present Tuscans. For if they could not acquire that power in Italy, which
that
method of procedure would have given them, they lived in security for a long
time, with very much glory of Dominion and arms, and especially praise for
their
customs and Religion. Which power and glory was first diminished by the Gauls,
and afterwards extinguished by the Romans: and was so completely
extinguished,
that, although two thousand years ago the power of the Tuscans was great, at
present there is almost no memory. Which thing has made me think whence this
oblivion of things arises, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V
THAT THE CHANGES OF SECTS AND LANGUAGES, TOGETHER WITH THE ACCIDENT OF
DELUGES
AND PESTILENCE, EXTINGUISHED THE MEMORY OF THINGS
To those Philosophers who hold that the World has existed from eternity, I
believe it is possible to reply, that, if such great antiquity was true, it
would be reasonable that there should be some record of more than five
thousand
years, except it is seen that the records of those times have been destroyed
from diverse causes: of which some were acts of men, some of Heaven. Those
that
are acts of men are the changes of the sects (religion) and of languages.
Because, when a new sect springs up, that is, a new Religion, the first
effort
is ((in order to give itself reputation)) to extinguish the old; and if it
happens that the establishers of the new sect are of different languages,
they
extinguish it (the old) easily. Which thing is known by observing the method
which the Christian Religion employed against the Gentile (heathen) sect,
which
has cancelled all its institutions, all of its ceremonies, and extinguished
every record of that ancient Theology. It is true that they did not succeed
in
entirely extinguishing the records of the things done by their excellent men,
which has resulted from their having maintained the Latin language, which was
done by force, having to write this new law in it. For if they could have
written it in a new language, considering the other persecutions they
suffered,
none of the past events would have been recorded. And whoever reads the
methods
used by Saint Gregory and the other Heads of the Christian Religion, will see
with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials, burning the
works
of the Poets and Historians, ruining statues, and despoiling every thing else
that gave any sign of antiquity. So that, if to this persecution they had
added
a new language, it would have been seen that in a very brief time everything
(previous) would have been forgotten.
It is to be believed, therefore, that that which the Christian Religion
wanted
to do against the Gentile sect, the Gentiles did against that which preceded
them. And as these sects changed two or three times in five or six thousand
years, all memory of things done before that time are lost. And if, however,
some signs of it were left, it would be considered a fabulous thing, and not
to
be given credence: as happened with the history of Diodorus Siculus, who
although he gives account of forty or fifty thousand years, none the less it
is
reputed ((as I believe it is )) a mendacious thing.
As to the causes that come from Heaven, they are those that extinguish the
human
race and reduce the inhabitants of parts of the world to a very few. And this
results either from pestilence, or famine, or from an inundation of water;
and
the last is the most important, as much because it is the most universal, as
because those who are saved are men of the mountains and rugged, who, not
having
any knowledge of antiquity, cannot leave it to posterity. And if among them
there should be saved one who should have this knowledge, he would hide it or
pervert it in his own way in order to create a reputation and name for
himself;
so that there remains to his successors only what he wanted to write, and
nothing else. And that these inundations, pestilences, and famines, occur, I
do
not believe there is any doubt, not only because all histories are full of
them,
but also because the effects of these oblivious things are seen, and because
it
appears reasonable they should be; For in nature as in simple bodies, when
there
is an accumulation of much superfluous matter, it very often moves by itself
and
makes a purgation which is healthy to that body; and so it happens in this
compound body of the human race, that when all the provinces are full of
inhabitants so that they cannot live or go elsewhere in order to occupy and
fill
up all places, and when human astuteness and malignity has gone as far as
they
can go, it happens of necessity that the world purges itself in one of the
three
ways, so that men having been chastised and reduced in number, live more
commodiously and become better. Tuscany, then, was once powerful, as was said
above, full of Religion and Virtu had its own customs and its own national
language; all of which was extinguished by the Roman power. So that ((as was
said)) nothing remained of it but the memory of its name.
CHAPTER VI
HOW THE ROMANS PROCEEDED IN MAKING WAR
Having discussed how the Romans proceeded in their expansion, we will now
discuss how they proceeded in making war, and it will be seen with how much
prudence they deviated in all the actions from the universal methods of
others,
in order to make their road to supreme greatness easy. The intention of
whoever
makes war, whether by election or from ambition, is to acquire and maintain
the
acquisition, and to proceed in such a way so as to enrich themselves and not
to
impoverish the (conquered) country and his own country. It is necessary,
therefore, both in the acquisition and in the maintenance, to take care not
to
spend (too much), rather to do every thing for the usefulness of his people.
Whoever wants to do all these things must hold to the Roman conduct and
method,
which was first to make the war short and sharp, as the French say, for
corning
into the field with large armies, they dispatched all the wars they had with
the
Latins, Samnites, and Tuscans, in the briefest time. And if all those things
they did from the beginning of Rome up to the siege of the Veienti were to be
noted, it will be seen that they were all dispatched some in six, some in
ten,
some in twenty days; for this was their usage. As soon as war broke out, they
went out with the armies to meet the enemy and quickly came to the
engagement.
Which, when they won it, the enemy ((so that their countryside should not be
completely laid waste)) came to terms, and the Romans condemned them (to turn
over) lands, which lands they converted into private possessions or consigned
them to a colony, which, placed on the confines of those people, served as a
guard to the Roman frontiers, with usefulness as well to those colonists who
received those fields as to the people of Rome, who, without expense,
maintained
that guard. Nor could this method be more secure, more effectual, or more
useful. For, as long as the enemy were not in the fields, that guard was
enough;
but as soon as they went out in force to oppress that Colony, the Romans also
came out in force and came to an engagement with them, and having waged and
won
the battle, (and), having imposed heavier conditions on them, they returned
home. Thus, little by little, they came to acquire reputation over them and
strength within themselves (their state). And they kept to this method up to
the
time of war when they changed the method of proceeding; which was after the
siege of the Veienti, where, in order to be able to wage a long war, they
ordered them to pay their soldiers, (and) which at first ((since it was not
necessary as the wars were short)) they did not pay. And although the Romans
gave them the money, and by virtue of which they were able to wage longer
wars,
and to keep them at a greater distance if necessity should keep them in the
field longer, none the less they never varied from the original system of
finishing them quickly, according to the place and time: nor did they ever
vary
from sending out of colonies. For, in the first system, the ambition of the
Consuls contributed in making the wars short ((in addition to the natural
custom)), who, being elected for one year, and six months of that year in
quarters, wanted to finish the war in order to (have a) triumph. In the
sending
of colonies there was usefulness to them and resultant great convenience.
They
(the Romans) made a good distribution of booty, with which they were not as
liberal as they were at first, as much because it did not appear to them to
be
so necessary ((the soldiers receiving a stipend)), as also because the booty
being larger, they planned to enrich themselves of it so that the public
should
not be constrained to undertake the enterprises with the tributes from the
City.
Which system in a short time made their Treasury very rich. These two
methods,
therefore, of distributing the booty and of sending of colonies, caused Rome
to
be enriched by the wars while other unwise Princes and Republics were
impoverished (by theirs). And these were brought to such limits that a Consul
did not think he could obtain a triumph unless, with his triumph, he could
bring
much gold and silver, and every other kind of booty into the Treasury.
Thus the Romans with the above described conditions and by finishing wars
quickly, being satisfied by the length (of the wars) to massacre the enemy,
and
by defeating (their armies) and overrunning (their lands), and (making)
accords
to their advantage, always became richer and more powerful.
CHAPTER VII
HOW MUCH LAND THE ROMANS GAVE EACH COLONIST
I believe it is very difficult to find out the truth as to how much land the
Romans distributed per colonist. I believe they gave them more or less,
according to the places where they sent the colonies. And I would judge that
in
any instance and in all places the distribution was small. First, in order to
send a greater number of men assigned to guard that country: then, as they
lived
poorly at home it would not have been reasonable that they should desire that
their men should live too abundantly outside.
And T. Livius says that, after taking Veii, they sent a colony there and
distributed to each three and seven-twelfths (3 7/12) Jugeri of land, which
in
our measures are ... (2 2/3 acres). For, in addition to the above written
things, they judged it was not the amount of land, but its good cultivation,
that should suffice. It is necessary also that all the colonies have public
fields where everyone could pasture their beasts, and forests where they
could
get wood to burn, without which things a colony cannot organize itself.
CHAPTER VIII
THE REASON WHY PEOPLE DEPART FROM THEIR NATIONAL PLACES AND INUNDATE THE
COUNTRY
OF OTHERS
Since there has been discussed above the method of proceeding in war observed
by
the Romans and how the Tuscans were assaulted by the Gauls, it does not
appear
to me alien to the subject to discuss how two kinds of war are made. One is
waged because of the ambitions of Princes or of a Republic that seek to
extend
their Empire, such as were the wars that Alexander the Great waged, and those
that the Romans waged, and those which one power wages against another. While
these wars are dangerous, they never drive all the inhabitants out of a
province, but the obedience of the people is enough for the conqueror, and
most
of the times he leaves them to live with their laws, and always with their
homes
and possessions: The other kind of war is when an entire people with all
their
families are taken away from a place, necessitated either by famine or by
war,
and goes to seek a new seat in a new province, not in order to seek dominion
over them as those others above, but to possess it absolutely; and to drive
out
or kill its old inhabitants. This kind of war is most cruel and most
frightful.
And of these wars Sallust discusses at the end of (the history) of Jugurtha,
when he says that, after Jugurtha was defeated, movements of the Gauls coming
into Italy were heard: where he (also) says that the Roman People had
combatted
with all the other peoples only as to who should dominate, but that with the
Gauls they combatted for the (very) existence of each. For to a Prince or a
Republic that assaults a province, it is enough to extinguish only those who
command, but to these entire populations, it behooves them to extinguish
everyone because they want to live on that which the others lived.
The Romans had three of these most perilous wars. The first was when Rome was
taken, which was occupied by those Gauls who had detached Lombardy ((as was
mentioned above)) from the Tuscans and made it their seat: for which Titus
Livius assigns two causes: The first, as was said above, that they were
attracted by the sweetness of the fruits and wines of Italy, which were
lacking
in France: The second, that in that Kingdom of Gaul, men multiplied so fast
that
they were no longer able to feed them, (and) the Princes decided it should be
necessary that a part of them should go some place to seek a new country. And
having made such a decision, they elected as captains over those who should
depart Bellovesus and Sicovesus, two Kings of the Gauls, of whom Bellovesus
went
into Italy and Sicovesus passed into Spain. From the passage of this
Bellovesus
there resulted the occupation of Lombardy, and hence the first war that the
Gauls made against Rome. After this came that which they made after the first
Carthaginian war, where they (the Romans) killed over two hundred thousand
Gauls
between Piombino and Pisa. The third was when the Teutons and Cimbrians came
into Italy, who having overcome several Roman armies, were defeated by
Marius.
The Romans, therefore, won these three most perilous wars. And no little
virtu
was necessary to win them; for it is seen that when that Roman virtu was lost
(and), those arms lost their ancient valor, that Empire was destroyed by
similar
people, such as were the Goths, Vandals, and the like, who occupied all the
western Empire.
These people go out from their countries ((as was said above)) driven by
necessity; and the necessity arises from famine, or war, and oppression,
which
in their own country is experienced by them, so that they are constrained to
seek new land. And these such are sometimes of a great number, and then enter
into the countries of others with violence, killing the inhabitants, taking
possession of their goods, create a new Kingdom, and change the name of the
province, as Moses did, and those people who occupied the Roman Empire. For
these new names that exist in Italy and in the provinces, do not come from
anything else than of having been thus named by the new occupiers, such as is
Lombardy which was called Cisalpine Gaul, France which was called Transalpine
Gaul, and now is called after the Franks, as those people were called who had
occupied it; Slavonia was called Illyria, Hungary Pannonia, England Brittania,
and many other provinces which have changed names, to recount which would be
tedious. Moses also called that part of Syria occupied by him Judea. And as I
have said above that sometimes such people are driven from their own seats
because of war, whence they are constrained to seek new lands, I want to cite
the example of the Maurusians, a most ancient people of Syria, who, hearing
of
the coming of the Hebrew people and judging not to be able to resist them,
thought it better to save themselves and leave their own country, than to
attempt to save it and lose themselves; and taking up their families, they
went
to Africa where they established themselves after driving out those
inhabitants
whom they found in that place. And thus those who were unable to defend their
own country, were able to occupy that of others. And Procopius, who wrote of
the
war that Belisarius made against the Vandals, occupiers of Africa, refers to
having read letters written on certain columns in the places that were
inhabited
by these Maurusians, which said: We Maurusians here fled from before Jesus
the
robber, son of Narva. Whence appeared the reason of their departure from
Syria.
These people, therefore, who have been driven out by an extreme necessity are
most formidable, and if they are not confronted by good arms, will never be
checked. But when those who are constrained to abandon their own country are
not
many, they are not as dangerous as those people who were discussed, for they
are
unable to use as much violence but must employ cunning in occupying some
place,
and having occupied it, to maintain themselves by way of friends and
confederates: as is seen was done by Aeneas, and Dido, and the Massalians,
and
the like, all of whom were able to maintain themselves, with the consent of
their neighbors.
The great numbers of people that went out, and are going out, are almost all
from the country of Scythia, a cold and poor place, where, because there were
a
great number of men and the country of a kind which was unable to feed them,
they are forced to go out, having many things which drive them out and none
to
retain them. And if in the past five hundred years it has not occurred that
some
of these people have not inundated any country, it arises from several
reasons.
The first, the great evacuation which that country made during the decline of
the Empire, when more than thirty tribes left (Scythia). The second is, that
Germany and Hungary, whence also such people went out, have now improved
their
country so that they are able to live comfortably, that they are not
necessitated to change places. On the other hand, their men being very
warlike
are a bastion in holding back the Scythians, who have the same boundary with
them, from presuming to overcome or pass through them. And often times there
occurred very great movements of Tartars, who were later checked by the
Hungarians and the Poles, and they often boast that if it had not been for
their
arms, Italy and the Church would have many times felt the weight of the
Tartar
armies. And this I want to be enough concerning the people mentioned.
CHAPTER IX
WHAT CAUSES COMMONLY MAKE WARS ARISE BETWEEN THE POWERFUL
The cause which made war arise between the Romans and the Samnites who were
in
league for a long time, is a common cause which arises among all powerful
Principalities. Which cause either arises by chance or is made to arise by
those
who desire to set a war in motion. That which arose between the Romans and
the
Samnites was by chance, for it was not the intention of the Samnites, in
setting
the war in motion against the Sidicians, and afterwards against the
Campanians,
to set it in motion against the Romans. But the Campanians being hard pressed
and having recourse to Rome, beyond the thoughts of the Romans and the
Samnites,
the Campanians forced the Romans to take them to themselves as subjects of
theirs, so that it appeared to them (the Romans) they could not honorably
evade
(the obligation) of defending them, and (hence) take up that war. For it
indeed
appeared reasonable to the Romans not to defend the Campanians as friends
against the Samnites, who were their friends, but it seemed to them
disgraceful
not to defend them as subjects, even though voluntary ones, judging that if
they
did not undertake such defense, it would alienate all those who should plan
to
come under their dominion. And as the aim of Rome was Empire and Glory, and
not
Quiet, she could not refuse this enterprise.
This same cause gave beginning to the first war against the Carthaginians
because of the defense of the Messenians in Sicily which the Romans
undertook,
which was also by chance. But the second war which afterwards arose between
them
was not by chance, for Hannibal the Carthaginian Captain assaulted the
Saguntines friends of the Romans in Spain, not to injure them, but to move
the
Romans to arms, and to have occasion to combat them and pass into Italy. This
method of kindling new wars has always been customary among Powers, and who
have
some respect for the faith (treaties) with others. For if I want to make war
against a Prince, and have between us a signed treaty observed for a long
time,
I would assault a friend of his very own with some other pretext and
justification, especially knowing that in assaulting his friend either he
would
resent it and I would obtain my intention of making war against him, or if he
did not resent it, his weakness and unfaithfulness in not defending his ally
will take away reputation from him, and to execute my designs more easily.
It ought to be noted, therefore, because of the dedication of the Campanians
in
setting the war in motion in the way mentioned above, that the best remedy
which
a City has, that is unable to defend itself, but wants to defend itself in
whatever manner against anyone who should assault them: which is to give
itself
freely to whomever they design to defend them, as the Campanians did to the
Romans, and the Florentines to King Robert of Naples, who, unwilling to
defend
them as friends, defended them afterwards as subjects against the forces of
Castruccio of Lucca who was pressing them hard.
CHAPTER X
MONEY IS NOT THE SINEW OF WAR ALTHOUGH THIS IS COMMON OPINION
Because anyone can commence a war at his pleasure, but cannot so finish it, a
Prince ought before he undertakes an enterprise to measure his forces, and
govern himself in accordance with them. But he ought to have so much prudence
as
not to deceive himself of the two forces: and he will deceive himself every
time
when he measures it either by his money, or by the location (of his country),
or
by good will of his people, while on the other hand he lacks his own arms.
For
although the above things will increase his strength, (but) they will not
give
it to him, and of themselves are nothing, and will not be of benefit without
trustworthy arms. For without them, great amounts of money will not suffice
you,
the strength of the country will not benefit you, and the faith and good will
of
men will not endure, as these cannot remain faithful to you if you are not
able
to defend them. Every mountain, every lake, every inaccessible place becomes
a
plain where strong defenders are lacking. Money alone, also, will not defend
you, but causes you to be plundered more readily. Nor can that common opinion
be
more false which says that money is the sinew of war. Which sentence was said
by
Quintus Curtius in the war which existed between Antipater the Macedonian and
the King of Sparta, where he narrates that because of a want of money the
King
of Sparta was obliged to come to battle and was routed, that if he had
deferred
the fight a few days the news of the death of Alexander in Greece would have
arrived, whence he would have remained victor without fighting. But lacking
money, and being apprehensive that, for the want of which, his army would
abandon him, was constrained to try the fortune of battle. So that for this
reason Quintus Curtius affirms money to be the sinew of war. Which opinion is
alleged every day, and acted on by not so prudent Princes to whom it is
enough
to follow it: For relying on it, they believe it is enough to have much
treasure
to defend themselves, and do not think that if treasure should be enough to
win,
that Darius would have vanquished Alexander, the Greeks would have vanquished
the Romans, and in our times Duke Charles would have vanquished the Swiss,
and a
few days ago the Pope and the Florentine together would not have had
difficulty
in defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Julius II, in the war at Urbino. But
all
the above named were vanquished by those who esteemed not money, but good
soldiers, as the sinew of war.
Among other things that Croesus, King of Lydia, showed to Solon the Athenian
was
a countless treasure: and asking what he thought his power to be, Solon
answered
that he did not judge him more powerful because of that, because war was made
with iron and not gold, and that someone might come who had more iron than he
and would take it away from him. In addition to this, when, after the death
of
Alexander the Great, a great multitude of Gauls passed into Greece and then
into
Asia, and the Gauls sent Ambassadors to the King of Macedonia to treat of
certain accords, that King to show his power and to dismay them showed them
much
gold and silver: whence those Gauls who had already as good as signed the
peace
broke it, so much did the desire grow in them to take away that gold. And
thus
was that King despoiled by the very thing that he had accumulated for
defense.
The Venetians a few years ago also, having their Treasury full of treasure,
lost
the State without being able to be defended by it.
I say, therefore, that gold ((as common opinion shouts)) is not the sinew of
war, but good soldiers; because gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers,
but good soldiers are indeed sufficient to find gold. To the Romans ((if they
had wanted to make war more with money instead of with iron)) it would not
have
been enough to have all the treasure of the world, considering the great
enterprises that they made and the difficulties that they had to encounter.
But
making their wars with iron, they never suffered from want of gold, because
it
was brought, even up to their camps, by those who feared them. And if that
King
of Sparta, because of a dearth of money, had to try the fortune of battle,
that
which happened to him on account of money many times would have happened for
other causes; for it has been seen that any army lacking provisions, and
being
obliged either to die of hunger or to engage in battle, will always take the
side of fighting as being more honorable, and where fortune can in some way
favor you. It has also happened many times that a Captain, seeing succor come
to
the army of his enemy, has preferred to come to an engagement with him at
once
and try the fortune of battle, rather than wait until he is reinforced and
then
have to fight him in any case under a thousand disadvantages. It has also
been
seen, how it happened to Hasdrubal when he was assaulted in the Marca (Metaurus
River) by Claudius Nero, together with the other Roman Consul, that a Captain
obliged either to fight or flee, always elects to fight, it seeming to him in
this way, even if most doubtful, to be able to win, but in the other to lose
in
any case.
There are many necessities, therefore, which make a Captain choose the side
of
coming to battle against his will, among which sometimes it can be the dearth
of
money, but not for this ought money to be judged the sinew of war more than
other things which induce men to a similar necessity. Repeating again,
therefore, the sinew of war is not gold, but good soldiers. Money is indeed
necessary in a secondary place, but it is a necessity that good soldiers by
themselves will overcome; for it is impossible that good soldiers will lack
money, as it is for money by itself to find good soldiers. Every history in a
thousand places shows that which we say to be true, notwithstanding that
Pericles had counselled the Athenians to make war with all the Peloponnesus,
showing that they could win that war with perseverance and by the power of
money. And although in that war the Athenians at times had prospered, in the
end
they lost, and the good counsels and good soldiers of Sparta were of more
value
than the perseverance and the money of Athens. But the testimony of Titus
Livius
is more direct than any other, where, discussing if Alexander the Great
should
have come into Italy, if he would have vanquished the Romans, he showed three
things to be necessary for war, many and good soldiers, prudent Captains, and
good fortune: where examining whether the Romans or Alexander should have
prevailed in these things, afterwards makes his conclusion without ever
mentioning money. The Campanians had, when they were requested by the
Sidicians
to take up arms of them against the Samnites, to measure their power by money
and not by soldiers; for having undertaken the proceeding to aid them, after
two
defeats were constrained to make themselves tributaries of the Romans if they
wanted to save themselves.
CHAPTER XI
IT IS NOT A PRUDENT PROCEEDING TO MAKE AN ALLIANCE WITH A PRINCE WHO HAS MORE
REPUTATION THAN POWER
Titus Livius, wanting to show the error of the Sidicians in trusting to the
aid
of the Campanians, and the error of the Campanians in believing themselves
able
to defend them, could not say it with more forceful words, saying, The
Campanians brought a greater name in aid of the Sidicians, than they did men
for
protecting them. Where it ought to be noted that leagues made with Princes
who
have neither the convenience of aiding you because of the remoteness of their
location nor the strength to do so because of disorganization or other
reasons
of theirs, bring more notoriety than aid to those who trust in them: as
happened
in our times to the Florentines, when in one thousand four hundred seventy
nine
(1479) the Pope and the King of Naples assaulted them, that being friends of
the
King of France derived from that friendship more notoriety than protection;
as
also would happen to that Prince who should undertake some enterprise
trusting
himself to the Emperor Maximilian, because this is one of those friendships
that
would bring to whoever made it more notoriety than protection, as is said in
this treatise of what that of the Campanians brought to the Sidicians.
¶ The Campanians, therefore, erred in this part by imagining themselves to
have
more strength than they had. And thus little prudence sometimes does to men,
who
not knowing how nor being able to defend themselves, want to undertake
enterprises to defend others; as also the Tarentines did, who, when the Roman
armies encountered the Samnites, sent ambassadors to the Roman Consul to make
him understand that they wanted peace between those two people, and that they
were ready to make war against the one that should refuse peace. So that the
Consul, laughing at this proposition, in the presence of the ambassadors, had
the (bugle) sound for battle and commanded his army to go and meet the enemy,
showing the Tarentines by acts and not words of what a reply they were
worthy.
¶ And having in the present chapter discussed the wrong proceedings which
Princes undertake for the defense of others, in the following one I want to
talk
of those means they should undertake for their own defense.
CHAPTER XII
IS IT BETTER, FEARING TO BE ASSAULTED, TO CARRY OUT OR AWAIT WAR
I have heard from men much practiced in the things of war some time discuss
whether, if there are two Princes of almost equal strength, if one more
stalwart
has declared war against the other, what would be the better proceeding for
the
other, either to await the enemy within his own boundaries, or to go out to
meet
him in his house and assault him. And I have heard reasons cited on every
side.
And those who defend the going out to assault the other, cite the counsel
that
Croesus gave to Cyrus when, having arrived at the confines of the Messagates
to
make war against them, their Queen Tamiri sent to say that they should select
which of the two proceedings they wanted, either to enter her Kingdom where
she
would await him, or that he want her to come out to meet him: And the matter
coming under discussion, Croesus, against the opinion of the others, said
that
he would go to meet her, saying that if he should vanquish her at a distance
from her kingdom, he would not be able to take away her kingdom because she
would have time to recover; but if he should vanquish her within her confines
he
could follow her in flight and, by not giving her time to recover, could take
away her State from her. He also cites the counsel that Hannibal gave
Antiochus
when that king planned to make war against the Romans, where he showed that
the
Romans could not be beaten except in Italy, for there the others could avail
themselves of the arms and the wealth of their friends; but whoever would
combat
them outside Italy and would leave Italy free to them, he would leave them
that
font which would never lack life in supplying strength where it was needed:
and
he concluded that Rome could be taken from the Romans easier than the Empire,
and Italy before the other provinces. He also cites Agatocles, who, not being
able to sustain the war at home, assaulted the Carthaginians who were waging
it
against him, and reduced them to ask for peace. He cites Scipio, who, to lift
the war from Italy, assaulted Africa.
Those who speak to the contrary say that he who wants to inflict an evil on
the
enemy will draw him away from home. They cite the Athenians, who, as long as
they made war convenient to their home, remained superior, but that when they
went a distance with their armies into Sicily, lost their liberty. They cite
the
poetic fables where it is shown that Anteus, King of Libya, being assaulted
by
Hercules the Egyptian, was insuperable as long as he awaited him within the
confines of his own kingdom, but as soon as he went off a distance, through
the
astuteness of Hercules, lost the State and his life. Whence a place is given
to
the fable of Anteus who, when (thrown) on the ground, recovered his strength
from his mother which was the earth, and that Hercules, becoming aware of
this,
lifted him high (and) off the ground. They also cite modern judges. Everyone
knows that Ferrando, King of Naples, was held to be a most wise Prince in his
time, and when two years before his death, news came that the King of France,
Charles VIII, wanted to come to assault him, after he had made preparations,
but
fell sick, and as he was approaching death, among other advices he left to
his
son Alfonso, was that he should await the enemy inside the Kingdom, and for
nothing in thy world to withdraw his forces outside of his State, but should
await him entirely within all his borders. Which (advice) was not observed by
him, but sending an army into the Romagna, without a fight, lost it and the
State. In addition to the instances described, the reasons that are cited in
favor of every (both) side are: That he who assaults comes with more spirit
than
he who awaits, which makes the army more confident. In addition to this, many
advantages are taken away from the enemy to be able to avail himself of his
resources, (and) he will not be able to avail himself of those from his
subjects
who have been plundered; and as the enemy is in his house, the Lord is
constrained to have more regard in extracting money from them and in
overworking
them, so that that font comes to dry up, as Hannibal says, which makes him
able
to sustain the war. In addition to this, his solders, because they find
themselves in the countries of others, are more necessitated to fight, and
that
necessity makes virtu, as we have several times said.
On the other hand, it is said that in awaiting the enemy one waits with many
advantages, for without any inconvenience you can cause great inconveniences
of
provisions and of every other thing which an army needs: You can better
impede
his designs because of the greater knowledge of the country you have than he:
You can meet him with more strength because of being able to unite
(concentrate)
(your forces) easily, while he cannot take his all away from home: You can
((if
defeated)) recover easily, as much because much can be saved of your army
having
places of refuge near, as well as reinforcements do not have to come from a
distance, so that you come to risk all your forces but not all your fortune;
but
taking yourself to a distance you risk all your fortune but not all your
strength. And there have been some who, in order better to weaken their
enemy,
have allowed him to enter several days (march) into their country and to take
many Towns, so that by leaving garrisons everywhere his army is weakened, and
then they are able to combat him the more easily.
But to say now what I think, I believe that this distinction ought to be
made:
either I have my country armed like the Romans and as the Swiss have, or I
have
it disarmed like the Carthaginians, and as have the Kings of France and the
Italians. In this (latter) case the enemy ought to be kept distant from home,
for your virtu being in money and not in men, whenever that (money) may be
impeded to you, you are lost, and nothing will impede it to you as war at
home.
As an example, there are the Carthaginians, who, as long as they were
undisturbed at home with their revenues, could make war against the Romans,
but
when they were assaulted (in their own country) they were unable to resist
(even) Agathocles. The Florentines did not have any remedy against Castruccio,
Lord of Lucca, because he waged war against them at home, so that they were
obliged to give themselves ((in order to be defended)) to King Robert of
Naples.
But after the death of Castruccio, those same Florentines had the courage to
assault the Duke of Milan in his home (territory) and work to take away his
Kingdom. As much virtu as they showed in distant wars, just so much baseness
(did they show) in nearby ones. But when Kingdoms are armed as Rome was armed
and as the Swiss are, the more difficult are they to overcome the nearer you
are
to them. For these bodies (states) can unite more forces to resist an attack
(impetus) than they are able to assault others. Nor am I moved in this case
by
the authority of Hannibal, because his passion and his interests make him say
thusly to Antiochus. For if the Romans had experienced in Gaul three such
defeats in so great a space of time as they had in Italy from Hannibal,
without
doubt they would have been beaten; for they would not have availed themselves
of
the remnants of the armies as they did in Italy, (and) could not have
reorganized them with the same ease, nor could they have resisted the enemy
with
that same strength as they were able to. It has never been found that they
ever
sent outside armies of more than fifty thousand men in order to assault a
province: but to defend themselves at home against the Gauls after the first
Punic war, they put eighteen hundred thousand men under arms. Nor could they
have put to rout those (Gauls) in Lombardy as they routed them in Tuscany,
for
they could not have led so great a force against so great a number of enemies
at
so great a distance, nor fight them with such advantage. The Cimbrians routed
a
Roman army in Germany; nor did the Romans have a remedy. But when they
(Cimbrians) came into Italy and they (Romans) were able to put all their
forces
together, they destroyed them (Cimbrians). The Swiss are. easily beaten when
away from home where they cannot send more than thirty or forty thousand men,
but it is very difficult to beat them at home where they are able to gather
together a hundred thousand.
I conclude again, therefore, that that Prince who has his people armed and
organized for war should always await a powerful and dangerous war (enemy) at
home and not go out to meet it. But that (Prince) who has his subjects
unarmed
and the country unaccustomed to war, should always keep it as distant as he
can.
And thus one and the other ((each in his own manner)) will defend himself
better.
CHAPTER XIII
THAT ONE COMES FROM THE BOTTOM TO A GREAT FORTUNE MORE BY FRAUD THAN BY FORCE
I believe it to be a most true thing that it rarely or never happens that men
of
little fortune come to high rank without force and without fraud, unless that
rank to which others have come is not obtained either by gift or by heredity.
Nor do I believe that force alone will ever be found to be enough; but it
will
be indeed found that fraud alone will be enough; as those will clearly see
who
read the life of Philip of Macedonia, that of Agathocles the Sicilian, and
many
such others, who from the lowest, or rather low, fortune have arrived either
to
a Kingdom or to very great Empires. Xenophon shows in his life of Cyrus this
necessity to deceive, considering that the first expedition that he has Cyrus
make against the King of Armenia is full of fraud, and that he makes him
occupy
his Kingdom by deceit and not by force. And he does not conclude anything
else
from such action except that to a Prince who wants to do great things, it is
necessary to learn to deceive. In addition to this, he made Cyraxes, King of
the
Medes, his maternal uncle, to be deceived in so many ways, without which
fraud
he shows that Cyrus could not have achieved that greatness he attained. Nor
do I
believe anyone will ever be found of such fortune to have arrived at great
Empire only by force and ingenuity, but indeed only by fraud, as did Giovanni
Galeazzo in order to take away the State and Dominion of Lombardy from his
uncle
Messer Bernabo. And that which Princes are obliged to do at the beginning of
their expansions, Republics are also obliged to do until they have become
powerful so that force alone will be enough. And as Rome used every means,
either by chance or by election, necessary to achieve greatness, she did not
also hesitate to use this one (fraud). Nor could she, in the beginning, use
greater deceit than to take up the method discussed above by us to make
associates for herself, because under this name she made them her slaves, as
were the Latins, and other surrounding people. For first she availed herself
of
their arms to subdue the neighboring peoples and to take up the reputation of
the State: after subduing them, she achieved such great expansion that she
could
beat everyone. And the Latins never became aware that they were wholly slaves
until they saw two routs of the Samnites and (saw them) constrained to come
to
an accord. As this victory greatly increased the reputation of the Romans
with
the distant Princes, who heard the Roman name and not their arms, generating
envy and suspicion in those who saw and felt those arms, among whom were the
Latins. And so much was this envy and so powerful this fear, that not only
the
Latins, but the colonies they had in Latium, together with the Associates who
had been defended a short time before, conspired against the Roman name. And
the
Latins began this war in the way mentioned above that the greater part of
wars
are begun, not by assaulting the Romans, but by defending the Sidicians
against
the Samnites, against whom the Samnites were making war with the permission
of
the Romans. And that it is true that the Latins began the war because they
had
recognized this deceit, is shown by T. Livius through the mouth of Annius
Setinus, a Latin Praetor, who in their council said these words: If even now
under the pretext of equal confederates, we can suffer servitude, etcetera.
It will be seen, therefore, that the Romans in their first expansions did not
also lack using fraud; which has always been necessary for those to use who,
from small beginnings, want to rise to sublime heights, which is less
shameful
when it is more concealed, as was this of the Romans.
CHAPTER XIV
MEN OFTEN DECEIVE THEMSELVES BELIEVING THAT BY HUMILITY THEY OVERCOME
HAUGHTINESS
Many times it is seen that humility not only does not benefit, but harms,
especially when it is used by insolent men who, either from envy or for other
reasons, have conceived a hatred against you. Of this our Historian gives
proof
on the occasion of the war between the Romans and the Latins. For when the
Samnites complained to the Romans that the Latins had assaulted them, the
Romans
did not want to prohibit such a war to the Latins, desired not to irritate
them;
which not only did not irritate them, but made them become more spirited
against
them (Romans), and they discovered themselves as enemies more quickly. Of
which,
the words of the aforementioned Annius, the Latin Praetor, in that same
council,
attest, where he says: You have tried their patience in denying them military
aid: why do you doubt this should excite them? Yet they have borne this pain.
They have heard we are preparing an army against their confederates, the
Samnites, yet have not moved from their City. Whence is there such modesty,
except from their recognition of both our virility and theirs? It is very
clearly recognized, therefore, by this text how much the patience of the
Romans
increased the arrogance of the Latins. And therefore a Prince ought never to
forego his own rank, and ought never to forego anything by accord, wanting to
forego it honorably, unless he is able or believes that he is able to hold
it;
for it is almost always better ((matters having been brought to the point
where
you cannot forego it in the manner mentioned)) to allow it to be taken away
by
force, rather than by fear of force; for if you permit it from fear, you do
so
in order to avoid war, but most of the times you do not avoid it, for he to
whom
you have from baseness conceded this, will not be satisfied, but will want to
take other things away from you, and he will excite himself more against you
esteeming you less: and on the other hand, in your favor you will find the
defenders more cold, it appearing to them that you are either weak or a
coward:
but as soon as you discover the intention of the adversary, if you prepare
your
forces, even though they may be inferior to his, he will begin to respect
you,
(and) the other neighboring Princes will respect you more, and the desire to
aid
you will come to those ((being armed by you)) who, even if you gave yourself
up,
would never aid you.
This is what is learned when you have an enemy: but when you have several, to
render to some of them some of your possessions, either to gain him over to
yourself even though war should already have broken out, or to detach your
enemies from the other confederates, is always a prudent proceeding.
CHAPTER XV
WEAK STATES ARE ALWAYS AMBIGUOUS IN THEIR RESOLUTIONS, AND WEAK DECISIONS ARE
ALWAYS HARMFUL
In connection with this same matter and with the origin of the war between
the
Latins and the Romans it can be noted, that in all deliberations it is well
to
come to the point of what it is to be decided and not to be always ambiguous,
nor to remain uncertain of the matter. Which is manifestly seen in the
deliberation that the Latins held when they thought of alienating themselves
from the Romans. For having foreseen this bad mood that had come upon the
Latin
people, the Romans in order to assure themselves of the matter and to see if
they could regain those people to themselves without resorting to arms, made
them understand that they should send eight Citizens to Rome, because they
wanted to consult with them. The Latins, learning of this, and being
conscious
of many things done against the wishes of the Romans, called a council to
arrange who should go to Rome and to give them the commission of what they
should say: And while this was deliberated in the councils, their Praetor
Annius
said these words: I judge it to be most important for our interest, that we
should think of what we shall do that what we shall say: when we have decided
that, it will be easy to accommodate our words (the details of our counsels)
to
our acts. These words without doubt are very true, and ought to be of benefit
to
every Prince and every Republic; for words are not made to explain the
ambiguity
and incertitude of that which is to be done, but once the mind is fixed, and
that which is to be done decided, it is an easy thing to find the words. I
have
the more willingly noted this part, as I have known many such indecisions to
interfere with public actions, with damage and shame to our Republic: And
this
will always happen that in doubtful proceedings and where spirit is needed in
making decisions, this ambiguity (indecision) will exist when these
deliberations and decisions have to be made by weak men. Slow and late
decisions
are also not less harmful than ambiguous ones, especially when they have to
decide in favor of some friend, for no person is helped by their lateness,
and
it injures oneself. Such decisions so made proceed from feebleness of spirit
and
strength or from the malignity of those who have to decide, who, moved by
their
own passion to want to ruin the State or to fulfill some desire of theirs, do
not allow the deliberations to proceed, but impede and thwart them. For good
citizens ((even though they see a popular fad turning itself into a perilous
course)) never impede deliberations, especially when those matters cannot be
delayed.
After the death of Hieronymus, Tyrant of Syracuse, while the war between the
Carthaginians and the Romans was at its height, a dispute arose among the
Syracusans whether they ought to follow the Roman friendship (alliance) or
the
Carthaginian. And so great was the ardor of the parties that they remained
undecided, nor was any action taken, until at last Appolonides, one of the
first
men of Syracuse, with a speech (of his) full of prudence, showed that those
who
held the opinion to adhere to the Romans were not to be blamed, nor those who
wanted to follow the Carthaginian side; but that it was right to detest that
indecision and tardiness in taking up the proceeding, because he saw surely
the
proceeding had been undertaken (the decision made), whatever it might be,
some
good could be hoped for. Nor could T. Livius show better than in this case
the
damage done by remaining undecided. He shows it also in the case of the
Latins,
for the Lavinians seeking their aid against the Romans, they delayed so long
in
determining upon it that, when they had just gone out of the gate with forces
to
give them succor, the news arrived that the Latins were routed. Whence
Milonius,
their Praetor, said: This short march would cost us much with the Roman
people:
For if they had decided at once either to help or not to help the Latins,
they
would by not aiding them not have irritated the Romans; and by helping them,
the
aid being in time, they could by joining forces enable them to win; but by
delaying, they would come to lose in any case, as happened to them.
And if the Florentines had noted this text, they would not have received so
much
injury or so much trouble from the French as they had in the passage of King
Louis XII of France to make war against Lodovico, Duke of Milan, in Italy.
For
the King when he was considering such a passage sought to make an accord with
the Florentines, and the ambassadors to the King made an accord with him that
they would remain neutral, and that the King after coming into Italy should
take
their State under his protection, and gave the City one month to ratify it.
This
ratification was delayed by those who, because of little prudence, favored
the
affairs of Lodovico, so that the King having already achieved his victory,
and
the Florentines then wanting to ratify it, the ratification was not accepted,
as
he recognized that the friendship of the Florentines came by force and not
voluntarily. Which cost the City of Florence much money, and was to lose them
the State, as happened to them another time from similar causes. And that
proceeding was so much more damnable because it did not even serve the Duke
Lodovico, who, if he had won, would have shown more signs of enmity against
the
Florentines than did the King.
And although above in another chapter I have discussed the evil that results
to
a Republic from this weakness, none the less having a new opportunity for a
new
incident, I wanted to repeat it, especially as it seems to me a matter that
ought to be noted by Republics similar to ours.
CHAPTER XVI
HOW MUCH THE SOLDIERS IN OUR TIMES ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE ANCIENT
ORGANIZATION
The most important engagement ever fought in any war with any nation by the
Roman People, was that which they had with the Latin people during the
Consulate
of Torquatus and of Decius. As every reason would have it, just as by the
loss
of the battle the Latins became slaves, so too the Romans would have been
slaves
if they had not won. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, because on both
sides
he makes the armies equal in organization, in virtu, in obstinacy, and in
numbers: the only difference he makes is that the Heads of the Roman army
were
of more virtu than those of the Latin army. It will also be seen that in the
managing of this engagement, two incidents arose which had not arisen before,
and that afterwards were rare examples; that of the two Consuls, in order to
uphold the courage of the soldiers and keep them obedient to their command
and
more deliberate in action, one killed himself and the other his son. The
equality which Titus Livius says existed in these armies resulted from their
having fought together a long time, having the same language, the same
discipline, and the same arms: For they held to the same manner in the order
of
battle, and the organizations and Heads of the organization had the same
names:
Being of equal strength and of equal virtu, it was therefore necessary that
something extraordinary should arise which would make one more firm and
obstinate than the other; in which obstinacy victory ((as was said at another
time)) was contained; for so long as that endured in the breasts of those who
combatted, no army will ever turn its back. And as it endured more in the
breasts of the Romans than in the Latins, partly chance and partly the virtu
of
the Consuls gave rise that Torquatus had to kill his son and Decius himself.
In demonstrating this equality of strength, T. Livius shows the whole
organization that the Romans had in the armies and in battles. As he has
explained this at length, I will not otherwise repeat it; but I will discuss
only that which I judge to be notable, and that which, because it is
neglected
by all Captains of these times, has caused many disorders in armies and
battles.
I say, then, that from the text of Livius it is gathered that the Roman
armies
were composed of three principal divisions, which in Tuscan can be called
Ranks,
and they named the first Astati, the second Principi, the third Triari, and
each
of these had its cavalry. In organizing a battle they put the Astati in
front,
directly behind in the second line they placed the Principi, and in the same
manner in the third line they placed the Triari. The cavalry of all of these
orders were placed to the right and the left of these three battalions, the
ranks of which cavalry, from their shape and place, they called Alae (Wings),
because they seemed like two wings of that body. They arranged the first
ranks
of the Astati, which were in the front and serried in a way that it could
strike
or sustain (the attack of) the enemy. The second line of the Principi ((as it
was not the first in combat, but was bound to support the first line when it
was
struck or hurled back)), they did not make straight, but maintained its order
open (thin) and of a kind so that it could receive within itself the first
line,
without disordering itself, whenever, pushed by the enemy, it should be
necessary for them to retreat. The third line of the Triari was arranged even
more open than the second, in order to receive within itself, if need be, the
first two lines of Principi, and Astati. These three ranks thus deployed
kindled
the battle, and if the Astati were forced or overcome, they retreated into
the
open ranks of the Principi, and the two ranks being united together into one
body rekindled the battle: if these were also forced or rebuffed, they both
retired into the open ranks of the Triari, and all these ranks becoming one
body, renewed the fight; where, if they were overcome ((for not having
further
reinforcements)) they lost the engagement. And as every time that this last
rank
of Triari became engaged, the army was in danger, and gave rise to that
proverb,
The matter has come to the Triari, which in Tuscan usage means to say, we
have
put up the last resource.
The captains of our times, having abandoned entirely the organization and no
longer observing the ancient discipline, have thus abandoned this part which
is
not of little importance: for whoever arranges (his army) so as to be able to
reorganize three times in an engagement, must have fortune inimical to him
three
times in order to lose, and must have (pitted) against him a virtu three
times
as adept to overcome him. But whoever cannot maintain himself against the
first
onrush ((as the Christian armies are today)) can lose easily, for every
disorder, every half-way virtu, can take away the victory. And that which
prevents our armies from being able to reorganize three times is to have lost
the manner of receiving one rank into the other. Which arises because at
present
engagements are arranged with two defects: either their ranks are formed
shoulder to shoulder, and make their battle line wide in front and thin in
depth, which makes it very weak from having too few men in the depth of the
ranks: or, in order to make it stronger, they reduce the ranks (in width of
the
front), in accordance as the Romans did; if the first rank is broken, there
not
being an arrangement to be received by the second, they will be entangled all
together, and rout themselves; for if that front rank is pushed back, it will
be
hurled on the second; if the second rank wants to go forward, it is impeded
by
the first: Whence that the first being hurled upon the second, and the second
on
the third, there ensues so much confusion that the slightest accident often
ruins an army.
In the battle at Ravenna, which was ((according to our times)) a very
well-fought engagement, in which the Captain of the French forces, Monsignor
De
Foix, was killed, the Spanish and French armies were organized in one of the
above mentioned methods, that is, that the one and the other army came with
all
its forces arranged shoulder to shoulder so as to have a wide front and
little
depth. And thus they always did when they had a large field as they had at
Ravenna: for recognizing the disorder that is caused in retiring, when they
put
themselves all into one rank, they avoid it when they can by making the front
wide, as has been said; but when the country is restricted, they remain in
the
disorder described above without thinking of a remedy. In similar disorder
the
cavalry rides through the enemy's country, either for plunder or for some
other
purpose of war. And at Santo Regolo and elsewhere in the war against Pisa,
where
the Florentines were routed by the Pisans in the (time of the) war which
existed
between the Florentines and that City because of her rebellion, after the
passage of Charles, King of France, into Italy; that ruin did not result from
anything else than the friendly cavalry, which being in front and repulsed by
the enemy, was thrown back into the Florentine infantry and broke it, whence
all
the remaining forces turned back: and Messer Criaco Del Borgo, Head of the
Florentine infantry, has affirmed in my presence many times that he would
never
have been routed except for the cavalry of his friends. The Swiss who are
masters of modern war, when they fought for the French, above all things they
take care to put themselves on the side where the friendly cavalry, if it
should
be repulsed, will not be hurled back on them.
And although this thing would appear easy to understand and not easy to do,
none
the less there has not yet been found any of our contemporary Captains who
have
imitated the ancient order and corrected the modem one. And although they
also
divide their army into three parts, calling one part the Vanguard, the next
the
Battle Corps, and the last the Rearguard, they do not serve themselves of it
other than to command them in their quarters; but in using it, it is a rare
thing ((as was said above)) that they do to unite them all in one body, so
that
they all share the same fortune: And as many, to excuse their ignorance,
allege
that the violence of the artillery will not allow the same arrangements that
the
ancients had to be used in these times, I want to discuss this matter in the
following chapter, and to examine whether the artillery impedes them so that
it
is not possible to use the ancient virtu.
CHAPTER XVII
HOW MUCH THE ARMY OUGHT TO ESTEEM THE ARTILLERY IN THE PRESENT TIMES, AND IF
THAT OPINION THAT IS GENERALLY HAD OF IT IS TRUE
In addition to the things written above, in considering how the many field
fights, called in our times by the French word Engagements (Giornate), and by
the Italians Deeds of arms, were fought by the Romans at diverse times, I
have
thought upon the general opinions of many, which hold that if artillery had
existed in those days the Romans would not have been permitted to conquer
provinces and make other people tributary to themselves as they did, nor
would
they in any way have been able to make such large acquisitions: They say also
that because of these instrument of fire men are not able to use or show
their
virtu as they were able to anciently. And a third thing should be added that
one
now comes to the joining of battle with more difficulty than formerly, nor is
it
possible to maintain the same discipline as in those times, so that in time
wars
will be reduced to artillery (exchanges). And as I judge it not to be outside
this subject to discuss whether such opinions are true, and whether artillery
has increased or diminished the strength of armies, and whether it gives or
takes away opportunity to good Captains of acting with virtu.
I shall begin by speaking concerning the first opinion that the ancient Roman
armies would not have made the conquests that they did if artillery had
existed:
Upon which in replying, I say that war is made either to defend oneself or to
take the offensive: whence it must first be examined as to which of these two
kinds of war make it (artillery) more useful or more damaging. And although
there is something to say on both sides, none the less I believe that beyond
comparison it does more damage to whoever defends himself than to whoever
attacks. The reason I say this is that he who defends himself is either
inside
some fortified place or in a camp within a stockade: and if he is inside a
town,
either this town is small as are the greater part of the fortresses, or it is
large: in the first case whoever defends himself is entirely lost, for the
impetus of the artillery is such that a wall has not yet been found which is
so
strong that in a few days it will be battered down by it; and if whoever is
inside does not have considerable space for retreat, and (cannot protect
himself) with ditches and earthworks, he is lost, nor can he sustain the
attack
of the enemy who would then enter through the breach in the wall: nor will
the
artillery he has be of any benefit to him in this, for there is a maxim that
where men attack in mass, the artillery will not stop them; and thus the fury
of
the Ultramontanes in the defense of their lands has never been resisted: the
assaults of the Italians are easily resisted, as they go in battle, not in
mass,
but in small detachments, which by their own name are called Scaramouches
(skirmishes): and when they deliberately go in this disordered manner into a
breach in a wall where there is artillery, they go to a certain death, for
against them the artillery is of value: but when they go in a dense mass, and
one pushes the other as they come to a break, if they are not impeded by
ditches
or earthworks, they enter in every place and artillery will not hold them:
and
if some are killed, they cannot be so many that they would impede the
victory.
That this is true has been recognized by the many conquests made by the
Ultramontanes in Italy, and especially that of Brescia; for when that land
rebelled against the French, and the fortress being still held by the King of
France, the Venetians, in order to resist the attacks which could come from
the
town, had fortified all the road that descends from the fortress to the City
with artillery, placing it in front and on the flanks and in every convenient
place: of which Monsignor De Foix took no account, rather, with his squadron,
he
descended on foot, and passing through the midst of it (the artillery)
occupied
the City, nor from what was heard had he received any recordable damage. So
that
whoever defends himself in a small area ((as was said)) and finding the walls
of
his town breached, and does not have space to retreat with earthworks and
ditches, and have to rely on artillery, will quickly be lost.
If you defend a large town and have the convenience of retreating, I none the
less maintain beyond comparison that artillery is more useful to whoever is
outside than to whoever is inside. First, because if you want artillery to
harm
those outside, you are necessitated to raise yourself with it above the level
of
the surrounding land, for being on the plain, every little embankment and
earthwork that the enemy raises remains secure, and you cannot harm him, so
that
by having to raise it and draw it along the aisle between the walls, or in
some
other way raise it above the ground, you have two drawbacks: the first, that
you
cannot place artillery of the same size and power as those outside can bring
to
bear, as you are not able in a small place to handle large things: the other,
no
matter how well you can place it, you cannot make those earthworks
trustworthy
and secure in order to save the said artillery as those outside can do being
on
higher ground, and having that convenience and space which they themselves
lacked: So that it is impossible to whoever defends a town to keep his
artillery
in elevated positions when those who are on the outside have plenty and
powerful
artillery: and if they have to place it in lower places, it becomes in large
part useless, as has been said. So that the defense of a City is reduced to
defending it with the same (manual) arms as was done anciently, and with
small
size artillery: from which little usefulness is derived ((because of the
small
size artillery)) unless there is a mine of disadvantages that counterweighs
the
advantage (of the artillery): for in respect to that, the walls of the town
are
kept low and almost buried in the ditches, so that when the battle comes to
hand
to hand fighting, either because the walls are breached or the ditches filled
up, those inside have many more disadvantages than they had before. And
therefore ((as was said above)) these instruments benefit much more whoever
besieges the towns that whoever is besieged.
As to the third case when you are in a camp within a stockade and you do not
want to come to an engagement unless it is at your convenience or advantage,
I
say that in this case you do not ordinarily have a better remedy to defend
yourself without fighting than what the ancients had, and some times you may
have greater disadvantage on account of your artillery: For if the enemy
turns
on you and has even a small advantage of ground, as can easily happen, and
finds
himself higher than you, or that at his arrival you have not yet finished
your
earthworks and covered yourself well with them, he quickly dislodges you
before
you have any remedy and you are forced to go out of your fortress and come to
battle. This happened to the Spaniards in the engagement at Ravenna, who,
being
entrenched between the river Ronco and an earthwork which was built
insufficiently high, and the French having a slight advantage of terrain,
were
constrained by the artillery to leave their fortified place and come to
battle.
But suppose ((as must often happen)) that the location you have chosen for
your
camp is higher than the other side at the (time of) encounter, and that your
earthworks are good and secure, so that owing to the site and your other
preparations, the enemy does not dare to assault you, in this case he will
resort to those means that the ancients resorted to when one, with his army,
was
in a position where he could not be attacked, that is, he will overrun the
country, take or besiege lands friendly to you and impede your provisions; so
that you will be forced by some necessity to dislodge him, and come to
battle,
where artillery ((as will be mentioned below)) will not be of much use.
Considering, therefore, in what manner the Romans made war, and observing
that
almost all their wars were to attack others and not to defend themselves, it
will be seen ((if all the things said above were true)) that they would have
had
even greater advantage, and would have made their conquests more easily, if
they
should have lived in those times (of the advent of artillery).
As to the second proposition, that men are not able to show their virtu as
they
could anciently because of the use of artillery, I say that it is true that
where men have to expose themselves in small groups, that they are exposed to
greater danger than when they had to scale (the walls of) a town or make
similar
assaults, where men did not have to act bunched together, but by themselves
one
after the other. It is also true that the Captains and Heads of the army are
now
subjected to the danger of death than at that time, as they can be reached by
artillery in every place, and it is of no benefit to them to be in the rear
ranks, and protected by their strongest men: None the less it is seen that
the
one and the other of these dangers rarely caused extraordinary damages, for
well
fortified towns are not scaled, nor do you go to assault them with feeble
attacks, but in wanting to conquer them, the matter is reduced to a siege, as
was done anciently. And even in those places that can be conquered by
assault,
the dangers are not much greater now then they were then, for even in that
time
there did not lack to the defenders of towns means for throwing (missiles),
which ((if they were not as furious (as cannon) is)) had a similar effect in
killing men. As to the death of Captains and Candottieri, in the twenty four
years in which there have been wars in Italy in recent times, there have been
fewer examples then there were in any ten years time (of war) of the
ancients.
For, outside of Count Lodovico Della Mirandola ((who was killed at Ferrara
when
the Venetians assaulted that State a few years ago)) and the Duke of Nemours
((who was killed at Cirignuola)), it never happened that any were killed by
artillery, since Monsignor De Foix was killed at Ravenna by steel (sword) and
not by fire. So that if men do not show their virtu individually, it is not
the
result of the artillery, but from poor discipline and weakness of the armies,
which, lacking virtu collectively, are not able to show it in the
(individual)
parts.
As to the third proposition mentioned by some, that it is no longer possible
to
come to hand-to-hand fighting, and that wars will be entirely conducted
through
artillery, I say this opinion is entirely false, and will always be so held
by
those who would want to manage their armies according to the ancient virtu:
For
whoever wants to create a good army must, by real or feigned exercises,
accustom
his men to meet the enemy, and to come against him with sword in hand and to
seize him bodily, and he must rely more upon the infantry than on cavalry,
for
the reasons which will be mentioned below. And when they rely on infantry and
on
the aforementioned means (of training), the artillery will become entirely
useless; for the infantry in meeting the enemy can escape the blows of the
artillery with greater ease than anciently they were able to escape from the
attacks of elephants, from scythed chariots, and other obsolete means of
attack
which the Roman infantry had to encounter, (and) against which they always
found
a remedy: and they would have found it so much more readily against this
(artillery), as the time in which artillery can harm you is much shorter than
that in which the elephants and chariots could do harm. For these
disorganized
you in the midst of battle, while that (the artillery) only impedes you
before
the battle; which impediment is easily avoided by the infantry either the
nature
of the site covering them or by lying down on the ground during the firing.
Even
experience has shown this not to be necessary, especially when defending
themselves from large artillery, which cannot be so (accurately) aimed, (and)
either ((if they are aimed high)) they pass over you, or ((if they are aimed
low)) they do not reach you. Then when you have come with the army to hand to
hand (fighting), this becomes clearer than light that neither the large nor
the
small artillery can then harm you. For if he has the artillery in front, you
capture it, and if he has it in the rear, he first harms his friend rather
than
you: even on the flank he cannot harm you so, that you cannot go up to
capture
them, and the result mentioned above (first) will happen.
Nor is this disputed very much, because the example of the Swiss has been
seen,
who in MDXIII (1513) at Novara, without artillery or cavalry, went to
encounter
the French army armed with artillery within their fortresses, and routed them
without having any impediment from that artillery. And the reason is ((in
addition to the things mentioned above)) that the artillery, to be well
served,
has need to be guarded either by walls, ditches, or earthworks: and that if
it
lacks one of these guards, it is captured or becomes useless, as happens in
open
field engagements and battles when it is defended only by men. On the flank
it
cannot be employed except in that manner that the ancients used their
catapults,
which they placed outside of the squadrons, so that they should fight outside
of
the ranks, and every time they were pressed by cavalry or others, they took
refuge within the legions. Who employs it otherwise does not understand it
well,
and relies on something which can easily deceive him. And if the Turk by
means
of artillery gained the victory over the Sofi (Persians) and the Soldan
(Egyptians), it resulted from no other virtu than from the unaccustomed noise
which frightened their cavalry. I conclude, therefore, coming to the end of
this
discussion, that artillery is useful in an army when it is mixed with the
ancient virtu, but, without that, it is most useless against a valorous army.
CHAPTER XVIII
THAT BECAUSE OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE ROMANS AND BY THE EXAMPLE OF ANCIENT
ARMIES, THE INFANTRY OUGHT TO BE MORE ESTEEMED THAN CAVALRY
And it can be clearly demonstrated by many arguments and by many examples how
much the Romans in all their military actions esteemed the foot soldier more
than the cavalry, and based all the plans of their forces on them: as is seen
by
many examples, and among others that which occurred when they came to battle
with the Latins next to Lake Regillo, where the Roman army already having
given
way, made their cavalry descend from their horses in order to succor their
foot
soldiers, and by that means renewed the battle and obtained the victory.
Where
it is manifestly seen that the Romans had more confidence in their men, when
on
foot, than maintaining them on horseback. They used this same means in many
other battles, and they always found it an optimum remedy in their dangers.
Nor
is the opinion of Hannibal opposed to this who, when he saw in the engagement
at
Cannae that the Consuls made their horsemen descend on foot, making a mock of
a
like proceeding, said: Quam malem vinctos mini traderent equites, that is, I
would have more concern if they would give them to me bound. Which opinion,
although coming from the mouth of a most excellent man, none the less if we
have
to go back to authority, we ought to believe more if it came from a Roman
Republic and from so many excellent Captains which she produced, than to one
single Hannibal; although even without authorities, there are manifest
reasons,
for a man can go into many places on foot where he cannot go on horseback:
you
can teach him to preserve the ranks, and should they be broken, how to reform
them, but it is difficult to make horses preserve the ranks, and when they
are
disturbed impossible to reform them: in addition to this, it will be found
((as
in men)) that some horses have little spirit and some have much, and many
times
it happens that a spirited horse is ridden by a base man, and a timid horse
by a
spirited man, and however this disparity arises, uselessness and disorder
result. Well disciplined infantry can easily break the cavalry but only with
difficulty can they be routed by them. Which opinion is corroborated ((in
addition to many ancient and modern examples)) by the authority of those who
make regulations for civil affairs, where they show that at first wars were
begun to be fought by cavalry, because (good) infantry was not yet been
organized: but as soon as this was done, it was quickly recognized how much
more
useful these were then cavalry: However, the cavalry is necessary in armies
for
reconnaissance, to overrun and plunder the country, and to pursue the enemy
when
in flight, and to be a part of the opposition to the cavalry of the
adversaries:
but the foundation and the sinew of the army, and that which should be more
esteemed, ought to be the infantry.
And among the faults of the Italian Princes who have made Italy slave to
foreigners, there is none greater than to have taken into little account this
organization (infantry), and to have turned all their attention to mounted
troops. Which error arose from the malignity of the Heads, and from the
ignorance of those who ruled the State: For during the past twenty five years
the Italian military have been brought under men who did not have a State,
but
were as Captains (Soldiers) of fortune, whose main thought was how they
should
be able to maintain their reputation by their being armed, and the Princes
disarmed. And as a large number of infantry could not continuously be paid by
them, and not having subjects of whom they could avail themselves, and as a
small number would not give them reputation, they turned to keeping cavalry;
for
two hundred or three hundred cavalry paid by a Condottiere maintained his
reputation, and the payment was not such that it could not be met by men who
had
a State: and so that this should be facilitated and to maintain themselves in
even greater reputation, they took away all the affection for and the
reputation
of the infantry, and transferred those to their cavalry; and so greatly
increased this disorder, that the infantry was a minimum part of any of the
largest armies. Which usage ((together with many other disorders that
accompanied it)) made the Italian military so weak, that their province has
been
easily trampled on by all the Ultramontanes. This error of esteeming cavalry
more than infantry is shown more openly by another Roman example. The Romans
were besieging Sora, and a squadron of cavalry having gone out from the town
to
assault the camp, the Master of the Roman cavalry went to meet it with his
cavalry, and coming breast to breast, chance would have it that in the first
shock the Heads of both armies were killed; and the fight continued none the
less, while (both sides) remained without direction, when the Romans in order
to
overcome the enemy more easily, dismounted and forced the cavalry ((if they
wanted to defend themselves)) to do similarly, and with all this the Romans
carried the victory.
This example could not be better in demonstrating how much greater virtu
there
is in the infantry than in the cavalry; for if in the other cases the Consuls
made the Roman cavalry dismount, it was to succor the infantry which was
suffering and in need of aid; but in this case they dismounted, not to succor
the infantry, nor to fight with enemy infantry, but a combat of cavalry
against
cavalry, (and) not being able to overcome them on horseback, they judged that
by
dismounting they would be able more easily to overcome them. I want to
conclude,
therefore, that a well organized infantry cannot be overcome without the
greatest difficulty, except by another infantry. Crassus and Marc Anthony
overran the dominion of Parthia for many days with very few cavalry and many
infantry, and encountered innumerable cavalry of the Parthians. Crassus with
part of the army was killed, Marc Anthony saved himself with virtu. None the
less, in this Roman affliction is seen how much the infantry prevailed
against
the cavalry; for being in a large country where mountains are rare, rivers
rarer, distant from the sea, and far from all conveniences, none the less, in
the judgment of the Parthians themselves, he saved himself skillfully; nor
did
the Parthian cavalry ever dare to try the discipline of his army. If Crassus
were returned to you, whoever examines his actions carefully will see that he
was rather deceived than overpowered, and never in his greatest straits did
the
Parthians dare to hurl themselves against him, rather they always went on
flanking him and impeding his provisions, (and) by promising them to him and
then not observing it, they reduced him to the last extremity.
I believe I should have to endure more hard work in persuading (the reader)
how
much more superior is the virtu of the infantry than that of the cavalry,
except
that there are many modern examples which render the fullest testimony. And
it
has been seen how nine thousand Swiss at Novara, mentioned above by us, went
out
and attacked ten thousand cavalry and as many infantry, and defeated them,
for
the cavalry could not attack them, and the infantry being forces composed for
the most part of Gascons and ill-disciplined, they (the Swiss) esteemed them
little. It has subsequently been seen how twenty six thousand Swiss went to
encounter north of Milan the King of the French, Francis, who had with him
twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and a hundred pieces of
artillery; and if they did not win the engagement, as at Novara, they fought
valiantly for two days, and though they were later routed, half of them were
saved. Marcus Attilius Regulus attempted to resist with his infantry not only
(the attack of) the cavalry, but the elephants: and if his design did not
succeed, yet it not that the virtu of his infantry was not such that he did
not
have faith in them believing them capable of overcoming those difficulties. I
repeat, therefore, that to want to overcome a disciplined infantry it is
necessary to oppose them with a better disciplined infantry, otherwise one
goes
to a manifest defeat.
In the time of Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, about sixteen thousand Swiss
descended into Lombardy, whence the Duke having at that time Carmignuola as
his
Captain, sent him with about a thousand cavalry and a few infantry to meet
them.
This man, not knowing their method of fighting, went to meet them with his
cavalry presuming to be able to rout them quickly. But finding them
immovable,
having lost many of his men, he retired: and being a most valiant man, and
knowing he had to take new proceeding in new events, reorganized his forces
and
went to meet them; and on coming to the engagement made all his men at arms
dismount and go on foot, and placing them at the head of the infantry, went
to
attack the Swiss, who had no remedy (against them). For the forces of
Carmignuola being on foot and well armored, could easily enter between the
ranks
of the Swiss without suffering any injury, and having entered therein could
easily attack them: So that of all that number, there remained only the part
which was saved through the humanity of Carmignuola.
I believe that many recognize this difference in virtu that exists between
the
one and the other of these systems, but so great is the infelicity of these
times, that neither the examples of the ancients or the moderns, nor the
confession of error, is enough to cause the modern Princes to re-see things,
and
to make them think that to give reputation to the military of a Province or a
State it is necessary to revive these insinuations (of the ancients), to keep
them close to one, to give them reputation, to give them life, so that in
return
it may give him life and reputation: And as they deviate from these methods,
so
they deviate from the other methods mentioned above: whence there results
that
the acquisitions become harmful, not an aggrandizement, to a State, as will
be
told below.
CHAPTER XIX
THAT ACQUISITIONS IN REPUBLICS NOT WELL ORGANIZED AND THAT DO NOT PROCEED
ACCORDING TO ROMAN VIRTU, ARE THE RUIN AND NOT THE EXALTATION OF THEM
This opinion contrary to the truth, founded upon those bad examples that have
been introduced by these corrupt centuries of ours, causes men not to think
of
deviating from their accustomed habits. Would it have been possible to
persuade
an Italian of thirty years ago that ten thousand infantry could have
attacked,
in an open plain, ten thousand cavalry and as many more infantry, and with
these
not only to fight them, but to defeat them, as is seen in the example at
Novara
given by us many times? And although histories are full (of such examples),
yet
they would not have believed it; and if they had believed it, they would have
said that in these times one is better armed, and that a squadron of men at
arms
would be more adept at charging a rock than a body of infantry: and thus with
these erroneous arguments their judgment was corrupted, nor have they
considered
that Lucullus with few infantry routed one hundred and fifty thousand cavalry
of
(King) Tigranes, and that among those horsemen was a kind of cavalry entirely
similar to our men at arms. And thus that fallacy was uncovered by the
example
of the Ultramontane forces: And as that which is narrated in histories is
seen
to be true in regard to infantry, so also ought all the other ancient
institutions to be believed to be true and useful. And if this were believed,
the Republics and Princes would have erred less, would have been stronger in
opposing the attack that might come upon them, they would not have put their
hope in flight, and those who had the government in their hands would have
known
better how to direct the manner of aggrandizement or the manner of
preservation;
and they would have believed that for the city to increase its inhabitants,
to
make associations for themselves and not subjects, to send colonies to guard
the
acquired countries, to make capital of the plunder, to subdue the enemy by
incursions and engagements, and by sieges, to keep the public rich, the
private
citizen poor, to maintain military exercises with the greatest zeal, these
are
the ways to make a Republic great and to acquire Empire. And if these means
of
expanding did not please them, they would consider that acquisitions by any
other means are the ruin of a Republic; and they would place a restraint to
all
ambition, regulating the internal affairs of the City well with laws and
other
customs, prohibiting conquests, and thinking only of defending themselves,
and
to keep the defenses well organized; as do the Republics of Germany, who, in
this manner, live and have lived for a long time.
None the less ((as I have said another time when discussing the difference
that
existed between being organized for conquest and being organized for
preservation)) it is impossible that a Republic succeeds in remaining quiet
and
enjoy its liberty and her limited confines; for even if she does not molest
others, she will be molested: and from being molested there will arise the
will
and desire for conquest: and even if she should not have any outside enemies,
she would find some at home, as it appears necessary to occur to all great
Cities. And if the Republics of Germany could live in this fashion, and have
been able to endure a long time, it arises from certain conditions that exist
in
that country which are not found elsewhere, without which they could not have
maintained such a manner of living. That part of Germany of which I speak was
subject to the Roman Empire, as was France and Spain: but when the decline of
the Empire came afterwards, and the rule of that Empire reduced in that
Province, the more powerful Cities begun ((according to the weakness or
necessity of the Emperors)) to make themselves free, ransoming themselves
from
the Empire by reserving a small annual rent to it: so that little by little
all
those Cities which were held directly by the Emperor, and were not subject to
any Prince, ransomed themselves in similar fashion. There occurred in these
same
times when these Cities were ransoming themselves, that certain Communities
subject to the Duke of Austria rebelled against him, among which were
Fribourg,
the Swiss, and other like, which prospering from the beginning, gradually
expanded little by little, that they did not return under the yoke of
Austria,
and became feared by their neighbors; and these are those whom we call Swiss.
And therefore this Province is divided between the Swiss, Republics which
they
call Free Towns, Princes, and the Emperor. And the reason that among such a
diversity of forms of government wars do not arise, or if they do arise they
do
not last long, is that this shadow of an Emperor, who, although he has no
power,
none the less he has so much reputation among them that he is their
conciliator,
and with his authority by interposing himself as a mediator, quickly
extinguishes all trouble. And the major and longer wars that have occurred
have
been those that took place between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria: and
although for many years past the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been
the
same person, yet he has never been able to overcome the audacity of the
Swiss,
where there has never been a means of accord except by force: Nor has the
rest
of Germany given him much help, as much because the Communities do not want
to
injure those who want to live free as they do, as because those Princes (are
unable to aid him) part of whom cannot because they are poor, part do not
want
to because they envy his power. These Communities therefore can live
contentedly
with their small dominions because they have no reason ((in respect to the
Imperial authority)) of desiring a greater one: They can live united within
their walls because they have an enemy nearby and who would take the
opportunity
to occupy them whenever they should have a discord. If this Province was
constituted otherwise, it would behoove them to seek to expand and break
their
quiet existence.
And because elsewhere such conditions do not exist, this way of living cannot
be
adopted, and it is necessary either to expand by means of leagues, or to
expand
as the Romans did: And whoever governs otherwise seeks not his life, but his
death and ruin, for in a thousand ways and for many reasons, the acquisitions
are harmful; for he may very well extend his Empire, but not power; and
whoever
acquires Empire and not power together, comes to ruin. Whoever impoverishes
himself in war cannot acquire power, even though he is victorious, for he
puts
in more than he draws out of the acquisitions; as the Venetians and
Florentines
have done, who have been much weaker when the one had Lombardy and the other
Tuscany, than they were when the one was content with the (dominion of the)
sea,
and the other with six miles of boundaries. For all of this resulted from
their
having wanted to acquire but not to have known the means to do so: and they
merit so much more blame as they had less excuse, having seen the methods
which
the Romans employed, and having been able to follow their example, while the
Romans, without any example, through their prudence, knew how to find it by
themselves. In addition to this, acquisitions sometimes do no little damage
to
any well ordered Republic when they acquire a City or a Province full of
luxury,
where those (indolent) habits can be picked up through intercourse they have
with them, as happened to Rome first in the acquisition of Capua, and
afterwards
also to Hannibal. And if Capua had been further distant from the City (of
Rome),
and if the errors of the soldiers had not have prompt remedy, or if Rome had
been in any part corrupted, that acquisition without doubt would have been
the
ruin of the Roman Republic: And Titus Livius bears witness of this with these
words; Capua the instrument of all pleasures, the least conducive to military
discipline, turned the spirit of the military away from the memory of their
country. And truly similar Cities or Provinces avenge themselves against
their
conquerors without a fight and without bloodshed; for by transferring to them
their own bad habits they expose them to being conquered by whoever assaults
them. And Juvenal in his Satires could not have better understood this part,
when he says that, because of the acquisitions of foreign lands, foreign
customs
had entered the breasts of the Romans, and in exchange for parsimony and
other
very excellent virtus, gluttony and luxury dwell there, and will avenge the
conquered world. If, therefore, the conquest was to be pernicious to the
Romans
in the times when they proceeded with so much prudence and so much virtu,
what
then would it be to those who deviate from their methods? And what would it
be,
if in addition to the other errors they make ((which have been discussed at
length above)), they avail themselves of mercenary or auxiliary soldiers?
Whence
often those injuries result which will be mentioned in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XX
WHAT PERILS ARE BROUGHT TO THAT PRINCE OR THAT REPUBLIC WHICH AVAILS ITSELF
OF
AUXILIARY AND MERCENARY TROOPS
If I had not in another work of mine treated a length of how useless
mercenary
and auxiliary troops are, and how useful their own (national troops) are, I
should extend myself in this discourse much more than I will: but having
talked
of it at length elsewhere, I shall be brief in this part. Nor did it seem to
me
I ought to pass it over entirely, having found in Titus Livius ((as to
auxiliary
soldiers)) so striking an example, for auxiliary soldiers are those which a
Prince or a Republic send to your aid, captained and paid: and referring to
the
text of Titus Livius, I say, that the Romans at different places had routed
two
armies of the Samnites with their army which had been sent to the succor of
the
Capuans, and by this liberated the Capuans from that war which the Samnites
made
against them, (and) as they wanted to return to Rome, in order that the
Capuans,
who had been deprived of their garrisons should not become a prey again to
the
Samnites, left two legions in the country of Capua for their defense: Which
legions, plunged into idleness, begun to delight themselves there, so that
forgetting their country and the reverence due to Senate, decided to take up
arms and make themselves lords of that country which they had defended with
their virtu, it appearing to them that the inhabitants were not worthy to
possess those things which they did not know how to defend. Which matter
becoming known, it was suppressed and corrected by the Romans, as will be
shown
more fully where we will speak of conspiracies.
I say again, therefore, that of all the other kinds of soldiers the
auxiliaries
are the most harmful, because that Prince or that Republic which calls them
to
their aid have no authority over them, but only he who sends them has
authority.
For auxiliary soldiers are those who are sent you by a Prince, as I have
said,
under their captains, under their ensigns, and paid by them, as was this army
that the Romans sent to Capua. Such soldiers as these, when they had won,
most
of the time plunder as well him who leads them as him against whom they are
led;
and they do so either from the malignity of the Prince who sends them or from
their own ambition. And although the intention of the Romans was not to break
the accord and convention which they had made with the Capuans, none the less
the ease of attacking them appeared to those soldiers to be such, that it was
able to persuade them to think of taking the town and the State from the
Capuans. We could give many examples of this, but I deem it sufficient to
cite
that of the Rhegians, whose lives and city were taken away by a legion which
the
Romans had placed there as a guard. A Prince or a Republic ought, therefore,
first to take up any other proceeding than to have recourse to bringing
auxiliary forces into their State relying on them for its defense, for every
pact, every convention ((however hard)) that they have with the enemy, will
be
much lighter than such a proceeding. And if past events are well read, and
present ones discussed, it will be found that for one who has had a good
ending,
infinite others have been deceived. And an ambitious Prince or Republic
cannot
have a greater opportunity to occupy a City or a Province, than to be
requested
by it to send their armies to its defense. Therefore, he who is so ambitious
that he calls for such aid not only to defend himself but to attack others as
well, seeks to acquire that which he will not be able to hold, and which can
easily be taken away from him by him from whom he acquired it. But the
ambition
of men is so great, that to gratify a present desire, do not think of the
evil
which, in a short time, will result from it. Nor do the ancient examples move
him, as well in this as in the other matters discussed; for if they were
moved
by them, they would see how much more the liberality they show their
neighbors,
and the less desirous they are of occupying them, so much the more they throw
themselves into your arms, as will be told below through the example of the
Capuans.
CHAPTER XXI
THE FIRST PRAETOR WHICH THE ROMANS SENT ANY PLACE WAS THE CAPUA, FOUR HUNDRED
YEARS AFTER THEY HAD BEGUN TO MAKE WAR (AGAINST THAT CITY)
It has been discussed at length above, how the Romans differed in their
manner
of proceeding in their acquisitions from those who in the present time expand
their jurisdiction; and how they left (the people of) those lands which they
did
not destroy living with their laws, including even those who had surrendered
to
them, not as associates, but as subjects, and how they did not leave in them
any
sign of the authority (Empire) of the Roman people, but obligated them to
some
conditions, which so long as they were observed by them, they would maintain
them in their state and dignity. And it is known that these methods were
observed until they went outside of Italy and commenced to reduce Kingdoms
and
States into Provinces. There is no clearer example of this than that of the
Praetors sent by them to any place was to Capua; whom they sent, not because
of
their ambition, but because they had been requested by the Capuans, who
((there
being discord among them)) judged it necessary to have a Roman Citizen within
that City who would restore order and re-unify them. From this example, (and)
moved and constrained by a similar necessity, the people of Antium also
requested a Praetor from them. And T. Livius says of this incident and
(commenting) on this new method of ruling, That they promised not only arms,
but
Roman justice. It is seen, therefore, how much this facilitated Roman
expansion;
for those Cities mainly that are accustomed to living free or to govern
themselves by their own citizens, remain more quiet and content under a
government they do not see ((even though it may have some inconvenience in
itself)) than under one which they see every day, as it would appear to them
they would be reproached by their servitude every day. Another advantage also
results to the Prince who, not having at hand his ministers, judges and
magistrates to render both civil and criminal decisions in that City, (and)
no
sentence being able ever to be pronounced which will bring censure or infamy
upon the Prince, in this manner, comes to escape many causes of calumny and
hatred.
¶ And that this is the truth, in addition to the ancient examples which
could be
cited, there is one recent example in Italy. For ((everyone knows)) Genoa
having
been occupied by the French many times, the King always ((except at the
present
time)) has sent a French Governor who governs in his name. Only at present
has
he allowed that City to be governed by itself and by a Genoese governor, not
by
election of the King, but because necessity so ordained. And without doubt,
if
it were to be examined as to which of these two methods gives more security
to
the King from the Rule (Empire) over it, and more contentedness to that
people,
without doubt this latter method would be approved. In addition to this, men
will so much more readily throw themselves into your arms the less you appear
disposed to subjugate them, and so much less will they fear you in connection
with their liberty as you are more humane and affable with them. This
affability
and liberality made the Capuans have recourse to request the Praetor from the
Romans: that if the Romans had shown the slightest desire to send one, they
would quickly have become jealous and would have kept their distance from
them
(Romans).
¶ But what need is there to go to Capua and Rome for examples, when we have
them
in Florence and Tuscany? Everyone knows how the City of Pistoia a long time
ago
came voluntarily under the Florentine Empire (Dominion). Everyone also knows
how
much enmity there has existed between the Florentines, the Pisans, the
Lucchese,
and the Sienese; and this difference in spirit has not arisen because the
Pistoians do not value their liberty as the others or do not esteem
themselves
as much as the others, but because the Florentines have always borne
themselves
toward them (the Pistoians) as brothers, and like enemies towards the others.
It
was this that caused the Pistoians to have run voluntarily under their
Dominion,
and the others to have used, and still use, every force not to come under
them.
And doubtless, if the Florentines either by means of leagues or by rendering
them aid, had cultivated instead of frightening their neighbors, at this hour
they would have been Lords of Tuscany. I do not judge by this that arms and
force are not to be employed, but that they ought to be reserved as the last
resort where and when other means are not enough.
CHAPTER XXII
HOW OFTEN THE OPINIONS OF MEN IN JUDGING THINGS (TO BE) GREAT ARE FALSE
Those who have found themselves witnesses of the deliberations of men have
observed, and still observe, how often the opinions of men are erroneous;
which
many times, if they are not decided by very excellent men, are contrary to
all
truth. And because excellent men in corrupt Republics ((especially in quiet
times)) are frowned upon both from envy and from other reasons of ambition,
it
follows that a common deception (error) is judged good, or it is put forward
by
men who want favors more readily for themselves than for the general good.
When
this error, in times of adversity, is discovered, then from necessity refuge
is
sought among those who in times of quiet were almost forgotten, as will be
discussed in full in its proper place. Certain events also arise where men
who
do not have a great amount of experience of things are easily deceived, for
they
have in them that incident which resembles so many similar actions which are
true as to make that one believed, (and) upon cases such as this men are
persuaded. These things have been said of that (error) which the Praetor
Numicus
((when the Latins were routed by the Romans)) persuaded them, and of that
(error) which a few years ago was believed by many, when Francis I, King of
France, attempted the conquest of Milan, which was defended by the Swiss.
¶ I say, therefore, that after the death of Louis XII, and Francis of
Angouleme
succeeded to the kingdom of France, and when he desired to restore to the
kingdom the Duchy of Milan, which a few years before was occupied by the
Swiss,
through the help of Pope Julius II, desired to obtain aid in Italy which
should
facilitate the enterprise for him; and, in addition to the Venetians whom
King
Louis and gained over to himself, attempted to regain the Florentines and
Pope
Leo X, deeming his enterprise would be easier any time he should have
regained
those people to himself, inasmuch as the forces of the King of Spain were in
Lombardy, and the other forces of the Emperor were in Verona. Pope Leo did
not
yield to the desires of the king, but was persuaded by those who counselled
him
((according as it was said)) to remain neutral, showing him that certain
victory
consisted in this proceeding, for the Church not to have either the King (of
France) or the Swiss too powerful in Italy; but if he wanted to bring it (the
Church) to its ancient liberty, it was necessary to liberate her from the
servitude of the one and the other. And because it was not possible to
overcome
one and the other, or each one separately, or both together, it would be best
that one should overcome the other, and that the Church with her friends
should
attack the one that remained victor. And it was impossible to find a better
opportunity than the present, as the one and the other were in the field, and
the Pope had his forces organized so as to be able to show himself on the
borders of Lombardy and near to both armies, under pretext of wanting to
guard
his possessions; and where he could remain until an engagement should take
place, which reasonably ((both armies being of equal virtu)) ought to be
bloody
for both parties, and leave the victor so debilitated that it would be easy
for
the Pope to assail him and rout him, and thus he would, with great glory to
himself, to remain Lord of Lombardy and arbiter of all Italy. And how much
this
opinion was wrong is to be seen from the result, for the Swiss were defeated
after a long fight, and the forces of the Pope and of Spain did not presume
to
assault the victors, but prepared for flight: which also would not have done
them good if it had not been for the humanity or indifference of the (French)
King, who did not seek a second victory, but it sufficed him to make an
accord
with the Church.
This advice was based on certain reasons which at a distance appear true, but
are entirely alien to the truth. For it rarely happens that the victor loses
many of his soldiers, because the victor loses only those who die in battle,
none by flight; and in the ardor of the combat, when men have turned to face
one
another, only a few fall, especially because very often it only lasts a short
time: and even if it did last a long time and many of the victors should die,
the reputation which follows the victory and the terror which it brings with
it,
are such that it greatly outweighs the injury which the death of his soldiers
causes the victor to endure. So that an army, which in the belief that he has
been weakened, should go and meet him, will find itself deceived, unless the
army should be such as to be able to have combatted with him at any time,
even
before the victory. In this case it is possible to win or lose according to
its
fortune and virtu; but that one which should have first fought, and won, will
have rather the advantage over the other. This was recognized for certain by
the
experience of the Latins and by the error that the Praetor Numicus committed,
and by the injuries which those people suffered who believed him, when
((after
the Romans had defeated the Latins)) he shouted throughout all the country of
Latium now was the time to assault the Romans weakened by the fight they had
had
with them, and that only the name of victory remained to the Romans, inasmuch
as
all the other injuries they had suffered were as though they had been
defeated,
and that any little force that should assault them anew would destroy them.
Whence those people who believed him raised a new army, but were quickly
routed,
and suffered those injuries which those people always suffer who hold similar
opinions.
CHAPTER XXIII
HOW MUCH THE ROMANS, IN JUDGING THE MATTERS FOR ANY INCIDENT THAT SHOULD
NECESSITATE SUCH JUDGMENT, AVOIDED HALF-WAY MEASURES
Such was the state of things in Latium, that they could endure neither peace
nor
war. Of all the happy and unhappy states to which a Prince or a Republic can
be
reduced is to come to such terms that they cannot accept peace or sustain
war;
to which those are reduced who are oppressed too much by the conditions of
the
peace, and who, on the other hand, ((wanting to make war)) would have to
throw
themselves as prey to those who aid them, or to remain prey to the enemy. And
all this comes from evil counsels and from the bad procedure of not having
well
measured their strength, as was said above. For that Republic or that Prince
which should measure them well, will only with difficulty be brought to that
condition which the Latins were brought, who made an accord with the Romans
when
they ought not to have, and declared war when they ought not to have, and
thus
they knew how to manage so that the enmity and friendship of the Romans were
equally damaging to them. The Latins were therefore overcome and afflicted in
the extreme, first by Manlius Torquatus, and afterwards by Camillus, who
having
constrained them to give themselves up and put themselves into the arms of
the
Romans, and having placed guards throughout the towns of Latium, and having
taken hostages from all, returned to Rome and reported to the Senate that all
Latium was in the hands of the Roman people. And as this judgment was notable
and merits being observed so as to be able to be imitated when similar
opportunities are given to Princes, I want to cite the words which Livius
placed
in the mouth of Camillus, which give witness both of the manner which the
Romans
held in expanding and how in the judgments of the State they always avoided
half-way measures and turned to extremes. For a government consists only in
so
holding the subjects that they cannot or ought not want to injure you. This
is
done either by assuring yourself entirely by taking away from them all means
of
harming you, or by benefiting them so that it would not be reasonable that
they
would have a desire for any change of fortune. Which is entirely understood,
first from the proposition of Camillus, and then by the judgment given by the
Senate upon it. His words were these: The immortal Gods caused you to go
where
you were able to by these counsels, placing in your hands whether Latium
should
exist. Therefore, you can prepare a peace in perpetuity in relation to the
Latins, either by violence or forgiveness. Will you proceed cruelly against
those whom you conquered and who gave themselves up to you? If so, you are at
liberty to destroy all Latium. Will you rather by example desire to increase
the
power of the Roman Republic by accepting those whom you have overcome into
your
citizenship? If so, you have the opportunity for a most glorious increase.
Certainly that Empire is more firm which enjoys obedience. While, therefore,
their minds are in a stupor and in suspense, it behooves you to assure
yourselves either through punishment or benefits. This proposition was
followed
by the decision of the Senate which was in accordance with the words of the
Consul, so that going from town to town which were of importance, they either
bestowed benefits on them or destroyed them, granting to the beneficiaries
exemptions and privileges, giving them Citizenship, and assuring them in
every
way: the others they destroyed their towns, colonies were sent there, (the
inhabitants) transferred to Rome, and so dispersing them that they could
never
by arms or by counsel injure Rome.
Nor did they (the Romans) ever employ neutral means in these matters of
moment
((as I have said)). Princes ought to imitate this judgment, and the
Florentines
ought to have adopted this course when, in MDII (1502) Arezzo and all the Val
Di
Chiana rebelled: which if they had done so, they would have secured their
Empire
and greatly increased the City of Florence, and given her those fields which
she
lacked in order to live. But they employed that middle way, which is most
pernicious in the judging of men, so that they exiled part of the Aretini,
and a
part they condemned to death, and they deprived all of them of their honors
and
their ancient ranks in the City, but left the City entire. And when any
Citizen
in their deliberations advised that Arezzo should be destroyed, those who
were
deemed more wise said that it would be of little honor to the Republic to
destroy her, as it would appear that Florence lacked the strength to hold
her:
which reasons are of those which appear to be, but are not, true; for by this
same reason a parricide, a criminal, or an infamous person would not be put
to
death, as it would be a shame for that Prince to show that he did not have
the
power to be able to restrain a solitary man, And those who have similar
opinions
do not see, that individual men, and a whole City, will some times so sin
against a State, that as an example to others, and for his own security, a
Prince has no other remedy but to destroy them. And honor consists in being
able
and knowing when and how to castigate them, not in being able with a thousand
dangers to hold them, for the Prince who does not castigate evil-doers in a
way
that he can no longer do evil, is held to be either ignorant or cowardly.
This
judgment which the Romans gave when it was necessary, is also confirmed by
the
sentence given against the Privernati. Where from the text of Livius, two
things
ought to be noted: the one, that which is mentioned above that subjects ought
to
given benefits or destroyed: the other, how much the generosity of spirit and
speaking the truth helps, especially when it is spoken in the presence of
prudent men. The Roman Senate had assembled to judge the Privernati, who had
rebelled, but were later by force returned to the Roman obedience. Many
Citizens
had been sent by the people of Privernatum to beg pardon from the Senate, and
when they had come into their presence, one of them was asked by a Senator,
what
punishment do you think the Privernati merit? To which the Privernate
replied,
That which those who feel themselves worthy of liberty merit. To which the
Consul replied, If we remit your punishment, what peace can we hope to have
with
you? To which that man responded, A faithful and perpetual one, if you give
us a
good one; if a bad one, only a day-by-day one. Whence, although many were
displeased, the wiser part of the Senate said, This was the voice of free and
virile people, and they could not believe that it is possible for that
people,
or an individual, would otherwise remain in a condition that was punishment
to
them, except if it resulted from necessity. Peace would be trustful where it
was
made voluntarily, and not from a position where servitude is prevalent where
it
is hopeless to look for good faith. And after these words they decided that
the
Privernati should be Roman Citizens, and they honored them with the
privileges
of their society, saying: Those who think of nothing except liberty are here
worthy of being Romans. So much did this true and generous response (of the
Privernati) please those generous spirits (Romans); for any other response
would
have been false and cowardly. And those who believe men to be otherwise
((especially if these are accustomed to be, or appeared to be, free)) deceive
themselves, and under this deception take up proceedings that are neither
good
in themselves nor satisfactory to them (who are affected by it). From which
there often results rebellions and the ruin of States.
But to return to our discussion, I conclude, both from this and from the
judgment given to the Latins, when a City, powerful and accustomed to living
free, is to be judged, it must be either destroyed or caressed, otherwise
every
judgment is vain; and above all the middle-way course ought to be avoided,
which
is pernicious, as it was to the Samnites when they had enveloped the Romans
at
the Caudine forks, and when they did not want to follow the advice of that
old
man who counselled them that they should allow the Romans to go honorably, or
to
kill them all; but by taking a middle way, disarming them and putting them
under
the yoke, they allowed them to go full of ignominy and anger. So that a
little
afterwards, to their harm, they realized how useful the sentence of that old
man
had been and how harmful was their decision, as will be discussed more fully
in
its place.
CHAPTER XXIV
FORTRESSES ARE GENERALLY MORE HARMFUL THAN USEFUL
It may perhaps appear to these sages of our times as something not well
considered, that the Romans in wanting to assure themselves of the people of
Latium and of the City of Privernum, did not think of building some
fortresses
there, which would be a restraint to hold them faithful; especially as there
was
a saying in Florence alleged by our wise men, that Pisa and other similar
Cities
ought to be held by fortresses. And truly, if the Romans had been like them,
they would have thought to build them: but as they were of another virtu, of
another judgment, of another power, they did not build them. And so long as
Rome
lived free and followed her institutions and virtuous constitutions, they
never
built one to hold either a City or a province, but they did save some that
had
already been built. Whence seeing the mode of proceeding of the Romans in
this
regard, and that of the Princes in our times, it appears to me proper to put
into consideration whether it is good to build fortresses, or whether they
are
harmful Or useful to him who builds them. It ought to be considered,
therefore,
whether fortresses are built for defending oneself from the enemy or to
defend
oneself form one's subjects.
In the first case they are not necessary, in the second harmful. And I will
begin by giving the reason why in the second case they are harmful, I say
that
that Prince or that Republic which is afraid of its subjects and of their
rebelling, it results first from the fact that that fear arises from the hate
which the subjects have for them, and the hate they have of the treatment
given
them. The ill treatment results either from the belief of being able to hold
them by force, or from the little prudence of those who govern them; and one
of
the things that makes them believe they are able to force them, is to have
their
fortresses near them: for the ill treatment that is the cause of hatred,
arises
in good part because of that Prince or that Republic have the fortresses,
which
((if this is true)) are much more harmful by far than useful: For firstly
((as
has been said)) they cause you to be more audacious and more violent toward
your
subjects: afterwards there is not that internal security of which you
persuade
yourself, as all the strength and violence that is employed in holding a
people
are nothing, except these two: either you have always to place a good army in
the field, as the Romans had, or you must disperse them, extinguish them,
disorganize them, and so destroy them that they are not able to come together
to
attack you; for if you impoverish them, the despoiled ones will win their
arms:
if you disarm them, fury will serve as arms: if you kill the Captains and
continue to injure the others, the Heads will spring up as those of the
Hydra:
if you build fortresses, they are useful in times of peace because they give
you
more courage to do evil to them, but in times of war most useless because
they
will be assaulted by the enemy and by your subjects, nor is it possible that
they can resist the one and the other. And if ever they were useless, they
are
now in our times on account of artillery, because of which the small places,
where moreover you cannot retire behind earthworks, are impossible to defend,
as
we discussed above.
I want to discuss this manner more tritely. Either you, a Prince, want to
keep
the people of the City in restraint with these fortresses, or you, a Prince
or a
Republic, want to keep a City in restraint that has been occupied in war. I
want
to turn to the Prince, and I say to him that such fortresses cannot be more
useless to him in holding his Citizens in restraint for the reasons given
above,
for it makes you more prompt and less regardful in oppressing them, and that
oppression will expose you to your ruin and will excite them so, that that
fortress which is the reason for it cannot afterwards defend you; so that a
wise
and good Prince, in order to keep himself good and not give cause to his sons
to
dare to become bad, will never build fortresses, so that they will rely, not
upon the fortresses, but on the good will of men. And if Count Francesco
Sforza
who had become Duke of Milan was reputed wise and none the less built
fortresses
in Milan, I say that in this case he was not wise, and the result has shown
that
that fortress was harmful and not a security to his heirs: for judging that
through the medium of it to live securely, and to be able to oppress their
Citizens and subjects, they indulged in all kinds of violence, so that they
became so hated as described above, that they lost the State as soon as the
enemy assaulted them: nor did that fortress defend them, nor did they have
any
usefulness for them in war, and in peace had done them much harm: for if they
had not had them, and if because of little prudence they had not treated
their
Citizens harshly, they would have discovered the peril more quickly, and
would
have retreated, and would then have been able to resist the impetus of the
French more courageously with friendly subjects and without a fortress, than
with hostile subjects, and with the fortress, which do you no good in any
way,
for either they (fortresses) are lost through the treachery of those who
guard
them, or because of the violence of those who assault it, or by famine.
And if you want them to do you any good and to help you in recovering a lost
State, where only the fortress remains to you, it behooves you to have an
army
with which you can assault those who have driven you out; and if you have the
army you would recover the State in any case, (and) even more (easily) if the
fortress did not exist, and so much more easily as men would be more friendly
than they were to you, for you had maltreated them because of the pride of
having the fortress. And from experience it has been seen that this fortress
of
Milan was of no usefulness either to the Sforza or to the French in times of
adversity for the one or the other; rather it brought much harm and ruin to
both, not having given thought because of it to more honest means of holding
that State. Guidobaldo Duke of Urbino, son of Frederick, who is his time was
an
esteemed Captain, was driven out of his State by Cesare Borgia, son of Pope
Alexander VI; when afterwards because of an incident that had arisen he
returned
there, he caused all the fortresses that existed in that province to be
destroyed, judging them to be injurious. For he being beloved by men, did not
need them on their account, and with regard to his enemies, he had seen that
he
could not defend them; as they needed an army in the field to defend them, he
resolved to destroy them. Pope Julius, after having driven out the Bentivogli
from Bologna, built a fortress in that City, and afterwards had those people
assassinated by one his Governors: so that that people rebelled, and the Pope
quickly lost the fortress; and thus the fortress did him no good, but injury,
and the more so, that by conducting himself otherwise it could have done him
good. Niccolo Da Costello, father of the Vitelli, returning to his country
when
he had been exiled, quickly razed two fortresses that Pope Sixtus IV had
built,
judging that the good will people, not the fortresses, would keep him in that
State. But of all the other examples, the most recent and the most notable in
every way, and apt to show the uselessness of building them and the
usefulness
of destroying them, is that of Genoa which ensued in the most recent time.
Everyone knows that in MDVII (1507) Genoa rebelled against Louis XII, King of
France, who had come in person with all his forces to recover it, and having
recovered it, he had a fortress built stronger than all others known up to
the
present time; it was impregnable because of its location and other
circumstances, being placed on the apex of a hill that extended into the sea,
called Codefa by the Genoese, and by means of this he commanded all the port
and
great part of the town of Genoa. Afterwards in the year MDVII (1512) it
happened
that the French forces were driven out of Italy, Genoa rebelled
notwithstanding
the fortress, and Ottaviano Fregoso seized the State, who, after sixteen
months
and with every industry, captured it by starvation. And everyone believed,
and
many counselled him, that he should preserve it as a refuge in any event: but
being a most prudent man, (and) knowing that the good will of men and not
fortresses maintained Princes in their States, destroyed it. And thus without
founding his State on the fortress, but on his virtu and prudence, he has
held
it and still holds it. And where before only a thousand infantry usually were
enough to overturn the State of Genoa, his adversaries have assaulted him
with
ten thousand and have not been able to harm him. It will be seen from this,
therefore, that the destruction of the fortress did no more harm Ottaviano,
than
the building of it protected the King of France. For when he was able to come
into Italy with his army, he was able to recover Genoa without the fortress
being there; but without the army he could not come into Genoa even though he
had a fortress there. For him, therefore, it was an expense to do (build) it
and
a disgrace to lose it: To Ottaviano the recovery of it was glorious and the
destruction of it useful.
But let us come to the Republics which build fortresses, not within their own
country, but inside the towns they acquire. And if the example given of
France
and Genoa are not enough to demonstrate the fallacy of this, those of
Florence
and Pisa will be enough for me; for the Florentines build fortresses in order
to
hold that City, and did not understand that to hold a City which was always
hostile to Florentine rule, had lived in freedom, and had resorted to
rebellion
as a refuge for liberty, it was necessary in wanting to observe the old Roman
method, either to make her an associate or to destroy her: for the virtu of
fortresses is seen in the coming of King Charles, to whom they all
surrendered,
either through the treachery of those who guarded it, or from fear of a
greater
evil: for if there had not been one, the Florentines never would have based
their holding Pisa on it, and the King (of France) could never in that manner
have deprived the Florentines of that City: and the means by which they had
maintained it up to that time would perhaps have been sufficient to preserve
it,
and without doubt would have stood the test better than the fortress.
I conclude, therefore, that to hold one's own country a fortress is injurious
and to hold towns that are acquired fortresses are useless: And I want the
authority of the Romans to be enough (for me), who razed the walls of those
towns which they wanted to hold, having taken them by violent means, and
never
rebuilt them. And if anyone should cite in opposition to this opinion that
(example) of Tarantum in ancient times and of Brescia in modern times, both
of
which places were recovered from their rebellious subjects by means of
fortresses, I reply, that for the recovery of Tarantum Fabius Maximus was
sent
at the beginning of the year with the entire army, who would have been more
apt
to have recovered it if there had not been a fortress: for although Fabius
had
used that means, if there had not been this means (fortress), he would have
used
other means which would have had the same result. And I do not know of what
usefulness a fortress may be, if in the recovery of a town, a consular army
with
Fabius Maximus for its Captain is needed to recover it: And that the Romans
would have recovered it in any event, is seen by the example of Capua where
there was no fortress, and which they reacquired through the virtu of the
army.
But let us come to Brescia. I say that there rarely occurs that which
occurred
in that rebellion, that while the fortress remains in your power ((the town
having revolted)) you should have a large army (and) nearby as was that of
the
French: for Monsignor De Foix, Captain of the King, being with his army at
Bologna and learning of the loss of Brescia recovered the town by means of
the
fortress. The fortress of Brescia, therefore, ((in order to be of benefit))
also
needed a Monsignor De Foix, and a French army which had to succor it in three
days: Hence this example in contrast to opposite examples is not enough, for
many fortresses have been taken and retaken in wars of our times, by the same
fortune as field campaigns (have taken and retaken), not only in Lombardy,
but
also in the Romagna, in the Kingdom of Naples, and throughout all parts of
Italy.
But as to building fortresses in order to defend oneself from external
enemies,
I say that they are not necessary to those people, or to those Kingdoms that
have good armies, and are useless to those who do not have good armies: for
good
armies without fortresses are sufficient to defend themselves, and fortresses
without good armies cannot defend you. And this is seen from the experience
of
those who are held to be excellent as governors and in other things, as was
the
case with the Romans and the Spartans; for if the Romans did not build
fortresses, the Spartans not only abstained from building them, but even did
not
permit the City to have walls, because they wanted (to rely on) the personal
virtu of their men to defend them, (and) not some other means of defense.
When,
therefore, a Spartan was asked by an Athenian whether the walls of Athens
appeared beautiful to him, he replied "yes, if the (City) was inhabited
by
women".
The Prince, therefore, who has good armies, may have on the frontiers of his
State, or on the sea, some fortresses that could resist the enemy for some
days
until he could be checked; this may sometimes be a useful thing, but is not a
necessary one. But when the Prince does not have a good army, then having
fortresses throughout his State or at the frontiers, are either injurious or
useless to him: injurious, because he loses them easily, and when they have
been
lost they are turned (make war) against him; or even if they should be so
strong
that that enemy cannot occupy them, they are left behind by the enemy army,
and
are of no benefit; for good armies, unless they are confronted by equally
brave
ones, enter into enemy country regardless of the City or fortress which they
leave behind, as is seen in ancient histories; and as Francesco Maria did,
who
in recent times, in order to assault Urbino, left ten enemy Cities behind
him,
without taking any account of them. That Prince, therefore, who can raise a
good
army, can do without building fortresses: He who does not have a good army,
ought not to build. He ought indeed to fortify the City where he lives, and
keep
it fortified, and keep the Citizens of that City well disposed, in order to
be
able to sustain an enemy attack so that he can (keep it) free by an accord or
by
external aid. All other plans are an expense in times of peace, and useless
in
times of war. And thus whoever considers all that I have said, will recognize
the Romans as wise in all their other institutions, as they were prudent in
their judgments concerning the Latins and the Privernati, where, not thinking
of
fortresses, they assured themselves of these people by wiser and more
virtuous
means.
CHAPTER XXV
THAT THE ASSAULTING OF A DISUNITED CITY IN ORDER TO OCCUPY IT BY MEANS OF ITS
DISUNION IS AN ERROR
There was so much disunity within the Roman Republic between the Plebs and
the
Nobility that the Veienti together with the Etruscans ((through the medium of
such disunion)) thought they could extinguish the name of Rome. And having
raised an army and made incursions upon the fields of Rome, the Senate sent
Gnaius Manilus and M. Fabius against them, (and) when they had led their army
near the army of the Veienti, the Veienti did not cease both with assaults
and
insults to attack and abuse the Roman name; and so great was their temerity
and
insolence that, from being disunited the Romans became united, and coming to
battle they defeated and routed them. It will be seen, therefore, how much
men
deceive themselves ((as we discussed above)) in adopting some course, and how
many times they believe they can gain a thing and lose it. The Veienti
believed
that by assaulting the Romans when they were disunited, they could defeat
them,
but that assault was the cause of the unification of them (the Romans) and of
their (the Veienti) ruin. For the cause of disunity in Republics most of the
times is due to idleness and peace; the cause of unity is fear and war. And,
therefore, if the Veienti had been wise, the more disunited they saw the
Romans,
the more they would have kept war away from them, and sought to oppress them
by
the arts of peace. The way to do this is to gain the confidence of the people
of
that City which is disunited, and to manage to become arbiters between the
parties, as long as they did not come to arms. But if they come to arms, to
give
light aid to the weaker party, as much to keep up the war longer and make
them
consume themselves, as well not to make them wholly apprehensive because of
your
large forces that you should want to oppress them and become their Prince.
And
if this part is well carried out it will always almost happen that you will
obtain the object which you had presupposed. The City of Pistoia ((as I have
said in other discussions and on other matters)) did not come to the Republic
of
Florence with other arts than this; for she being divided, and the
Florentines
favoring first the one party, and then the other, without caring for either,
brought her to such terms that, weary of her tumultuous existence, she came
to
throw herself spontaneously into the arms of Florence. The City of Siena has
never changed her State with the help of the Florentines unless that help has
been weak and small. For when it has been strong and large, they caused that
City to become united in defense of the existing government. I want to add
another example to those written above. Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan,
often
made war against the Florentines, relying on their disunity, and always was
the
loser. So that he had to say, lamenting his enterprise, that the follies of
the
Florentines had made him spend two millions in gold uselessly.
The Veienti and the Tuscans, therefore, ((as was said above)) were deceived
by
this opinion, and were in the end defeated by the Romans in one engagement.
And
thus in the future anyone who believes he can subjugate a people in a similar
manner and for similar reasons will be deceived.
CHAPTER XXVI
CONTEMPT AND INSULT GENERATE HATRED AGAINST THOSE WHO EMPLOY THEM, WITHOUT
ANY
USEFULNESS TO THEM
I believe that it is one of the great signs of prudence which men exhibit in
abstaining from threatening and injuring anyone with words, for neither the
one
and the other takes away strength from the enemy; but the one makes him more
cautious, and the other causes him to have greater hatred against you, and
with
more industry to think of injuring you. This is seen from the example of the
Veienti of whom discussion was had in the above chapter, who added the
opprobrium of words to the injury of war against the Romans, from which every
prudent Captain ought to make his soldiers abstain, as they are things which
inflame and excite the enemy to revenge, and in no way impede him ((as has
been
said)) in attacking you, so that they are all as arms turned against you. A
notable example of which occurred in Asia, where Gabades, Captain of the
Persians, having for a long time besieged Amida, and becoming weary of the
siege, decided to depart, and having already broken up his camp, all the
inhabitants of the town came upon the walls; and having become haughty from
(the
thought) of victory, did not omit assailing them with every kind of injury,
vituperating them, accusing and reproaching them for their cowardice and
poltroonery. Irritated by this, Gabades changed his counsel and returned to
the
siege, and so great was his indignation at this injury, that in a few days he
took and sacked it. And the same thing happened to the Veienti, to whom ((as
has
been said)) it was not enough to make war against the Romans, but they also
had
to vituperate them with words, and went up to the very stockade of their camp
to
speak their insults, irritating them more with words than with arms: and
those
soldiers who at first fought unwillingly, constrained the Consuls to enkindle
the battle, so that the Veienti suffered the punishment for their contumacy
as
was mentioned previously. Good Princes (Leaders) of the army and good
Governors
of a Republic, therefore, have to take every convenient means that these
injuries and reproaches are not used either by their Citizens or their army,
either among themselves or against the enemy, for then there arises those
inconveniences mentioned above; and among themselves, it would be even worse
unless they are stopped, as prudent men have always stopped them. The Roman
legions left at Capua having conspired against the Capuans, as will be
narrated
in its proper place, and this conspiracy having given rise to sedition, which
was later quelled by Valerius Corvinus, among the other stipulations of the
convention that was made, was that they ordained the greatest penalties
against
those who should ever reprove any of those soldiers with that sedition.
Tiberius
Gracchus, who in the war against Hannibal, was made Captain over a certain
number of slaves whom the Romans had armed because of the scarcity of men,
ordered among the first things that the capital penalty (be inflicted) on
whoever should reproach any of them with their (previous) servitude. So much
did
the Romans think this was a harmful thing ((as has been said above)) to treat
men with contempt and reproach them with any disgrace, because there is
nothing
that so excites their spirit and generates greater indignation, that whether
true or false, it is said: For harsh statements, even when they have the
least
truth in them, leave their harshness in the memory.
CHAPTER XXVII
TO PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS, IT OUGHT TO BE ENOUGH TO WIN, FOR OFTEN IT
IS
NOT ENOUGH IF THEY LOSE
The use of dishonorable words against an enemy arises most of the times from
the
insolence that victory, or the false hope of victory, gives you; which false
hope makes men err not only in their words, but also in their deeds. For when
this (false) hope enters the hearts of men, it makes them go beyond the mark,
and often lose that opportunity of obtaining a certain good, hoping to obtain
an
uncertain better. And because this is a matter that merits consideration,
this
deception that exists in men and very often causing damage to their State, it
appears to me it ought to be demonstrated in detail by ancient and modem
examples, as it cannot be so clearly demonstrated by arguments. After
Hannibal
and defeated the Romans at Cannae, he sent his ambassadors to the
Carthaginians
to announce the victory and request their support. This was discussed in the
Senate as to what should be done. Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian
Citizen
advised that they should use this victory wisely in making peace with the
Romans, for, having won, they were able to do so with more favorable
conditions
than they would expect (to make them) after a defeat; for the intentions of
the
Carthaginians ought to be to show the Romans that it was enough for them in
combatting them, to have obtained a victory for themselves and not to seek to
lose it in the hope of a greater one. This proceeding was not taken, but
later
when the opportunity was lost, it was well recognized by the Carthaginian
Senate
to have been a wise one. After Alexander the Great had already conquered all
the
Orient, the Republic of Tyre ((noble and powerful in those times for having
their City situated on water like the Venetians)), seeing the greatness of
Alexander, sent ambassadors to tell him they wanted to be his good servants
and
to render him that obedience he wanted, but that they were not ready to
accept
him or his forces in their land. Whereupon Alexander, indignant that a City
should close those doors that all the world had opened to him, rebuffed them,
and, not accepting their conditions, went to besiege them. The town was
situated
in water and very well supplied with provisions and the other munitions
necessary for defense, so that Alexander saw after four months (of siege)
that
taking the City would take away more time and glory from him that many other
acquisitions had not taken away, decided to try for an accord and concede to
them that which they themselves had asked. But those people of Tyre having
become haughty, not only did not want to accept the accord, but killed
whoever
came to present it. At which Alexander being indignant, he exerted himself
with
so much strength to its extinction that he took and destroyed it, and killed
or
made slave its people. In the year 1502 a Spanish army came into the
Florentine
dominion to reinstate the Medici in Florence and to tax the City, they being
called there by its Citizens who had given them hope that, as soon as they
had
entered the Florentine dominion, they would take up arms in their favor; and
having entered the plain and not discovering anyone, and having a scarcity of
provisions, they attempted an accord: which the people of Florence, having
become haughty, did not accept; when there resulted the loss of Prato and the
ruin of that State (Florence). Princes who are attacked cannot make a greater
error, therefore, especially when the assault is made by men who are far more
powerful than they, than to refuse any accord, and especially when it is
offered; for it would never be offered so harshly that it will not be in some
way good for those who accept it, and they will in a way have obtained a part
of
the victory. For it should have been enough for the people of Tyre that
Alexander had accepted those conditions which he at first refused, and it
should
have been a great enough victory for them that they had with arms in hand
made
so great a man condescend to their will. It should also have been enough for
the
Florentine people, and it would have been a great victory for them, if the
Spanish army had yielded in something to their will, and not fulfill all
things
of theirs, for the intention of that army was to change the State in
Florence,
to take it away from its attachment to, France, and extract money from it. If
of
the three things, they (Spaniards) should have obtained the last two, and
there
should have remained to the (Florentine) people the first, that of saving
their
State, there would have remained within each one some honor and satisfaction
and
the people ought not to have cared for the other two things, as long as they
existed free; nor ought they ((even if they should have seen a greater and
almost certain victory)) to have wanted to put any part of it (their liberty)
to
the discretion of fortune, as this was their last resource, which no prudent
man
would ever risk except from necessity.
Hannibal departed from Italy where he had been for sixteen glorious years,
recalled by the Carthaginians to succor his own country; he found Hasdrubal
and
Syphax broken, the Kingdom of Numida lost, Carthage restricted between the
confines of its walls, and no other refuge remaining but he and his army: and
knowing that this was the last resource of his country, he did not want to
place
it in jeopardy without first having tried every other remedy, and was not
ashamed to ask for peace, judging that if his country had any remedy, it was
in
it (peace) and not in war; which afterwards having been refused, he did not
hesitate to combat ((and to be defeated)), judging he might have (a chance
to)
win, or if he lost, to lose gloriously. And if Hannibal who had so much virtu
and had his army intact, sought peace first rather than a battle, when he saw
that losing it his country would be enslaved, what ought someone else with
less
virtu and less experience than he do? But men make this error of not knowing
where to place the limits to their hopes, and by relying on these without
otherwise measuring their resources, they are ruined.
CHAPTER XXVIII
HOW DANGEROUS IT IS FOR A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC, NOT TO AVENGE AN INJURY MADE
AGAINST THE PUBLIC OR A PRIVATE (CITIZEN)
That which indignation makes men do, is easily recognized as that which
happened
to the Romans when they sent the three Fabii as ambassadors to the Gauls who
had
come to assault Tuscany, and Clusium in particular. For the people of Clusium
having sent to Rome for aid, the Romans sent Ambassadors to the Gauls that in
the name of the Roman people they should signify to them to abstain from
making
war against the Tuscans: These ambassadors, being more accustomed to act than
to
speak, having arrived there as the Gauls and Tuscans were engaged in battle,
put
themselves among the first in combatting against them: Whence there arose
that,
being recognized by them (the Gauls), all the indignation that they had
against
the Tuscans turned against the Romans. This indignation became greater,
because
the Gauls having complained to the Roman Senate through their Ambassadors of
this injury, and asked that in satisfaction for the harm done that the three
above-mentioned Fabii should be turned over to them; not only were they not
delivered to them or in any way castigated, but when the Comitii assembled,
they
were made Tribunes with consular powers. So that the Gauls seeing those men
honored who ought to have been punished, took it all to be to their
disparagement and ignominy, and, excited by anger and indignation, went to
assault Rome, and captured it all except the Campidoglio (Capitol). This ruin
to
the Romans resulted only from their own non-observance of justice, for their
Ambassadors having sinned against the law of nations, instead of being
castigated were honored.
It is to be considered, therefore, how much every Republic and every Prince
ought to be careful in making a similar injury, not only against an entire
people, but even to an individual. For if a man is greatly offended either by
the public or by a private citizen, and is not avenged according to his
satisfaction, if he lives in a Republic he will seek to avenge himself even
with
their ruin, if he lives under a Prince and has any courage within himself, he
will never remain quiet until in some way he should have revenged himself
against him, even though he may see in it his own ruin. To verify this, there
is
no better or truer example than that of Philip of Macedonia, father of
Alexander. This man had in his court Pausanias, a beautiful and noble youth,
of
whom Attalus, one of the chief men close to Philip was enamored; and having
several times sought that he should consent (to his desires), but finding him
opposed to such things, decided to obtain by deceit and force that which he
was
unable to obtain by other means. And he gave a grand banquet at which
Pausanias
and many other noble Barons were gathered; after each one was full of viands
and
wine, he caused Pausanias to be seized, and brought to a retired place; and
he
not only gave vent to his libido by force, but also to shame him still more,
caused him to be abused in a similar fashion by many others. Pausanias
complained of this injury many times to Philip, who for a time kept him in
the
hope of avenging him, but not only did he not avenge him, but promoted
Attalus
to the governship of a Province of Greece: Whence Pausanias seeing his enemy
honored and not castigated, turned all his indignation not against him who
had
injured him, but against Phillip who had not avenged him; and one morning
during
the solemn nuptial of the daughter of Phillip to Alexander of Epirus, while
Phillip was going to the Temple to celebrate them, between the two Alexanders,
his son and son-in-law, he (Pausanias) killed him. Which example is very
similar
to that of the Romans, should be noted by anyone who governs, that he ought
never to underestimate a man so as to believe ((adding injury on injury))
that
he whom he has injured does not think of avenging himself, even with every
danger and injury to himself.
CHAPTER XXIX
FORTUNE BLINDS THE MINDS OF MEN WHEN SHE DOES NOT WANT THEM TO OPPOSE HER
DESIGNS
If we consider well how human affairs proceed, many times many events will be
seen to arise and accidents happen against which the Heavens have not
entirely
desired that they should be provided. And if this of which I speak happened
at
Rome where there was so much virtu, so much religion, and so much order, it
is
no wonder that it should happen much more often in a City or a Province which
lacks the above mentioned attributes. And as this case in point is most
remarkable in demonstrating the power of Heaven over human affairs, T. Livius
relates it at length and in the most effective language, saying that Heaven,
wanting some means to have the Romans know its power, first made those Fabii
err
who had gone as ambassadors to the Gauls, and through whose deeds excited
them
to make war against Rome: Afterward it ordained that, to reprimand them for
that
war, nothing should be done in Rome worthy of the Roman people, having first
ordained that Camillus, who alone could be the remedy for so much evil, was
sent
into exile at Ardea; afterwards when the Gauls were approaching Rome, those
people who had many times before created a Dictator in order to check the
attacks of the Volscians and other neighboring enemies, did not create one
when
the Gauls came. Also they were slow and without extraordinary diligence in
making their selection of soldiers, and were so slow in taking up arms, that
only with great effort were they in time to meet the Gauls on the river Allia,
ten miles distant from Rome. Here the Tribunes established their camp without
any of the customary diligence, without first examining the place, not
circumscribing it with ditches and palisades, and not using any human or
divine
remedy. And in the order of battle, they made the ranks open and weak, so
that
neither the soldiers nor the Captains did anything worthy of the Roman
discipline. They fought them without any bloodshed, for they fled before they
had been assaulted; and the greater part went off to Veii, the remainder
retreated to Rome, where they entered the Capitol without entering even their
own homes; so that the Senate with no thought of defending Rome ((any more
than
the others)) did not close its gates, (and) a part of them fled, another part
entered the Capitol with the others. In defending it (the Capitol), however,
they did employ some non-tumultuous methods, for they did not burden it with
useless people, they supplied it with all the grain they could so as to be
able
to endure a siege, and of the useless crowd of old men and women and
children,
the greater part fled to the surrounding towns, the rest remained in Rome a
prey
to the Gauls. So that whoever had read of the things done by that people so
many
years before, and then should read of the events of those times, could in no
way
believe that it was the same people. And T. Livius who had told us of all the
above mentioned troubles, concludes by saying: Fortune thus blinds the minds,
when she does not want them to resist her power.
Nor can this conclusion be more true. Whence men who ordinarily live in great
adversity or prosperity merit less praise or less blame, for most of the time
it
will be seen that they have been brought to ruin or to greatness by some
great
expedient which Heaven has caused, giving them the opportunity or depriving
them
of the ability to work with virtu. Fortune indeed does this, when she wants
to
bring some great things, she selects a man of much spirit and much virtu,
that
he will recognize those opportunities she offers. So too in the same way,
when
she wants to bring some great ruin, she promotes men who can do such ruin.
And
if anyone should be able to resist her, she either kills him or deprives him
of
all the faculties of being able to do any good. From this text it is to be
clearly recognized how fortune, in order to make Rome greater and bring her
to
that greatness that she arrived at, judged it was necessary to beat her ((as
will be discussed at length in the beginning of the next book)) but did not
want
to ruin her entirely. And because of this, it is seen that she caused
Camillus
to be exiled and not killed, caused Rome to be taken but not the Capitol,
ordained that the Romans should not think of any good thing in preparing Rome
(for the attack), but should not lack any good preparation for the defense of
the Capitol. She caused ((as Rome was to be taken)) that the greater part of
the
soldiers who were defeated at the Allia to go to Veii, and thus cut off all
means for the defense of the City of Rome. And yet in ordaining this, she
prepared everything for her recovery, having conducted an entire Roman army
to
Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, in order to be able to raise a large band under
a
Captain unstained by any ignominy of defeat and completely dedicated to the
recovery of his country.
We might cite some modern example in confirmation of the things mentioned
here,
but as I judge it unnecessary, ((this one being able to satisfy anyone)) I
shall
omit it. I indeed reaffirm this to be most true ((according as is seen from
all
histories)) that men can second fortune but not oppose her, they can develop
her
designs but not defeat them. They ought never to abandon themselves; because
not
knowing her aims, (and) the devious and unknown ways she takes, they always
have
hope; and in hoping, not to abandon themselves no matter in what (ill)
fortune
or trouble they find themselves.
CHAPTER XXX
TRULY POWERFUL REPUBLICS AND PRINCES DO NOT PURCHASE FRIENDSHIP WITH MONEY,
BUT
WITH VIRTU AND REPUTATION OF STRENGTH
The Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and although they awaited succor
from
Veii and from Camillus, being driven by hunger, they came to terms with the
Gauls to ransom themselves with a certain amount of gold, but while making
these
terms ((the gold already being weighed)) Camillus arrived with his army,
which
fortune caused ((as the historian says)) so that the Romans should not live
under an aura of ransom. Which occurrence not only is more noteworthy in this
instance, but more so in the course of events of this Republic, where it is
seen
that they never acquired lands by means of money, but always through the
virtu
of their army. Which I do not believe ever to have happened with any other
Republic.
And among the other signs by which the power of a State is recognized, is to
see
how it lives with its neighbors; and if it is governed in a way that the
neighbors ((so as to have them friendly)) are its pensioners, then it is a
certain sign that that State is powerful: But when these said neighbors
((although inferior to it)) draw money from it, then it is a great sign of
its
weakness. Let anyone read all the Roman histories and he will see that the
Massalians, the Aeduans, the Rhodians, Hiero the Syracusan, Eumene and the
Kings
of Massinissa, who all lived near to the confines of the Roman Empire, in
order
to have its friendship, agreed to contribute to its needs and expenses by
tribute, not seeking any other return from it than to be defended. On the
other
hand, it will be seen in weak States, and beginning with our own Florence in
times past in the period of her greatest reputation, that there was not a
petty
Lord in the Romagna who did not get a pension from her, and in addition she
gave
one to the Perugini, the Castellani, and all her other neighbors. But if this
City had been armed and strong, everything would have proceeded oppositely,
for
everyone in order to have her protection would have given money to her, and
sought, not to sell their friendship, but to purchase hers. Nor are the
Florentines to be seen alone in this baseness, but the Venetians and the King
of
France, who with so great a Kingdom lives tributary to the Swiss and the King
of
England. All of which resulted from having disarmed their people, and because
that King and the others mentioned above desired rather to enjoy a present
usefulness of being able to plunder the people, and to avoid an imaginary
rather
than a real peril, than to do things which would have assured them and made
their States happy in perpetuity. Such baseness, if it sometimes produces
some
quiet, is in times of necessity the cause of irreparable harm and ruin.
And it would be lengthy to recount how many times the Florentines, and the
Venetians, and this Kingdom (of France) have bought themselves off in wars,
and
how many times they subjected themselves to an ignominy to which the Romans
were
subjected only one time. It would be lengthy to recount how many lands the
Florentines and the Venetians have purchased, in which disorders were seen
afterwards, and that the things acquired with gold cannot be defended with
iron.
The Romans continued in this high-minded existence as long as they lived
free,
but when they came under the Emperors, and the Emperors commenced to be bad,
and
to love the shade more than the sun, they too begun to buy off now the
Parthians, now the Germans, now other neighboring peoples, which was the
beginning of the ruin of so great an Empire. Such troubles proceeded,
therefore,
from having disarmed its own people, from which an even greater evil results,
that the more the enemy comes near, so much more will he find you weak. For
whoever lives in the manner mentioned above, ill treats those subjects who
are
in the interior of his Empire so as to obtain men who can hold the enemy at
the
frontiers. From this there arises that to keep the enemy more distant he has
to
give subsidies to these Lords and peoples who are near their borders. Whence
there arises that these States so paid make a little resistance at their
frontiers, but as soon as the enemy has passed, they do not have any
advantage.
And they do not see that this mode of proceeding of theirs is against every
good
institution. For the heart and the vital parts of the body have to be kept
armored, and not its extremities, for without these it is possible to live,
but
when the former are injured, it is possible to die: And these States have
their
hearts unarmored but their hands and feet armored. The disorders which have
been
caused to Florence have been seen, and can be seen, every day, that as soon
as
an army passes the frontiers and enters near the heart, no further remedy is
to
be found. In the last few years the Venetians afforded similar proof, and if
their City had not been surrounded by water, their end would have been seen.
This experience has not often been seen in France because that Kingdom is so
great that it has few enemies who are superior. None the less, when the
English
in MDXIII (1513) assaulted that Kingdom, all that Province trembled, and the
King himself and everyone else believed that only one defeat would take away
the
State.
The contrary happened to the Romans, for the more the enemy approached Rome,
so
much more he found that City powerful to resist him. And it is seen in the
coming of Hannibal into Italy, that after three defeats and after so many
captains and soldiers were killed, they were able not only to sustain the
enemy,
but to win the war. All of which resulted from her having the heart well
armored
and holding little account of the extremities. For the foundation of their
State
was in the people of Rome, the Latin people, and the other lands allied in
Italy, and their Colonies, from which they drew so many soldiers sufficient
for
then to conquer and hold the world. And that this is true is seen from the
question that Hanno the Carthaginian put to those Ambassadors of Hannibal
after
the battle at Cannae, who having magnified the things done by Hannibal, were
asked by Hanno if anyone had come from the Roman people to ask for peace, and
if
any towns of the Latins or any of the Colonies had rebelled against the
Romans:
and when they replied negatively, Hanno replied; This war is yet as full as
before.
It will be seen therefore, both from this discussion and from what we have
said
elsewhere several times, how much difference there is in the proceedings of
present Republics from the ancient ones. Because of this every day are seen
astonishing losses and remarkable conquest, for where men have little virtu,
fortune greatly shows her power, and as she varies it, Republics and States
change often, and they will always change until there springs up one who is a
great lover of antiquity who is able to rule so that she has no reason at
every
revolution of the sun to show how powerful she can be.
CHAPTER XXXI
HOW DANGEROUS IT IS TO BELIEVE EXILES
And it does not appear to me to be foreign to this subject to discuss among
other matters how dangerous a thing it is to believe those who have been
driven
out of their country, these being matters that are acted upon each day by
those
who govern States; and I am especially able to demonstrate this by a
memorable
example given by T. Livius in his history, even though it may be outside his
subject. When Alexander the Great crossed with his army into Asia, Alexander
of
Epirus, his brother-in-law and uncle, came with his forces into Italy, having
been called there by the exiled Lucanians, who had given him the hope that he
could through their means occupy all that province. Whence he, upon their
faith
and hope, having come into Italy, was killed by them, because they had been
promised a return to their Country by the Citizens if they would kill him. It
ought to be considered, therefore, how vain are the faith and promises of
those
who find themselves deprived of their country. For, as to their faith, it has
to
be borne in mind that anytime they can return to their country by other means
than yours, they will leave you and look to the other, notwithstanding
whatever
promises they had made you. As to their vain hopes and promises, such is the
extreme desire in them to return home, that they naturally believe many
things
that are false and add many others by art, so that between those they believe
and those they say they believe, they fill you with hope, so that relying on
them you will incur expenses in vain, or you undertake an enterprise in which
you ruin yourself. The previously mentioned example of Alexander is enough
for
me, but in addition, that of Themistocles, the Athenian, who, having been
declared a rebel, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him so much if he
should want to assault Greece, that Darius turned to that enterprise.
Themistocles, not being able to observe these promises, he poisoned himself,
either from shame or from fear of punishment. And if this error was made by
Themistocles, a most excellent man, it ought to be considered how much more
those men err who, because of less virtu, allow themselves to be drawn by
their
desires and passions. A Prince, therefore, ought to go slowly in undertaking
an
enterprise upon the representations of an exile, for most of the times he
will
be left either with shame or very grave injury. And as the taking of towns
rarely succeeds by deceit or by intelligence others within may have, it does
not
appear outside the subject to discuss it in the following chapter, adding
some
account of how many ways the Romans acquired them.
CHAPTER XXXII
IN HOW MANY WAYS THE ROMANS OCCUPIED TOWNS
The Romans being very often at war, they always did so with every advantage,
both as to expense and as to every other thing that it required. From this
arose
the fact that they guarded against the taking of towns by siege, as they
judged
this method to be of such an expense and so much trouble that it surpassed by
far any usefulness that they could draw from the acquisition: and because of
this they thought that it would be better and more useful to subjugate a town
by
any other means than besieging it: whence there are very few examples of
sieges
made by them in so many wars and in so many years. Their mode of taking
Cities,
therefore, was either by assault or by voluntary surrender. The capture by
assault was either by force or by open violence, or by force mixed with
fraud:
the open violence was either by assault without piercing the walls ((which
they
called attacking the city in crown fashion)) because they surrounded the City
with the entire army, as when Scipio took New Carthage in Spain; or if this
assault was not enough they addressed themselves to breeching the walls with
rams or with other machines of war of theirs; or they made a mine and by
means
of it entered the City, by which method they took the City from the Veienti:
or
in order to be at the same level with those who defended the walls, they made
towers of wood: or they made embankments of earth placed against the outside
of
the walls in order to come to a height above them. In the first case those
who
were defending the towns against these assaults were exposed to the greatest
peril quickly from being assaulted on all sides and had the greatest doubts
of
being able to remedy this, because they needed to have many defenders in
every
place, (and) those they had were not numerous enough to be able to substitute
for or relieve those in every place, or if they were able to do so, they were
not all of equal courage to resist; and if the fight was lost on any one
side,
all the rest were lost. It happened, therefore, ((as I have said)) that this
mode (of assault) many times was a happy success. But if it did not succeed
at
the first (try), they did not repeat it much, as it was a dangerous method
for
the army, for defending themselves over so much space, everything was left
weak
so as to be unable to resist a sortie that those inside might make, and also
it
would fatigue the soldiers and cause disorder: so that they attempted this
method only one time and by surprise. As to the breaking down of walls, it
was
opposed as in the present time by repairs; and to resist the mines they made
counter mines, and through which they opposed the enemy either with arms or
other means, among which was this that they filled barrels with feathers
which
they set on fire while burning they put them into the mine, so that the smoke
and the smell impeded the entrance to the enemy: and if they assaulted them
with
towers, they endeavored to ruin them by fire. And as to earth embankments,
they
broke the wall down where the embankment leaned against it, drawing inside
the
earth which those outside were heaping, so that placing earth outside and
taking
it away from inside, the embankment did not grow. These means of attack
cannot
be attempted for long, and (if not successful) the siege must be abandoned
and
other means sought to win the war, as did Scipio, when he entered Attica,
having
assaulted Utica and not succeeding in taking it, he betook himself from the
field and sought to break the Carthaginian army, or rather to turn to
(regular)
sieges as he did at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and similar towns which
they occupied by sieges.
As to the acquisition of towns by stealth and violence, ((as happened at
Palepolis, where the Romans occupied it by treating secretly with those
within))
this kind of conquest was tried by the Romans and many others, but few
succeeded: the reason is, that every least impediment disrupts the design,
and
impediments come easily. For the conspiracy is discovered before the deed
happens, which is done without much difficulty, as much from the treachery of
those to whom it is communicated, as from the difficulty of carrying it out,
having to come together with enemies or under some pretext with those with
whom
it is not permitted to speak. But if the conspiracy is not discovered in its
progress, then thousand difficulties spring up in putting it into execution.
For
if you arrive before the designated time or if you arrive after, everything
is
spoiled. If a furtive noise is raised, as the geese at the Capitol, if a
customary order is broken, every least least error and every least fault
made,
will ruin the enterprise. Added to this is the darkness of the night which
puts
more fear into those who are engaged in those dangerous things. And the
greater
part of men who are engaged in similar enterprises being unacquainted with
the
situation of the country or the places where they are sent, are confounded,
become afraid, and will turn back at every least unforeseen accident. And
every
false imagining acts to make them put themselves in flight. Nor has anyone
ever
been found who was more successful in these fraudulent and nocturnal
expeditions
than Aratus of Sicyon, who was as valiant in these as he was pusillanimous in
expeditions carried out openly and in daylight. Which can be attributed
rather
to some occult virtu which he possessed, than to any natural faculty in
achieving success. Of these attempts, many are projected, few are put to the
test, and very few succeed.
As to the acquisition of Towns through surrender, they give up either
voluntarily, or by force. The willingness arises either from some extrinsic
necessity that constrains them to find refuge under you, as did Capua to the
Romans, or from the desire to be well governed, being attracted by the good
government which that Prince bestows on those who have voluntarily placed
themselves in his arms, as were the Rhodians, the Massileans, and other such
Citizens, who gave themselves to the Roman People. As to forced surrenders,
this
force results either from a long siege ((as was said above)), or from a
continuous pressure from incursions, depredations, and other ill treatment;
which in wanting to avoid, a City surrenders. Of all the methods mentioned,
the
Romans employed this last more than any others, and during more than four
hundred and fifty years of harassing their neighbors with routs and
incursions,
and then by means of accords obtained reputation over them, as we have
discussed
at another time. And they always relied on this method, even though they
tried
all others, which they found more dangerous or useless. For in a siege it is
the
length of time and expense; in open assault it is doubtful and dangerous; in
a
conspiracy it is uncertitude. And they (the Romans) saw that by one rout of
an
enemy army they acquired a Kingdom in a day, but in taking an obstinate City
by
siege, they consumed many.
CHAPTER XXXIII
HOW THE ROMANS GAVE THEIR CAPTAINS OF ARMIES UNCONTROLLED COMMISSIONS
I think that ((reading this history of Livius and wanting to profit)) all the
methods of procedure of the Roman People and Senate should be considered. And
among other things that merit consideration, is to see with what authority
they
sent out their Consuls, Dictators, and other Captains of armies; from which
it
is seen that the authority was very great, as the Senate did not reserve to
itself anything other than the authority to declare new wars, to confirm
peace
(treaties), and left everything else to the arbitration power of the Consul.
For
once a war was decided on by the People and the Senate ((for instance against
the Latins)) they remitted all the rest to the discretion of the Consul, who
could either make an engagement or not make it, and lay siege to this or that
town as seemed proper to him. Which things are verified by many examples, and
especially by that which occurred in the expedition against the Tuscans. For
Fabius, the Consul, having defeated them near Sutrium, and planning
afterwards
to pass with the army through the Ciminian forest and go to Tuscany, not only
did not counsel with the Senate, but did not even give them any notice, even
though war was to be waged in a new unknown, and dangerous country. Further
witness of this is given by the decisions which were made by the Senate on
learning of this, who, when they had heard of the victory Fabius had won, and
fearful that he might take up the proceeding of passing through the said
forest
into Tuscany, judging that it would not be well to attempt that (war) and run
that risk, sent Legates to Fabius to make him understand he should not cross
into Tuscany; but when they arrived he had already crossed over, and had
obtained this victory, so that in place of being impeders of the war, they
returned as messengers of the conquest and the glory that was obtained.
And whoever considers well this method will see it is most prudently
employed,
for if the Senate had wanted the Consul to proceed in the war from hand to
hand
according to that which they committed to him, they would have made him (Fabius)
less circumspect and more slow; for it would not have seemed to him that the
glory of the battle should be all his, but as being shared by the Senate, by
whose counsels he had been governed. In addition to this the Senate would
have
obligated itself to want to advise on a matter that they could not have
understood; for notwithstanding that there many of them who were men most
expert
in war, none the less not being in that place, and not knowing the infinite
particulars that are necessary to be known to want to counsel well, infinite
errors ((by counselling)) would have been made. And because of this, they
wanted
the Consul to make decisions by himself and that the glory should be all his,
the love of which they judged should be a restraint as well as a rule in
making
him conduct himself well.
This part is more willingly noted by me, because I see that the Republics of
present times, as the Venetian and the Florentine, have understood it
otherwise,
and if their Captains, Providers, or Commissioners have to place (a battery
of)
artillery, they want to know and counsel about it. Which system merits the
same
praise as (their conduct) in other things merit, which all together have
brought
about the conditions that are found at present.
THIRD BOOK
TO WANT THAT A SECT OR A REPUBLIC EXIST FOR LONG, IT IS NECESSARY TO RETURN
THEM OFTEN TO THEIR PRINCIPLES
It is a most true thing that all the things of the world have to have an
ending to their existence. But these only run the entire course that is
generally ordained by Heaven, which does not disorganize their body, but keeps
it so organized that it is not changed, or if it is changed, it is for its
welfare and not its injury. And as I speak here of mixed bodies, as are
Republics and (Religious) Sects, I say that those changes are for the better
which bring them back to their (original) principles. And, therefore, those are
better organized and have a longer existence, which through their own means are
able frequently to renew themselves, or which through some accident outside the
said organization come to that renewal. And it is something clearer than light,
that these bodies which do not renew themselves, do not endure. The means of
renewing them ((as has been said)), is to bring them back to their (original)
principles. For all the principles of Sects and Republics and of Kingdoms must
have within themselves some goodness, by means of which they obtain their first
reputation and first expansion. And as in the process of time that goodness
becomes corrupted, of necessity it will kill the body, unless something
intervenes to bring it back to the sign (normality). And Doctors of medicine say
((speaking of the bodies of men)): Every day something is gathered, and when
it is ill, it must be cured.
This turning back to principles ((speaking of Republics)) is caused either by
an extrinsic accident or by an intrinsic prudence. As to the first, it is seen
how necessary it was that Rome should be taken by the Gauls to want to be
reborn, and being reborn should resume a new life and a new virtu, and should
resume the observance of Religion and Justice, which were beginning to blemish
themselves in her. This is very well known from the history of Livius, where he
shows that in calling out the army against the Gauls, and in creating the
Tribunes with Consular power, they did not observe any religious ceremony. Thus
in the same way they not only did not deprive the Fabii (of their rank), who, contrary
to the law of nations, had fought against the Gauls, but created them
Tribunes. And it ought easily to be presupposed that they had begun to hold in
less account those good institutions established by Romulus and those other
prudent Princes, than what was reasonable and necessary to keep their liberty.
This blow from the outside had to come, therefore, so that all the institutions
of that City should be resumed, and that it should be shown to those people that
it was not only necessary to maintain Religion and Justice, but also to esteem
their good Citizens, and to take more account of their virtu than of that
convenience which, because of their work, seemed to be lacking to them. Which is
seen succeeded entirely, for as soon as Rome was retaken they renewed all the
institutions of their ancient Religion, punished the Fabii who had fought against
the law of nations, and then esteemed highly the virtu and goodness of
Camillus that the Senate and the others put aside all envy, placing again on him
all the burden of this Republic.
It is necessary, therefore, ((as has been said)) that men who live together
in some kind of organization, often know each other either by these external
incidents, or by internal ones. And as to these latter, it happens that they
arise either from a law which often reviews the conduct of the men who are in
that body, or truly by some good man who arises amongst them, who by his example
and his deeds of virtu causes the same effect as that institution. This good
then springs up in Republics either from the virtu of one man or from the virtu
of one institution. As to the latter, the institutions that returned the Roman
Republic back to its (original) principles was the Tribunes of the Plebs, and
all the other laws that curbed the ambitions and insolence of men. Which
institutions have need to be kept alive by the virtu of one Citizen who will
courageously take part in their execution against the power of those who
transgress them.
The most notable examples of such execution of the laws, before the taking of
Rome by the Gauls, were the death of the sons of Brutus, the death of the ten
Citizens (Decemvirs), and that of Melius, the grain dealer; and after the taking
of Rome were the death of Manlius Capitolinus, the death of the son of Manlius
Torquatus, the punishment inflicted by Papirius Cursor on Fabius, his Master of
Cavalry, and the accusation of Scipio. As these were the extreme and most
notable examples, each time one arose, it caused the people to turn back to
their principles; and when they began to be more rare, they begun also to give
men more latitude in becoming corrupt, and the carrying out of the laws was done
with more danger and more tumults. So that from one such execution to another,
no more than ten years should elapse, for beyond this time men begin to change
their customs and transgress the laws; and unless something arises which recalls
the punishment to their memory, and revives the fear in their minds, so many
delinquents will soon come together that they cannot any longer be punished
without danger.
In connection with this subject, those who governed the State of Florence,
from the year one thousand four hundred thirty four (1434) until the year one
thousand four hundred ninety four (1494) said that it was necessary to resume
the government every five years, otherwise it would be difficult to maintain it:
and they called "the resuming of the government" to put the same fear
and terror in men as they had done in the assuming of it, having in that time
punished those who ((according to that mode of living)) had conducted themselves
badly. But as the memory of that punishment fades, men become bold to try new
things and speak ill of it (the government), and therefore it is necessary to
provide against this, by bringing (the government) back to its original
principles. This return of Republics back to their principles also results from
the simple virtu of one man, without depending on any law that excites him to
any execution: none the less, they are of such influence and example that good
men desire to imitate him, and the wicked are ashamed to lead a life contrary to
those examples. Those particularly, who in Rome produced these good results,
were Horatius Codes, Scaevola, Fabricus, the two Decii, Regulus Attilius, and
some others, who by their rare examples of virtu produced almost the same effect
in Rome that laws and institutions would have done. And if the above executions,
together with these particular examples had been followed at least every ten
years in that City, it would have followed of necessity that it would never have
been corrupt: but as they caused both these things to become rare, corruption
began to multiply, for, after Marcus Regulus, no similar example is seen: and
although the two Cato's had sprung up in Rome, so great was the interval between
him (Regulus) and them, and between the one and the other (Cato), and they were
so isolated instances, that they could not effect any good work by their good
examples. And especially the later Cato, who, finding the City in good part
corrupt, was not able by his example to make the Citizens become better. And
this is enough as regards Republics.
But as to the Sects, such renewal is also seen to be necessary by the
examples of our religion, which, if it had not been brought back to its
principles by Saint Francis and Saint Dominic, would have been entirely
extinguished: for by their poverty and by their example of the life of Christ,
brought it back to the minds of men where it had already been extinguished; and
their new orders were so powerful, that they were the reason why the dishonesty
of Prelates and the Heads of the Religion did not ruin her; they yet continue to
live in poverty and have so much credit with the people through confessions and
preachings, that they were able to make them understand that it was evil to
speak evil of the bad, and that it was good to live rendering them obedience,
and if they had made errors to leave their punishment to God. And thus these bad
(rulers) do as much evil as they can, because they do not fear that punishment
they do not see or believe. This renewal (of Saint Francis and Saint Dominic)
therefore has maintained and still maintains this Religion. Kingdoms also have
need to renew themselves and bring their laws back to first principles. And it
is seen how much good resulted from such a renewal in the Kingdom of France,
which Kingdom exists under laws and ordinances more than any other Kingdom. The
Parliaments are the maintainers of these laws and ordinances, and especially
that of Paris; (and) these are renewed by them at any time by an execution
against a Prince of that Kingdom, and at times even by condemning the King in
some of his decisions. And up to now it has maintained itself because it has
been an obstinate executor against that nobility: but if at any time they should
allow some (disorder) to go on with impunity, and which would then come to be
multiplied, and without doubt there would result either that the (evildoers)
would be corrected with (accompanying) great disorders, or that the Kingdom
itself would be dissolved.
I conclude, therefore, that there is nothing more necessary in a community of
men, either as a Sect, or Kingdom, or Republic, than to restore it to that
reputation that it had at its beginning, and to endeavor to obtain either good
ordinances or good men to bring about such a result, and not to have an
extrinsic force do it. For although some time this may be the best remedy, as it
was at Rome, it is so dangerous that it is in no way desirable. But to show to
anyone how much the actions of some men in particular had made Rome great and
caused many good results in that City, I shall come to the narration and
discussion of them, among the objects of which this third book and last part of
the first Ten (Books) will be concluded. And although the actions of the Kings
were great and notable, none the less, as history treats of them fully, we will
leave them aside, nor otherwise speak of them, except where some of the things
worked openly for their private advantage, and we shall begin with Brutus, the
father of Roman liberty.
HOW AT TIMES IT IS A VERY WISE THING TO SIMULATE MADNESS
No one was ever so prudent, or was esteemed so wise for any singular deed of
his, as Junius Brutus merited to be esteemed for his simulation of foolishness.
And although Titus Livius did not mention but one reason that had induced him to
such simulation, which was that he might be able to live in greater security and
maintain his patrimony, none the less, considering his method of proceeding, it
can be believed that he had simulated this also in order to be less observed and
to have greater opportunity to attack the Kings, and liberate his country
whenever he should be given the occasion. And that he should think of this, is
seen, first, in his interpretation of the oracle of Apollo, when he simulated
falling down to kiss the earth, judging by that to propitiate the Gods to his
thoughts; and afterwards, when on the occasion of the death of Lucretia, in the
midst of the father and husband and other relatives of hers, he was the first to
draw the knife from the wound, and make all those around there swear that they
should henceforth suffer no one to reign (as King) in Rome.
From this example, all who are discontent with a Prince have to learn that
they first ought to weigh and measure their strength, and if they are so
powerful that they can declare themselves his enemies and openly make war
against him, they ought to employ this method that is less dangerous and more
honorable. But if they are of a kind that their strength is not sufficient to
make open war on him, they ought with all industry to seek to make him a friend,
and to this purpose employ all the means they deem necessary, adopting his
pleasures and taking delight in all those things that come to delight him. This
intimacy will first enable you to live securely and without bringing on any
danger, it makes you enjoy the good fortune of that Prince with him, and will
afford you every convenience to satisfy your spirit (of resentment). It is true
that some say that one should not keep so close to Princes that their ruin
should encompass you, or so distant that if they are ruined, you should not be
long in rising on their ruin; which middle course would be the truest if it
could be preserved: but as I. believe that is impossible, it must come to the
two methods mentioned above, that is, to get away from or come closer to them:
who does otherwise, and is a man notable for his quality, lives in continuous
danger. Nor is it enough for him to say, I do not care for anything, I do not
desire honors or profit, I want to live quietly and without trouble, for these
excuses are heard and not accepted: nor can men of such quality elect their own
way of living, (and) if they could elect it truly and without ambition, they
would not be believed: so that if they wanted to live in that manner, they would
not be allowed to do so by others.
It is advantageous, therefore, to play the fool as Brutus did, and one is
made to be very foolish by praising, talking, seeing and doing things contrary
to your thinking, to please the Prince. And as I have not spoken of the prudence
of this man in recovering the liberty of Rome, we will now speak of his severity
in maintaining it.
HOW IT WAS NECESSARY, IN WANTING TO MAINTAIN THE NEWLY ACQUIRED LIBERTY, TO
KILL THE SONS OF BRUTUS
The severity of Brutus was no less necessary than useful in maintaining that
liberty in Rome which she had acquired; which is an example rare in all the
record of history to see a father to sit in judgment, and not only condemn his
sons to death, but to be present at their deaths. And this will always be known
by those who read ancient history, that after a change of State, either from a
Republic to a Tyranny, or from a Tyranny to a Republic, a memorable execution
against the enemies of the existing conditions is necessary. And whoever
restores liberty to a State and does not kill Brutus, and whoever restores
liberty to a State and does not kill the sons of Brutus, maintains himself only
a short time. And as this has been discussed at length in another place above, I
refer to what has already been said there: I will cite only one memorable
example which has occurred in our times and in our country. And this is that of
Piero Soderini, who believed with his patience and goodness that he would be
able to overcome that same determination that was in the sons of Brutus to
return to another form of government, and he was deceived: And although because
of his prudence he recognized this necessity, and that chance and their ambition
which drove them, gave them the opportunity to destroy themselves, none the less
his courage never allowed him to do it. For he thought, in addition to his
belief of being able to dispel the bad disposition with patience and goodness,
and to consume some of the enmity of someone by rewards ((and many times he had
done so with faithful friends)) that to want boldly to drive out his opposition
and beat down his adversaries, it would oblige him to assume extraordinary
authority and legally destroy civil equality. Which thing ((even though it
should not afterward be used tyrannically by him)) would have so terrified the
general public, that after his death they would never again agree to reelect a
Gonfalonier for life: which institution he judged was good for strengthening and
maintaining the government. Which respect (for the laws) was wise and good: none
the less one ought never to allow an evil to run on out of regard for a good,
when that good could easily be suppressed by that evil: And he ought to bear in
mind that his deeds and his intentions should have to be judged by the results
((if fortune and life would stay with him)), that he could certify to everyone
that that which he had done was for the welfare of the country, and not from him
ambition; and he could have regulated things in a way that a successor of his
could not be able to do by evil means that which he had done for good. But the
first opinion deceived him, not knowing that malignity is not subdued by time,
nor placated by any gift. So that by not knowing how to imitate Brutus, he lost
at the same time his country, his State, and his reputation.
And as it is a difficult thing to save a republic, so it is difficult to save
a Monarchy, as will be shown in the following chapter.
A PRINCE DOES NOT LIVE SECURELY IN A PRINCIPALITY WHILE THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN
DESPOILED OF IT LIVE
The death of Tarquinius Priscus caused by the sons of Ancus, and the death of
Servius Tullus caused by Tarquinius Superbus, shows how difficult and perilous
it is to despoil one of a Kingdom, and leave him alive, even though he should
seek to win him over to himself by benefits. And it will be seen how Tarquinius
Priscus was deceived by the seemingly legal possession of that Kingdom, it
having been given to him by the people and confirmed by the Senate. Nor could he
believe that the sons of Ancus could have so much resentment that they would not
be content with him (as ruler), of whom all Rome was content. And Servius Tullus
deceived himself believing he could win over to himself the sons of Tarquin by
new benefits. So that, as to the first, every Prince can be advised that he will
never live securely in his Principality so long as those live who have been
despoiled (of their possessions). As to the second, it should remind every
potentate that old injuries were never cancelled by new benefits, and so much
less if the new benefit is less that the injury inflicted. And without doubt
Servius Tullus was little prudent to believe that the sons of Tarquinius would
be content to be the sons-in-law of him, when they judged they ought to be the
Kings. And this desire to reign is so great, that it not only enters the hearts
of those who expect to inherit the Kingdom, but even to those who do not have
such expectation: as existed in the wife of Tarquin the younger, daughter of
Servius, who, moved by this rabidness, against every filial piety, set her
husband against his father to take away his life and kingdom, so much more did
the esteem to be a Queen than a daughter to a King. If, therefore, Tarquinius
Priscus and Servius Tullus lost the kingdom by not knowing how to secure
themselves from those whose (thrones) they had usurped, Tarquinius Superbus lost
it by not observing the institution of the ancient Kings, as will be shown in
the following chapter.
THAT WHICH MAKES A KING LOSE THE KINGDOM THAT WAS INHERITED BY HIM
Tarquinius Superbus having killed Servius Tullus, and the latter not leaving
any heirs, he (Tarquinius) came to possess the kingdom with security, not having
to fear those things which had harmed his predecessors. And although the manner
of his occupying the kingdom was irregular and odious, none the less had he
observed the ancient institutions of the other Kings, he would have been
tolerated, and the Senate and Plebs would never have arisen against him and
taken the State away from him. This man, therefore, was not driven out because
of his son Sextus having violated Lucretia, but for having broken the laws and
governed it (his Kingdom) tyrannically; having taken away all authority from the
Senate and assumed it himself, and those funds which were marked for public
improvements with which the Roman Senate was satisfied, he diverted to the
building of his own palace, with disgust and envy for him resulting. So that in
a very short time, he despoiled Rome of all that liberty which she had
maintained under the other previous Kings. And it was not enough for him to make
the Fathers (Senators) his enemies, but he aroused the Plebs against himself,
working them hard in mechanical labor and all unlike those which his
predecessors had employed. So that by having filled Rome with such cruel and
haughty examples of his, he had already disposed the minds of all the Romans to
rebellion whenever they should have the opportunity. And if the incident of
Lucretia had not happened, even so another would have arisen which would have
produced the same result: For if Tarquin had lived like the other Kings and his
son Sextus had not made that error, Brutus and Collatinus would have had
recourse to Tarquin for vengeance against Sextus, and to the Roman People.
Princes should understand, therefore, that they begin to lose the State from
that hour when they begin to break the laws and ancient institutions under which
men have lived for a long time. And if as private citizens, having lost the
State, they should ever become so prudent to see with what facility
Principalities are kept by those who are counselled wisely, they would regret
their loss much more, and would condemn themselves to greater punishment than
that to which others have condemned them: For it is much more easy to be loved
by the good than the bad, and to obey the laws then to enforce them. And in
wanting to learn the course that they should have to hold to do this, they do
not have to endure any other hardship than to mirror for themselves the lives of
good Princes, such as Timoleon the Corinthian, Aratus the Sicyonian, and similar
ones, in the lives of whom they would find as much security and satisfaction to
him who ruled as to he who is ruled; so that they ought to want to imitate him,
being able to do so for the reasons mentioned: For men when they are well
governed, do not seek or desire any other liberty; as happened to the people
governed by the above named (Princes), whom they constrained to be Princes as
long as they lived, even though they often had been tempted to return to private
life.
And as in this and the two preceding chapters, there has been discussed the
dispositions aroused against Princes, and of the Conspiracy made by the sons of
Brutus against their country, and of those made against Tarquinius Priscus and
Servius Tullus, it does not appear to me to be something outside this subject to
speak at length of them in the following chapter, being a matter worthy of being
noted by Princes and Private Citizens.
OF CONSPIRACIES
And it does not appear proper to me to omit the discussion of Conspiracies,
being a matter of so much danger to Princes and Private Citizens. For it is seen
that many more Princes have lost their lives and States through them, than by
open war. For it is conceded only to a few to be able to make open war against a
Prince, but the ability to conspire against them is conceded to everyone. On the
other hand, private citizens do not enter in an enterprise more perilous nor
more foolhardy than this, as it is difficult and most dangerous in all of its
parts. Whence it happens that many are attempted, and very few have the desired
ending. So that, therefore, Princes may learn to guard themselves from these
dangers, and that Private Citizens may less rashly engage in them, and rather
may learn to live contentedly under the Rule that has been assigned to them by
chance and by their state, I shall speak widely, not omitting any notable case,
in documenting the one and the other. And truly that sentence of Cornelius
Tacitus is golden, which says that men have to honor things past but obey the
present, and ought to desire good Princes, but tolerate the ones they have. And
truly, whoever does otherwise, most of the time will ruin himself and his
country.
We ought, therefore, ((in entering on this matter)) to consider first against
whom conspiracies are made, and we will find them to be made either against a
country or against a Prince. It is of these two that I want us to discuss at
present; for those which are made to give a town over to the enemy who besiege
it, or that have some reason similar to this, have been talked about above
sufficiently. And in this first part we shall treat of that against a Prince,
and first we will examine the reasons for it, which are many, but there is one
which is more important than all the others: and this is his being hated by the
general public; for in the case of that Prince who has aroused this universal
hatred, it is reasonable (to suppose) that there are some particular individuals
who have been injured by him more (then others) and who desire to avenge
themselves. This desire of theirs is increased by that universal ill disposition
that they see is aroused against him. A Prince ought therefore to avoid these
public charges, but I do not want to talk here ((having treated of this
elsewhere)) of what he should do to avoid them. For by guarding himself against
this (hatred), the simple offenses against particular individuals will make less
war against him: One, because rarely is a man met who thinks so much of an
injury that he will put himself in so much danger to avenge it: The other, even
if they should be of a mind and power to do so, they are held back by that
universal benevolence that they see the Prince to have. Injuries that happen to
an individual are of Possessions (taking them from him), of Blood (physical
injury), or of Honor. Of those of Blood, threats are most dangerous, and there
is no peril in the execution, because he who is dead cannot think of vengeance,
and those who remain alive most of the time leave such thoughts to the dead: but
he who is threatened, and sees himself constrained by necessity either to act or
to suffer, becomes a most dangerous man for the Prince, as we shall relate in
detail in its place. Outside of this necessity, those (injuries) of Possession
and Honor, are matters that harm men more than any other offense, and against
which the Prince ought to guard himself, for he can never despoil one so much
that he does not leave a mind obstinate to vengeance. And of (injuries) of
honor, that are inflicted on men, that against their women is most important,
and after that, insult to their person. This (kind of injury) armed Pausanias
against Phillip of Macedonia: this has armed many others against many other
Princes: and in our times, Julio Belanti would not have set in motion a
conspiracy against Pandolfo, Tyrant of Siena, except that the latter had given
him a daughter for his wife, and then took her away, as we will relate in its
place. The major cause that made the Pazzi conspire against the Medici, was the
inheritance of Giovanni Borromei, which was taken from the former by the latter.
There is another reason, and a very great one, which makes men conspire
against a Prince, (and) that is the desire to liberate the country which has
been occupied by him. This reason moved Brutus and Cassius against Caesar: this
moved many others against the Falari, the Dionysii, and other occupiers of their
countries. Nor can any Tyrant guard himself from this disposition, except by
giving up the Tyrancy. And because none are found who will do this, few are
found who do not come to an evil end; whence there arose this verse of
Juvenal's:
Few kings descend to the family place of Ceres
Without wounds and slaughter, and in this way tyrants die.
The dangers incurred in Conspiracies ((as I said above)) are great, being
incurred at all times: for in such cases there is danger run in plotting it, in
its execution, and after it has been executed. Those who conspire may be alone,
or may be more than one. The one cannot be said to be a Conspiracy, but is a
firm disposition rising in a man to kill the Prince. This alone, of the three
dangers that Conspiracies run, lacks the first, because it does not carry any
danger before the execution; since no others have his secret, there is no danger
that his design will be carried to the ears of the Prince. Such a decision
(plot) can be made by any man, of whatever sort, small or great, noble or
ignoble, familiar or not, familiar with the Prince: for it is permitted to
everyone at some time to talk to him, and to him who is permitted to talk it is
allowed to give vent to his feelings. Pausanias, of whom was spoken at another
place, killed Phillip of Macedonia who was going to the Temple surrounded by a
thousand armed men, and between his son and son-in-law: but that man was a Noble
and known to the Prince. A poor and abject Spaniard stabbed King Ferrando of
Spain in the neck: the wound was not mortal, but from this it is seen that that
man had the courage and opportunity to do it. A Turkish Dervish priest drew a
scimitar on Bajazet, the father of the present Grand Turk: he did not wound him,
but he too had the courage and the opportunity to have done it, if he wanted to.
Of these spirits thusly constituted, I believe many could be found who would do
such a thing ((as there is no danger or punishment in wanting to do so)) but few
who do it. But of those who do, there are none or very few who are not killed in
the deed.
But let us go from these plots by single individuals, and let us come to the
Conspiracies formed by the many. I say that in history it is to be found that
all the conspiracies were made by great men, or those most familiar with the
Prince: for others, unless they are completely mad, are not able to conspire,
that men of weak condition and not familiar with the Prince lack all that hope
and opportunities that are needed for the execution of a conspiracy: First, weak
men cannot be sure of the faith of accomplices, as no one will enter into their
plot without having those hopes which cause men to expose themselves to great
dangers, so that as (the conspirators) are increased to two or three persons,
they find an accuser and ruin them: but even if they were so lucky that such an
accuser would not be found, they are surrounded by such difficulties in the
execution ((from not having an easy access to the Prince)) that it is impossible
that they are not ruined in its execution. For if great men and those who have
easy access are oppressed by those difficulties that will be described below, it
will happen that to the others those difficulties will increase without end.
Men, therefore, ((because where life and property are at stake, they are not all
insane)) when they see themselves weak guard themselves from them; and when they
have cause for harming a Prince, attend to vilifying him, and wait for those who
are more powerful than they who will avenge them. And if it should ever be found
that any such as these should have attempted such an undertaking, they should be
lauded for their intentions and not their prudence.
It will be seen, therefore, that those who have conspired are all great men,
or familiars of the Prince. Of the many who have conspired, as many were moved
thusly by too many benefits as by too many injuries; as was that of Perennius
against Commodus, Plautianus against Severus, and of Sejanus against Tiberius.
All of these men were loaded by their Emperors with so many riches, honors, and
dignities, that it seemed nothing was wanting to them for the perfection of
their power other than the Empire, and not wanting to be lacking this, they set
themselves to conspire against the Prince, but their conspiracies all had that
ending which their ingratitude merited. Although one of these was seen in recent
times to have had a good ending, that of Giacopo D'Appiano against Messer Piero
Gambacorti, Prince of Pisa, this Giacopo had been raised and nourished and given
reputation by him, afterwards took away his State. Of this kind, in our times,
was that of Coppola against King Ferrando of Aragon; this Coppola had come to
such greatness that it seemed he lacked nothing except the Kingdom, (and) in
wanting this, however, he lost his life. And truly if any conspiracy made by
great men against a Prince ought to have succeeded, it should have been this, as
it was made by another King, so to speak, and one who had so great an
opportunity to fulfil his desire: but that cupidity for domination which blinds
them, also blinds them in the managing of their enterprise, for if they should
know how to accomplish this evil with prudence, it would be impossible for them
not to succeed. A Prince, therefore, who wants to guard himself from
Conspiracies ought to fear more those men to whom he has given too many
benefits, than those to whom he had caused too many injuries. For these latter
lack the opportunity, the former abound in them; and the desire is the same,
because the desire of dominating is as great or greater than is that of
vengeance. They ought never, therefore, give so much authority to their friends,
but that a distance should exist between them and the Principate, and that there
should be something left (in the middle) for them to desire; otherwise it will
be a rare occasion if it will not happen to them as to the above mentioned
Princes.
But let us return to our subject. I say that they who conspire having to be
great men and have easy access to the Prince, it remains to be discussed what
successes there have been of their enterprises, and to see what were the causes
which made them happy or unhappy. And ((as I have said above)) in all these
conspiracies, there are to be found three dangerous periods of time; before,
during, and after the fact. Few are found, however, which have had good endings,
that it is almost impossible that all should have passed through (the first
period) happily. And in beginning to discuss the dangers of the first period,
which are the most important, I say that there is need to be very prudent and
have great good fortune, that in conducting a conspiracy, it not be discovered
(at this stage). And they are discovered either by (someone) telling or by
conjecture. The telling results from finding little faith or little prudence in
the men to whom you have communicated it: the little faith (treachery) is so
commonly found, that you cannot communicate it (the conspiracy) except to your
trusted ones who, for love of you, risk their own deaths, or to those men who
are discontent with the Prince. Of such trusted ones, one or two may be found,
but as you extend this, it is impossible that many will be found. Moreover,
there is good need that the good will they bear you is so great that the plot
does not appear to them greater than the danger and fear greater than the
punishment: also most of the times men are deceived by the love they judge
others have for them, nor can they ever be sure of this except from experience;
and to have such experience in this is most dangerous: and even if you should
have had experience in some other dangerous occasion, where they had been
faithful to you, you can not by that faith measure this one, as this one
surpasses by far all other kinds of danger. If you measure this faith from the
discontent which a man has toward the Prince, you can be easily deceived in
this: because as soon as you have opened your mind to that malcontent, you give
him material to content himself, and to keep him faithful, his hate (for the
Prince) must be very great or your authority (over him) must be greater. From
this, it has followed that many (conspiracies) have been revealed and crushed in
their very beginning, and that if one has been kept secret among many men for
along time, it is held to be a miraculous thing; as was that of Piso against
Nero, and in our times, that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano De'Medici,
of which more than fifty thousand were cognizant, and which waited until its
execution to be discovered.
As to being discovered because of little prudence, this occurs when a
conspiracy is talked about with little caution, so that a servant or other third
person learns of it, as happened to the sons of Brutus, who in arranging the
plot with the legates of Tarquin were overheard by a slave who accused them; or
when from thoughtlessness it comes to be communicated to a woman or a child whom
you love, or to some similar indiscreet person, as did Dinnus, one of the
conspirators with Philotas against Alexander the Great, who communicated the
conspiracy to Nicomachus, a young boy loved by him, who quickly told it to his
brother Ciballinus, and Ciballinus to the King. As to being discovered by
conjecture, there is for an example the conspiracy of Piso against Nero, in
which Scevinus, one of the conspirators, the day before he was to kill Nero,
made his testament, ordered that Melichus his freedman should sharpen an old
rusty dagger of his, freed all his slaves and gave them money, and caused
bandages to be ordered for tying up wounds: by means of which conjectures,
Melichus ascertained the plot, and accused him to Nero. Scevinus was taken, and
with him Natales, another conspirator, with whom he had been seen talking the
day before in secret and for a long time; and the reasons given (by each) not
being in accord, they were forced to confess the truth, so that the Conspiracy
was discovered to the ruin of all the conspirators. It is impossible to guard
oneself from this cause of discovery of Conspiracies, as it will be discovered
by the accomplices through malice, through imprudence, or through
thoughtlessness, whenever they exceed three or four in number. And as soon as
more than one is taken, it is impossible for it not to be discovered, for two
cannot agree together in all their statements. If only one of them is taken who
is a strong man, he can with his courage and firmness remain silent on (the
names of) the conspirators; but then it behooves the other conspirators not to
have less firmness and courage, and not to discover it by their flight, for if
courage be wanting on any side, either by he who is arrested or he who is free,
the conspiracy is discovered. And a rare example is cited by Titus Livius in the
conspiracy formed against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, where Theodorus, one of
the conspirators taken, concealed with great virtu all the conspirators, and
accused the friends of the King; and on the other hand, all the conspirators
placed so much confidence in the virtu of Theodorus, that no one left Syracuse
or gave any sign of fear. The conduct of a Conspiracy, therefore, passes through
all these dangers before it comes to its execution; and in wanting to avoid
these, there exist these remedies. The first and most certain, rather to say it
better, the only one, is not to give the conspirators time to accuse you, and
therefore to communicate the plot to them just at the time you are to do it, and
not sooner: those who do thusly are likely to avoid the dangers that exist in
the beginning, and most of the time, the others also; actually they have all had
happy endings: and any prudent man will have the opportunity of governing
himself in this manner.
It should suffice for me to cite two examples. Nelematus, not being able to
endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, Tyrant of Epirus, assembled in his house many
relatives and friends, and exhorted them to liberate their country; several of
them requested time to discuss and arrange it, whereupon Nelematus made his
slaves lock the house, and to those whom he had called he said, either you swear
to go now and carry out the execution of this (plot), or I will give you all as
prisoners to Aristotimus: moved by these words they swore, and going out without
any (further) intermission of time, successfully carried out the plot of
Nelematus. A Magian having by deceit occupied the kingdom of the Persians, and
when Ortanus, one of the great men of the kingdom, had learned and discovered
the fraud, he conferred with six other Princes of that State seeking how they
were to avenge the kingdom from the Tyranny of that Magian. And when one of them
asked as to the time, Darius, one of the six called by Ortanus, arose and said:
Either we go now to carry out the execution of this, or I will go and accuse you
all; and so by accord, without giving time to anyone to repent of it, they arose
and easily executed their designs. Similar to these two examples also is the
manner that the Aetolians employed in killing Nabis, the Spartan Tyrant; they
sent Alexemenes, and enjoined the others that they should obey him in every and
any thing, under pain of exile. This man went to Sparta, and did not communicate
his commission until he wanted to discharge it, whence he succeeded in killing
him. In this manner, therefore, these men avoided those dangers that are
associated with the carrying out of conspiracies, and whoever imitates them will
always escape them. And that anyone can do as they did, I want to cite the
example of Piso referred to above. Piso was a very great and reputed man, and a
familiar of Nero who confided in him much. Nero used to go often to his garden
to dine with him. Piso could then have made friends for himself some men of
mind, heart, and of disposition to undertake the execution of (such a plot),
which is very easy for a great man to do; and when Nero should be in his garden,
to communicate the matter to them, and with appropriate words animated them to
do that which they would not have had time to refuse, and which would have been
impossible not to succeed.
And thus, if all the other instances are examined, few will be found in which
they (the conspirators) could not have been able to proceed in the same manner.
But men, ordinarily little learned in the ways of the world, often make very
great errors, and so much greater in those that are extraordinary, as is this
(conspiracies). The matter ought, therefore, never to be communicated except
under necessity and at its execution; and even then, if you have to communicate
it, to communicate it to one man only with whom you have had a very long
experience (of trust), or who is motivated by the same reason as you. To find
one such is much more easy than to find many, and because of this, there is less
danger: and then, even if he should deceive you, there is some remedy of
defending yourself, than where there are many conspirators: for I have heard
many prudent men say that it is possible to talk of everything with one man, for
((if you do not let yourself be led to write in your hand)) the yes of
one man is worth as much as the no of another: and everyone ought to
guard himself against writing as from a shoal, because there is nothing that
will convict you more easily than your handwriting. Plautanias, wanting to have
the Emperor Severus and his son Antoninus killed, committed the matter of the
Tribune Saturninus; who wanting to accuse him and not obey him, and apprehensive
that coming to the accusation, he (Plautanius) would be more believed than he (Saturninus),
requested a copy in his handwriting so that he should have faith in this
commission, which Plautanias, blinded by ambition, gave him: whence it ensued
that he was accused by the Tribune and convicted; and without that copy and
certain other countersigns, Plautanias would have won out, so boldly did he deny
it. From the accusation of a single one, some remedy will be found, unless you
are convicted by some writing or other countersigns, from which one ought to
guard himself. In the Pisonian conspiracy there was a woman called Epicaris, who
in the past had been a friend of Nero, who judged it to be advisable to place
among the conspirators a Captain of some triremes whom Nero had as his guard;
she committed the conspiracy to him, but not (the names of) the conspirators.
Whence that the Captain breaking his faith and accusing her to Nero, but so
great was the audacity of Epicaris in denying it, that Nero, remaining confused,
did not condemn her.
There are two dangers, therefore, in communicating a plot to only one
individual: the first, that he does not accuse you as a test: the other, that he
does not accuse you, he being convicted and constrained by the punishment to do
so: he being arrested because of some suspicion or some other indication on his
part. But there is some remedy for both of these dangers; the first, being able
to deny it, alleging the hate that the man had for you; and the other to deny
it, alleging the force that had constrained him to tell lies. It is prudent,
therefore, not to communicate the plot to anyone, but act according to those
above mentioned examples; and even if you must communicate it, not to more than
one, for while there is some danger in that, it is much less than in
communicating it to many.
Next to this, there may be a necessity which constrains you to do to that
Prince what you see the Prince would want to do to you, (and) which is so great
that it does not give you time to think of your own safety. This necessity
almost always brings the matter to the desired ending, and to prove it, I have
two examples which should suffice. The Emperor Commodus had among his best
friends and familiars Letus and Electus, Heads of the Praetorian soldiers, and
had Marcia among his favorite concubines and friends: and as he was sometimes
reproached by these (three) for the way he stained his personal (dignity) and
that of the Empire, decided to have them killed, and wrote the names of Marcia,
Letus and Electus, and several others on a list of those whom he wanted killed
the following night, and he placed this list under the pillow of his bed: and
having gone to bathe, a favorite child of his playing in the room and on the bed
found this list, and going out with it in his hand met Marcia who took it from
him; and when she read it and saw its contents, she quickly sent for Letus and
Electus, and when all three recognized the danger they were in, they decided to
forestall it, and without losing time, the following night they killed Commodus.
The Emperor Antoninus Caracalla was with his armies in Mesopotamia, and had for
his prefect Macrinus, a man more fit for civil than military matters: and as it
happens that bad Princes always fear that others will inflict on them that
(punishment) which it appears to them they merit, Antoninus wrote to Maternianus
his friend in Rome that he learn from the Astrologers if there was anyone who
was aspiring to the Empire and to advise him of it. Whence Maternianus wrote
back to him that Macrinus was he who aspired to it, and the letter came first
into the hands of Macrinus than of the Emperor; and because of this the
necessity was recognized either to kill him before a new letter should arrive
from Rome, or to die, he committed to his trusted friend, the Centurion
Martialis, whose brother had been killed by Antoninus a few days before, that he
should kill him, which was executed by him successfully. It is seen therefore,
that this necessity which does not give time produces almost the same effect as
the means employed by Nelematus of Epirus described by me above. That of which I
spoke of almost at the beginning of this discourse is also seen, that threats
injure a Prince more, and are the cause of more efficacious Conspiracies than
the injury itself; from which a Prince ought to guard himself; for men have to
be either caressed or made sure of, and never reduced to conditions in which
they believe they need either to kill others or be killed themselves.
As to the dangers that are run in its execution, these result either from
changing the orders, or from the lack of courage of those who should execute it,
or from an error that the executor makes from little prudence, or from not
perfecting the plot leaving some of them alive who had been planned to be
killed. I say, therefore, that there is nothing that causes disturbance or
impediment to all the actions of men as much as when in an instant and without
having time, to have to change an order, and to change it from the one that had
been ordered first: and if this change causes disorder in anything, it does so
especially in matters of war and matter similar to those of which we are
speaking; for in such actions there is nothing so necessary to do as much as
firming the minds of men to execute the part assigned to them: and if men have
their minds turned for many days to a certain matter and certain order, and that
be quickly changed, it is impossible that all be not disturbed, and everything
not ruined; so that it is much better to execute a plot according to the order
given ((even though some inconvenience is to be seen)) than to want to cancel it
to enter into a thousand inconveniences. This happens when one has no time to
reorganize oneself, for when there is time, men can govern themselves in their
own way.
The Conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano De'Medici is well
known. The arrangement made was that they were to dine at the Cardinal of San
Giorgio's, and at that dinner to kill them (the Medici): in which place there
were distributed those who were to seize the palace, and those who were to
overrun the City and call the people to liberty. It happened that while the
Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were at the solemn office in the Cathedral
Church in Florence, it was learned that Giuliano was not dining that morning,
which caused the conspirators to gather together, and that which they had to do
in the house of Medici, they decided to do in the Church: which caused the
disturbance of all the arrangements, as Giovanbattista da Montesecco did not
want to consent to the homicide, saying he did not want to do it in the Church:
so that they had to change to new members for every action who, not having time
to firm up their minds, made such errors, that they were crushed in the
execution.
The spirit is sometimes lacking to those who should execute (a plot) either
from reverence of from the innate goodwill of the executor. So great is the
majesty and reverence which surrounds the presence of a Prince, that it is an
easy matter for it either to mitigate (the will of) or terrify an executor. To
Marius ((having been taken by the Minturnians)) was sent a slave who was to kill
him, (but) who was so terrified by the presence of that man and by the memory of
his fame, that he became cowardly, and lost all courage to kill him. And if this
power exists in a man bound and a prisoner, and overwhelmed by bad fortune, how
much more is it to be feared from a Prince free, with the majesty of ornaments,
of pomp, and of his court: so that this pomp can terrify you, and that grateful
welcome can humiliate you.
Some subjects conspired against Sitalces, King of Thracia; they fixed the day
of its execution, they came to the appointed place where the Prince was, but
none of them would move to attack him, so that they departed without having
attempted anything, and without knowing what had impeded them, and they blamed
one another. They fell into this error several times, so that the conspiracy was
discovered, and they suffered the punishment for that evil which they could have
committed, but would not.
Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him, and they
employed as the executioner (of their plot) Giannes, Priest and Cantor of the
Duke, who several times at their request had brought the Duke to them, so that
they would have occasion to kill him: None the less, none of them ever dared to
do it, so that it was discovered, and they bore the penalty of their wickedness
and little prudence. This neglect of taking advantage of the opportunity
resulted either from his presence dismaying them or from some humane act by the
Prince humbling them. The failures that arise in such executions arise either
from the error of little prudence or little courage; for when one or the other
of these things invades you, and carried by that confusion of the brain, you are
made to say and do that which you ought not.
And that men's minds are thus invaded and confounded, Titus Livius cannot
demonstrate better then when he writes of Alexemenes, the Aetolian, who ((when
he wanted to kill Nabis, the Spartan, of which we talked about above)), when the
time came for the execution (of his design), discovered to his men what had to
be done, Titus Livius speaks these words: He collected his own spirits, which
were confused seeing the greatness of the undertakings. For it is impossible
that anyone ((even though he be of firm spirit and accustomed to the use of the
sword and the killing of men)) be not confused. Hence only men experienced in
such affairs ought to be selected, and none other be trusted, even though he
held to be most courageous. For the certainty of anyone's courage cannot be
promised without having had experience. Such confusion, therefore, can either
make the arms fall from your hand, or make you say things that will have the
same result.
Lucilla, the sister of Commodus, ordered Quintianus to kill him. This man
awaited Commodus at the entrance of the amphitheatre, and encountering him, with
drawn dagger, shouted, The Senate sends you this: which words caused him
to be seized before he had lowered his arm to wound him. Messer Antonio Da
Volterra deputed ((as is mentioned above)) to kill Lorenzo De'Medici, in meeting
him said, Ah traitor!, which word was the saving of Lorenzo and the ruin
of the Conspiracy.
When the conspiracy is against only one Head, success of the affair cannot be
obtained, for the reasons mentioned: but success is obtained even less easily
when the conspiracy is against two Heads; actually, it is so difficult that it
is almost impossible that it succeed: for to undertake the same action at the
same time in different places is almost impossible, as it cannot be done at
different times without one spoiling the other: so that conspiring against one
Prince is a doubtful, dangerous and little prudent thing; to conspire against
two is entirely vain and foolhardy. And if it were not for the respect I have of
history, I would never believe that that would be possible which Herodianus says
to Plautianus, when he commissioned Saturninus, the Certurian, that he alone
should kill Severus and Antoninus (Caracalla) living in different places; for it
is so far from reasonableness, that other than this authority would not have me
believe it. Certain young Athenians conspired against Diodes and Hippias,
Tyrants of Athens. They killed Diodes, but Hippias who remained avenged him.
Chion and Leonidas, of Heraclea, and disciples of Plato, conspired against the
Tyrants Clearchus and Satirus: they killed Clearchus, but Satirus who remained
alive avenged him. The Pazzi, mentioned by us many times, did not succeed in
killing anyone except Giuliano; so that everyone ought to abstain from such
Conspiracies against several Heads, for they do no good to yourself, nor the
country, nor anyone: rather those (tyrants) who remain become more harsh and
unendurable, as Florence, Athens, and Heraclea know, as I have stated above. It
is true that the conspiracy that Pelopidas made to deliver his country, Thebes,
(from the Tyrants) faced all the difficulties: none the less it had a most happy
ending; for Pelopidas not only conspired against two Tyrants, but against ten:
not only was he not a confidant and did not have easy access to the Tyrants, but
he was also a rebel: none the less he was able to come to Thebes, kill the
Tyrants, and free the country. Yet, none the less, he did all with the aid of
one Charon, counsellor or the Tyrants, through whom he had an easy access to the
execution of his (plot). Let no one, none the less, take this as an example;
for, as that enterprise was almost impossible, and a marvelous thing to succeed,
(and) so regarded by the writers, who commemorate it as something rare and
unprecedented. Such execution can be interrupted by a false alarm or by an
unforeseen accident that arises in its doing.
The morning that Brutus and the other conspirators wanted to kill Caesar, it
happened that he (Caesar) talked at length with Gn. Popilius Lena, one of the
conspirators, and the others seeing this long talk were apprehensive that the
said Popilius might reveal the conspiracy to Caesar. They were tempted to kill
Caesar here, and not wait until he should be in the Senate: and they would have
done so except that the discussion ended, and as it was seen that Caesar did not
do anything extraordinary, they were reassured. These false alarms are to be
regarded and considered with prudence, and so much more as they come about
easily, for he who had his conscience blemished, readily believes that
(everyone) talks of him. It is possible to hear a word spoken by another so that
it will make your mind disturbed, and to believe that it has reference to you,
and causes you either to discover the Conspiracy by flight, or to confuse the
action by accelerating it before its time. And this will happen much more
readily, when there are many who know of the Conspiracy.
As to accidents ((because they are unforeseen)) they cannot be demonstrated
except by examples which should serve to make men cautious. Julio Belanti of
Siena ((of whom we have made mention above)), because of the anger he had
against Pandolfo, who had taken his daughter from him before he had given her to
him as a wife, decided to kill him, and chose the time. Almost every day
Pandolfo went to visit an infirm relative, and on his way passed by the house of
Julio. That man, therefore, having observed this, arranged to have his
conspirators in the house so arranged as to kill Pandolfo when he passed; and
putting them, armed, behind the door, and kept one at the window who should give
a sign when Pandolfo was near the door. It happened that Pandolfo came, that man
gave the sign, but he (Pandolfo) met a friend who stopped him, while some who
were with him went on ahead, and seeing and hearing the noise of arms discovered
the ambush, so that Pandolfo was saved, and Julio with his companions had to
flee from Sienna. That accident of that meeting impeded that action and caused
Julio's enterprise to be ruined. Against which accidents ((as they are rare)) no
remedy can be made. It is very necessary to examine all those things that can
happen and remedy them.
It remains now only to discuss the dangers that occur after the execution (of
a plot); of which there is only one, and this is when someone is left who will
avenge the slain Prince. There may remain, then, his brothers, or his sons, or
other adherents who expect (to inherit) the Principality; and they can be left
either because of your negligence, or for the reasons mentioned above, and who
would undertake this vengeance; as happened to Giovan Andrea Da Lampognano, who,
together with his conspirators, had killed the Duke of Milan, who left a son and
two brothers, who in time avenged the dead man. And truly in these cases, the
conspirators are to be excused, for they had no remedy: but when some are left
alive because of little prudence or from negligence, they (the conspirators) do
not merit to be excused. Some conspirators from Furli killed the Count Girolamo,
their Lord, and took his wife and children, who were little: and as it appeared
to them they could not live securely unless they had made themselves lords of
the fortress; but as the castellan did not want to give it up to them, Madonna
Caterina ((as the Countess was called)) promised the conspirators that, if they
allowed her to enter it, she would have it consigned to them, and that they
might retain her children with them as hostages. Under this pledge, these men
allowed her to enter, but she, as soon as she was inside the walls, reproached
them for the death of her husband, and threatened them with every kind of
vengeance: and to show that she did not care for her children, she showed them
her genital member, saying that she had the means of making more. Thus those men
(conspirators), short of counsel and having too late seen their error, suffered
the penalty of their too little prudence by a perpetual exile. But of all the
perils that can happen after the execution (of a plot), there is none more
certain and which is to be feared more than when the people are friends of the
Prince whom you have killed; for against this the conspirators do not have any
remedy and against which they can never be secure. As an example, there is
Caesar, who, by having the people or Rome friendly, was avenged by them; for
having driven the conspirators out of Rome, they were the cause that they were
all killed at various times and in various places.
Conspiracies that are made against the Country are less perilous for those
who plan them, than are those made against Princes; for in plotting them there
are less dangers than in the other, in the execution of them they (dangers) are
the same, and after the execution there is none. In plotting it there are not
many dangers, for a citizen can aspire to power without manifesting his mind and
designs to anyone: and if those aspirations of his are not interfered with, his
enterprise will turn out happily; or if they are interfered with by some law, he
can wait a time and attempt it by another way. This is understood in a Republic
which is partly corrupted; for in an uncorrupted one ((there not being any bad
principles there)) these thoughts cannot occur in its citizens. The citizens,
therefore, through many ways and means can aspire to the Principality where they
do not run the dangers of being crushed: as much because Republics are slower
than a Prince, and are less apprehensive, and because of this are less cautious;
as well as because they have more respect for their Great citizens, and because
of this are more audacious and courageous in conspiracy against them.
Everyone has read of the Conspiracy of Cataline written by Sallust, and knows
that after the Conspiracy was discovered Cataline not only stayed in Rome, but
came into the Senate, and mouthed villainies at the Senate and the Consul, so
great was the respect which that City had for its citizens. And when he had
departed from Rome, and was already with the army, Lentulus and the others would
not have been taken, except that they had letters in their handwriting which
accused them manifestly. Hanno, a very great citizen in Carthage, aspiring to
the Tyrancy, had arranged to poison all the Senate during the nuptials of a
daughter, and afterwards make himself Prince. When this was learned, nothing was
done in the Senate than to pass a law which placed a limit to the expenses of
banquets and nuptials, so great was the respect they had for his kind.
It is indeed true that in the execution of a Conspiracy against one's Country
there are more difficulties and greater perils; for it is rare that your own
forces of the conspiracy are sufficient against so many, and not everyone is
Prince of an army, as were Caesar, or Agathocies, or Cleomenes, and the like,
who, through force, quickly occupied their Country; for to such men the way is
sure and easy, but others who do not have the support of force must accomplish
their purpose either through deceit and cunning, or by foreign forces.
As to deceit and cunning, Pisistratus, the Athenian, having overcome the
Megarians and, because of this, had acquired good will among the people (of
Athens); one morning he went outside wounded, saying that the Nobility had
injured him from envy, and demanded that he be able to keep armed men with him
as his guard. From this authority, he easily rose to such power, that he became
Tyrant of Athens. Pandolfo Petrucci returned with other exiles to Sienna, and he
was assigned the guard of the government plaza, as a mechanical (secondary)
matter and which others had refused: none the less those armed men in time gave
him such reputation, that in a little time he became Prince. Many others have
employed other means and perseverance, and in a (short) space of time and
without peril have succeeded. Those who have conspired to occupy their country
with their own forces or with foreign armies, have had various success,
according to their fortune. Cataline, mentioned before above, was ruined. Hanno
((of whom we made mention above)) not having succeeded with poison, armed many
thousand (persons) of his partisans, and both he and they were killed. Some of
the first citizens of Thebes, in order to make themselves Tyrants, called a
Spartan army to their aid, and seized the Tyrancy of that City. So that
examining all the Conspiracies against the Country, none or few will be found,
which were crushed in their plotting; but all either met with success or failure
in their execution. Once they are executed, they do not bring other dangers than
those which the nature of the Principality in itself bring: for once one has
become a Tyrant, he has his natural and ordinary perils which befall a Tyranny,
against which there are no other remedies than those which have been discussed
above.
This is as much as has occurred to me to write of Conspiracies, and if I have
discussed those only where the sword was used and not poison, it is because both
result in the same effect. It is true that those using poison are more dangerous
because they are more uncertain; for everyone does not have the opportunity (of
employing this means), and it must be reserved for the one who does have, and
this necessity of reserving it for some makes it dangerous. Further, for many
reasons, a drink of poison need not be fatal, as happened with those who killed
Commodus; here, he having thrown up the poison which they had given him, they
were forced to strangle him in order to kill him.
Princes, therefore, have no greater enemy than a conspiracy; for, once a
conspiracy is made against him, it either kills or defames him. For if the
conspiracy succeeds, he dies; if it is discovered and he kills the conspirators,
it will always be believed that it was an invention of that Prince to give vent
to his cruelty and avarice against the blood and possessions of those whom he
has killed. I do not want, therefore, to omit advising that Prince or that
Republic against whom there had been conspiracies, that, when they have
knowledge that there is a conspiracy manifest against them, before they engage
in an enterprise to avenge it, to seek to learn very well its nature, and to
measure well the conditions of both themselves and the conspirators; and if they
find it (the conspiracy) to be big and powerful, they must never discover it
until they are prepared with sufficient force to crush it, otherwise by doing so
they will discover their own ruin: therefore they ought with every industry
conceal it, for the conspirators, seeing themselves discovered, driven by
necessity, will act without consideration. As an example, there are the Romans,
who had left two legions of soldiers to guard the Capuans from the Samnites ((as
we said elsewhere)); the Heads of those legions conspired together to oppress
the Capuans: when this was learned at Rome, they commissioned Rutilius, the new
Consul, that this be prevented; who, to lull the conspirators to sleep, had
published that the Senate had reaffirmed the quartering of the legions in Capua.
Which, being believed by those soldiers, and it appearing to them to have time
to execute their design, did not seek to accelerate the matter, and thus they
remained until they begun to see that the Consul was separating them from each
other; which thing generating suspicion in them, caused them to be discovered
and to go on with their desire to execute the plot. Nor could there be a better
example for both parties; for through this, it is seen how much men are dilatory
in things when they believe they have time, and how ready they are when
necessity drives them. Nor can a Prince or a Republic who want, for their own
advantage, to defer the discovery (of a conspiracy) use better means than to
hold out another opportunity to the conspirators through slyness, so that they
expecting it, or it appearing to them to have time, the (Prince) or (Republic)
will have time to castigate them. Whoever has done otherwise has accelerated his
ruin, as did the Duke of Athens and Guglieimo De Pazzi. The Duke, having become
Tyrant of Florence, and learning that he was being conspired against, caused
((without otherwise examining the matter)) one of the conspirators to be taken,
which quickly made the others take up arms, and take the State away from him.
Guglieimo being commissioner in the Val Di Chiano in MDI (1501), and having
learned that there was a conspiracy in Arezzo in favor of the Vitelli, to take
that town away from the Florentines, quickly went to that City, and without
taking into consideration the strength of the conspirators, or of his own, and
without preparing any force for himself, by the counsel of his son, the Bishop,
caused one of the conspirators to be taken; after which seizure the others took
up arms and took the town away from the Florentines and Guglieimo from being
Commissioner became a prisoner.
But when Conspiracies are weak they can and ought to be crushed without
regard. However, the two methods used, although almost the contrary of each
other, are not in any way to be imitated: The one is that of the above named
Duke of Athens, who, to show his belief in having the good will of the Citizens
of Florence, put to death one who had discovered the Conspiracy to him: the
other is that of Dion, the Syracusan, who, to test the loyalty of anyone of whom
he had suspicion, ordered Callipus in whom he confided, that he should pretend
to make a Conspiracy against him, and both of these fared badly: for the one
took away courage from the accusers and gave it to whoever wanted to conspire;
the other made the way easy for his own death, but actually was his own Head of
a Conspiracy against himself, as was proved by experience, for Callipus ((being
able to plot against Dion without regard)) plotted so well, that he took away
from him the State and his life.
WHENCE THAT WHEN CHANGES TAKE PLACE FROM LIBERTY TO SLAVERY, AND FROM
SLAVERY TO LIBERTY, SOME ARE EFFECTED WITHOUT BLOODSHED, AND SOME ARE FULL OF IT
Some may doubt whence it arises that many changes that are made from liberty
to tyranny, and contrarywise, some are done with bloodshed, some without. For
((as is learned from history)) in such changes, some times an infinite number of
men have been killed, some times no one has even been injured, as happened in
the change that Rome made from Kings to Consuls, where only the Tarquins were
driven out and no one else suffered injury. Which depends on this, whether that
State that is changed does so with violence, or not: for when it is effected
with violence, it does so with injury to many; then in its ruin, it is natural
that the injured ones would want to avenge themselves, and from this desire for
vengeance results bloodshed and the death of men. But when that change of State
is made by common consent of the general public who had made it great, then
there is no reason when it is overthrown, for the said general public to harm
anyone but the Head. And the State of Rome was of this kind, and so was the
expulsion of the Tarquins, as also was the State of De' Medici in Florence, when
in the year one thousand four hundred ninety four (1494) no one was harmed but
themselves. And such changes do not come to be very dangerous; but those are
indeed very dangerous that are made by those who have to avenge themselves,
which were always of a sort to make those who read ((and others)) to become
terrified: but because history is full of these examples, I shall omit them.
HE WHO WANTS TO ALTER A REPUBLIC OUGHT TO CONSIDER ITS CONDITION
And if there has already been discussed above how a bad Citizen cannot work
evil in a Republic which is not corrupt, this conclusion is fortified ((in
addition to the reasons that have already been given)) by the example of Spurius
Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus; this Spurius being an ambitious man, and
wanting to assume extraordinary authority in Rome, and to gain over to himself
the plebs by giving them many benefits such as selling them those fields which
the Romans had taken from the Hernicians; this ambition of his was discovered by
the Fathers (Senate), and he was held in so great suspicion, that in talking to
the people and offering to give them that money which they had received for the
grain that the public had caused to be sent from Sicily, they (the people)
refused it entirely, as it appeared to them that Spurius was wanting to give
them the price of their liberty. But if this people had been corrupt, it would
not have refused the said price, but would have opened the road to that Tyranny
which they had closed to him.
The example of this Manlius Capitolinus is even a better one, for, through
this man, it is seen how much virtu of the mind and body, and how much good
works done in favor of the Country are afterward cancelled by the evil ambition
to rule; which ((as is seen)) sprung up in this man because of the envy he had
for the honors given to Camillus, and he came to such a blindness of the mind,
that without considering the customs of the City, nor examining its condition,
which was not yet prepared to accept a bad form of Government, he set himself to
create tumults in Rome against the Senate and against the laws of the country.
Here we see the perfection of that City, and the excellence of its people; for
in his case, no one of the Nobility ((although they were ardent defenders of
each other)) moved to favor him, none of his relatives made any enterprise to
aid him: and where in the case of the other accused (their families) were
accustomed to appear downcast, dressed in black, all sadness, in order to obtain
mercy in favor of the accused, with Manlius not one was seen. The Tribunes of
the plebs who were accustomed always to favor the things that seemed to them to
benefit the people, and especially when they were against the nobles, in this
case they united with the Nobles to suppress a common pestilence. The people of
Rome, most desirous of preserving its own interests, and lovers of things
brought against the Nobility, had at first shown many favors toward Manlius;
none the less, the Tribunes cited him and brought his cause to the judgment of
the people; (and) that people from being defenders became judges, without any
regard condemned him to death. I do not believe, therefore, that there is an
example in history more suitable to show the excellence of all the Institutions
of this Republic as much as this, seeing that no one of that City moved to
defend a Citizen full of every virtu, and who publicly and privately had
performed many laudable deeds. For the love of country had more power over all
of them than any other consideration; and they considered much more the present
dangers to which they were exposed than his past merits, so that they liberated
themselves by his death. And Titus Livius said; Thus ended the career of this
man, who would have been memorable had he not been born in a free society.
Here two things are to be considered: the one, that glory is to be sought by
other means in a corrupt City than in one which still lives with its
institutions: the other, ((which is almost the same as the first)) that men in
their dealings, and so much more in their greatest actions, ought to consider
the times and accommodate themselves to them: and those who from a bad choice or
from a natural inclination are not in accord with the times, most of the times
live unhappily and their actions have bad endings; and, on the contrary, those
live happily who are in accord with the times. And without doubt, from the words
mentioned by the historian, it can be concluded, that if Manlius had been born
in the times of Marius and Sulla, when the people were corrupt, and when he
could have shaped them according to his ambition, he would have obtained those
same results and successes as Marius and Sulla, and the others who after them
aspired to the Tyranny. Thus, in the same way, if Sulla and Marius had lived in
the times of Manlius, they would have been crushed in their first enterprise.
For a man can well by his methods and evil ways begin to corrupt the people of a
City, but it is impossible that the life of one is (long) enough to corrupt them
so that they, through it, can enjoy its fruit; and even if it were possible by
the length of time that he should do so, it would be impossible from the manner
in which men proceed, who, being impatient, cannot delay a passion of theirs for
a long time, so that they deceive themselves in their own affairs, and
especially in those which they desire very much. So that either from little
patience, or from deceiving themselves, they attempt an enterprise at the wrong
time, and would end badly.
To want to assume authority in a Republic, and install there a bad form of a
Government, therefore, there is need to find the people corrupted by the times
and that, little by little, from generation to generation, it is led to this
corruption; these are led by necessity to this, unless they are ((as has been
discussed above)) reinvigorated frequently by good examples or brought back by
good laws to their principles. Manlius, therefore, would have been a rare and
memorable man if he had been born in a corrupt City. And therefore the Citizens
in a Republic who attempt an enterprise either in favor of Liberty or in favor
of Tyranny, ought to consider the condition of things, and judge the difficulty
of the enterprise; for it is as difficult and dangerous to want to make a people
free who want to live in servitude, as to want to make a people slave who want
to live free. And as it has been said above that men in their actions ought to
consider the kind of times and proceed according to them, we will discuss this
at length in the following chapter.
HOW ONE MUST CHANGE WITH THE TIMES, IF HE WANTS TO HAVE GOOD FORTUNE ALWAYS
I have many times considered that the causes of the good and bad fortunes of
men depend on the manner of their proceeding with the times. For it is seen that
some men in their actions proceed with drive, others with consideration and
caution. And as in the one and the other of these suitable limits are exceeded,
not being able to observe the true course in either, errors are made: but he who
comes to err less and have good fortune, is he who suits the times ((as I have
said)) with his methods, and always proceeds according to the impulses of his
nature. Everybody knows that Fabius Maximus proceeded with his army with
consideration and caution, far removed from all impetuosity and all Roman
audacity, and his good fortune was that his method well suited the times. For
Hannibal having come into Italy a young man and with his fortunes fresh, and
having already twice overcome the Roman People, and that Republic being almost
deprived of her good troops and discouraged, could not have experienced better
fortune than to have a Captain who, with his slowness and caution, had kept the
enemy at bay. Nor could Fabius also have found times more suitable to his
methods, from which his glory resulted. And that Fabius had done this from his
nature, and not by choice, is seen when Scipio wanting to pass into Africa with
those armies to put an end to the war, Fabius contradicted this so greatly, as
one who could not break away from his methods and his customs. So that, if he
had been (master), Hannibal would still be in Italy, as he (Fabius) could not
see that the times had changed. But being born in a Republic where Citizens and
dispositions were different, as was Fabius, who was excellent in the times
needed to protract the war, and as was Scipio in the times suited to win it.
From this it happens that a Republic has a greater vitality and a longer good
fortune than a Principality, for it can accommodate itself better to the
differences of the times, because of the diversity of its Citizens, than can a
Principality. For a man who is accustomed to proceed in one manner, will never
change, as has been said, and it happens of necessity that, when times change in
a way not in accordance with his manner, he is ruined. Piero Soderini, mentioned
previously several times, proceeded in all his affairs with patience and
humanity. He and his country prospered while the times were in conformity with
his manner of proceeding: but afterwards when the times came when it was
necessary to break that patience and humility, he did not know how to do it; so
that, together with his country, he was ruined. Pope Julius II proceeded during
all the time of his Pontificate with impetuosity and with fury, and because the
times well accorded with him, all his enterprises turned out successfully for
him. But if other times had existed requiring other counsel, of necessity he
would have been ruined, for he would not have changed his manner nor his
conduct.
And there are two reasons that we cannot thus change; The one, that we cannot
resist that to which nature inclines us: The other, that having prospered
greatly by one method of procedure, it is not possible to persuade them they can
do well to proceed otherwise: whence it happens that fortune varies in a man, as
it varies with the times, but he does not change his methods. The ruin of Cities
also happens from the institutions of the Republic not changing with the times,
as we discussed at length above. But they (changes) arrive later (in a Republic)
because they suffer more in changing, for times will come when the whole
Republic will be unsettled, so that the changing in method of procedure by one
man will not suffice.
And as we have made mention of Fabius Maximus, who held Hannibal at bay, it
appears to me proper to discuss in the following chapter, how a Captain
((wanting in any way to come to an engagement with the enemy)) can be impeded by
the (enemy) from doing so.
THAT A CAPTAIN CANNOT AVOID AN ENGAGEMENT IF THE ADVERSARY WANTS TO DO SO IN
EVERY WAY
Gneius Sulpitius, appointed Dictator in the war against the Gauls, not
wanting to commit his fortunes against the host, whose (position) was daily
deteriorating from the disadvantage of the place. When an error is followed
in which all or a greater part of men deceive themselves, I do not believe it is
bad sometimes to refute it. Therefore, although I have many times before shown
how much the actions concerning great things are different from those of ancient
times, none the less, it does not appear to me superfluous at present to repeat
it. For, if we deviate in any part from the institutions of the ancients, we
deviate especially in military actions, where at present none of those things
greatly esteemed by the ancients are observed. And this defect arises because
Republics and Princes have imposed this charge on others, and to avoid the
dangers have far removed themselves from this practice: and even if a King of
our times is sometimes seen to go in person, it is not to be believed therefore
that methods meriting greater praise will arise; for even if he does follow that
practice, he does it for pomp only, and not from any other laudable reason. Yet
these make less error in showing themselves with their armies while retaining
for themselves the title of Commander, than do the Republics; and especially the
Italian ones, which, trusting in others, do not understand anything of what
pertains to war, and on the other hand wanting ((in order to appear as a Prince
to them)) to decide things, make a thousand errors in such decisions. And
although I have elsewhere discussed some, I do not now want to be silent on one
of the most important.
When these indolent Princes, or effeminate Republics, sent out their Captain,
the wisest commission that it appears to them to give him is this, when they
impose on him that he does not come to an engagement under any circumstance, but
rather above everything to guard against coming to battle: and in this, they
appear to imitate the prudence of Fabius Maximus, who be delaying the fighting
saved the state for the Romans; but they did not understand that the greater
part of the time such a commission is null or harmful; for this conclusion ought
to be made, that a Captain who wants to stay in the field, cannot avoid an
engagement any time the enemy wants to do so in any way. And this commission is
nothing else, but to say - make the engagement at the convenience of the enemy,
and not at your own. For to want to stay in the field and not undertake an
engagement, there is no more secure remedy than to keep oneself and at least
fifty thousand men a good distance from the enemy and then to keep good spies
who, when they see him coming toward you, give you time to distance yourself.
Another procedure is this, to shut yourself up in a City; and both of these
proceedings are harmful. In the first, one leaves his country prey to the enemy,
and a valiant Prince would rather try the fortune of battle than to lengthen the
war with so much harm to his subjects. In the second proceeding defeat is
manifest; for it will happen if you bring yourself with the army into a City,
you will come to be besieged, and in a short time suffer hunger and you will
come to surrender. So that to avoid an engagement by these two methods ins most
injurious. The method employed by Fabius Maximus of staying in a strong place is
good when you have an army of so much virtu that the enemy does not dare to come
to meet you inside your advantageous position. Nor can it be said that Fabius
avoided an engagement, but rather that he wanted to do it at his advantage. For,
if Hannibal had gone to meet him, Fabius would have awaited him and fought an
engagement with him: but Hannibal never dared to combat with him in the manner
of his (Fabius). So that an engagement was avoided as much by Hannibal as by
Fabius: but if one of them had wanted to in any way, the other would have had
three remedies, that is, the two mentioned above, or flight.
That what I say is true is clearly seen from a thousand examples, and
especially in the war the Romans carried on with Philip of Macedonia, father of
Perseus; for Philip being assaulted by the Romans, decided not to come to
battle, and in order not to wanted to do first as Fabius Maximus had done in
Italy, posting himself with his army on the summit of a mountain, where he
greatly fortified himself, judging that the Romans would not dare to go to meet
him. But they did go and combat him, and drove him from the mountain, and no
longer being able to resist, fled with the greater part of his forces. And what
saved him from being entirely destroyed was the irregularity of the country,
which prevented the Romans from pursuing him. Philip, therefore, not wanting to
come to battle, but being posted with his camp adjacent to the Romans, was
forced to flee; and having learned from this experience that keeping on the
mountains was not enough in wanting to avoid a battle, and not wanting to shut
himself up in towns, decided to take the other method of staying many miles
distant from the Roman camp. Whence, if the Romans were in one province, he
would go into another: and thus whenever the Romans left one place, he would
enter it. And seeing in the end that in prolonging the war by this means only
worsened his condition, and that his subjects were oppressed now by him, now by
the enemy, he decided to try the fortune of battle, and thus came to a regular
engagement with the Romans.
It is useful, therefore, not to combat when the armies have such conditions
as the army of Fabius had, and which that of C. Sulpicius did not have, that is,
to have an army so good that the enemy will not dare to come to meet you within
your strongholds; or that he is in your territory without having taken many
footholds, so that he suffers from lack of supplies. And in this case the
procedure is useful, for the reasons that Titus Livius says; No one should
commit his fortune against a host, which time and the disadvantage of the place
makes to deteriorate daily. But in any other case, the engagement cannot be
avoided without danger and dishonor to you. For to flee ((as Philip did)) is as
being routed, and with more disgrace when less proof is given of your virtu. And
if he (Philip) had succeeded in saving himself, another would not have succeeded
who was not aided by the country, as he was. No one will ever say that Hannibal
was not a master of war; and if, when he was at the encounter with Scipio in
Africa, he should have seen advantage in prolonging the war, he would have done
so: and for the future ((he being a good Captain and having a good army)) he
would have been able to do as Fabius did in Italy, but not having done so, it
ought to be believed that some important reason had persuaded him. For a Prince
who has an army put together, and sees that from a want of money or of friends
he cannot maintain such an army for any length of time, is completely mad if he
does not try the fortune (of battle) before such an army would be dissolved,
because by waiting he loses for certain, but by trying he may be able to win.
There is something else to be esteemed greatly, which is, that in losing one
ought also to want to acquire glory: and there is more glory in being overcome
by force, than by some other evil which causes you to lose. So must Hannibal
also have been constrained by this necessity. And on the other hand Scipio, when
Hannibal had delayed the engagement and lacked sufficient courage to go to meet
him in his strongholds, did not suffer, for he had already defeated Syphax and
acquired so much territory in Africa that he was able to remain there as secure
and with convenience as in Italy. This did not happen to Hannibal when he was
encountering Fabius, nor to those Gauls who were at the encounter with Sulpicius.
So much less also can that man avoid an engagement who with the army assaults
the country of others; for if he wants to enter the country of the enemy, he
must ((if the enemy comes to an encounter with him)) come to battle with him;
and if he besieges a town, he is so much more obliged to come to battle; as
happened in our times to Duke Charles of Burgundy, who being in camp before
Moratto, a town of the Swiss, was assaulted and routed by them; and as happened
to the French army, while encamping before Novara, was routed by the Swiss in
the same way.
THAT HE WHO HAS TO DO WITH MANY, EVEN THOUGH HE IS INFERIOR, AS LONG AS HE
RESISTS THE FIRST ATTACK, WINS
The power of the Tribunes of the plebs in the City of Rome was great and
necessary, as has been discussed by us many times, because otherwise it would
not have been able to place a restraint on the ambitions of the Nobles, who
would have a long time before corrupted that Republic which was not corrupted.
None the less, as in all human things ((as has been said at other times)) there
is some inherent evil hidden which causes new accidents to spring up, it is
necessary to provide against these by new institutions. The authority of the
Tribunes had become insolent and formidable to the Nobility and to all Rome, and
some evil would have arisen harmful to Roman liberty if the means had not been
shown by Appius Claudius with which they could protect themselves against the
ambitions of the Tribunes; this was that there was always to be found among
themselves some one who was either afraid, or corruptible, or a lover of the
common good, whom they would dispose to be opposed to the decisions of those
others who should act contrary to the wishes of the Senate. Which remedy was a
great tempering force against so much authority, and for a long time benefited
Rome. Which thing has made me consider that whenever there are many powerful
ones united against another powerful one, even though they all together may be
more powerful than he, none the less hope ought always to be placed more in that
one by itself and less strong than in the greater number of them even though
stronger. For ((taking into account all those things of which one can take
advantage better than the many, which may be infinite)) this will always occur,
that by using a little industry he will be able to disunite the many and make
weak that body which was strong. I do not want here to cite ancient examples, of
which there are many, but I want those happening in our times to suffice me. In
the year one thousand four hundred eighty four (1484) all Italy conspired
against the Venetians, and then when they had lost everything and could no
longer keep an army in the field, they corrupted Signor Lodovico who was
governing Milan, and by this corruption made an accord in which they not only
recovered the lost territories, but they usurped part of the State of Ferrara.
And thus, those who had lost in war, remained superior in peace. A few years ago
all the world conspired against France, none the less before the end of the war
had been seen, Spain rebelled from its confederates and made an accord with them
(France), so that the other confederates were constrained a little later also to
make an accord with them. So that without doubt, judgment ought always to be
made when one sees a war fought by many against one, that the one will remain
superior, if he is of such virtu that he can resist the first shock and await
events by temporizing; for, if he cannot do this, he is faced with a thousand
dangers, as happened to the Venetians in eight (1508), who, if they could have
temporized with French the army, and have had time to win over to themselves
some of those colleagued against them, would have escaped that ruin; but not
having armed men of such virtu able to temporize with the enemy, and because of
this not having time to separate anyone, they were ruined: For it is seen that
the Pope, after having recovered his possessions, made friends with them; and so
did Spain: and both of these two Princes very willingly would have saved the
State of Lombardy for the Venetians against the French, in order not to make
them so powerful in Italy, if they had been able. The Venetians, therefore, were
able to give up part in order to save the rest, which, if that had been done it
in time before it appeared to have been a necessity, and before the war was
begun, would have been a most wise proceeding; but once the was set in motion,
it would have been disgraceful, and perhaps of little profit. But before the war
began, a few of the Citizens of Venice were able to see the danger, very few to
see the remedy, and none advised it. But to return to the beginning of this
discourse, I conclude that just as the Roman Senate had a remedy for saving the
country from the ambitions of the Tribunes, who were many, so also any Prince
will have a remedy, who is assaulted by many, any time he knew how to use with
prudence the means suitable to disunite them.
HOW A PRUDENT CAPTAIN OUGHT TO IMPOSE EVERY NECESSITY FOR FIGHTING ON HIS
SOLDIERS, AND TAKE THEM AWAY FROM THE ENEMY
At another time we have discussed how useful necessity is to human actions,
and to what glory they have been led by it; and it has been written by some
moral Philosophers that the hands and the tongue of men, two most noble
instruments to ennoble him, would not have operated perfectly, nor brought human
works to the heights to which it has been seen they were conducted, unless they
had been pushed by necessity. The ancient Captains having recognized the virtu
of such necessity, therefore, and how much it caused the spirits of the soldiers
to become obstinate in the fighting, did everything they could to see that the
soldiers were constrained by it. And on the other hand they used all industry so
that the enemy be freed (from fighting); and because of this they often opened
to the enemy that road which they could have closed, and closed to their own
soldiers that which they could have left open. Whoever, therefore, desires that
a City be defended obstinately, or that an army in the field should fight, ought
above every other thing to endeavor to put such necessity into the hearts of
those who have to fight. Whence a prudent Captain who has to go to destroy a
City, ought to measure the ease or difficulty of the siege by finding out and
considering what necessity constrains its inhabitants to defend themselves; and
when much necessity is found which constrains them to the defense, he judges the
siege will be difficult, if otherwise, he judges it to be easy. From this it
follows that towns, after a rebellion, are more difficult to acquire than they
were in the original acquisition; for in the beginning, not having cause to fear
punishment because they had not given offense, they surrender easily: but if it
appears to them ((they having rebelled)) to have given offense, and because of
this fearing punishment, they become difficult under siege.
Such obstinacy also arises from the natural hatred the neighboring Princes
and Republics have for one another, which proceeds from the ambition to dominate
and the jealousy of their State; especially if they are Republics, as happened
in Tuscany: which rivalry and contention has made, and always will make,
difficult the destruction of one by the other. Whoever, therefore, considers
well the neighbors of the City of Florence and the neighbors of the City of
Venice, will not marvel ((as many do)) that Florence has expended more in war
and acquired less than Venice; for it arises from the fact that the Venetians
did not have neighbors as obstinate in their defense as had Florence, and the
neighboring Cities of Venice being accustomed to live under a Prince and not
free; and those which are accustomed to servitude often esteem less a change of
masters, and rather many times they desire it. So that Venice ((although she had
neighbors more powerful than did Florence)), because of having found these
(neighboring) lands more obstinate, was able rather to overcome them than that
other (Florence), since it is surrounded entirely by free States.
A Captain ought, therefore, ((to return to the beginning of this discourse))
when he assaults a town, to endeavor with all diligence to deprive the defenders
of such necessity, and thus also its obstinacy; promising them pardon if they
have fear of punishment, and if they have fear of losing their liberty, to
assure them he is not contriving against the common good, but against the few
ambitious ones in the City. This has often facilitated the enterprise and the
capture of towns. And although similar (artifices) are easily recognized, and
especially by prudent men, none the less the people are often deceived; they, in
their intense desire for present peace, close their eyes to any other snare that
may be hidden under these large promises, and in this way, an infinite number of
Cities have fallen into servitude; as happened to Florence in recent times, and
to Crassus and his army (in ancient times) who, although he recognized the vain
promises of the Parthians which were made to deprive the soldiers of the
necessity to defend themselves, none the less, being blinded by the offer of
peace which was made to them by their enemies, he could not keep them obstinate
(in their resistance), as is observed reading of the life of (Crassus) in
detail.
I say, therefore, that the Samnites, because of the ambitions of a few and
outside the conventions of the accord, overran and pillaged the fields of the
confederate Romans; and then sent Ambassadors to Rome to ask for peace, offering
to restore the things pillaged and to give up as prisoners the authors of the
tumults and the pillaging, but were rebuffed by the Romans: and (the
Ambassadors) having returned to Samnium without hope for any accord, Claudius
Pontius, then Captain of the Army of the Samnites, pointed out in a notable
oration that the Romans wanted war in any event, and even though they themselves
should desire peace, necessity made them pursue the war, saying these words: War
is just, where it is from necessity, and where there is no hope but in arms;
upon which necessity he based his hope of victory with his soldiers.
And in order not to return to this subject further, it appears proper to me
to cite those Roman examples which are more worthy of annotation. C. Manlius was
with his army encountering the Veientes, and a part of the Veientan army having
entered into the entrenchments of Manlius, Manlius ran with a band to their
succor, and so that the Veientans would not be able to save themselves, occupied
all the entrances to the camp: whence the Veienti, seeing themselves shut in,
began to fight with such fury that they killed Manlius, and would have attacked
all the rest of the Romans, if one of the Tribunes by his prudence had not
opened a way for them to get out. Whence it is seen that when necessity
constrained the Veienti to fight, they fought most ferociously: but when they
saw the way open, they thought more of flight than of fighting. The Volscians
and Equeans had entered with their armies into the confines of Rome. They (the
Romans) sent Consuls against them. So that the army of the Volscians, of which
Vettius Messius was Head, in the heat of battle found itself shut in between its
own entrenchments which were occupied by the Romans and the other Roman army;
and seeing that they needs much die or save themselves by the sword, he (Messius)
said these words to his soldiers; Follow me, neither walls nor ditches block
you, but only men armed as you are: of equal virtu, you have the superiority of
necessity, that last but best weapon. So that this necessity is called by T.
Livius THE LAST AND BEST WEAPON. Camillus, the most
prudent among all the Roman Captains, having already entered the City of the
Veienti with his army, to facilitate its taking and to deprive the enemy of the
last necessity of defending themselves, commanded, in a way that the Veienti
heard, that no one was to be harmed of those who should be disarmed. So that
they threw down their arms and the City was taken almost without bloodshed.
Which method was afterwards observed by many Captains.
WHERE ONE SHOULD HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE, EITHER IN A GOOD CAPTAIN WHO HAS A
WEAK ARMY, OR IN A GOOD ARMY WHICH HAS A WEAK CAPTAIN
Coriolanus, having become an exile from Rome, went to the Volscians, where he
raised an army with which he went to Rome in order to avenge himself against his
Countrymen; but he left there more because of his affection for his mother than
of the power of the Romans. On which occasion T. Livius says it was because of
this that it was recognized that the Roman Republic grew more from the virtu of
the Captains than of its soldiers, seeing that the Volscians had in the past
been defeated, and that they only won because Coriolanus was their Captain. And
although Livius holds such an opinion, none the less it is seen in many
instances in history where soldiers without a Captain have given marvelous proof
of their virtu, and to have been better ordered and more ferocious after the
death of their Consuls, than before they died; as occurred with the army that
the Romans had in Spain under the Scipio's which, after the death of its two
Captains was able through its own virtu not only to save itself, but to defeat
the enemy and preserve that province for the Republic. So that, everything
considered, many examples will be found where only the virtu of the soldiers won
the day, and other examples where only the virtu of the Captains produced the
same result; so that it can be judged that they both have need for each other.
And it may be well here to consider first, which is more to be feared, a good
army badly captained, or a good Captain accompanied by a bad army. And following
the opinion of Caesar in this, both the one and the other ought to be little
esteemed. For when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petreius who had a
(good) army, he said he cared little of that: He was here going against an
army without a leader, indicating the weakness of the Captains. On the other
hand, when he went into Thessaly against Pompey, he said, I go against a
leader without an army. Another thing to be considered is whether it is
easier for a good Captain to create a good army, or a good army to create a good
Captain. Upon this I say that the question appears to be decided, for it is much
easier for the many good to find or instruct one so that he becomes good, than
the one to from the many. Lucullus, when he was sent against Mithradates, was
completely inexpert in war: none the less, that good army in which there were
very many good Heads, soon made him a good Captain. The Romans, because of a
lack of men, armed many slaves and gave them to Sempronius Gracchus to be
trained, who in a brief time made a good army of them. After Pelopidas and
Epaminondas ((as we said elsewhere)) had delivered Thebes, their country, from
the servitude of the Spartans, in a short time made very good soldiers of the
Theban peasants, who were able not only to sustain the attack of the Spartan
troops, but to overcome them. So the matter is equal; for one good finds
another. None the less, a good army without a good Captain often becomes
insolent and dangerous, as was the case with the army of Macedonia after the
death of Alexander, and with the veteran soldiers in the civil wars (of Rome).
So that I believe that more reliance can be had in a Captain who has time to
instruct his men and the facilities for arming them, than in an insolent army
with a Head tumultuously made by them. The glory and praise of those Captains,
therefore, is to be doubled, who not only had to defeat the enemy, but, before
they met them hand to hand, were obliged to train their army and make them good.
For in this is shown that double virtu that is so rare, that if the same task
was given to many (Captains), they would not have been esteemed and reputed as
much as they are.
WHAT EFFECTS THE NEW INVENTION AND NEW VOICES HAVE THAT APPEAR IN THE MIDST
OF BATTLE
Of what importance is some new incident which arises from something new that
is seen or heard in conflicts and battles, is shown in many instances, and
especially in the example that occurred in the battle which the Romans fought
with the Volscians, where Quintus seeing one wing of his army give way, began to
shout strongly that they should hold firm, as the other wing of the army was
victorious. With which words he gave new courage to his soldiers and dismayed
the enemy, so that he won. And if such voices have such great effects in a well
organized army, they have even greater effect in a tumultuous and badly
organized one, for all are moved by a similar impulse. And I want to cite a
notable example which occurred in our own times. A few years ago the City of
Perugia was divided into two parties, the Oddi and the Baglioni. The latter
ruled and the former were exiles: who, having gathered an army through their
friends, and established themselves in several towns adjacent to Perugia; one
night, with the aid of their partisans, they entered that City, and without
being discovered they succeeded in taking the piazza. And as that City had the
streets in all of its parts barred by chains, the Oddi forces had one man in
front, who broke the fastenings of the chains with an iron club, so that horses
could pass; and only the one which opened on the plaza remained to be broken,
and the cry to arms already had been raised; and he who was breaking (the
chains) being pressed by the disturbance of those who came behind, could not,
because of this, raise his arms to break the chain, in order to manage this
called to them to fall back; which cry passing from rank to rank, saying
"fall back", began to make the last (rank) flee, and one by one the
others followed with such fury, that they were routed by themselves: and thus
the designs of the Oddi were in vain because of so slight an accident. Which
shows the necessity of discipline in an army is not only necessary for them to
be able to combat with order, but also to keep every slight accident from
disorganizing them. Because not for any other reason are the undisciplined
multitudes useless in war, as every noise, every voice, every uproar confuses
them, and makes them flee. And therefore a good Captain, among his other orders,
ought to arrange who those should be who have to take up his voice (commands)
and transmit them to others, and he should accustom his soldiers not to believe
anything except those of his Heads, and those Heads of his to say nothing except
what he commissions them to; it has often been seen that the nonobservance of
this rule has caused the greatest misfortunes.
As to seeing new things, every Captain ought to endeavor to make some appear
while the armies are engaged, which will give courage to his men and take it
away from the enemy, because among incidents which will give you the victory,
this is most efficacious. For which, the testimony of C. Sulpicius, the Roman
Dictator, can be cited, who, coming to battle with the Gauls, armed all the
teamsters and camp followers, and making them mount mule's and other beasts of
burden, and with arms and ensigns made them appear as mounted forces; he placed
them behind a hill, and commanded that at a given signal at the time the battle
was hottest, they should discover and show themselves to the enemy. Which thing
thus organized and carried out, gave the Gauls so much terror, that they lost
the day. And, therefore, a good Captain ought to do two things: the one, to see
that with some of these new inventions to dismay the enemy; the other, to be
prepared, if these things are done against him by the enemy, to be able to
discover them and make them turn useless; as did the King of India against
Semiramis, who (the Queen) seeing that the King had a good number of elephants,
to frighten him and to show him that hers were also plentiful, formed many with
the hides of buffaloes and cows, and these she placed on camels and sent them
forward; but the deceit being recognized by the King, that design turned out not
only useless but damaging to her. The Dictator Mamercus was waging war against
the Fidenati, who, in order to dismay the Roman army, arranged that, in the
ardor of battle there should issue forth from Fidene, a number of soldiers with
fire on their lances, so that the Romans, occupied by the novelty of the thing,
would break ranks (and create confusion) among themselves. Here it is to be
noted, that when such inventions contain more of reality than fiction, they can
be shown to men, because as they appear strong, their weakness will not be
readily discovered; as did C. Sulpicius with the muleteers. For where there is
intrinsic weakness, if they come too near, they are soon discovered, and cause
you more harm than good, as did the elephants to Semiramis, and the fire to the
Fidentes; which, although they did in the beginning disturb the army a little,
none the less, when the Dictator saw through them, and, begun to shout to them,
saying they should be ashamed to flee the smoke like insects, and shouted to
them that they should return to the fight. (And) With their torches destroy
Fidenes, which your benefits could not placate, he turned that artifice used
by the Fidenati useless, and caused them to be the losers of the fight.
THAT AN ARMY SHOULD HAVE ONE, AND NOT MANY, IN CHARGE, AND THAT MANY
COMMANDERS ARE HARMFUL
The Fidenati having revolted, and having killed the Colony that the Romans
had sent to Filene, the Roman, in order to remedy this insult, created four
Tribunes with Consular power, one of whom they left to guard Rome, and the other
three were sent against the Fidenati and the Veienti; who (the Tribunes),
because they were divided among themselves and disunited, gained dishonor but
experienced no injury. For this dishonor they themselves were the cause, the
virtu of the soldiers was the cause of their not receiving injury. Whence the
Romans, seeing this disaster, had recourse to the creation of a Dictator, so
that one alone would restore that which three had destroyed. Whence the
uselessness of many commanders in an army, or in a town that has to be defended
is recognized: and Titus Livius could not more clearly state it with these
forcible words: Three Tribunes with Consular power, proved how useless it was
to give the conduct of the war to any; for each having his own counsel, each
different from the others, they afforded the enemy (hosts) an opportunity to
take advantage of the situation. And although this is a good example to
prove the disorder which a plurality of commanders create in a war, I want to
cite some others, both modern and ancient, to clarify this further. In the year
one thousand five hundred (1500), after King Louis XII of France had retaken
Milan, he sent his forces to Pisa to restore her to the Florentines; where
(Florence) sent as Commissioners Giovanbattista Ridolfi and Luca Antonio Degli
Albizzi. And as Giovanbattista was a man of reputation and the older (of the
two), Luca left the management of everything to him: and although he did not
show his ambition by opposing him, he showed it by his silence and by the
indifference and contempt toward everything, so that he did not aid him in the
actions in the field either with deeds or counsel, as if he had been a man of no
importance. But then the very opposite was seen when Giovanbattista, because of
certain incidents that occurred, had to return to Florence; then Luca remaining
alone showed how much he was worth by his courage, industry, and counsel, all of
which were lost as long as there was a colleague. I want again to cite in
confirmation of this the words of Titus Livius, who, referring to the Romans
sending of Quintus and Agrippa, his colleague, against the Equeans, tells of how
Agrippa wanted the entire administration of the war be given to Quintius, and
said: For the success of the administration of great things, the principal
authority is to exist in one man. Which is contrary to that which is done by
our Republics and Princes today, who sent more than one Commissioner or more
than one Head to (different) places in order to administer them better, which
created an inestimable confusion. And if the causes of the ruin of the Italian
and French armies of our times should be sought, this would be found to have
been the most powerful of (all the) causes. And it may be truly concluded that
it is better to send only one man of prudence on an expedition, than two most
valiant men together with the same authority.
THAT TRUE VIRTU IS DIFFICULT TO FIND IN DIFFICULT TIMES, AND IN EASY TIMES
IT IS NOT MEN OF VIRTU THAT PREVAIL, BUT THOSE WHO HAVE MORE FAVOR BECAUSE OF
RICHES OR (POWERFUL) RELATION
It has always been, and always will be, that rare and great men are neglected
in a Republic in times of peace; for through envy of their reputation which that
virtu has given them, there are in such times many other citizens, who want to
be, not only their equals, but their superiors. And of this, there is a good
account by Thucydides, the Greek historian, who shows that the Athenian Republic
having become superior in the Peloponnesian war, and having checked the pride of
the Spartans, and almost subjected all of Greece, arose in reputation so much
that she designed to occupy Sicily. This enterprise came to be debated in
Athens. Alcibiades and some other Citizens counselled that it be done, as they
thought more of honor and little of the public good, and planning to be heads of
such an enterprise. But Nicias, who was first among men of reputation in Athens,
dissuaded her, and the major reason he cited in addressing the people ((as they
had faith in him)) was this, that in counselling her not to undertake this war,
he was counselling something that was not being done for his interest, for as
long as Athens was at peace he knew there were an infinite number of men who
wanted to take precedence over him, but in making war he knew no citizen would
be his equal or superior. It is seen, therefore, that in Republics there is this
evil of having little esteem for men of valor in tranquil times. Which thing
causes them to be indignant in two ways: the one, to see themselves deprived of
their rank; the other, to see unworthy men (and) of less capacity than they
become their colleagues and superiors. This defect in Republics has caused much
ruin, for those Citizens who see themselves deprecated undeservedly, and knowing
that the reasons for it are the easy and unperilous times, endeavor to disturb
the Republic by setting new wars in motion to its detriment.
And in thinking of what those remedies could be, there are two to be found:
the one, to keep the Citizens poor so that their wealth and lack of virtu should
not enable them to corrupt either themselves or others; the other, to organize
themselves for war in a way that war may always be undertaken and that there
would always be undertaken and that their would always be need for Citizens of
reputation, as did Rome in her early times. For as that City always kept armies
(outside) in the field, there was always a place for men of virtu; nor could
rank be taken away from one who merited it, and given to one who did not merit
it. For, even if this was done some time either by mistake or by way of trial,
so many disorders and dangers would occur to it that they quickly returned to
the true course. But other Republics, which are not organized as she (Rome) was,
and who wage war only when necessity constrains them to, cannot defend
themselves from such inconvenience, but rather always run into them; and
disorders will always arise when that virtuous but neglected Citizen is
vindictive, and has reputation and adherents in that City. And if the City of
Rome was defended from this (evil) for a time, and ((after she had overcome
Carthage and Antioch, as was said elsewhere)) no longer fearing war, she seemed
to be able to commit (the conduct of) the armies to whoever wanted it, not
regarding virtu as much as the other qualities which would obtain for him the
good will of the people. For it is seen that Paulus Emilius was refused the
Consulship many times, nor was he made Consul until the Macedonian war had
sprung up, which being thought perilous, (the command of the army) was committed
to him by the consent of all the City.
Many wars having occurred in our City of Florence after (the year) one
thousand four hundred ninety four (1494), and the Florentine Citizens all having
given bad proof (of their ability), by chance there was found in the City one
who showed in what manner the army should be commanded; this was Antonio
Giacomini: and as long as they had dangerous wars to wage, all the ambition of
her citizens ceased, and he had no one as competition in the choice as
Commissary and Head of the armies: but when a war was to be waged where there
was no doubt (of the outcome), and where there were to be only honors and rank
(obtained), many competitors were to be found; so that having to select three
Commissaries to besiege Pisa, he (Antonio) was left out. And although the evil
that should ensue to the public for not having sent Antonio was not evident,
none the less a conjecture of it could be made most easily; for the Pisans not
having provisions with which to defend themselves, would have been in such
straits that they quickly would have given themselves up to the
discretion of the Florentines, if Antonio had not been there (in command).
But being besieged by Heads who did not know either how to press them or force
them, they were so long delayed, that the City of Florence purchased it (Pisa).
Such an indignity might well have had an effect on Antonio and it was necessary
that he should have been good and very patient not to have desired to avenge
himself either by the ruin of the City ((he being able to)) or by the injury of
some particular citizen. From which a Republic ought to guard itself, as will be
discussed in the ensuing chapter.
THAT ONE WHO HAS BEEN OFFENDED OUGHT NOT TO BE PLACED IN ANY ADMINISTRATION
AND GOVERNMENT OF IMPORTANCE
A Republic ought to take great care not to promote anyone to any important
administration who has been done a notable injury by someone. Claudius Nero
((who had left the army which he had confronting Hannibal, and with a part of it
went into the Marca to meet the other Consul in order to combat Hasdrubal before
he could join up with Hannibal)) found himself in Spain in front of Hasdrubal,
and having locked him with his army in a place where he had to fight Hasdrubal
at a disadvantage to himself, or to die of hunger; but he was so astutely
detained by Hasdrubal with certain proposals of an accord, that he escaped and
took away his (Nero's) opportunity of crushing him. Which thing being known in
Rome, the Senate and the People became greatly saddened, and he was discussed in
shame throughout the entire City, not without great dishonor and indignity to
him. But after having been made Consul and sent to encounter Hannibal, he took
the above mentioned proceeding, which was most dangerous: so that all Rome
remained troubled and in doubt until there came the news of the rout of
Hasdrubal. And Claudius, afterwards being asked what the reason was why he had
taken so dangerous a proceeding, in which without any extreme necessity he had
almost gambled away the liberty of Rome, he answered that he had done so because
he knew that if it succeeded, he would reacquire that glory that he had lost in
Spain; and if he did not succeed, and their proceeding had had a contrary
ending, he knew he would be avenged against that City and those Citizens who had
so ungratefully and indiscreetly offended him. And if these passions could so
exist in a Roman Citizen, and in those times when Rome was yet incorrupt, one
ought to think how much they could exist in a Citizen of a City that was not
like she was. And as similar disorders which arise in Republics cannot be given
a certain (adequate) remedy, if follows that it is impossible to establish a
perpetual Republic, because in a thousand unforeseen ways its ruin may be
caused.
NOTHING IS MORE WORTHY OF A CAPTAIN THAN TO PENETRATE THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ENEMY
Epaminondas the Theban said nothing was more necessary and more useful for a
Captain, than to know the decisions and proceedings of the enemy. And as such
knowledge is difficult (to obtain), so much more praise does he merit who acts
in a way that he conjectures it. And it is not so difficult to learn the designs
of the enemy as it is sometimes difficult to understand his actions, and not as
much his actions that he does at a distance, as those he does at the moment and
near by. For it has happened many times that ((the battle having lasted until
nightfall)) he who had won believed he had lost, and he who had lost believed he
had won. Such an error had made men decide things contrary to the welfare of the
one who made the decision; as happened to Brutus and Cassius, who by such an
error lost the war, for Brutus having won on his wing, Cassius thought it had
lost, and that the whole army had been routed, and despairing of his safety
because of this error, killed himself. And in our times in the engagement which
Francis, King of France, made in Lombardy at Santa Cecilia against the Swiss,
night having fallen, that part of the Swiss who had not been broken believed
themselves to have won, not knowing that the others had been routed and killed:
which error caused them not to save themselves, for they awaited the morning to
fight at such a disadvantage to them, that they also made another error; and
this same error came near ruining the army of the Pope and of Spain, which, on
the false news of victory, crossed the Po, and, if it had advanced any further,
would have become prisoners of the French, who were victorious.
Such a similar error occurred in the camps of the Romans and those of the
Equeans, where Sempronius the Consul with his army having come to an encounter
with the enemy, and the battle having been enkindled, they fought all day until
night with varying fortunes for the one and the other: the one went with the
Consul, the other with one Tempanius, a Centurion, through whose virtu that day
the Roman army was not entirely routed. When morning had come, the Roman Consul
((without knowing anything more of the enemy)) withdrew himself toward Rome, and
the army of the Equeans did similarly; for each of these believed that the enemy
had won, and therefore each one retreated without regard to leaving their
encampment a prey (to the other). It happened that Tempanius, who was with the
rest of the army and also retreating, learned from certain wounded of the
Equeans that their Captains had departed and had abandoned their encampments;
whence he, on this news, returned to the Roman encampments, and saved them, and
afterwards sacked those of the Equeans, and returned to Rome victorious. Which
victory ((as is seen)) consisted only in which of them first learned of the
disorder of the enemy. Here it ought to be noted that it can often occur that
two armies confronting themselves, are in the same disorder, and suffering from
the same necessity; and he will become the victor who is the first to learn of
the necessity of the other.
I want to give a domestic and modern example of this. In the year one
thousand four hundred ninety eight (1498), when the Florentines had a big army
before Pisa and pressed that city strongly; the Venetians having undertaken its
protection and seeing no other way of saving her, decided to make a diversion
from that war by assaulting from another side the dominion of the Florentines,
and raising a powerful army, they entered it by was of the Val Di Lamona, and
occupied the Borgo Di Marradi, and besieged the Rock (Fort) of Castiglione,
which is on the top of the hill. The Florentines hearing of this, decided to
succor Marradi, without diminishing the force they had before Pisa: and raising
new infantry and organizing new cavalry forces, they sent them there, of which
the heads were Jacopo Quarto D'Appian, Lord of Piombino, and the Count Rinuccio
Da Marciano, When these forces were brought to the hill above Marradi, the enemy
(Venetians) withdrew from around Castiglione and retired into the Borgo: and
both of these armies having been facing each other for several days, both
suffered from (lack of) provision and every other necessary thing; and one not
daring to face the other, nor one knowing of the disorganization of the other,
both decided to raise their camp the following morning and withdraw, the
Venetians toward Berzighelli and Faenza, the Florentines toward Casaglia and the
Mugello. When morning came, therefore, and each of the camps had commenced to
send away its baggage, by chance a woman departed from the Borgo Da Marradi, and
came toward the Florentine camp, being secure because of her old age and
poverty, and desired to see certain of her people who were in the camp: from
whom the Captains of the Florentine forces learning that the Venetian camp was
departing, they were encouraged by this news, and changing their counsel, went
after them, as if they had dislodged the enemy; and wrote to Florence that they
had repulsed (the Venetians) and won the war. Which victory did not result from
anything else other than to have learned before the enemy that they were
departing, which news, if it had first gone to the other side, it would have had
the same result against us.
WHETHER OBSEQUIES ARE MORE NECESSARY THAN PUNISHMENT IN RULING A MULTITUDE
The Roman Republic was disturbed by the enmity between the Nobles and the
Plebs: none the less, when a war occurred (to them), they sent out Quintius and
Appius Claudius with the armies. Appius, because he was cruel and rude in
commanding, was ill obeyed by his soldiers, so that being almost overcome he
fled from his province. Quintius, because he was if a benign and humane
disposition, had his soldiers obedient to him, and brought back the victory.
Whence it appears that it is better to be humane than haughty, gentle than
cruel, when governing a multitude. None the less, Cornelius Tacitus ((with whom
many other writers are in agreement)) in one of his opinions concludes the
contrary, when he says: In governing the multitude Punishment is worth more
than Obsequies. And in considering if it is possible to reconcile both of
these opinions, I say that you have to rule men who ordinarily are colleagues,
or men who are always your subjects. If they are your colleagues, punishment
cannot entirely be used, nor that severity which Cornelius recommends: and as
the Roman Pleb had equal sovereignty with the Nobility in Rome, anyone who had
temporarily become a Prince could not manage them with cruelty and rudeness. And
many times it is seen that better results were achieved by the Roman Captains
who made themselves beloved by the armies, and who managed them with obsequies,
than those who made themselves extraordinarily feared, unless they were already
accompanied by an excessive virtu, as was Manlius Torquatus: But he who commands
subjects ((of whom Cornelius talks about)), ought to turn rather to punishment
than to gentleness, so that they should not become insolent and trample on you,
because of your too great easiness. But this also ought to be moderate so that
hatred is avoided, as making himself hated never returns good to a Prince. And
the way of avoiding (hatred) is to let the property of the subjects alone; as to
blood ((when one is not under the desire of rapine)), no Prince desires it
unless it is necessary, and this necessity rarely arises; when it is mixed with
rapine, it always arise, nor will there ever be reasons and the desire for
shedding it lacking, as has been discussed at length in another treatise on this
matter. Quintius, therefore, merits more praise than Appius; and the opinion of
Cornelius within his own limitations, and not in the cases observed by Appius,
merits to be approved. And as we have spoken of punishment and obsequies, it
does not appear to me superfluous to show that an example of humanity can
influence the Faliscians more than arms.
AN EXAMPLE OF HOW HUMANITY DID INFLUENCE THE FALISCIANS MORE THAN ALL THE
POWER OF ROME
When Camillus was with his army around the City of The Faliscians, and
besieging it, a (school) teacher of the more noble children of that City,
thinking to ingratiate himself with Camillus and the Roman people, under pretext
of exercising them, went with them outside the City and led them all to the camp
before Camillus, and presenting them to him said, that by means of them (the
children) that town would be given into his hands: Which offer was not only not
accepted by Camillus, but having had the teacher stripped and his hands bound
behind his back, put a rod into the hands of each of the children, made him be
beaten by them back to the town. When this was learned by those citizens, they
liked the humanity and integrity of Camillus so much, that they decided to give
up the town to him without wanting to defend themselves further. Whence it is to
be observed by this true example how some times an act of humanity and full of
charity can have more influence on the minds of men, than a ferocious and
violent act; and that many times that province and that City, which, with arms,
instruments of war, and every other human power, could not be conquered, was
conquered by an example of humanity, of mercy, of chastity, or of generosity. Of
which there are many other examples in the histories ((in addition to this)).
And it is seen that Roman arms could not drive Pyrrhus out of Italy, but the
generosity of Fabricus in making known to him the offer which his familiar
(servant) had made to the Romans of poisoning him, did drive him out. It is also
seen that the capture of New Carthage in Spain did not give Scipio Africanus so
much reputation, as that example of chastity gave him, of having restored the
young beautiful wife untarnished to her husband, the fame of which action made
all Spain friendly to him. It is also to be seen how much people desired this
virtu in great men, and how much it is praised by writers, and by the
biographers of Princes, and by those who describe how they should live. Among
whom Xenophon makes a great effort to show how many honors, how many victories,
how much fame came to Cyrus by his being humane and affable, and by his not
giving example of himself either of cruelty or haughtiness, or of luxuriousness,
or of any other vice which stains the lives of men. Yet, none the less, seeing
that Hannibal had acquired great victories and fame by contrary means, it
appears proper to me to discuss in the following chapter whence this happens.
WHENCE IT HAPPENED THAT HANNIBAL, WITH A DIFFERENT METHOD OF PROCEEDING THAN
SCIPIO, ACHIEVED THE SAME RESULT IN ITALY AS THE LATTER (DID IN SPAIN)
I think that some can marvel to see some Captains, not withstanding that they
have employed contrary methods, to have none the less achieved the same results
as those who have employed the methods described above; so that it appears the
cause for victories does not depend on the aforesaid reason, rather it appears
that those methods do not render you more powerful or more fortunate, as you are
able by contrary methods to acquire glory and reputation. And so that I do not
leave the above mentioned men, and to clarify more what I have wanted to show, I
say that it is seen that as soon as Scipio entered Spain, he quickly made
himself a friend of that province, and with that humanity and goodness of his,
was adored and admired by the People. The contrary is seen when Hannibal entered
Italy, and with every contrary method, that is, with violence, cruelty, rapine,
and every kind of perfidy, obtained the same result that Scipio did in Spain;
for all the Cities of Italy rebelled in favor of Hannibal, and all the people
followed him. And in considering why this should result, many reasons are seen.
The first is, that men are desirous of new things, which most of the times are
desired as much by those who are well off as by those who are badly off; for
((as had been said another time, and is true)) men get tired of the good, and
afflict themselves with the bad. This desire, therefore, opens the door to
anyone in a province, who is the head of an innovation; and if he is a foreigner
they run after him, if he is a provincial they surround him, favoring him and
increasing his influence. So that in whatever way he proceeds, he will succeed
in making great progress in those areas. In addition to this, men are pushed by
two main things, either by love or by fear; so that he who makes himself loved
commands as well as he who makes himself feared, although most of the times he
who makes himself feared, although most of the times he who makes himself feared
will be followed and obeyed (more readily) than he who makes himself loved. It
matters little, therefore, to any Captain by which of these ways he proceeds, as
long as he is a man of virtu, and that that virtu makes him reputed among men.
For when this is great, as it was with Hannibal and Scipio, it cancels all those
errors which are made either from making oneself loved too much or from making
oneself feared too much. For from both of these two methods great evils may
arise and apt to cause a Prince to be ruined. For he who desires too much to be
loved becomes condemned every little he departs from the true path: the other
who desires too much to be feared, becomes hated every little that he goes too
far in that manner. And holding to the middle path cannot be done, because our
nature does not permit this. But it is necessary to mitigate these extremes by
an excessive virtu, as did Hannibal and Scipio. None the less it is seen that
both of them were both hurt as well as exalted by this method of proceeding of
theirs.
The exaltation of these two has been mentioned. The harm concerning Scipio,
was that his soldiers in Spain rebelled with part of his friends, which resulted
from nothing else other than they did not fear him: for men are so restless that
with every little opening of the door to their ambitions, they quickly forget
all the love that they had for the Prince because of his humanity, as the
aforesaid soldiers and friends did; so that Scipio in order to remedy this evil
was constrained to employ some of that cruelty which he had avoided. As to
Hannibal, there is no particular example where his cruelty and perfidy caused
him to be harmed. But it can indeed he presumed that Naples and many other towns
which remained faithful to the Roman people, remained so because of fear of them
(his cruelty and perfidy). This much is seen, that that method of his of acting
unmercifully made him more odious to the Roman people than any other enemy which
that Republic ever had. So that while they informed Pyrrhus ((while he was with
the army in Italy)) of he who wanted to poison him, yet they never forgave
Hannibal ((though disarmed and a fugitive)), so much so that they caused him to
kill himself. This disaster happened to Hannibal, therefore, because of his
being held unmerciful, cruel, and a breaker of the faith; but, on the other
hand, he derived a great advantage from it, which is admired by all the writer,
that in his army ((even though composed of various races of men)) there never
arose any dissension, either among themselves, or against him. This could not
derive from anything else other than from that terror which arose from his
person, which was so great, and combined with that reputation which his virtu
gave him, that he kept his soldiers quiet and united.
I conclude, therefore, that it does not matter much in what way a Captain
proceeds, as long as there is in him such great virtu that it permits him to
succeed with either method: for ((as has been said)) there are dangers and
defects in both these methods, unless corrected by an extraordinary virtu. And
if Scipio and Hannibal, one by praiseworthy means, the other by detestable ones,
obtained the same results, it does not appear proper to me to omit the
discussion also of two Roman Citizens who acquired the same glory by different
methods, though both praiseworthy.
HOW THE HARSHNESS OF MANLIUS TORQUATUS AND THE HUMANITY OF VALERIUS CORVINUS
ACQUIRED THE SAME GLORY FOR EACH
There were in Rome at the same time two excellent Captains, Manlius Torquatus
and Valerius Corvinus, who, of equal virtu and of equal triumphs and glory, were
living in Rome; and each of them, as far as pertained to the enemy, acquired
them by equal virtu, but, as far as pertained to the armies and their treatment
of soldiers, they proceeded most differently; for Manlius commanded his with
every kind of severity, (subjecting them) without intermission to hard work and
punishment; Valerius, on the other hand, treated them with every kind and degree
of humanity, and full of affability. Thus it is seen that in order to obtain the
obedience of his soldiers, one put to death even his own son, and the other
never harmed anyone. None the less, in such difference of procedure, each reaped
the same fruit, both against the enemy and in favor of the Republic, as well as
in their own interests. For no soldier refused to fight, or rebelled against
them, or was in any way opposed to their will; although the commands of Manlius
were so harsh that all other decrees which exceeded the ordinary were called Manlian
Decrees. Here it is to be considered, first, whence it came that Manlius was
constrained to proceed so rigidly; next, whence it happened that Valerius was
able to proceed so humanely; another, what was the reason that these different
methods obtain the same result; and lastly, which of them is it better and more
useful to imitate.
If anyone well considers the nature of Manlius, from when T. Livius began to
make mention of him, he will see him a very strong man, gentle toward his father
and his country, and most respectful to his elders. These things we know from
the defense of his father against a Tribune, and from the slaying of that Gaul,
and how before he went to fight the Gaul he went to the Consul with these words:
I will never fight the enemy without your order, not even if certain victory
is in view. When a man thus constituted comes to the rank of command, he
desires to find all men like himself, and his strong spirit makes his commands
as strong, and these same ((once they are commanded)) he wants observed. And it
is a true ruler, that when harsh things are commanded, they must be made to be
observed with harshness, otherwise you will find yourself deceived. Here it is
to be noted that in wanting to be obeyed, it is necessary to know how to
command, and those who know how to command are those who make a comparison of
their strength with that of those who have to obey; and when they are seen to be
in proper proportion, then they command, when out of proper proportion, they
abstain. And, therefore, it was said by a prudent man, that to hold a Republic
by violence it must be necessary that there be a proper proportion between he
who forces and he who is forced. And anytime this proportion exists, it can be
believed that that violent (regime) will endure. But when the oppressed is
stronger than the oppressor, it can be feared that the violent (regime) should
cease any day.
But returning to our discussion, I say that to give vigorous orders, one must
be strong, and he who is of this strength and commands them, cannot then make
them to be observed by gentle means: But he who is not of this strength of mind
ought to guard himself from extraordinary decrees; but in the ordinary ones he
can use his humanity, for ordinary punishments are not imputed to a Prince, but
to laws and institutions. It ought therefore, to be believed that Manlius was
constrained to proceed so rigorously by the extraordinary decrees of his, to
which his nature inclined him, and which are useful in a Republic as it brings
her back to her ancient virtu. And if one Republic should be so fortunate as to
have often ((as we said above)) men who by their example restore the laws, and
not only retain those which should not incur her ruin, but carry her in the
opposite direction and perpetuate her existence. So that Manlius was one of
those who by the harshness of his decrees retained the military discipline in
Rome, constrained first by his nature, then by the desire he had for the
observance of those (orders) which his natural temperament had made ordinary for
him. On the other hand, Valerius was able to proceed humanely, as one to whom it
sufficed that those things be observed which customarily were observed in the
Roman armies. Which custom ((because it was good)) was enough to have him
honored, and was not hard to be observed, and did not necessitate Valerius
punishing the transgressors, as much because there weren't any, as also, if
there were any, they imputed ((as was said)) their punishment to the ordinances
and not to the cruelty of the Prince. So that Valerius was able to arouse in
himself every humaneness, from which he acquired the good will of his soldiers
and their contentment. Whence it happens that both obtaining the same obedience,
they were able to act differently and obtain the same results. Those who may
want to imitate these men can be exposed to those vices of contempt and hatred,
which as I have said above of Scipio and Hannibal, can be avoided by an
excessive virtu which is in you, and not otherwise.
It remains now to be considered which of these methods of proceeding is more
laudable, and this I believe is disputable, as writers praise both methods. None
the less, those who write about how a Prince has to govern approach more toward
Valerius than to Manlius, and Xenophon whom I have quoted before, in giving many
examples of the humaneness of Cyrus, greatly conforms to what T. Livius says of
Valerius. For when he was made Consul against the Samnites, and the day arriving
when he was to do battle, he spoke to his soldiers with that humanity with which
he governed them, and after relating this speech T. Livius says these words. No
other leader was so familiar with his soldiers, sharing all burdens cheerfully,
amongst even the lowest soldiers. In military exercises, he contested equally
with his men, in tests of speed, and whether he won or was defeated, it was the
same to him; nor did he ever object to any one who offered; in his actions he
was benign in all things; in speech, he was no less concerned with the liberty
of others, as of his own dignity; and in the arts of the magistrate, he acted as
if he was their petitioner ((even though not of the people)). T. Livius
similarly speaks honorably of Manlius, showing that the severity in putting his
son to death made the army so obey the Consul, that it was the cause of the
Roman people obtaining the victory over the Latins; and in fact he goes on to
praise him, that after such a victory, he describes all the orders of battle and
shows all the dangers to which the Roman people were exposed, and the
difficulties that were encountered in the winning, and makes this conclusion,
that only the virtu of Manlius gave the victory to the Romans: And making a
comparison of the strengths of both armies, he affirms that the portion which
had Manlius as Consul had gained the victory. So that considering everything
that the writers have said, it is difficult to judge. None the less, so as not
to leave this part undecided, I say, that in a citizen who lives under the laws
of a Republic, I believe the procedure of Manlius is more praiseworthy and less
dangerous, because this method is all in favor of the public, and does not
regard in any part private ambitions; for by such a method, partisans cannot be
acquired; showing himself harsh to everyone and loving only the common good, a
(commander) does not acquire particular friends ((as we said above)), such as we
call partisans, So that such methods of procedure cannot be more useful or of
more value in a Republic, as it does not lack usefulness to the public, and
there not being able to be any suspicion of private power. But in the method of
procedure of Valerius the contrary is the case; for although the same effects
are produced as far as the public is concerned, none the less, many
apprehensions spring up because of the particular (individual) good will which
he acquires with the soldiers having, in a long rule, had effects against
(public) liberty. And if these bad effects did not happen with (Valerius)
Publicola, the reason was that the minds of the Romans were not yet corrupt, and
he had not been long and continuously governing them.
But if we have to consider a Prince, as Xenophon considers it, we must come
near to Valerius in everything, and leave Manlius; for a Prince ought to seek
obedience and love in his soldiers and subjects. Obedience will obtain for him
their observance of the ordinances, and his being held a man of virtu: love will
give him that affability, humanity, mercy, and all those other qualities which
existed in Valerius, and which Xenophon writes also existed in Cyrus. For, a
Prince being individually greatly desired, and having the army as his partisan,
conforms with the other interests of the State. But in a citizen who has the
army as his partisan, this part does not conform to the other institutions,
which cause him to live under the laws and obey the Magistrates. Among the other
ancient history of the Venetian Republic, it is to be read that when the
Venetian galleys returned to Venice, a certain difference arose between the men
of the galleys and the people, whereupon it came to tumults and arms; and the
matter not being able to be quelled, either by the power of the ministers, or by
the respect for the (principal) citizens, or by fear of the Magistrates, but as
soon as a Gentleman who had been their captain the previous year appeared before
the sailors, because of their love for him, they departed and left the fight.
Which obedience excited the suspicions of the Senate so much, that soon
afterwards the Venetians assured themselves of him by imprisonment and putting
him to death.
I conclude, therefore, that the procedure of Valerius is useful in a Prince,
but pernicious in a citizen, not only towards the country, but towards himself:
to the country because these methods prepare the way for Tyranny: to himself,
because his city becoming suspicious of the method of his proceeding, is
constrained to assure itself with injury to him. And, on the other hand, I
affirm the procedure of Manlius to be harmful in a Prince, but useful in a
citizen and especially to the country; and although it rarely harms him, unless
this hatred which it engenders be made more severe by the suspicions which your
other virtues and great reputation inspire, as we will discuss below (speaking)
of Camillus.
FOR WHAT REASON CAMILLUS WAS DRIVEN OUT OF ROME
We have concluded above that proceeding as Valerius did is harmful to the
country and to oneself, and proceeding as Manlius did is beneficial to the
country, but sometimes harmful to oneself. This is very well proved by the
example of Camillus, who in his proceedings resembled Manlius rather than
Valerius. Whence T. Livius, speaking of him, says that He was hated by the
soldiers, but was admired for his virtues, what kept him admired was the
solicitude, the prudence, the greatness of mind, that good organization he
observed in the operation and the command of the armies. What made him admired
was his being more severe in castigating them than liberal in rewarding them.
And T. Livius cites these reasons for the hatred: the first, that the money
which was brought in from the goods of the Veienti which were sold, he applied
to the public (treasury) and did not divide it with the plunder: the other, that
in the triumph he had his triumphal carriage drawn by four white horses, where
they said that from pride he had wanted to rival the sun: the third, that he
made a vow to give Apollo the tenth part of the plunder from the Veienti, and
which ((wanting to satisfy the vow)) he had to take from the hands of the
soldiers who had already appropriated it.
Here those things can surely and easily be noted which make a Prince odious
to his people, the principal one of which is to deprive them of something useful
to them: which thing is of the greatest importance, because when a man is
deprived of those things which are useful in themselves, he never forgets it,
and every least necessity makes him remember; and because necessities happen
every day, they remind you of them every day. The other thing is to appear
haughty and presumptuous, which cannot be more odious to a people, and
especially to a free people. And although this pomp and pride may not give rise
to any inconvenience to them, none the less, it makes those who use them to be
hated. From which a Prince ought to guard against as from a rock; for to draw
hatred upon himself without profit to him, is entirely reckless and imprudent.
THE PROLONGATION OF (MILITARY) COMMANDS MADE ROME SLAVE
If the proceedings of the Roman Republic is considered well, two things will
be seen to have been the causes of the dissolution of that Republic: the one was
the contentions that arose from the Agrarian law, the other the prolongation of
the (military) Commands; if these matters had been well understood from the
beginning, and proper remedies taken she would have existed free longer, and
perhaps more tranquil. And although it is seen that the prolongation of Commands
never caused any tumult to arise, none the less facts show how much that
authority which the citizens took because of such decisions was harmful to the
City. And if the other citizens for whom the Magistracy was prolonged had been
wise and good, as was L. Quintius, this inconvenience would not have incurred.
His goodness is a notable example; for when the terms of an accord were
completed between the Plebs and the Senate, and the Plebs having prolonged the
Commands of the Tribunes for a year, because they judged it would help to enable
them to resist the ambitions of the Nobles, the Senate wanted, in competition
with the Plebs not to appear less (powerful) than they, to prolong the
Consulship of L. Quintius; but he completely negated this decision, saying that
they should seek to destroy the evil example not to increase their number with
other worse examples, and he desired they create new Consuls. If this goodness
and prudence had existed in all the Roman citizens, they would never have
allowed that custom of prolonging the Magistracies to be introduced, which in
time ruined that Republic.
The first to whom the Command was extended was P. Philo, who being at the
siege of the City of Paleopolis, and the end of his Consulship having arrived,
and as it appeared to the Senate that he had the victory in hand, they did not
send him a successor but made him Proconsul. So that he was the first Proconsul.
Which thing ((although it was moved by the Senate as being useful to the
public)) was what in time brought Rome to servitude. For the further away the
Romans sent their armies (from Rome), so much more did such prolongations appear
necessary, and the more they employed them. This caused two evils. The one, that
a smaller number of men were given experience in the Command (of armies), and,
because of this, reputation (authority) came to be restricted to a few: the
other, that a citizen being a command of an army for a long time, he gained it
over to himself and made it his partisan, for that army in time forgot the
Senate and recognized him as chief. Because of this Sulla and Marius were able
to find soldiers willing to follow them against the public good. Because of this
Caesar was able to seize the country. Thus, if the Romans had not prolonged the
Magistracies and Commands, although she would not have come to so great power,
and her conquests would have been slower, she would also have come to her
servitude more slowly.
OF THE POVERTY OF CINCINNATUS AND MANY ROMAN CITIZENS
We have argued elsewhere that the most useful thing which is established in a
republic is that its Citizens are to be kept poor. And although there did not
appear to be those ordinances in Rome which would have that effect ((the
Agrarian law especially having had so much opposition)) none the less, from
experience, it is seen that even after four hundred years after Rome had been
founded, there still existed a very great poverty; nor can it be believed that
any other great institution caused this effect than to observe that poverty did
not impede the way (to you) to any rank or honor, and that merit and virtu could
be found in any house they lived in. Which manner of living made riches less
desirable. This is manifestly seen when the Consul Minitius with his army was
besieged by the Equeans, Rome was full of apprehension that the army should be
lost, so that they had recourse to the creation of a Dictator, their last remedy
in times of affliction. And they created L. Quintius Cincinnatus (Dictator), who
was then to be found on his little farm, which he worked with his own hands.
Which event is celebrated in words of gold by T. Livius, saying, Let everyone
not listen to those who prefer riches to everything else in the world and who
think there is neither honor nor virtu where wealth does not flow.
Cincinnatus was working on his little farm, which did not exceed beyond four jugeri,
when the Legate came from Rome to announce to him his election to the
Dictatorship, and to show him in what peril the Roman Republic found itself. He
put on his toga, went to Rome and gathered an army, and went to liberate
Minitius; and having routed and despoiled the army, and freed that man (Minitius),
he did not want the besieged army to share in the booty, saying these words to
them: I do not want you to share in the booty of those to whom you had been
about to become prey; and he deprived Minitius of the Consulship, and made him
Legate, saying to him: You will remain in this grade until you have learned to
be Consul.
He (Cincinnatus) had made L. Tarquinius master of his cavalry, who because of
his poverty fought on foot. It is to be noted here ((as has been said)) the
honor which was given to poverty in Rome, and how to a good and valiant man, as
was Cincinnatus, four jugeri of land was enough to support him. Which
poverty was also seen (to be honored) in the times of Marcus Regulus, for when
he was in Africa with the armies, he asked permission of the Senate to be able
to return to look after his farm, which was being spoiled by his laborers. Here
two notable things are to be observed: one, how they were content to remain in
such poverty, and that it was enough for those citizens to obtain honors from
war, and to leave all the useful things to the public; for if they thought of
enriching themselves from the war, they would have given little concern to their
fields being spoiled. The other is to consider the generosity of spirit of those
citizens who, when placed in charge of an army, rose above every Prince through
the greatness of their souls; they not esteeming Kings or Republics, nor did
anything dismay or frighten them, and afterwards when they returned to private
life, they became frugal, humble, carers of their small facilities, obedient to
the Magistrates, reverent to their elders, so that it appears almost impossible
that the same mind should be able to bear such changes. This poverty lasted even
up to the times of Paulus Emilius, which were about the last of the happy times
of that Republic, when a citizen who had enriched Rome with his triumph, none
the less kept himself poor. And so much was this poverty still esteemed, that
Paulus in honoring those who conducted themselves well in the war, presented his
son-in-law with a silver cup, which was the first (piece of) silver that came
into his house.
And I could demonstrate with a long discussion how many better fruits are
produced by poverty than are by riches; and that the first has honored Cities,
Provinces, Sects, while the other has ruined them, — if this matter had not
been many times illustrated by other men.
HOW A STATE IS RUINED BECAUSE OF WOMEN
A difference arose in the City of Ardea between the Patricians and the
Plebians, because of a marriage contract, in which an heiress about to be
married, was asked for at the same time by a Plebeian and a Noble; and as she
did not have a father, her guardians wanted to unite her to the Plebeian, her
mother to the Noble: and such a tumult arose from this that they came to arms;
in which all the Nobility armed themselves in favor of the Noble, and all the
Plebeians in favor of the Plebeian. So that the Plebs being overcome, they went
out from Ardea and sent to the Volscians for aid, while the Nobles sent to Rome.
The Volscians arriving first, surrounded Ardea and besieged it. When the Romans
arrived, they shut in the Volscians between the town and themselves, so that
they constrained them ((being pressed by hunger)) to surrender themselves at
discretion. And when the Roman entered the City, they put to death all the heads
of the sedition, and restored order in that City. There are several things to
note in this text. First it is seen that Women have been the cause of many
ruinations, and have done great damage to those who govern a City, and have
caused many divisions in them: and ((as has been seen in our history)) the
excess committed against Lucretia deprived the Tarquins of their State; and the
other committed against Virginia deprived the Ten (Decemvirs) of their
authority. And Aristotle, among the first causes of the ruin of the Tyrants,
places the injury they committed on Women, either by seduction, by violence, or
corruption of marriages, as we have discussed this subject at length in the
Chapter in which we treated of Conspiracies.
I say, therefore, that absolute Princes and governors of Republics do not
have to take little account of this subject, but ought to consider the disorders
which may arise from such incidents, and remedy them in time that it does not
injure and disgrace their State or Republic; as happened to the Ardeans, who,
for allowing the rivalry to increase among their citizens, were led to become
divided among themselves, and wanting to reunite, had to send for outside
succor, which is a great beginning to a sure servitude. But let us come to
another notable way of reuniting a City, of which we will treat in the next
chapter.
HOW A DIVIDED CITY IS TO BE UNITED, AND HOW THAT OPINION IS NOT TRUE WHICH
SUPPOSES THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP A CITY DISUNITED IN ORDER TO HOLD IT
From the example of the Roman Consuls who reconciled together the Ardeans,
the method is to be noted of how a divided City ought to have its order
restored, which is none other than to kill the leaders of the tumults, and it is
not otherwise to be cured, and it is necessary to take one of three ways: either
to kill them as the Romans did, or to remove them from the City, or for them to
make peace together under an obligation not to offend each other again. Of these
three methods this last is the most harmful, less certain, and more useless; for
it is impossible where much blood has run or other similar injuries inflicted
that a peace made by force should endure; for seeing themselves together face to
face each day, it is difficult that they should abstain from injuring each
other, as new causes for quarrel can arise among themselves because of their
intercourse every day. A better example of this cannot be given than that of the
City of Pistoia.
Fifteen years before, that City was divided ((as it is now)) into the
Panciatichi and Cancellieri, but at that time they were under arms, and today
they have laid them down. And after many disputes among themselves they came to
bloodshed, to the razing of houses, at plundering possessions, and to every
other kind of enmity. And the Florentines who had to restore order to them,
always employed this third method, and always there arose serious tumults and
troubles: so that, becoming weary they came to employ the second method of
removing the Leaders of the parties, of whom some they imprisoned and others
they exiled to various places, in order that accord could exist, and has existed
to this day. But without doubt, the most secure would have been the first
method. But as this has need of power and courage, a weak Republic does not know
how to accomplish it, and they go so far afield, that the effort required
induces them to the second method.
And these are some of those errors, of which I spoke in the beginning, that
the Princes of our time make, who, when they have to judge serious matters,
ought to want to see how the ancients governed who had to judge in similar
cases. But the weakness of present day men, caused by their feeble education and
little knowledge of affairs, makes them regard the ancient judgments as partly
inhuman, partly impossible of application. And certainly their modem opinions
are very far from the truth, as those which the wise men of our City said at one
time, that is, That it was necessary to hold Pistoia by parties, and Pisa by
fortresses: and they do not see how useless are both of these methods. I
want to omit talking of fortresses, as we have talked of them above at length,
but I want to discuss the uselessness that results from the holding of towns by
having a divided government. First it is impossible for a Prince or a Republic
to maintain both old parties. For, by nature it is given to men to take sides in
any difference of opinion, and for them to prefer the one more than the other.
So that, having one party of the town discontented, the first occasion of war
will cause you to lose it, for it is impossible to guard a City that has enemies
outside and inside. If it is a government of a Republic, there is no better way
to make your citizens bad, and to make your City divided, than to have a
division of parties in the City; for each side seeks to obtain aid, and by
corruption of every king to make friends for themselves. So that two very great
evils arise. The one, that you do not make friends of them because you are not
able to govern well, often changing the government, now with one humor, now with
another. The other, that such favoring of parties of necessity keeps your
Republic divided. And Biondo (the historian) speaking of the Florentines and
Pistoians gives testimony when he says, While the Florentines were
endeavoring to reunite Pistoia, they divided themselves. The evils that
arise from such division, therefore, can easily be seen. In the year one
thousand five hundred and one (1501) when Arezzo was lost, and all the Val Di
Tevere and Val Di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and the Duke Valentino,
there came a Monsignor Di Lante sent by the King of France to cause a
restitution to be made of all the towns they had lost; and Lante finding in the
castles only men who, in visiting them, said they were of the party of Marzocco[1],
censured this division most severely, saying that, if in France any one of the
subjects should say he was of the King's party, he would be castigated, because
such a remark would signify nothing else other than there should be forces
hostile to the King in that town, and that the King wanted all the towns to be
friendly, united, and without parties. But all these methods and opinions that
differ from the truth, arise from the weakness of those who are the Lords, who,
seeing they are unable to hold the State by force and virtu, turn to similar
expedients, which some times in times of tranquillity may be of some benefit,
but with the advent of hard times, their fallacy is demonsrated.
THAT THE ACTIONS OF CITIZENS OUGHT TO BE OBSERVED, FOR MANY TIMES A
BEGINNING OF TYRANNY IS HIDDEN UNDER A PIOUS ACT
The City of Rome was afflicted by a famine, and as the public provisions were
not enough to end it, one Spurius Melius, who was very rich according to those
times, had the mind of privately making a provision of grain and feed the plebs
at his expense. For which thing a great assembly of people gave him their favor,
that the Senate thinking of the evil that could arise from that liberality of
his, and in order to suppress it before it should gather greater strength,
created a Dictator against him, who had him put to death. Here it is to be noted
that many times actions that appear merciful, and which cannot be reasonably
condemned, may become cruel, and very dangerous to a Republic if not corrected
at the proper time. And to discuss this matter in more detail, I say that a
Republic cannot exist without Citizens of repute, nor govern itself well in any
way. On the other hand, the reputation of such Citizens is the cause of tyranny
in Republics. And in order to regulate this thing, it (the Republic) needs to be
so organized, that the reputation of Citizens be based on the benefits it gives
to the City and not on any harm to it and its liberty. And, therefore, the
methods with which they assume reputation ought to be examined, and these, in
effect, are two, either public or private. The public methods are when one
acquires reputation by counselling well and acting well for the common benefit.
The way to such honors ought to be opened to every Citizen, and rewards proposed
for their good counsels and good works, so that they may obtain honors and be
satisfied: and when such reputation is obtained through these pure and simple
ways, it will never be dangerous: but when it is obtained through a private way
((which is the other method mentioned)) it is most dangerous and wholly harmful.
The private ways are by doing good to this and that private individual by
lending them money, marrying their daughters, defending them in front of
Magistrates, and doing them similar private favors, which make men partisans,
and give encouragement to whoever is thus favored to be able to corrupt the
public and break the laws. A well organized Republic ought, therefore, to open
the ways ((as has been said)) to whoever seeks favors through public means, and
close them to whoever seeks them through public means, as was seen that Rome
did; for as a reward to whoever acts well for the public she ordered triumphs
and all the other honors which she gave to its Citizens; and she ordered
accusations be brought against whoever, under various pretexts of theirs, by
private means sought to make themselves powerful: and when these did not suffice
because of the people being blinded by a species of false benefits, they ordered
(the creation of) a Dictator, who, (armed) with Regal power made those who had
gone astray to return within the fold, as she did in punishing Spurius Melius.
And if one of these is allowed impunity, it is apt to ruin a Republic, as, with
that as an example, it will be difficult to return later to the true path.
THAT THE FAULTS OF THE PEOPLE ARISE FROM THE PRINCES.
Princes should not complain of any fault that is committed by the People who
are under their authority, for such faults result either from their negligence
or because they are stained by similar faults. And whoever discusses those
people who in our time have been given to robberies and similar faults, will see
that these arise entirely from those who govern them, who were of a similar
nature. The Romagna, before those Lords who ruled her were crushed by Pope
Alexander VI, was an example of all the most criminal life, as here a great many
killings and robberies were seen to happen for any slight reason. Which resulted
from the wickedness of the Princes, and not from the wicked nature of men, as
was said. For those Princes being poor, but wanting to live as rich men, were
forced to turn themselves to many robberies and employ various methods in doing
them. And among the other dishonest means they employed, they made laws and
prohibited some activities, then they were the first who give cause for their
non-observance, and they never punished the non-observers except when they saw
there were many others guilty of the same, and then they turned to punishing
them, not from any zeal for the law which was enacted, but from the cupidity
(for money) expected from commuting the penalty. Whence many evils arose; and,
above all of them, that the people were impoverished without being corrected,
and those who were impoverished endeavored to make good (their losses) from
those less powerful. Whence all those evils sprung up that were mentioned above,
of which the Prince was the cause. And that this is true, T. Livius shows when
he narrates, how, when the Roman legates brought the gift of the booty of the
Veienti to Apollo, they were seized by the corsairs of Lipari in Sicily, and
carried to that land. And Timastheus, their Prince, learning what gift this was,
where it was going, and who was sending it, conducted himself ((although born in
Lipari)) as a Roman, and showed his people how impious it was to seize such a
gift. So that by general consent, he allowed the Legates to go with all their
things. And the words of the historians are these: Timasitheus implanted
religion in the multitude, who always imitate their rulers. And Lorenzo
De'Medici in confirmation of this opinion says:
And that which the Lord does, many then do,
Whose eyes are always turned on their Lord.
FOR A CITIZEN WHO WANTS TO DO SOME GOOD DEED IN HIS REPUBLIC ON HIS OWN
AUTHORITY, IT IS FIRST NECESSARY TO EXTINGUISH ENVY; AND HOW THE DEFENSE OF A
CITY OUGHT TO BE ORGANIZED ON THE COMING OF THE ENEMY
The Roman Senate learning that Tuscany had made new levies to come to attack
Rome, and that the Latins and the Hemicians, who had been in the past friends of
the Roman people, had allied themselves with the Volscians, the perpetual
enemies of Rome, judged that this war would be a dangerous one. And Camillus,
finding himself Tribune with consular power, thought he would be able to do
without creating a Dictator, if the other Tribunes, his colleagues, would yield
the supreme Command to him. Which the other Tribunes did voluntarily. Believing
((says Livius)) that this would not detract from their authority, conceded
that authority to him. Whence Camillus taking this consent at its word,
commanded that three armies should be raised. The first he wanted to Head and go
against the Tuscans: the second, of which he made Quintus Servilius Head, he
wanted kept near Rome to restrain the Latins and Hemicians if they should make a
move. The third, he placed Lucius Quintus at its Head, and was to serve to keep
the City guarded, (and) to defend the gates and the Curia (Senate) in any event
that might arise. In addition to this, he ordered that Horatius, one of his
colleagues, should provide arms and grain and all the other things requested in
times of war. He placed Cornelius, also a colleague of his, in charge of the
Senate and the public council, so that he should be able to counsel what actions
were to be taken and executed daily. Thus were the Tribunes in those times
disposed to command and obey where the safety of the country was involved. It is
to be noted from this test what a good and wise man does, and of what good he is
the cause, and how much usefulness he can accomplish for his country, when, by
his goodness and virtu, he has extinguished envy; this, many times, is the
reason that men are not able to act well, the said envy not permitting them to
have that authority which is necessary to have in important events.
This envy can be extinguished in two ways: either by some extraordinary and
difficult incident, where everyone seeing himself about to perish, lays aside
every ambition and runs voluntarily to obey him who he believes can, by his
virtu, liberate him; as happened to Camillus, who, having given many proofs (of
himself) of being a most excellent man, hand having been made Dictator three
times, and having always employed that rank for public usefulness and not for
his own advantage, had caused men not to fear his power; and as he was as
powerful as he was reputed to be, they did not esteem it a disgrace to be
inferior to him. And therefore Titus Livius wisely spoke those words, Believing
that this, etc. The other way of extinguishing envy is, when either by
violence or by natural orders, those men die who have been your rivals in
arriving at some reputation and power, and who on seeing you reputed more than
they, find it impossible ever to acquiesce and remain patient. And, if there are
men accustomed to live in a corrupt City, where education has not resulted in
any goodness in them, it is impossible that they should be restrained by any
accident: but so as to obtain their desires and satisfy their perversity of
mind, they would be content to see the ruin of their country. To overcome such
envy, there is no other remedy than the death of those who have it: and when
fortune is so propitious to that man of virtu as to make them die naturally, he
becomes glorious without trouble, and may then display his virtu without any
obstacle and without offense to anyone. But when he does not have such good
fortune, he must think of every way to cut them off beforehand, and before he
does anything he needs to overcome this difficulty. And whoever reads the Bible
attentively, will see Moses, in wanting that his laws and his orders be
observed, was forced to kill an infinite number of men who opposed his designs,
moved by nothing else other than envy. Brother Girolamo Savonarola recognized
this very well: Pietro Soderini, Gonfalonier of Florence also recognized it. The
one would not overcome it because he did not have the authority to be able to do
it, and this was the Brother; but because he was not well understood by those
who followed him, he did not have the authority. None the less, he did all he
could, and his preachings are full of accusations and invective against the wise
of the world, for he thus called the envious and those who opposed his
doctrines. The other (Soderini) believed that with time, with goodness, with his
good fortune, and by benefiting some, to be able to extinguish this envy; seeing
himself young and with so many new favors that his method of proceeding were
adding to him, he believed he could overcome the many who opposed him from envy,
without any trouble, violence, and tumult: but he did not know that time cannot
wait, goodness is not enough, fortune changes, and malignity does not find gifts
which placate it. So that both of these men were ruined, and their ruin was
caused by their not having known how or having been able to overcome this envy.
The other thing to be noted is the orders given by Camillus, both inside and
outside the City, for the safety of Rome. Truly and not without reason good
historians ((as is our T. Livius)) wrote distinctly and in detail of certain
cases, so that future people may learn how they have to defend themselves in
similar incidents. And it ought to be noted from this text that there is no more
dangerous or more useless defense than that which is done tumultuously and
without order. And this is shown by that third army which Camillus had raised to
have in Rome to guard that City; for many had judged and still would judge this
part to be superfluous, since that people were warlike and ordinarily armed, and
therefore it was not necessary to raise it as it was enough to have the citizens
armed when the need should arise. But Camillus, and whoever was as wise as he
was, judged otherwise; for he never permitted a multitude to take up arms except
with certain orders and in a certain way. And, therefore, based on this example,
one in charge of guarding a City ought to avoid as a dangerous rock the arming
of men tumultuously, but ought first to have enrolled and chosen those he wants
armed, and whom they must obey, where are the places of assembly, and where they
are to go; and to command those who are not enrolled to remain in their homes to
guard them. Those who follow these orders in a City under attack, are able
easily to defend themselves: those who do otherwise do not imitate Camillus, and
will not be able to defend themselves.
STRONG REPUBLICS AND EXCELLENT MEN RETAIN THE SAME COURAGE AND DIGNITY IN
ANY FORTUNE
Among the other admirable things that our historian has Camillus say in order
to show how an excellent man ought to be constituted, he puts these words in his
mouth: My Dictatorship neither gave me courage, nor did my exile diminish it.
By which words it is seen how great men are always the same in any fortune; and
if it should change, exalting him now, oppressing him then, he does not change
but always keeps his courage, and this is joined with his way of living so that
everyone easily knows that fortune does not have power over him. Weak men
conduct themselves otherwise; for becoming vain and inebriated by good fortune,
they attribute all the good that they obtained to that virtu which they will
never know: Whence it arises that they become unbearable and odious to all those
who are around them. And when there is a sudden change of fortune, as soon as
they come face to face with the cause, they come quickly into that other defect,
and become vile and abject. From which it happens that Princes thus constituted,
in adversity, think more of fleeing than of defending themselves, like those
who, for having ill used that good fortune, are unprepared for any defense
(against a reverse). This virtu and this vice which I say are found in an
individual, are also found in a Republic, and in example there are the Romans
and the Venetians.
No ill fortune ever made the Romans become abject, nor did good fortune ever
make them become insolent, as was manifestly seen after the defeat they
experienced at Cannae, and after the victory they obtained against Antiochus:
for this defeat, although it was most grave for having been the third one, never
made them cowardly, but sent out new armies: they did not want to go against
their institutions by ransoming their prisoners, nor did they send to Hannibal
or Carthage to seek peace: but keeping out all these abject thoughts, they
thought always of (continuing) the war, arming old men and slaves for want of
men. When this thing became known to Hanno, the Carthaginian, ((as was said
above)) he pointed out to that Senate how little account they (the Romans) took
of the defeat at Cannae. And thus it is seen that times of difficulty did not
dismay them or render them humble. On the other hand, prosperous times did not
make them insolent; for when Antiochus, before they had come to the battle with
them, and in which he had been defeated, sent ambassadors to Scipio seeking an
accord, (and) Scipio gave him certain conditions for peace, which were that he
should retire inside Syria, and leave the rest (of the country) to the control
of the Romans: Which accord Antiochus refused, and coming to battle, and losing
it, he again sent ambassadors to Scipio with the commission that they should
accept all those conditions which were given them by the victor: to whom he
(Scipio) did not propose other terms than those which he had offered before he
he had won, adding these words: The Romans do not lose their courage when
defeated, nor become insolent when they win.
The opposite of this was seen to be done by the Venetians, who, in good
fortune ((which they seemed to think they gained by that virtu which they did
not have)), had come to such insolence that they called the King of France a son
of Saint Mark, they did not respect the Church, nor recognize any other (power)
in Italy, and had presupposed in their minds the creation of an empire similar
to the Roman one. Afterwards, when good fortune abandoned them, and they
suffered a partial defeat at Vaila at the hands of the King of France, they not
only lost all their State by rebellion, but, through cowardice and abjection of
spirit, gave a good part (of their territory) to both the Pope and the King of
Spain, and were so demoralized that they sent ambassadors and made themselves
tributary to him, and wrote letters full of humility and submission to the Pope
in order to move him to compassion. To which infelicity they came in four days,
and after only a partial defeat; for their army, after having fought, in the
retreat about half of it was attacked and beaten, so that only one of the
Proveditori who saved himself, arrived in Verona with more than twenty five
thousand soldiers, both horse and foot. So that if there had been any kind of
virtu in Venice and in their institutions, they could easily have reorganized
and shown a new face to their fortune, and would have been in time either to
have won or lost more gloriously, or to have obtained a more honorable accord.
But the baseness of their spirit, caused by the bad quality of their military
organization, made them lose at a single blow their courage and their State. And
thus it will always happen to whoever is governed as they were; for this
becoming insolent in good fortune, and abject in bad, arises from your mode of
procedure and from the education in which you are raised, which, when they are
weak and vain makes you likewise, but when it has been otherwise, makes you also
otherwise; it will make you know the world better, less joyful in good fortune,
and less depressed in bad (fortune). And that which is said of an individual, is
said also of the many who live in a Republic, and who will perfect themselves
according to the manner in which they live there.
And although at another time it has been said that the foundation of all
States is a good military organization, and that where this does not exist there
cannot be any good laws or any other good thing, it does not appear superfluous
to me to repeat it; for the necessity of this is seen to appear at every point
in the reading of this history; and it is seen that the military organization
cannot be good unless it is disciplined, and that it cannot be done unless it is
composed of your subjects. For a State is not always at war, or can be:
therefore it must be able to train troops in times of peace, and this cannot be
done with others except subjects on account of the expense. Camillus had gone
out with the army ((as we said above)) against the Tuscans, and his soldiers,
having seen the size of the enemy army, were all dismayed, as they deemed
themselves inferior and unable to sustain their (enemy's) attack. And this bad
disposition of the troops coming to the ears of Camillus, he showed himself
outside, and going about the camp, he spoke to this soldier and that one, and
then without making any change in arrangements, he said: What every man has
learned and is accustomed to do, let him do it. And whoever considers these
circumstances well, and the words he said to reanimate them to go against the
enemy, will realize that he could neither say nor do any of those things to the
army, unless it had first been organized and trained both in peace and in war.
For a Captain cannot trust those soldiers who have not learned to do anything or
believe that they will do anything well. And if a new Hannibal were to command
them, he yet would be ruined; for a Captain ((while the engagement is going on))
cannot be in every place, and unless he has first disciplined them to have the
same spirit as himself, and trained them well in his method of proceeding, of
necessity it must happen that he be ruined. If, therefore, a City would be armed
and organized as Rome, and its citizens every day both privately and publicly
are required to make a test of their virtu and the power of fortune, it will
always happen that they will maintain the same courage and dignity as the Romans
under similar conditions. But if they are disarmed and rely only on the vagaries
of fortune, and not on their own virtu, they will change with changes of
fortune, and will give of themselves the same example as the Venetians had
given.
WHAT MEANS SOME HAVE HAD TO DISTURB A PEACE
Circea and Velitrae, two of her (Roman) colonies, having rebelled from the
Roman people, under the hope of being defended by the Latins, and the Latins
afterwards having been defeated, they were deprived of that hope, many citizens
counselled that Ambassadors be sent to Rome to submit themselves to the Senate;
which proceeding was disturbed by those who had been the authors of the
rebellion, who feared that all the punishment would fall on their heads. And to
take away all discussion of peace, they incited the multitude to arm themselves
and make incursions into the confines of Rome. And truly, if anyone sees a
People or a Prince abandon all idea of an accord, there is no other more sure or
more effective way, than to make them commit some grave wickedness against those
with whom you do not want the accord made. For the fear of that punishment which
seems to them to be merited because of the error they committed will always keep
them apart. After the first war that the Carthaginians fought with the Romans,
those soldiers who had been employed by the Carthaginians in that war in Sicily
and Sardinia, as soon as peace was made, went to Africa; where, not being
satisfied with their stipend, turned their arms against the Carthaginians, and
creating two chiefs for themselves, Mathus and Spendius, they occupied many
towns of the Carthaginians, and sacked many of them. The Carthaginians, in order
to try every other means than battle, sent their citizen Hasdrubal as an
ambassador to them, thinking he should have some influence with them as he had
been their Captain in the past. And when he arrived, Mathus and Spendius wanting
to oblige all those soldiers never to have peace again with the Carthaginians
and therefore to oblige them to make war, persuaded them it was better to kill
him together with all the other Carthaginians who were their prisoners.
Whereupon they not only killed them, but first tore them to pieces with a
thousand torments, adding to this wickedness and edict that all Carthaginians
who might be taken in the future, should be killed in similar fashion. Which
decision and execution made that contest against the Carthaginians cruel and
obstinate.
IN WANTING TO WIN AN ENGAGEMENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE ARMY HAVE
CONFIDENCE BOTH IN THEMSELVES AND IN THEIR CAPTAIN
In wanting an army to win an engagement, it is necessary to make it confident
so that it believes it ought to win in any circumstance. The things that make it
confident are, that it be well armed and organized, and each man should know the
other. Nor can this confidence or discipline result unless those soldiers are
natives and live together. It is necessary also that the Captain be esteemed in
a way that they have confidence in his prudence, and will always consider him so
when they see him orderly, watchful, and courageous, and maintains the majesty
of his rank by a good reputation: and he will always maintain it when he
punishes their errors, does not fatigue then in vain, observes his promises to
them, and shows them that the path to victory is easy, and conceals and makes
light of those dangers which he is able to discern from afar. Which things well
observed are good reasons why the army becomes confident, and being confident,
wins. The Romans used to make their armies assume this confidence by way of
Religion, whence it happened that they created Consuls, levied troops, sent out
the armies, and came to the engagement, by the use of auguries and auspices: and
without doing these things a good and wise Captain would never hazard any
action, thinking he could easily lose it if his soldiers should not first have
learned that the Gods were on their side. And if any Consul or other Captain had
fought contrary to the auspices, they would have punished him as they punished
Claudius Pulcher. And although this part is observed in all Roman histories,
none the less it is most certainly proved by the words Livius put in the mouth
of Appius Claudius, who, complaining to the people of the insolence of the
Tribunes of the plebs, points out how, by their means, the auspices and other
things pertinent to Religion were corrupted, says thusly: It pleases them now
to deride religion; Do they not care if the fowl are fed, or if they come out of
their cages slowly? These things are small; but small things are not to be
condemned. By them our ancestors made this Republic great. For in these
little things is the strength to hold the soldiers united and confident, which
are the principal causes of every victory. None the less it is necessary that
these things be accompanied by virtu, otherwise they are of no value.
The Praenestines, having taken the field against the Roman army, they went to
encamp on the river Allia, the place where the Romans had been overcome by the
Gauls. They did this in order to put confidence in their soldiers, and to
frighten the Romans because of the fortune of the place. And although this
proceeding of theirs was probable for those reasons that have been discovered
above, none the less the way the event turned out showed that true virtu does
not fear every least incident. The historian expresses this well with the words
placed in the mouth of the Dictator, who speaks thusly to his Master of the
horse: You see the enemy, trusting to fortune, placed on the Allia; and you,
trusting to arms and valor, attack the center of their battle line. For a
real virtu, a good organization, a sureness derived from so many victories,
cannot be extinguished in a moment; nor does a vain thing make them fear, or a
disorder injure them; as is certainly seen where the two Consuls Manlius, when
they were going against the Volscians, foolishly sent part of their camp to
pillage the country, it happened that at the same time, both those who had gone
out and those who remained found themselves besieged; from which danger, it was
not the prudence of the Consuls, but the virtu of the soldiers themselves which
freed them. Whence Titus Livius says these words: The soldiers, even without
a leader, were saved by their own virtu. I do not want to omit an expedient
employed by Fabius, when he first entered into Tuscany with his army in order to
make them confident, as he judged such confidence more necessary in leading them
into a new country and against new enemies, he addressed his soldiers before the
battle, and after giving them many reasons through which they could hope for
victory, he said he could also tell them other good things which would make
their victory certain, except that it would be dangerous to reveal them. This
method so wisely used, also merits to be imitated.
WHAT FAME OR VOICE OR OPINION WHICH A PEOPLE MAKE BEGINS TO FAVOR A CITIZEN;
AND WHETHER THEY DISTRIBUTE THE MAGISTRACIES WITH GREATER PRUDENCE THAN A PRINCE
At another time we have spoken of how Titus Manlius, who was afterwards
called Torquatus, saved L. Manlius, his father, from an accusation that had been
made against him by Marcus Pomponius, Tribune of the Plebs. And although the
manner of saving him was somewhat violent and extraordinary, none the less, that
filial piety toward the father was so agreeable to the general public, that not
only was he not censured, but when they had to create Tribunes of the legions,
T. Manlius was named to the second place. This success, I believe, should make
the manner to be considered well, in which the people have to judge men in their
distribution of offices, and because of this we see whether what had been
concluded above is true, that the people are better distributors of offices than
a Prince. I say, therefore, that the people in their distribution are guided by
what is said of one by the public voice and fame, even if by his noted deeds he
appears different; or by the preconceptions or opinion which are had of him.
Which two things are caused either by the fathers of such men who had been great
and valiant men in the City and so it was believed that the sons ought to be
like them, until the contrary is found out by their deeds; or by the opinion
that the speaker holds. The better means that can be employed is to have as
companions serious men, of good habits, and reputed wise by everyone. And
because no better index can be had of a man than the companion with whom he
keeps company, and meritedly one who keeps company with honest companions
acquires a good name, for it is impossible that he does not have some similitude
with them. Or truly this public fame is acquired by some extraordinary and
notable act, even though it may be a private matter, which has turned out
honorably. And of all these three things, which in the beginning give a good
reputation to one, none gives it best than this last; for the first is based on
relatives and fathers, and is so fallacious, that it comes to men so slowly and
in a little while is consumed if the individual virtu of that man who is to be
judged does not accompany him. The second, which makes you known by way of your
practices, is better then the first, but is much inferior to the third; for
until some sign arising from you is seen, your reputation is founded on opinion,
which is most easy to stamp out. But that third, being begun and founded on your
actions, gives you such a name in the beginning that it will be necessary that
you many times do contrary deeds if you want to destroy it. Men who are born in
a Republic ought, therefore, to adopt this last course and endeavor to begin to
elevate themselves by some extraordinary action.
This is what many of the young men did in Rome, either by promulgating a law
that served some common usefulness, or by accusing some prominent citizen as a
transgressor of the laws, or by doing some similar new and notable things for
which he is talked about. Not only are such things necessary in order to begin
to give oneself reputation, but they are also necessary to maintain and increase
it. And to want to do this, it is necessary to repeat them, as Titus Manlius did
in his entire lifetime; for, having defended his father so extraordinarily and
with so much virtu, and because of this act acquired this original reputation,
and after a few years he fought that Gaul and, killing him, took from his that
chain of gold which gave him the name of Torquatus. This was not enough for him,
for afterwards when he was already of mature age, he killed his own son for
having fought without permission, even though he had defeated the enemy. Which
three acts gave him fame at that time, and will make him more celebrated for all
the centuries to come, than all the victories and all the triumphs with which he
was honored, as much as any other Roman, gave him. And the reason is, that in
that victory Manlius had very many rivals, but in these particular acts he did
not have any or only a very few. The elder Scipio did not gain as much glory
with all his triumphs as was given him by his having defended his father on the
Ticino while a youth, and be having, after the defeat at Cannae, animatedly with
bloody sword made many young Romans swear that they would not abandon their
country, as they had already decided; which two acts were the beginning of his
reputation, and made for him the ladder for the triumphs of Spain and Africa.
Which opinion was also increased by him when, in Spain, he sent back a daughter
to her father and a wife to her husband. Such conduct is necessary not only for
those Citizens who want to acquire fame in order to obtain honors in their
Republic, but is also necessary for Princes to enable them to maintain their
reputation in their Principality; for nothing makes itself so esteemed as his
giving some example of some rare deed or saying concerning the common good,
which show the lord to be magnanimous, liberal, or just, and which is such that
it becomes as a proverb among his subjects, But to return whence we begun this
discussion, I say, that when the people begin to bestow a rank upon one of its
Citizens, if founded on those three reasons mentioned above, it is not badly
founded: but when, however, the many examples of his good conduct make him more
noted, it is better founded; for in such a case they are almost never deceived.
I speak only of those ranks that are given to men in the beginning, and before
they are known from firm experience, and before they pass from one act to
another dissimilar one. Here, both as to false opinion and corruption, the
people always make smaller errors that do Princes. Although it could happen that
the people might be deceived by the fame, opinions, and acts of a man, esteeming
them greater than, in truth, they are; which does not happen to a Prince, for he
would be told and advised of it by those who counsel him; for although the
people do not lack these counsels, yet the good organizers of Republic have
arranged that, when appointments have to be made to the highest offices of the
City, where it would be dangerous to place inadequate men, and where it is seen
that the popular will is directed toward naming some that might be inadequate,
it be allowed to every citizen, and it should be imputed to his glory, to make
public in the assemblies to defects of that one (named for public office), so
that the people ((lacking knowledge of him)) can better judge. And that such was
the custom in Rome is witnessed by the speech of Fabius Maximus which he made to
the people in the second Punic war, when in the creation of consuls their favors
turned to the creation of T. Otacilius: and Fabius judging him inadequate to
govern in the Consulship in those times, spoke against him and turned the favor
of the people to one who merited it more than he. The people, therefore, in the
election of Magistrates judge according to the best evidence that they can
obtain, and err less than Princes: and the Citizen who desires to begin to
obtain the favor of the people ought to gain it for himself ((as T. Manlius
did)) by some notable deed.
WHAT DANGERS OCCUR IN MAKING ONESELF HEAD IN COUNSELLING A THING, AND HOW
MUCH THE DANGER INCREASES WHEN IT IS AN EXTRAORDINARY THING
It would be too lengthy and important a matter to discuss here what a
dangerous thing it is to make oneself Head of a new thing which relates to many
people, and how difficult it is to direct and achieve it, and having achieved it
to maintain it: reserving it to a more convenient place, therefore, I will speak
only of those dangers that Citizens are exposed to in counselling a Prince to
make himself head of a grave and important decision in such a manner that the
entire counsel given him is imputed to him. For as men judge a matter by its
result, all the evil that may result is imputed to the author of the counsel,
but if the result is good he is commended, but the reward does not
counterbalance by far the punishment. The present Sultan Selim, called the Grand
Turk, having prepared himself ((according to what was reported by some who came
from his country)) to make an enterprise against Syria and Egypt, was advised by
one of his Pashas whom he had stationed at the borders of Persia, to go against
the Sofi (Shah): motivated by this counsel, he went on that enterprise with a
very large army, and having arrived in that very large country where there are
great deserts and rivers are rare, and finding those same difficulties that had
already caused the ruin of many Roman armies, was so overwhelmed by them that
((even though he had been superior in the war)) he lost a great part of his
forces by famine and pestilence. So that angered against the author of the
counsel, he killed him. You will read of many Citizens having been advisors (in
favor) of an enterprise, and because that resulted badly, they were sent into
exile. Some Roman Citizens advised that in creating Chiefs, that Plebs should be
made Consuls in Rome. It happened that the first who went in the field with an
army was defeated, whence harm would have come to those counsellors if that
party, in whose honor that particular decision had been made, had not been so
powerful. It is a most certain thing, therefore, that those who counsel a
Republic and those who counsel a Prince, are placed between these two hazards;
that if they do not counsel the things which appear to them useful either to the
Prince or to the City (Republic) without regard (to the consequences to
themselves), they fail in their office: if they do counsel it, they do so at the
peril of their lives and their States; for all men are blind in these things,
and are accustomed to judge the good or evil of a counsel by its result.
And in thinking of how they may be able to avoid this infamy or danger, no
other way is seen than to take things moderately, and not to undertake any as
one's own enterprise, and to give an opinion without passion, and without
passion to defend it modestly: so that if the Princes or the City follows it,
they do so voluntarily and does not appear as though they were drawn into it by
your importunity. When you act thusly, it is not reasonable that a Prince or a
People will wish you ill because of your counsel, as it was not followed against
the wishes of the many. For here the danger arises when it is contradicted by
many, who then, when the result is unhappy, come "together in causing your
ruin. And, if in such a case that glory is lacking which is acquired in being
alone against the many in counselling a thing which chances to have good ending,
yet there are two benefits which result: The first, danger is avoided: The
second, that if you counsel a thing modestly, and because of contradiction your
counsel is not taken, but ruin results from the counsel of others, you will
obtain a very great glory. And although you cannot enjoy the glory that is
acquired from the misfortune that happens to your City or your Prince, none the
less it is to be held of some account.
I do not believe other advice can be given to men in this case, for in
counselling them to remain silent and not speak their opinion, would be a
useless thing to the Republic or to their Princes, and they would not avoid
danger as in a little while they would become suspect: and it could happen to
them as to those friends of Perseus, King of the Macedonians, who, when he was
defeated by Paulus Emilius, having fled with a few friends, it happened that, in
discussing the past events, one of them begun to tell Perseus of the many errors
committed by him which had been the cause of his ruin; to which Perseus, turning
to him, said: Traitor, you have waited to tell me this until now when I no
longer have a remedy; and upon these words he killed him with his own hands: and
thus this man suffered the punishment for having been silent when he should have
spoken, and to have spoken when he should have been silent, and he did not avoid
the danger by not having given his counsel. I believe, therefore, that the
course mentioned above is the one to be held and observed.
THE REASON WHY THE GAULS HAVE BEEN, AND STILL ARE, JUDGED AT THE BEGINNING
OF A BATTLE TO BE MORE THAN MEN, AND AFTERWARDS LESS THAN WOMEN
The boldness of that Gaul who defied any Roman at the river Arno to combat
(singly) with him, and the subsequent fight he had with T. Manlius, makes me
remember what T. Livius often says, that the Gauls at the beginning of a fight
are more than men, and in the course of the fight they turn out then to be less
than women. And in thinking whence this arises, it is believed by many that it
is because of their nature, and which I believe it true: but it is not because
of this that this nature of theirs which makes them ferocious in the beginning,
cannot be so disciplined that they might maintain that ferocity until the end.
And in wanting to prove this I say that there are three kinds of armies: the
one, where there is ardor and discipline, for from discipline there arises ardor
and virtu, like that of the Romans: For it is seen in all histories that there
was discipline in those armies, such military discipline had prevailed for a
long time: for in a well-ordered army no one ought to perform any action except
by regulation: and therefore it will be found that in the Roman army ((which
having conquered the world, all other armies ought to take as an example)) no
one ate, slept, traded, or did any other military or domestic act, without an
order from the Consul. For those armies which do otherwise are not truly armies,
and if they sometimes give some proof of it, they do this by their ardor and
impulse, not because of virtu. But where virtu is disciplined, it employs its
ardor with moderation and at the right time; and no difficulty debases it, or
makes it lose courage, because good order renews this courage and ardor,
nourished by the hope of victory, which is never missing while discipline is
preserved. The contrary happens in those armies where there is ardor but no
discipline; as were the Gauls, who were completely lacking in this while
combatting, for if they did not succeed in winning with the first onset, in
which they hoped, and not being sustained by a well regulated virtu, and not
having anything outside of their fury in which to confide, they failed when that
(first ardor) cooled. The Romans were the opposite; they were less apprehensive
of danger because of their good discipline, were not mistrusting of victory,
fought with the same courage and virtu at the end as at the beginning (of a
battle), the heat of battle actually inflaming them. The third kind of armies is
where there is no natural ardor or chance discipline; as are our Italian armies
of our time, which are all useless, and unless they fall upon an army that by
some accident is fleeing, they never win. And without citing other examples, it
is seen every day that they give proof of not having any virtu. And as everyone
knows from the testimony of T. Livius how good military organizations are
created and how bad ones are made, I want to cite the words of Papirius Cursor
when he wanted to punish Fabius, his Master of cavalry, when he said: Let no
one have fear of men or Gods; but let them observe neither the Imperial edicts
nor the auspices: let the soldiers, without provisions, roam in packs when going
in the territory of the enemy; forgetting their oaths, from which they absolve
themselves as they wish; let them desert their ensigns in large numbers, nor
follow the edicts for assembling: let them indiscriminately fight by day and by
night, in favorable and unfavorable positions, with or without the orders of the
Commanders; and let them observe neither the ensigns nor discipline, blind and
confused like robbers -than being like a sacred and solemn army.
From this text, therefore, it can be easily seen whether the military of our
times are blind and confused, or sacred and solemn, and how much they lack in
being like that which can be called military, and how far they are from being
arduous and disciplined like the Romans, or furious only as the Gauls.
WHETHER SKIRMISHES BEFORE AN ENGAGEMENT ARE NECESSARY, AND HOW TO RECOGNIZE
A NEW ENEMY IF THEY ARE AVOIDED
It appears that in the actions of men ((as we discussed at other times))
there is found, in addition to the other difficulties when it is desired to
conclude something successfully, that good is always accompanied by some evil,
which so easily arises with that good, that it appears impossible to do without
the one when desiring the other; and this is seen in all the things that men do.
And, therefore, good is acquired with difficulty, unless you are aided by
fortune in a way that she, with her power, overcomes the ordinary and natural
difficulties.
The combat between Manlius Torquatus and the Gaul makes me remember this, of
which Titus Livius says: So much influence did the momentous outcome of that
fight have on the whole war, that the army of the Gauls, having precipituously
retreated from their camps, fled across the Tiber, and then into the fields of
Campania. For, on the one hand I consider that a good Captain ought to avoid
entirely doing anything of little importance which can have a bad effect on his
army; for to begin a battle where he cannot employ all his strength and where he
risks his entire fortune, is a completely foolhardy thing, as I said above when
I condemned the guarding of passes. On the other hand. I consider that a wise
Captain, when he comes to encounter a new enemy which has reputation, finds it
necessary before coming to an engagement for his soldiers to probe such enemies
by skirmishes, so that they begin to know him and how to handle him and lose any
terror which their fame and reputation may have given them. And this part (of
his duties) in a Captain is most important, for he feels almost a necessity in
himself which constrains him to do it, as it appears to him he would be going to
a certain defeat unless by these light experiences he first removes that terror
which the reputation of the enemy may have placed in their hearts. When Valerius
Corvinus was sent by the Romans with the armies against the Samnites, who were
new enemies, and in the past had never had a test of arms against each other, he
made the Romans engage the Samnites in some skirmishes, where as Titus Livius
says: Neither a new war or a new enemy should make them fear. None the
less, there is a very great danger that if your soldiers are defeated in those
slight battles, their fear and apprehension will increase, and that the opposite
effects will ensue from what you designed, that is, you may have discouraged
them where you had planned to reassure them. So that this is one of those things
which has evil so near the good, and are so joined together, that it is an easy
thing to adopt one (course) believing to have taken the other.
Upon this I say, that a good Captain ought to see to it with all diligence,
that nothing springs up which, by some accident, can discourage his army. And
that which can begin to discourage is to begin to lose, and, therefore, he
should guard against small combats and not permit them unless he can engage in
them with the greatest advantages and certain hope of victory: he ought not to
engage in guarding passes where he cannot employ all his army: he ought not to
engage in guarding towns except those which, if lost, would of necessity cause
his own ruin, and in those that he does guard so organize himself that if faced
with the possibility of siege, he can with the guards and the army employ all
his strength, and ought to leave the other places undefended: For whenever
something is lost which is abandoned but the army remains intact, he neither
loses reputation in the war nor the hope of winning it. But when something is
lost which you had planned to defend, and everyone believed you would defend it,
then there is damage as well as defeat, and you have almost, like the Gauls,
lost the war through a matter of little moment. Philip of Macedonia, father of
Perseus, a military man and of great renown in his times, having been assaulted
by the Romans, abandoned and laid waste many of his territories which he judged
he could not defend; for in his prudence he judged it would be more pernicious
to lose his reputation by not being able to defend that which he set himself to
defend, than by leaving it a prey to the enemy lose it as something neglected
(and of no value). The Romans, after the defeat at Cannae, when their affairs
were afflicted, refused aid to many of their allies and subjects, advising them
to defend themselves as best they could. Which proceedings are much better than
to undertake their defense and then not defending them: for in such a proceeding
both friends and strength are lost, while in the other they lose only friends.
But to return to skirmishes, I say, that even if the Captain is constrained
to engage in some because of the newness of the enemy, he ought to do so only
with so much advantage on his side that there is no danger of losing; or
certainly do as did Marius ((which is the better proceeding)) when going against
the Cimbrians, a most ferocious people who came to plunder Italy; and their
coming spread fear because of their numbers and ferocity and because of having
already overcome one Roman army; and Marius judged it necessary, before coming
to battle, to do something by which his army might lose that terror which fear
of the enemy may have given them; and as a most prudent Captain, he placed his
army several times in positions whence the Cimbri with their army should have to
pass. And thus, he wanted his soldiers, from within the strongholds of his camp,
to see and accustom their eyes to the sight of that enemy, so that seeing a
disorganized multitude, encumbered with impediments, partly armed with useless
weapons and partly without arms, they would be reassured and become desirous of
the battle. Which proceeding, as it was wisely taken by Marius, so also should
it be diligently imitated by others, so as not to incur those dangers which I
have mentioned above, and not to have to do as the Gauls: who in fear
from some small thing, retreated to the lands behind the Tiber and into Campania.
And as we have cited Valerius Corvinus in this discourse, I want ((through the
medium of his words)) in the following chapter to show how a Captain ought to be
constituted.
HOW A CAPTAIN OUGHT TO BE CONSTITUTED, IN WHOM IN ARMY CAN CONFIDE
Valerius Corvinus ((as I have mentioned above)) was sent with his army
against the Samnites, new enemies of the Roman people, whence, in order to
reassure his soldiers and to make them recognize the enemy, had them engage in
some skirmishes; nor was this enough for him, as he wanted to speak to them
before the engagement; and with great efficacy he showed them how little they
should esteem such enemies, recalling to them the virtu of his soldiers and his
own. Here it can be noted, from the words which Livius makes him say, how a
Captain ought to be constituted in whom an army has to confide: Which words are
these: Think of him under whose lead and auspices you are going to fight:
whether he you are hearing is only a magnificent exhorter, ferocious only in
words, or expert in military matters, and himself a thrower of weapons, to lead
before the ensigns, and to combat in the thickest of the fight. Follow my
actions, I do not want to say to you soldiers my words, and not only my orders,
but the example of him who by his right arm has fought for the consulship and
the highest glory. Which words, well considered, teach anyone how he ought
to proceed in wanting to hold the rank of Captain: and he who acts otherwise
will find in time that rank ((to which he may have been led by ambition or
fortune)) to have been taken away and not have given him reputation; for titles
do not honor men, but men titles. It ought also to be considered from the
beginning of this discourse, that, if great" Captains have employed
extraordinary means to firm up the courage of a veteran army, how much more he
has to use that industry with those unaccustomed to face the enemy in a new army
that has never seen the enemy face to face. For if an unaccustomed enemy creates
terror in an old army, how much more ought any enemy create it in a new army.
Yet all these difficulties have many times been seen to have been overcome by
the prudent acts of a good Captain; as were Gracchus, the Roman, and Epaminondas,
the Theban, of whom we have spoken another time, who with new armies overcame
the veteran and best disciplined armies. The methods they employed were to
exercise their troops in sham battles for several months, accustom them to
obedience and order, and afterwards with maximum confidence lead them into the
real battle. Any military man, therefore, ought not to despair of being able to
create a good army as long as he does not lack men; for that Prince who abounds
in men but lacks soldiers, ought not to complain of the baseness of men, but
only of his indolence and little prudence.
THAT A CAPTAIN OUGHT TO BE ONE HAVING A KNOWLEDGE OF SITES
Among the other things that are necessary to a Captain of armies is the
knowledge of sites (localities) in the countries, for without this general and
particular knowledge, a Captain of armies cannot do anything well. And although
wanting to possess successfully every science requires practice, yet this one
requires more than others. This practice, or rather this particular knowledge,
is acquired more by means of the chase, than by any other exercise. For the
ancient writers say that those Heroes who governed the world in their time, were
brought up in forests and in the chase: for, in addition to this knowledge, the
chase teaches infinite things that are necessary in war. And Xenophon, in his
life of Cyrus, shows that, when Cyrus was going to assault the King of Armenia,
in dividing the army (among the commanders) recalled to his men that this was
nothing more than one of those chases which they had many times made with him.
And he recalled to those whom he sent in ambush in the mountains, that they were
very similar to those who went to rouse the game from their den, so that they
would drive them into the nets. This is said to show how the chase, according to
its proof by Xenophon, is an image of a war. And because of this such exercise
is honorable and necessary to great men. This knowledge of countries cannot be
learned in any other convenient manner than by way of the chase, for the chase
makes those who indulge in it to know in detail the character of the country
where the army is. And when one has become familiar with a region afterwards he
easily knows the character of all new countries, for every country and every
part of them have together some conformity, so that the knowledge of one
facilitates the knowledge of others. But he who has not experienced one, with
difficulty or never learns (of another country) except after a long time. And
whoever has had that experience will in a glance know how the plain lies, how
that mountain rises, where that valley leads to, and all other such things of
which in the past he has made a firm study.
And that this is true Titus Livius shows us with the example of Publius
Decius, who was Tribune of the Soldiers in the army which the Consul Cornelius
led against the Samnites, and the Consul having come to a valley where the army
of the Romans could be closed in by the Samnites, and (Publius Decius) seeing it
in so great danger, said to the Consul: Do you see that point above the
enemy, Aulus Cornelius? That strong point is our hope and our safety, if we ((as
the Samnites blindly have left it)) seize it quickly. And before these words
were spoken by Decius, T. Livius says: Publius Decius, the Tribune of the
army, had observed a hill immediately above the camp of the enemy, difficult to
get on (by an army) with its impediments, but expeditiously by light armed
(soldiers). Whence being sent by the Consul to take it with three thousand
soldiers, he saved the Roman army; and designing with the coming of night to
depart and save his soldiers as well as himself, (T. Livius) has him say these
words: Come with me, and while daylight remains, let us explore where the
enemy strong points are placed, and how we can exit from here. And lest the
enemy about should note him from among his soldiers, he changed his clothing.
He who considers all this text, therefore, will see how useful and necessary it
is for a Captain to know the nature of countries; for if Decius had not known
and recognized them, he could not have judged how useful the taking of that hill
was to the Roman army, nor would he have been able to recognize from a distance
if that hill was accessible or not, and having then brought himself to it, and
having the enemy around him, he would not have been able from a distance to
reconnoiter the path of his departure, nor the places guarded by the enemy. So
that of necessity it behooved Decius to have such perfect knowledge (of the
country) which enabled him, by the taking of that hill, to save the Roman army,
and afterwards ((being besieged)) knowing how to find the way to save himself
and those who he had with him.
THAT TO USE DECEIT IN THE MANAGING OF A WAR IS A GLORIOUS THING
Although to use deceit in every action is detestable, none the less in the
managing of a war it is a laudable and glorious thing; and that man is equally
lauded who overcomes the enemy by deceit, as is he who overcomes them by force.
And this is seen by the judgment which those men make who write biographies of
great men, and who praise Hannibal and others who have been very notable in such
ways of proceeding. Of which so many examples have been cited that I will not
repeat any. I mention only this, that I do intend that that deceit is glorious
which makes you break your trust and treaties that you made; for although it
sometimes acquires a State and a Kingdom for you, as has been discussed above,
will never acquire them for you gloriously. But I speak of that deceit which is
employed against that enemy who distrusts you, and in which properly consists
the managing of a war; as was that of Hannibal when he feigned flight on the
lake of Perugia in order to close in the Consul and the Roman army; and when to
escape from the hands of Fabius Maximus he fired (the fagots on) the horns of
his cattle. A similar deceit was also employed by Pontius, the Captain of the
Samnites, in order to close in the Roman army within the Caudine forks, who,
having placed his army behind a mountain, sent some of his soldiers under the
dress of shepherds with a large herd upon the plain; who, being taken by the
Romans and asked where the army of the Samnites was, all agreed according to the
orders given by Pontius to say that it was at the siege of Nocera. Which was
believed by the Consuls, and caused them to be enclosed within the defiles (of
Claudium), where (having entered) they were quickly besieged by the Samnites.
And this victory obtained by deceit would have been most glorious to Pontius, if
he had followed the counsels of his father, who wanted the Romans either to be
liberally set free, or all put to death, and would not take the middle way: Never
make a friend or remove an enemy. Which way was always pernicious in the
affairs of a State, as has been discussed above in another place.
THAT ONE'S COUNTRY OUGHT TO BE DEFENDED, WHETHER WITH IGNOMINY OR WITH
GLORY, BUT IT CAN BE DEFENDED IN WHATEVER MANNER
The Consul and the Roman army ((as mentioned above)) were besieged by the
Samnites, who had proposed the most ignominious conditions to the Romans, which
were to put them under the yoke, and to send them back to Rome disarmed; the
Consuls were astonished and the entire army was in despair because of this; but
L. Lentulus, the Roman legate said, that it did not appear he should avoid any
procedure in order to save the country, for as the life of Rome depended on the
life of that army, it appeared to him it should be saved in whatever way, and
that the country is well defended in whatever way it is defended, either with
ignominy or with glory; for by saving that army, Rome would in time wipe out
that ignominy; but by not saving it, even though they should die most
gloriously, Rome and its liberty would be lost. Which thing merits to be noted
and observed by any citizen who finds himself counselling his country; for where
the entire safety of the country is to be decided, there ought not to exist any
consideration of what is just or unjust, nor what is merciful or cruel, nor what
is praiseworthy or ignominious; rather, ahead of every other consideration, that
proceeding ought to be followed which will save the life of the country and
maintain its liberty. Which counsel is imitated by the words and deeds of the
French in defending the majesty of their King and the power of the Kingdom, for
they listen to no voice more impatiently than that which says: Such a proceeding
is ignominious to the King; for they say that their King cannot suffer disgrace
in any of his decisions either in good or adverse fortune, because, whether he
wins or loses, they all say it is a matter that only concerns the King.
THAT PROMISES MADE BY FORCE OUGHT NOT TO BE OBSERVED
When the Consuls returned to Rome with the disarmed army and the ignominies
received, the first who said that the peace made at Claudium (the Caudine Forks)
ought not to be observed was the Consul Sp. Posthumius; he said that the Roman
people were under no obligation, but only he and the others who had promised the
peace were obligated: and, therefore, if the People wanted to free themselves
from every obligation, they had only to give him and the others who had promised
it as prisoners into the hands of the Samnites. And he held this conclusion with
such obstinacy that the Senate agreed to it, and sent him and the others as
prisoners to Samnium, protesting to the Samnites that the peace was of no value.
And so favorable was fortune to Posthumius in this case, that the Samnites did
not keep him, and when he returned to Rome, Posthumius was received by the
Romans more gloriously for having lost, than was Pontius by the Samnites for
having won. Here two things are to be noted: the one, that glory can be acquired
in any action; for it is ordinarily acquired in victory and in defeat it is
acquired either by showing that this defeat was not due to your fault, or by
quickly doing some act of virtu which counteracts it: the other, that it is not
a disgrace not to observe those promises which were made by force: and always
forced promises regarding public affairs, will be disregarded when that force is
removed, and he who disregards them is without shame. Many examples of this are
to be read in all histories. And, not only are forced promises not observed
among Princes when that force is removed, but also other promises are not
observed when the causes for making those promises are removed. Whether this is
praiseworthy or not, and whether or not a Prince ought to observe them in a
similar manner, has been discussed at length by use in the treatise on the
Prince: therefore we will be silent for the present.
THAT MEN BORN IN A PROVINCE OBSERVE FOR ALL TIME ALMOST THE SAME NATURES
Prudent men usually say ((and not by chance or without merit)) that whoever
wants to see what is to be, considers what has been; for all the things of the
world in every time have had the very resemblance as those of ancient times.
This arises because they are done by men who have been, and will always have,
the same passions, and of necessity they must result in the same effects. It is
true that men in their actions are more virtuous in this province than in
another, according to the nature of the education by which those people have
formed their way of living. It also facilitates the knowledge of future events
from the past, to observe a nation hold their same customs for a long time,
being either continuously avaricious, or continuously fraudulent, or have any
other similar vice or virtu. And whoever reads of past events of our City of
Florence, and takes in consideration also those which have occurred in recent
times, will find the French and German people full of avarice, haughtiness,
ferocity, and infidelity, because all of these result in things at different
times; which have greatly harmed our City. And as to bad faith, everyone knows
how many times money was given to King Charles VIII on his promise to restore to
them the fortresses of Pisa, but he never restored them: in which the King
showed the bad faith and great avarice of his. But let us come to more recent
events. Everyone may have heard of what ensued in the war which the Florentine
people carried on against the Visconti, Dukes of Milan, and how Florence,
deprived of other expedients, decided to call the Emperor into Italy, who, with
his reputation and strength, would assault Lombardy. The Emperor promised to
come with a large force, and to undertake the war against the Visconti, and to
defend Florence against their power if the Florentines would give him a hundred
thousand ducats when starting, and a hundred thousand more when they would enter
Italy. The Florentines consented to these terms, and paid them the first moneys,
and later the second, but when he arrived at Verona, he turned back without
doing anything, alleging as a reason for leaving, that they had not observed the
conventions that existed between them.
So that, if Florence had not been constrained by necessity or carried away by
passion, and having studied and known the ancient customs of the barbarians, she
would not have been deceived by them on this and other occasions; for they (the
Gauls) have always been the same and conducted themselves on every occasion and
towards everyone, as is seen they did in ancient times to the Tuscans; who,
having been hard pressed by the Romans, having been routed and put to flight by
them many many times, and seeing that they could not by their own forces be able
to resist the assaults (of the Romans), came together with the Gauls who lived
in Italy on this side of the Alps, to give them a sum of money, for which they
should be obliged to join their armies with theirs (Tuscans), and go against the
Romans. Whence it happened that the Gauls, having taken the money, did not then
want to take up arms for them, saying that they had received it, not for making
war against the enemy, but for abstaining from plundering the Tuscan country.
And thus the Tuscan people were, because of the avarice and bad faith of the
Gauls, suddenly deprived of their money and the aid they had hoped to obtain
from them. So that it is seen from the example of the ancient Tuscans and from
that of the Florentines, that the Gauls (and French) have employed the same
means; and from this, it can be easily conjectured how much Princes can have
confidence in them.
IMPETUOSITY AND AUDACITY MANY TIMES CAN OBTAIN THAT WHICH, WITH ORDINARY
MEANS, CAN NEVER BE OBTAINED
The Samnites being assaulted by the Roman army, and being unable to stay
abreast of the Romans in the field, decided, ((having placed guards in the town
of Samnium)) to pass with all their army into Tuscany, during a time of truce
with the Romans, to see whether, by such a passage and the presence of their
army, they could induce the Tuscans to take up arms again, which they had
refused to their Ambassadors. And in the talks which the Samnites had with the
Tuscans ((especially in showing them the reason which induced them to take up
arms)) they used a notable term, where they said: They had rebelled, for peace
was more of a burden to slaves than war is to free men. And thus, partly by
persuasion, parly by the presence of their army, they induced them to take up
arms. Here it is to be noted that when a Prince desires to obtain something from
another, he ought not ((if the occasion permits him)) to give him time to
deliberate, but to act so as to make the other see the necessity for quick
decision, who, when it is demanded of him, will see that to refuse or delay it,
a sudden and dangerous indignation may arise.
This method has been seen to be well employed in our times by Pope Julian
against the French, and by Monsignor De Foix, Captain of the King of France
against the Marquis of Mantua; for Pope Julius, wanting to drive the Bentivogli
from Bologna, and judging therefore to have need of the French forces and for
the Venetians to remain neutral, and having sought the one and the other and
obtaining dubious and various replies, decided that, by not giving them time, to
make both come to terms with him; and departing from Rome with as much of a
force as he could gather, went toward Bologna, and sent to tell the Venetians to
remain neutral and to the King of France to send his forces to him. So that, as
they were both pressed by the short space of time and seeing that an open
indignation would arise in the Pope if they were refused or delayed, they
yielded to his desires, and the King sent him aid and the Venetians remained
neutral. The Monsignor De Foix was still with his army at Bologna, and having
learned of the rebellion at Brescia, and wanting to go to recover it, had two
paths (available): the one, long and tedious, through the dominion of the King,
and the other, short, through the dominion of that Marquis; but he had to enter
there over certain dikes between the swamps and the lakes of which that region
is full, and which are closed and guarded by him by fortresses and other means.
Whence that De Foix decided to go by the shorter route and to overcome every
difficulty, and not give the Marquis time to decide, he at once moved his forces
by that road, and signified to the Marquis to send him the keys to (the fortress
which guarded) that pass. So that the Marquis, occupied by this quick decision,
sent him the keys, which he would never have sent if De Foix had conducted
himself more lukewarmly; for the Marquis, being in league with the Pope and the
Venetians, and having one of his sons in the hands of the Pope, had reasons
which could have given him an honest excuse to refuse them to him. But assaulted
by the quick proceeding ((for the reasons given above)) he yielded them. The
Tuscans also acted likewise toward the Samnites, being forced by the presence of
the army of the Samnites to take up those arms which they had refused to take up
at other times.
WHAT IS THE BETTER PROCEEDING IN BATTLE, EITHER TO SUSTAIN THE FIRST SHOCK
OF THE ENEMY, AND HAVING SUSTAINED IT, HURL THEM BACK, OR RATHER TO ASSAULT HIM
FIRST WITH FURY
The Roman Consuls, Decius and Fabius, were with their two armies at the
encounter with the armies of the Samnites and Tuscans, and both coming to battle
on the same day, it is to be noted which of the two different methods of
proceeding adopted by the two Consuls was better. Decius assaulted the enemy
with all his strength and all impetuosity: Fabius only sustained (his attack),
judging a slow assault to be more useful, reserving his fury for the last when
the enemy should have lost his first ardor for combat, and ((as we said before))
his vehemence. Here it is seen that the success resulting from the plan of
Fabius turned out much better than that of Decius, who, weary from the first
shocks and seeing his band disposed rather to flee than otherwise, to acquire
that glory by death which he was unable to gain by victory, in imitation of his
father, sacrificed himself for the Roman legions. When this was heard by Fabius,
so as not to acquire less honor by living than his colleague had acquired by
dying, he rushed to the front all those forces which he had reserved for such a
necessity, whence it gained him a most happy victory. From this it is seen that
the method of proceeding of Fabius is more certain and worthy of imitation.
WHENCE IT HAPPENS THAT A FAMILY IN A CITY FOR A TIME, HAVE THE SAME CUSTOMS
It appears that one City not only has certain ways and institutions different
from another, and produces men who are either more harsh or effeminate, but
within one City such differences are seen between one family and another. This
is proved in every City, and many examples are seen in the City of Rome; for
there are seen that the Manlii were hard and obstinate, the Publicoli benign and
lovers of the people, the Appii ambitious and enemies of the plebs, and thusly
many other families, each having its own qualities apart from the others. This
cannot only result from blood ((for it must be that it changes from the
diversity of marriages)) but must result from the different education that one
family has from another. For it is very important that a young man of tender
years begins to hear the good and bad of a thing, as it must of necessity make
an impression on him, and from that afterwards regulate the method of proceeding
all the rest of his life. And if this were not so it would be impossible that
all the Appii should have had the same desires, and should have been stirred by
the same passions, as Titus Livius has observed in many of them, and
(especially) in that last one who was made Censor; and when his colleague at the
end of eighteen months ((as the law called for)) laid down the magistracy,
Appius did not want to lay down his, saying he could hold it five years
according to the original laws ordained by the Censors. And although many public
meetings were held on this question, and many tumults were generated, yet no
remedy was ever found to depose him (from the office which he held) against the
wishes of the people and the greater part of the Senate. And whoever reads the
oration he made against P. Sempronius, the Tribune of the plebs, wfll note all
the insolence of Appius, and all the good will and humanity shown by infinite
Citizens in obeying the laws and auspices of their country.
THAT FOR THE LOVE OF HIS COUNTRY, A GOOD CITIZEN OUGHT TO FORGET PRIVATE
INJURIES
Manlius, the Consul, was with his army against the Samnites when he was
wounded in a battle, and as this was bringing danger to his forces, the Senate
judged it necessary to send Papirus Cursor as Dictator to supply the place of
the Consul. But as it was necessary that the Dictator should be named by Fabius,
who was then with the armies in Tuscany, and being apprehensive that as he was
hostile he would not want to name him, the Senators sent two Ambassadors to
entreat him that he lay aside his personal hatred and name him for the public
benefit: which Fabius did, moved by his concern for the Country, although he
showed by his silence and in many other ways that this nomination was pressed on
him; for which, all those who seek to be regarded as good citizens ought to take
an example.
WHEN A GOOD ERROR IS SEEN TO BE MADE BY THE ENEMY, IT OUGHT TO BE BELIEVED
THAT IT IS DONE UNDER DECEIT
Fulvius, having been left as Legate in the army that the Romans had in
Tuscany, while the Consul had gone to Rome for some ceremonies, the Tuscans to
see if they could trap him, placed an ambush near the Roman camp; and they sent
some soldiers dressed as shepherds with a large flock, and had them come in the
sight of the Roman army, and thus dressed approached the entrenchments of the
camp: whence the legate wondering at this presumption of theirs, and as it did
not appear reasonable, took means to discover the deceit, and thus defeated the
designs of the Tuscans. Here it can be conveniently noted that a Captain of
armies ought not to trust in an error which he sees done by the enemy, as it
always is done under deception, for it is unreasonable that men are so
incautious. But often, the desire for victory blinds the minds of men who do not
see anything else other then that which favors them. After the Gauls had
overcome the Romans on the Allia, they came to Rome, and finding the gates open
and unguarded, remained all that day and night without entering in fear of a
deception, unable to believe that there should be so much baseness and so little
counsel in the hearts of the Romans that they should abandon their country. When
the Florentines in the year one thousand five hundred eight (1508) went to
besiege Pisa. Alfonso Del Mutolo, a Pisan citizen, was (found to be) a prisoner
of the Florentines, and promised that if they should free him, he would deliver
a gate of Pisa to the Florentine army. He was set free. Afterward, to carry out
the promise, he often came to talk with those sent by the commissioners, but
never came concealed, but openly and accompanied by Pisans, whom he left to one
side when he talked with the Florentines. Hence his duplicity could have been
conjectured, for it was not reasonable that he should treat the proceeding so
openly if he had been acting faithfully. But the desire they had to obtain Pisa
so blinded the Florentines that, being led through his arrangement to the gate
at Lucca, where, by the double treachery of the said Alfonso, they lost many of
their Leaders and other forces in a dishonorable manner.
A REPUBLIC WANTING TO MAINTAIN ITSELF FREE HAS SOME NEED OF NEW PRECAUTIONS,
AND IT WAS BY SUCH METHODS THAT Q. FABIUS WAS CALLED MAXIMUS
Of necessity ((as we mentioned other times)) it happens that in a great City
incidents arise every day which have need of a doctor, and according as they are
more important, a wiser doctor must be found. And if such strange and unforeseen
incidents ever arose in such a City, they arose in Rome; as was that where it
seemed that all the Roman women had conspired against their husbands to kill
them, so that many were found who had (actually) poisoned them, and many who had
prepared the poison to poison them; and as also was the conspiracy of the
Bacchanals which was discovered at the time of the Macedonian war, where many
thousands of men and women were implicated; and if it had not been discovered,
it would have been dangerous for that City, and if the Romans had not been
accustomed to punish the great number of guilty men. For, if the greatness of
this Republic and its power of execution had not been seen from infinite other
signs, it is seen from the kind of penalty imposed on those who erred. It did
not hesitate through a judicial decision to put to death an entire legion at one
time, or (to destroy) an entire City, and to exile eight or ten thousand men
with such extraordinary conditions as could be observed, not by one man alone,
but by many; as happened to those soldiers who fought unhappily at Cannae, who
it exiled in Sicily, and imposing on them that they not live in towns and should
eat standing. But the most terrible of all other executions was the decimation
of the army, where by lot, one out of ten in the army was put to death. Nor in
punishing a multitude could a more frightening punishment than this be found,
for when a multitude errs, and where the author is not certain, everyone cannot
be punished because they are too many: to punish a part and leave a part
unpunished, would be wrong to those who would be punished, and the unpunished
would have a mind to en another time. But to put to death part by lot when all
merited it, those who are to be punished will complain of their lot, those who
are not punished fear that another time the lot might fall to them, and will
guard themselves from error. The Poisoners and the Bacchanals, therefore, were
punished according as their crimes merited.
And although these maladies in a Republic have a bad effect, they are not
fatal, for there is always time to correct them; but there is no time for those
that affect the State, which, if they are not corrected by a prudent man, ruin
the City. Because of the liberality which the Romans showed in giving their
civil privileges to foreigners, many new people sprung up in Rome, and these
begun to have a part in the elections; so that the government began to change
and depart from those institutions and principles of those men who had been
accustomed to direct it. When Quintus Fabius, who was Censor, became aware of
this, he put all the new people, from whom this disorder derived, into four
Tribes, so that they should be unable ((reduced to such small a space)) to
corrupt all Rome. This was well recognized by Fabius, and put into effect a
suitable remedy, which without change, was so well accepted by the Society
(Republic), that he merited being called Maximus.
1. Marzocco is the name Florentines gave
a marble lion (attributed to Donatello) with the coat of arms, at the gate of
the Palazzo Vecchio; hence, the party supporting the government was called the
party of Marzocco.
copyright Mike Abrams, PhD
Courtesy of
Michael Abrams, Ph.D
courtesy of
Michael Abrams, ph.d.
order the
new personality text by Albert Ellis